How to Chin 1 TRAN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 6 STEVEN C. JACOBS, CASE NO. A-10-6276917 DEPT. NO. XI Plaintiff, 8 VS. Transcript of Proceedings 9 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., SANDS 10 CHINA LTD., SHELDON G. 11 ADELSON, 12 Defendants. 13 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DEFENDANT SANDS CHINA LTD'S MOTION TO STAY COURT'S MARCH 6, 14 2015 DECISION AND ORDER AND TO CONTINUE THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON JURISDICTION SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 20, 2015; 15 DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS 16 FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 2015 17 **APPEARANCES:** 18 For the Plaintiff: JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ. 19 TODD L. BICE, ESQ. JORDAN T. SMITH, ESQ. 20 J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. For the Defendants: 21 J. RANDALL JONES, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ. 22 IAN P. MCGINN, ESQ. 23 RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, DISTRICT COURT 24 TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript 25 produced by transcription service.

FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 2015 AT 8:30 A.M.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. BICE: Good morning.

MR. JONES: Good morning.

MR. PEEK: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, it's your Motion.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, I would normally not file this kind of a motion until the writ was filed and because of the timing issues, we haven't been able to get the writ done because I know the Court likes to at least have an opportunity to look at the writ when it considers motions like this. So, we apologize for not being able to have that --

THE COURT: I'm not worried about it in this particular case, given the long history of the number of writs that have gone up. This one is not one that concerns me as much as most of them.

MR. JONES: With that said, Your Honor, I know the Court is familiar with the factors under *Hansen* about granting a stay and circumstances. Again, we're somewhat handicapped having not had the opportunity to show you the writ, but in terms of the factors, we looked at this, Your Honor, as a situation where obviously from a timing standpoint we had to file this now because the order is

going to take effect or require action by -- on the  $16^{
m th}$ .

With respect to the issues of the writ, essentially, Your Honor, it's our position that the *Viega* case does not contemplate a circumstance where the -- a party does not have the opportunity to present evidence in a jurisdictional hearing. So there's no precedent for this type of situation in the state of Nevada at this point in time and, therefore, we think this is an important issue that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: So can I ask you a question?

MR. JONES: Sure.

THE COURT: What do you believe the standard of proof is in the jurisdictional hearing that I've been directed to conduct by the Nevada Supreme Court in the writ that was issued on August  $26^{\rm th}$ , 2011 or so?

MR. JONES: I'm sorry the standard of?

THE COURT: Proof.

MR. JONES: The standard of proof for?

THE COURT: For plaintiffs to show.

MR. JONES: For the plaintiffs to show? Well, you know, Your Honor, I have to tell you that I've done this so many times that I should know this off the top of my head, but I don't want to misspeak as to what the standard is.

THE COURT: Here's what I think it is.

MR. JONES: All right.

THE COURT: Just -- and the only reason I know is because I went through and read a lot of briefs yesterday while I was listening to some boring depositions.

I think it's a prima facie showing by the plaintiffs even after discovery occurred and I'm conducting a jurisdictional hearing with additional findings that are then made at the time of trial related to jurisdiction.

MR. JONES: The only difference of opinion that I would have about this, and I have been involved in lots of these cases, is I think prima facie case, that may be correct with respect to specific jurisdiction. I don't believe that is the standard -- it's my understanding that's not the standard with respect to general jurisdiction and so that is, obviously, an issue that we would want to have the Supreme Court to weigh in on and under those circumstances, this -- we do think that there is an issue here that would result -- without the stay, would result in a --

THE COURT: Well, here's why I think that's the standard. In paragraph 2 of the writ or the order granting the writ, it says:

Petitioner asserts District Court improperly based its exercise of personal jurisdiction on petitioner's status [indiscernible] officers and directors. The real party in interest contends the District Court

properly determined that he had established a prima facie basis for personal jurisdiction based on the acts taken in Nevada to manage petitioner's operations in Macau.

They never depart from that, which has been the longstanding standard on the initial jurisdictional determination that has to be made by the Court. What is stated in this order is that I have to make specific findings after conducting a further hearing and you guys decided you wanted an evidentiary hearing and you wanted to do discovery and so that was four years ago.

