IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation,

Petitioner,

vs.

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE, DEPT. 11,

Respondents,

and

STEVEN C. JACOBS,

Real Party in Interest.

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APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
PROHIBITION OR
MANDAMUS
RE MARCH 6, 2015
SANCTIONS ORDER

Volume XIV of XXXIII (PA2641 – 2848)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 25, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP; that, in accordance therewith, I caused a copy of the APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS RE MARCH 6, 2015 SANCTIONS ORDER Volume XIV of XXXIII (PA2641 – 2848) to be served as indicated below, on the date and to the addressee(s) shown below:

VIA HAND DELIVERY (CD)

Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

Respondent

VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE

James J. Pisanelli Todd L. Bice Debra Spinelli Pisanelli Bice 400 S. 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, NV 89101

Attorneys for Steven C. Jacobs, Real Party in Interest

DATED this 20th day of March, 2015.

By: <u>/s/ PATRICIA FERRUGIA</u>

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

vs.

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

DEPT. NO. XI

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Defendants .

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

TODD BICE, ESQ.

DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ. JORDAN SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STPHEN PEEK, ESQ.
JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

MARK JONES, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 2014, 8:40 A.M.
2	(Court was called to order)
3	THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands. Good morning.
4	MR. RANDALL JONES: Good morning, Your Honor.
5	MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor.
6	MR. PEEK: Good morning, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Does everybody have a copy of the Nevada
. 8	Supreme Court's order denying a rehearing dated August 7th?
9	MR. BICE: We do.
10	MR. PEEK: Yes, Your Honor, I do.
11	THE COURT: Okay. So that slightly impacts some of
12	the things we're going to talk about today. And I appreciate
13	your supplemental brief after the orders.
14	Okay. Does everybody want to identify themselves
15	for purposes of the record, since Tina is not my usual clerk.
16	MR. BICE: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Todd
17	Bice on behalf of plaintiff Steven Jacobs.
18	MR. PISANELLI: Good morning, Your Honor. James
19	Pisanelli on behalf of Steven Jacobs.
20	MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Jordan Smith
21	on behalf of Steven Jacobs.
22	MS. SPINELLI: Good morning, Your Honor. Debra
23	Spinelli on behalf of Mr. Jacobs.
24	MR. RANDALL JONES: Good morning, Your Honor.
25	Randall Jones and Mark Jones on behalf of Sands China Limited.

MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Steve Morris on behalf of Sheldon Adelson.

MR. PEEK: And good morning, Your Honor. Stephen Peek on behalf of the Las Vegas Sands and Sands China Limited.

THE COURT: All right. Which motion would you like to start with, the motion to amend the complaint?

MR. BICE: I leave it to the Court's pleasure.

THE COURT: Let's go to the motion to amend the complaint first.

MR. BICE: Okay. Your Honor, as you are aware, at this juncture, notwithstanding the fact of the age of this case --

(Pause in the proceedings)

THE COURT: All right. Let's go.

MR. BICE: Your Honor, notwithstanding the age of this case, as Your Honor is very familiar with it, Sands China has not filed an answer in this action, and we have sought to amend the complaint. And we would submit, Your Honor, that Sands China as the basis for its opposition to this amendment is in fact contrary to its arguments about jurisdiction. What it is insisting to this Court is that it has to look at each particular cause of action now in order to assess particularly with respect to specific jurisdiction. And to do that the Court obviously needs to then have before it all potential claims that are being asserted or are going to be asserted in

order to assess that specific jurisdiction issue.

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But now they come to you and they say, well, you shouldn't, because the stay precludes you from allowing Mr. Jacobs to amend his complaint. And our position on that, Your Honor, as we put forth in our pleadings, is I think very straightforward, is the merits stay does not in any way preclude these types of amendments, because these types of amendments directly relate to, to use the Supreme Court's words, matters relating to the determination of personal jurisdiction. We have learned through the jurisdictional discovery of a lot of facts concerning the activities that Sands China was undertaking in cooperating with LVSC in Las Vegas and undertaking those actions that give rise to the claims. And so therefore we are seeking to amendment to assert those causes of action to have them before the Court, because that necessarily with respect to specific jurisdiction plays a role in this Court's ultimate determination on the jurisdictional question. And the Supreme Court's order, Your Honor, does not say -- and we cite caselaw for you for this proposition -- does not say anything that precludes Mr. Jacobs from making an amendment, either expressly or even implicitly. We would submit to the contrary by necessary implication of its directive that the Court entertain matters that are relating to the determination of personal jurisdiction an amendment that adds causes of action specifically predicated

upon Sands China's Nevada activities are appropriate. I thank the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Who wants to speak relative to opposition to the motion?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I will speak on behalf of Sands China, Your Honor.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I noted -- good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Jones. How are you today?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, thank you.

I would note that Mr. Bice said that -- very unequivocally that merits stay does not stay these types of amendments. And as we noted in our opposition on page 4, and I'm quoting here, Mr. Bice said that, "At this point the merits stay precludes Jacobs from amending his complaint," end quote. He went on to say, "But when that is gone he will be -- we will be amending his complaint to assert, among other things, claims for abuse of process against both Sands China and LVSC," end quote. And at the Supreme Court argument he repeated this point by saying, quote, "Presently the District Court views the merits stay as prohibiting Jacobs from amending his complaint even to augment his claims which would reinforce his theories for jurisdiction," end quote. That's

Exhibit B at page 21, note 11.