MR. JONES: Right. And I -- and my only comment to that would be the comment in the order that you just read about the acts taken in the state of Nevada and, again, that -- I think, and this is just my interpretation, Your Honor, the Supreme Court may say I'm completely wrong about this, but I have had, I think, every case -- well, even including this one now that's been decided since Daimler has happened and I think the standard is that on general jurisdiction is where the company is at home or the foreign entity is at --

THE COURT: I understand, --

MR. JONES: -- home.

THE COURT: -- but the reason I'm asking the questions is the standard of proof and if the standard of

proof is only a prima facie standard, that's a pretty low standard, and it's merely a showing that the plaintiffs have to make.

MR. JONES: And, again, my only quibble with that, Your Honor, is that I think there's a differentiation between specific jurisdiction and general. Even with the language that you just quoted in this case, first of all, I would say that that was pre *Daimler* and, secondly, --

MR. JONES: -- I think that the language talks about since it refers to acts in Nevada, I think that would -- my interpretation of that would be an issue related to

True.

specific jurisdiction, not general, but unfortunately, because that really was not -- as I understood it, was not really an issue that was specifically detailed by the Supreme Court in that order, we don't have a lot of guidance in that respect. So, that's my -- the difference

THE COURT: Well I'm just asking the question because --

I have with the Court in terms of that issue.

MR. JONES: Sure.

THE COURT:

THE COURT: -- my understanding what the hearing has always been is that the plaintiffs have to make a prima facie showing after presenting whatever evidence they're going to make. It's not a very high standard. It's a

pretty low standard. I've been waiting for a long time to do this hearing and I structured the decision I wrote as a lesser sanction, and I do not see it as a terminating sanction, because you're still able to test their prima facie showing through cross-examining the evidence they would present to make that showing without necessarily presenting any affirmative evidence of your own.

I understand your issue, but because it's only a prima facie showing that is required, I am not certain that I see the level of prejudice that you're trying to express to me. So I need you to -- if you think the standard of proof is different than the prima facie, it affects my decision making. So that's why I'm asking you these questions.

MR. JONES: And I understand that and I saw -certainly saw the Opposition filed by plaintiff which, I
think, makes them -- or brings up some of the points you
just referenced about prejudice and the standard. And so,
I would say to you if I wasn't -- if my comment wasn't
clear before, I do believe there is a definite distinction,
especially in light of the Daimler and Viega cases between
specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.

And so, the prima facie case I would certainly -you know, my understanding of the law with respect to
specific jurisdiction. It is not my understanding of the

law with respect to general jurisdiction, especially in 1 light of Daimler and Viega. And so, in that regard, Your 2 3 Honor, I think that the standard of proof is significantly different and higher for the plaintiff in this case to 4 demonstrate. And so, consequently, I think that that 5 factor actually weighs in our favor with respect to general 6 jurisdiction. 7 8 THE COURT: What do you think the standard of 9 proof is? 10 MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, that's an interesting question because I don't know that the Supreme 11 Court -- either the U. S. Supreme Court or the Nevada 12

Supreme Court has given us any particular direction on that and I -- and as I sit here today, that may not be the case. 14 Again, I haven't --15 16

THE COURT: I think that's a prima facie showing on that, too, with the --

It may be, Your Honor. I don't --MR. JONES: THE COURT: -- caveat that you still have got to make the findings at trial.

MR. JONES: I don't know about that. I honestly would have to -- I would want to look at that issue --

> Okay. THE COURT:

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MR. JONES: -- particularly because that, from my perspective, you know, I -- maybe I should have anticipated that, but I didn't, and so --

THE COURT: It's okay.

MR. JONES: In speaking directly to that, I just think it's a higher standard and that's based upon my reading of *Daimler* and *Viega*, but I can't -- off the top of my head, I cannot point the Court to a specific higher standard to reference.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. JONES: So, with that said, Your Honor, I think that there is a difference. I think that difference is material and I think it's important and I think it's something that we believe we need to get some direction from the Supreme Court on, that their -- and I understand that the Opposition's argument that, as you just said, you didn't say the sanction is I'm going to strike any defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, but we believe that the order, as it's been issued, hamstrings my client to such an extent that there is certainly the possibility that it's inevitable of a finding of jurisdiction against my client.

It so hampered their due process rights, and I understand that the -- that, again, the plaintiff disagrees with that. We think that that is an infringement of our due process rights in presenting our case for a company that primary place of business is in Macau. It's a Cayman Islands company. It's on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.

It's -- all of its employees are in Macau and it's being told, essentially, you're going to come here and defend yourself and if you -- in defending yourself at this jurisdictional hearing, you won't be able to present any affirmative evidence, we think that impacts our due process rights and we think that that's an issue that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court as to whether or not Viega goes that far because certainly on its face, the Viega case does not suggest that these kind of sanctions and inability to present affirmative evidence as a part of the Viega rule.

With respect to the prejudice, you know that's an interesting issue. We believe that's an extremely prejudicial to us and there's a case called -- it's Sparks -- I'm trying to find my case now. I think it's the -- oh yeah, I'm sorry. The City of Sparks versus Sparks Municipal Court. I found this last night because, of course, we didn't have an opportunity to Reply because of the order shortening time, but that is a case that says -- this is a Nevada case.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with that case.

MR. JONES: Okay. With that said, then you understand that the Court said:

A constitutional violation may be difficult or impossible to remedy through money damages. Such a

violation made by itself be sufficient to constitute irreparable harm.

So that is an issue, we think, that needs to be presented to the Supreme Court with respect to the prejudice of the plaintiff.

I -- again, I read their Opposition. They've talked about delay. We don't think that any delay associated with the MPDPA redactions has occurred. As we presented at the sanctions hearing, but I would add this, Judge. There has been a substantial time period that has elapsed and I understand that and I understand the plaintiffs saying that has impacted our ability to get to this hearing -- jurisdictional hearing and ultimately the hearing on the merits.

What has happened in the interim though, Judge, is a bunch of writs and -- as you've already mentioned and I don't see how it can be an inappropriate or prejudicial delay to a party when the writs are filed and the Supreme Court accepts them.

THE COURT: Well the problem is Rule 41 because the orders that have been issued by the Nevada Supreme Court in this case are unclear as to the effect of the stays on the binding of the rule at the time under Rule 41 and when I previously asked for briefing on this issue from the parties, the parties disagreed as to whether there was

tolling related to those stays. As a result of that, I've 1 got a serious problem and I have to start a trial prior to 2 October 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015. 3 MR. JONES: Well, let me address that issue, Your 4 Honor, anticipating that that issue may come up. 5 6 THE COURT: Well I put it in the decision I issued last Friday for a reason. 7 8 MR. JONES: And I want to address that issue. It's -- it is -- I would say this. I would acknowledge that the case law in the state of Nevada has essentially 10 determined that the -- a stay tolls the statute. 11 12 THE COURT: But it's only a stay. If --13 MR. JONES: Excuse me, tolls the five-year rule. 14 THE COURT: Only if it's a stay of the entire 15 case. We've not had a stay of the entire case in this situation. 16 17 MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, I don't know that I read the case law that way and to the extent that that's an 18 19 issue, I think that we would acknowledge that the stay does 20 That's not what was acknowledged when 21 THE COURT: got the briefing previously. 22 23 MR. JONES: Well I'm --

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A different position --

-- here acknowledging that point to

THE COURT:

MR. JONES:

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the Court in direct response to the Court's question.

THE COURT: And what is Las Vegas Sands' position?

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, it's the same position as

Sands China Limited.

THE COURT: So when do you think the -- or how many days do you think have been tolled under Rule 41 as a result of the --

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, given --

THE COURT: -- stays? I'm sorry.

MR. PEEK: My apologies.

Given the fact that the stay was issued in August of 2011 and there were a number of intermediate stays after that of the entire proceedings, including the jurisdictional hearing, if we were to just use those stays that stayed the entire case, as per the Court's comment and inquiry, we would certainly go back to at least the -- I'm trying to think the two writs that stayed the entire case. That would be the one related to Justin Jones, the one related to the attorney-client privilege of the documents that Mr. Jacobs took when he left, and then the stay related to the sanctions that the Court's order of March 27<sup>th</sup> of 2013. I don't know the exact time frame of those, but if I took those three stays which stayed the entire case, including jurisdictional discovery and jurisdictional hearing, Your Honor, the Justin Jones decision, I think,

was in September 2012 and I don't remember when the Supreme Court decision was, but I can go back and calculate those times. But they're probably at least a year.

If you were certainly to go back all the way to September -- to August of 2011, we know -- I can do that calculation for you because that would be three years and approximately six months. So multiply three times -- three and a half times 365 which comes out to 1,000 days.

THE COURT: You think there's been three days of stay?

MR. PEEK: Yeah. So --

THE COURT: I mean, three years of stay?

MR. PEEK: There's been at least three years of stay using that one, Your Honor, but using just those that stayed the entire case because they would be on top of the jurisdictional --

THE COURT: I don't care what you say the number is, I just care that you say on the record how many days you think --

MR. PEEK: I don't know the exact number of days, Your Honor. Using the two forms of calculus, the one calculus where the Court says the stay of the entire case. I don't know that calculus. I can do that and present it to the Court.

I do -- I certainly do know the calculus as it

relates to September -- excuse me, August of 2011.

THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask you a question a little bit differently and the reason I'm asking you, and I'm going to include Mr. Morris in this discussion, is part of my concerns, as I indicated on page 2 of my decision that was issued last Friday, is the Rule 41 issues that I previously had briefed by the parties which did not appear to take the same position that you are taking at this point.

If you are agreeing and stipulating on the record that there has been an extension of the five-year rule for a certain period of time, that will weigh in my consideration of this Motion, --

MR. PEEK: Okay.

THE COURT: -- but I need you to, as a group, all three of you, to give me that -- what period of time that is because that is a significant issue for me as a trial judge because in unpublished decisions that the Nevada Supreme Court have issued, they have been very critical of judges who do not ensure their cases are tried within the five-year rules.

MR. PEEK: And Your Honor I'm respectful of that concern of the Court and respectful of the Supreme Court's criticism, but I can't give you an exact answer here today but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PEEK: -- I would like --

THE COURT: That's fair.

MR. PEEK: I'm going to say, Your Honor, that for at least for a period of one year or more there has been a stay of the entire proceedings and if I may, Your Honor, -- if you give me a little bit of a break so I can talk to my colleagues to get an answer on that? I want to talk to Mr. Adelson's counsel and I want to talk to Mr. Jones as well.

MR. JONES: I think we can calculate the period of time related to the stays of the entire case within a few minutes -- well, certainly come within a real close within a real close number within a few minutes if we can get -- and we can give that to the Court, but I would certainly agree with Mr. Peek that at a minimum, we're probably talking about over a year but I don't have the exact number of days off the top of my head.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PEEK: Can we have a moment, Your Honor, to counsel with each other to --

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, do you want them to take their break before or after you argue now?

MR. BICE: Well, I obviously want --

THE COURT: Because I'm going to give them the break before I decide.

1 MR. BICE: All right. Then have them do it now. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Because I'm -- I want to be heard --3 MR. BICE: THE COURT: Absolutely. I'm just trying to get 4 5 them --6 MR. BICE: -- on this. 7 THE COURT: -- to give me a number. 8 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. BICE: 9 THE COURT: So you can take a short break. However long you need. 10 11 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. PEEK: 12 THE COURT: Have a nice visit. I'm going to try and find the prior briefing that occurred. Does anybody 13 14 remember when that was? Two years ago? MR. BICE: Your Honor, I'm not sure that briefing 15 ultimately was ever submitted. I recall us having the 16 discussion and I recall us having a dispute about it, but I 17 don't know that the briefing ever actually occurred. 18 19 THE COURT: Was it two years ago? 20 MR. PEEK: I don't -- I remember the inquiry of the Court and I'm like Mr. Bice, I do not remember that 21 there actually was a brief submitted to the Court on this 22 I do remember the Court inviting briefing on this 23 issue, but I don't believe that any of us did. 24

Imagine that. Me inviting briefing.

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THE COURT:

Okay. Bye. Go consult.

MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor.

[Recess taken at 8:49 a.m.]

[Hearing resumed at 9:05 a.m.]

THE COURT: While you were gone, we found where we discussed it. We discussed it in case number A671020, which is the deposition case out of Florida on January 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2014. We were supposed to get briefs in this case sometime in February 2014 and the only brief I got related to the cyber-attack that Mr. peek filed. I didn't get a brief on the five-year rule from anybody. I think there was a discussion among counsel and you all decided that it wasn't fruitful to file the brief because somebody called and asked us to take the status check I had set off.

MR. PEEK: Or because of the cyber-attack, Your Honor, we got a little distracted.

THE COURT: Mr. Peek, I -- that's probably why, but that's -- Dulce was able to recollect that we had the discussion in another case and it's -- the minutes in A671020 on January 22, 2014 reflect the discussion we had in this case about the five-year rule. So, --

MR. JONES: What -

THE COURT: -- did you come up with a number?

MR. JONES: With that said, Your Honor, no we did not come up with a number. We've come up with an estimate,

but here's where -- what I can say to the Court.

To -- with respect to a stipulation, I need client approval for that and I understand the concern of the Court with the timing. My client is asleep right now, but I can probably get ahold of him as early as 4 o'clock this afternoon and I will have a precise number that I can provide the Court and I can tell the Court whether I have the authority to enter into a stipulation because obviously this does go to the, you know, substantive rights of the parties. And so I need to do that and I understand the timing issues and --

THE COURT: I --

MR. JONES: -- if that's not acceptable to the Court --

THE COURT: Thanks. I understand what you're saying.

MR. JONES: I appreciate that but that is what I would offer to the Court and the -- and I would be trying to get confirmation of whether or not I have the authority to stipulate to the tolling and the exact period of time that we would agree that the case has been tolled with respect to the five-year rule and -- as early as late this afternoon. And, unfortunately, Your Honor, I need to have that authority before I can do it on the record.

THE COURT: I absolutely understand, Mr. Jones.

Thank you.

MR. JONES: And with that said, Your Honor, I don't know if you need to hear any additional arguments. I think that the point is we do think our substantive due process rights are impacted by the situation and we have a unique situation here, unprecedented, and we think it's imperative that we get some direction from the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, again, so with respect to Las Vegas Sands, --

THE COURT: He didn't give me a number, so it doesn't really matter what anybody else says.

MR. PEEK: I understand but I -- all right.

THE COURT: If we get to a point where somebody wants to enter a stipulation, then all of you will have to sign one.

MR. PEEK: Right. But I -- but, Your Honor given that concern is that we certainly want until at least whatever time Mr. Jones needs to get to somebody who is asleep in Macau. I mean, it's only fair that if we're going to enter a stipulation we have the client's consent to do that.

THE COURT: Absolutely. It just means we can't do

a stipulation right now and I understand what he's --

MR. PEEK: No, but --

THE COURT: -- saying. Not that you weren't willing to, you just can't.

MR. PEEK: Right and I understand the Court's concern about the stay and having a stipulation, but that's important to all of us.

THE COURT: I understand. Thank you. Mr. Bice, your turn.

MR. BICE: Yes, thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, the five-year rule on this is a red herring, we would submit. Here is -- and you can tell all of the sort of wrangling going on over this issue. The reason why there were no briefs submitted on it now upon reflection of hearing this discussion is we're not -- our client is not willing to run the risk. Even if the Court ruled that it had been told and they objected to it --

THE COURT: I'm not ruling. The only way it's happening is if there's a stipulation.

MR. BICE: And that's why they're -- that's why -to hear this coming from them now, I think, sort of speaks
volumes. There is no basis for a stay under *Hansen* of the
Court's ruling. The Court's ruling -- if they would like
to go seek a stay from the Supreme Court, if they think
that they can convince the Supreme Court that a sanction

order -- there is no irreparable harm here. The evidentiary hearing can go forward and if they want to try to convince the Supreme Court that the Supreme Court should review this and should enter a stay while it reviews is, that is certainly something that they can attempt to do. We will oppose that at the Supreme Court and we believe that the Supreme Court will deny it. We believe that the Supreme Court won't even entertain this writ because this is not a case where privilege is implicated or any irreparable harm is implicated. They are simply wrong when they state that the law somehow that their due process rights are implicated here.

As the U. S. Supreme Court has said and as the Nevada Supreme Court has said, even striking an Answer in its entirety as a discovery sanction for conduct far less egregious than what has gone on in this case, does not implicate people's due process rights.

It's a little ironic for us, obviously, to hear the defendants, particularly Sands China, talking about due process when for four years it has sabotaged that right of Mr. Jacobs' throughout this proceeding, misrepresenting where documents were at, their access to them, their use of them, etcetera, etcetera.

So there is no basis under *Hansen* for a stay of this case. There is no irreparable harm. The evidentiary

hearing can go forward. They have plenty of time to try and convince the Nevada Supreme Court between now and April  $20^{\rm th}$  that the Nevada Supreme Court should grant them a stay.

What this Court should not do is grant a -- grant even a temporary stay so that it gives the appearance that somehow the Court thinks that a stay is warranted because that's what they will do. If the Court even gives them a stay for a few days, they will tell the Court: Look, Judge Gonzalez thinks that this is so important that it merits even a stay. They should go to the Supreme Court and try and convince them that there is a basis for a stay when there isn't one at all on this writ petition because it doesn't deprive them of any legal rights. But you know what it does do, Your Honor? It deprives my client of substantial rights.

Your Honor, we already know that Mr. Schwartz is dead. We already know that Mike Leven is gone from the company. I don't know how old Mr. Leven is, but he's not young. Irwin Segel, Your Honor, who was also on the Sands' Board of Directors that was intimately involved in this, he has also left the Sands' Board and I know that Mr. Segel is over 80 years old. I do not know the status of his health. I know that Mr. Adelson is over 80 years old and has had health problems in the past. We have got — this case has been going on for over four years. No evidence is being

preserved. The memories of people are fading. Their testimony is not being preserved and they're all going to be allowed to claim: You know what? I don't remember.

And that is going to become a convenient denial for people and they'll be able to say: Well, passage of time. I just can't remember now why this happened or what we did, etcetera.

We need to be able to preserve evidence in this case and we are being deprived of that and we have been deprived of it for years as a result and principally -- you know, Mr. Jones is new to the case, relatively speaking, considering that it's four years old. He says that the MPDPA, you know, hasn't had that much impact. The MPDPA is the impetus of the -- of everything that has happened in this case.

Let's remember something. It is the impetus, it is the cornerstone that caused the stay to be in place the first time. Mr. Fleming submitted a declaration to the Nevada Supreme Court without disclosing all of the documents were -- had been already brought over to Nevada or in to the United States. Without disclosing that fact, he represented to the Court, as Ms. Glaser did as well, to the Supreme Court to obtain that stay that all of the documents were in Macau and it would take them a \$1,000,000 to do that. That was their representations.

Now we know that those representations were incomplete to say the least. So that MPDPA excuse has been the entire predicate of the delay of this case since its very inception. And so to claim that: Oh, it hasn't really been the cause of the delay, is simply ignoring the actual facts and ignoring the actual record.

So, under Hansen, they have to show you irreparable harm, absent a stay. There is no irreparable harm absent a stay and, as we cite the Second Circuit in the Linde decision, which involved the exact same points, the exact same arguments of someone saying: Well, we were relying upon this Foreign Secrecy Act and so we're not going to comply with discovery. And the Second Circuit said: Well, that's too bad, but you can't seek writ review by a sanctions order that's saying you're not allowed to do that because your remedy is an appeal of all things after all because it's an available remedy. If you lose, you can appeal and the same is true here.

They do not suffer any irreparable harm because they're not being forced to forfeit any rights whatsoever. They forfeited those rights long ago when they got sanctioned for misrepresenting to the Court about the MPD - making the misrepresentations to the Court about the MPDPA.

And, again, Your Honor, when you look at who is it

that's going to be prejudiced by yet another delay of this case, there's only one side that is going to be prejudiced and that's Mr. Jacobs because more and more evidence is going to disappear with yet another delay of this case.

We have -- we set this hearing down for April 20<sup>th</sup>. That hearing has to proceed, Your Honor. My client is being prejudiced constantly by these delays and witnesses are going to be allowed to claim that they don't remember and witnesses are going to continue to disappear and/or pass away. These are not young people that are -- that were on the Board of Directors of Las Vegas Sands. George Ku has also left the Board of Directors of Las Vegas Sands Corp., Your Honor, and he was also there at the time and I know that Mr. Ku is over 80 years is my recollection.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. BICE: So, with that, it should be denied, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Jones, anything else?
MR. JONES: Just briefly, Judge.

I would say this. I understand there's been a long passage of time and I would point out though that these are important issues and the fact that they're important issues or the proof that they're important issues and Mr. Bice talks about the time frames that have occurred, the proof that they're important issues is the

fact that these writs were accepted and that decisions have come out of those writs that give you guidance and give us some guidance.

THE COURT: But I have witnesses who testified at my sanctions hearing who don't remember stuff that only happened two years ago. Imagine how bad it's going to be when you finally start taking depositions in this case.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, you know, as you know, I'm on both sides of cases and I'm faced with that same prospect every day in cases that I have. That's not an unusual circumstance and I've had witnesses --

THE COURT: It is unusual for a case to be four years old and substantive discovery not to have started yet.

MR. JONES: It's not as normal as others. I've had cases where I didn't get out of the Motion to Dismiss stage until 11 years and it went all the way to the United States Supreme Court because important issues were implicated.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. JONES: And so that's what happens when you have these kind of issues.

I would submit to this Court we are talking about due process rights and we may -- the Supreme Court may decide that our argument is not meritorious with respect to

these issues, but we believe we have a legitimate due process issue that we think needs to be presented to the Supreme Court and that case by -- I was talking about, Humana versus Forsyth, I had class representatives who were older people and after 11 years, I was worried that I wasn't going to have a class representative anymore, but those issues went up to the Ninth Circuit twice. Those issues had to be addressed. And so, that is unfortunately or not, and I would suggest that this is the way our system works, those are issues that have to be addressed.

And so, the -- and I think you said it yourself during the sanctions hearing. Delay alone is not sufficient. Assuming that you -- as Mr. Bice asserts, that you can tie all of the delay that has occurred here back to the MPDPA issues, and I submit and I believe we showed graphically that that's just not true, but even if it were true, if these kind of issues are implicated, there's a -- and I think this Court has been cautious. Even though I know you're anxious to have a jurisdiction hearing, you have also been very cautious about letting these issues be played out where these important matters are the subject of the case and have granted stays I know -- where I got the impression you didn't want to grant the stay because you wanted to get on with things, but you still took the cautious approach and we think that's the best approach

here.

I would ask the Court to give me until this afternoon, at least until 5 o'clock --

THE COURT: Well you're not going to get a stipulation because plaintiffs aren't going to stipulate.

MR. JONES: Well --

THE COURT: So even if you were to concede when the timing was, they're not going to stipulate. So I don't have a stipulation.

MR. JONES: I understand.

THE COURT: And so I don't have a stipulation that I would need under Rule 41. So that's --

MR. JONES: I understand, Your Honor, but I -- if my client gave that stipulation, if Las Vegas Sands did, if Mr. Adelson was able to do that by 5 o'clock, whether Mr. Bice stipulates or not, if there is a stay ultimately granted by you or the Supreme Court and we continue on here and as a -- we are willing -- we -- say the Court were willing to do that, Mr. Bice may change his mind down the road because that may be in his interest to do so.

The point is that he wants to push this case but he is now telling you: I will not agree to that because I want to push this matter. And so, you've got to balance whether or not if my client were willing to stipulate to this, that there is not this deadline on the five-year rule

the Court is up against. So that, again, alleviates the concern for Mr. Bice's client versus is it a necessary issue to go to the Supreme Court and determine whether or not these due process issues are something that the Supreme Court thinks need to be decided first?

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. JONES: No. No, thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. The Motion to Stay is denied. Here the Court has to only make a prima facie determination at the jurisdictional hearing that is currently scheduled for April 20. I entered sanctions that are a lesser sanction that, in my opinion, do not infringe the due process rights of Sands China Limited.

Given the issues that I identified and procedural posture portion of my brief, the timing, given a lack of stipulation to the extension of the five-year rule or the period of tolling pursuant to the stays, prevents me from being able to grant a stay. So the Motion is denied.

Anything else?

MR. JONES: Your Honor, just if we could get a -THE COURT: Here -- I'll say something because it
was in your brief. If you file a list of witnesses and
documents on behalf of Sands China, I am not going to
sanction you for doing that if you're doing it in order to
be cautions just in case the Nevada Supreme Court does

something else. So if you think you need to file that, go ahead and file it. I have made a determination you may not use those witnesses, but I'm not going to preclude you from making that filing because I know that you put in one of the briefs that you didn't want to offend me. You are not going to offend me by preserving your rights.

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, there's a concern of giving out \$250,000 to various legal associations, not being able to get it back in case the Supreme Court does grant that stay. Is the Court at least interested in granting a limited stay as to --

THE COURT: No.

MR. PEEK: -- the payment of those monies?

THE COURT: I'm not interested in granting any stay.

MR. PEEK: Okay.

THE COURT: I think the order that was fashioned was one that you were lucky to get on your side.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, with respect to the order, is Mr. Bice going to prepare that and if so, could we see that and --

MR. BICE: Of course.

MR. JONES: -- obviously we'd like to see it as soon as possible.

MR. BICE: Of course. Yes.

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. BICE: And we've agreed, Your Honor -- I think we agreed that we're pushing off the deadline for witnesses 3 and exhibits for a week in any event because I know that 4 that was an issue in their Motion and Mr. Jones and Mr. --5 the other Mr. Jones, we -- he and I have had a couple of 6 conversations over the last couple of days. 7 8 THE COURT: Okay. That was my understanding that 9 MR. JONES: Yeah. Mark Jones agreed to --10 11 THE COURT: But --12 Yeah. MR. BICE: MR. JONES: -- a week, assuming the Court is okay 13 with that. 14 THE COURT: Just so we're clear, I'm not going to 15 sanction you for filing something to preserve your rights. 16 MR. JONES: All right. Thank you. 17 18 THE COURT: I mean, I'm not going to. I mean, if you've got to preserve your rights, preserve your rights. 19 It's not going to bother me. 20 21 MR. JONES: Very well. Thank you. Anything else? 22 THE COURT: 23 Thank you. MR. PEEK: Nothing. THE COURT: Have a lovely weekend. 24

Thank you.

MR. MORRIS:

25

1	MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Bye.
3	MR. MORRIS: Thanks for the coffee.
4	THE COURT: Absolutely, Mr. Morris.
5	MR. PEEK: Thanks for your patience on
6	THE COURT: I have no issues, Mr. Peek. Have a
7	wonderful weekend. Travel safely.
8	
9	PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 9:23 A.M.
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# CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

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**AFFIRMATION** 

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

VDICTEN LINKWITTE

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

Electronically Filed Mar 17 2015 08:49 a.m. Tracie K. Lindeman Clerk of Supreme Court

### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., A NEVADA CORPORATION, AND SANDS CHINA LTD., A CAYMAN ISLANDS CORPORATION

PETITIONERS,

VS.
CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THE
HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ,
DISTRICT JUDGE, DEPT. 11,
RESPONDENTS,

AND STEVEN C. JACOBS,

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.

Case Number: 67576

District Court Case Number A627691-B

Supplemental Exhibit to Petitioners Emergency Motion to Stay Under NRAP 27(e)

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Attorneys for Petitioners

Petitioner Sands China Ltd. hereby supplements the Emergency Motion to Stay Under NRAP 27(e) with the transcript of the district court's March 13, 2015 hearing. The transcript was not available at the time the motion was filed, and an electronic record of the district court's proceeding was submitted as Exhibit 3 in its stead. The attached transcript replaces the previously submitted Exhibit 3.

### MORRIS LAW GROUP

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#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 25, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP; that, in accordance therewith, I caused a copy of the **SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT TO PETITIONERS EMERGENCY MOTION TO STAY UNDER NRAP 27(e)** to be hand-delivered on the date and to the addressee(s) shown below:

Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

## Respondent

A copy was delivered by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage fully prepaid to the persons and addresses listed below:

Todd L. Bice James J. Pisanelli Debra Spinelli Pisanelli Bice 400 S. 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89101

# Attorneys for Steven C. Jacobs, Real Party in Interest

DATED this 16th day of March, 2015.

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>