So Mr. Bice has acknowledged to this Court and the Supreme Court that the stay does include amending the complaint, including augmenting his theories of jurisdiction. It cannot get any more clear than that. And I don't know how he can come in here and say the exact opposite is a justification for his attempts to now amend the complaint.

And there are other issues implicated by this, as well, Your Honor, but the <u>Daimler</u> case tells us, as you know, we have issues about -- we have to consider the issues about where the defendant was at home.

THE COURT: And have fun defining "at home."

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, that's going to be an interesting discussion, Your Honor. We think it's pretty straightforward. We obviously have a disagreement with Mr. Bice about that subject. But with respect to specific jurisdiction, which appears to be what he is trying to do now with his amendment with these new claims, at least that's what he appears to be saying in his motion, first of all, we believe they have waived any arguments about specific jurisdiction. And that I think is something the Court needs to consider in making a decision with respect to this motion in addition to the fact that Mr. Bice has acknowledged that he can't do what he's now trying to do and should be judicially estopped from trying to do it, but even if he was allowed to

assert these new claims against Sands China related to specific jurisdiction, as the Court knows, you still have to make an independent decision with respect to specific jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, which would take us back to his original breach of contract claim and specific jurisdiction.

So his new claims do nothing -- that was one of his arguments, these new claims reinforce his existing arguments for jurisdiction. And they don't. Because they have to be looked at independently. So they don't do anything to reinforce his original claims for specific jurisdiction, assuming he actually had made those claims.

But, Your Honor, that also raises another issue, that if he was allowed to amend at this late point in time -- and he started out his discussion by saying, we're way far into this, it's been years and years. We all know the history. It certainly has been a long time. So --

THE COURT: And you missed part of it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I did miss part of it. He wants to now amend the complaint to add two new claims, and we would then have a right, obviously, to respond to those claims, assuming the Court allowed them. And I can assure the Court that we would be looking very carefully at a motion to dismiss, which would further delay what Mr. Bice says he wants to do right away, which is have a hearing on jurisdiction.

1 So, you know, Mr. Bice loves to get up here and make pejorative statements about my client and the other parties in this case at every opportunity. And one of the things he 3 loves to harp on is that he claims we've continued to cause 5 What he's doing now is an attempt to delay this delay. process further. And so we would like to get to the jurisdictional hearing as soon as possible, because we think 8 there is no jurisdiction against Sands China. So this attempt 9 at this late date will simply further delay this process, and we think it is not justified or appropriate. And Mr. Bice, up 10 11 until this recent motion, had said it was not only not 12 appropriate, but he couldn't do it and that you have said he 13 couldn't do it before. So we would believe that the stay does 14 prohibit that and that there's no justification for it 15 otherwise. Thank you, Your Honor. 16

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, I have nothing to add on behalf of Las Vegas Sands --

THE COURT: Thank you.

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MR. PEEK: -- other than what has been argued by Mr. Jones.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Morris, this issue doesn't impact you, does it?

MR. MORRIS: Well, when we started -- opened this hearing you remarked about denial of rehearing on August the 7th. I think it does have some relationship, but I'll --

we're now addressing the second amended complaint or the 1 2 proposed --3 THE COURT: Yes. I'm not at the motion for 4 reconsideration of the defamation issues yet, which is a 5 different motion. MR. MORRIS: Well, I'll speak in response to that. 7 But I still -- what I have to say does pertain to --8 THE COURT: I'm happy to listen. 9 MR. MORRIS: Well, okay. If you're happy to 10 listen --11 THE COURT: And I know that all these other people 12 in the audience are happy to listen, too. 13 MR. MORRIS: I'm happy to speak. 14 MR. PEEK: We might get some CLE from it, Your 15 Honor. 16 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, with respect to the 17 defamation, that claim in the second amended complaint -- or 18 the proposed second amended complaint not only adds -- puts 19 Mr. Adelson back in the case, but it makes claims against Las 20 Vegas Sands and Sands China. I point this out because you 21 have raised it at the outset, and I think it's of 22 significance. 23

claim this is premature. The remittitur from the Supreme

Court has not issued. There's 25 days from August the 7th.

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With respect to reinstatement of this defamation

So until that occurs, Your Honor, there isn't any occasion with respect to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a motion to dismiss.

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But, having said that, I was not here, and I'm sorry that I wasn't now, in the meeting before last when a point came up that I think is of some consequence. We wish to file a motion to -- against the proposed second amended complaint when it is appropriate to do so, and that is when remittitur has run.

THE COURT: So you're saying it's not appropriate to do that until September.

MR. MORRIS: Yes, that's my point. And we would like to -- and that motion, of course, because it is against the defamation claim and it brings up and we'll bring before you a point that the Supreme Court addressed in its decision, it's four-three decision reversing dismissal of the defamation claim in 2012, it brings up the Anzelone case and conditional privilege, and we would like the opportunity, since you are the person who in the first instance will consider the applicability of that privilege, we would like the opportunity to move against the filing of this second amended complaint on the ground that the conditional privilege applies, which is a point that the Supreme Court said you did not address, and it is among those things that the Court said --

THE COURT: That's what happens when I decide it's

an absolute privilege. I don't look at the conditional privilege.

MR. MORRIS: Of course. And I'm not quarrelling with that. But we made alternative arguments before you and before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said -- in substance what the Supreme Court said is, take it to Judge Gonzalez first.

THE COURT: They said that in three opinions. So we're going to talk about some of those others in a minute.

So your position, Mr. Morris, is because the second amended complaint attempts to resolve the defamation issue which was on appeal and which is now the subject of soon-to-be remitted, we should delay consideration of this because of the fifth cause of action?

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bice.

MR. BICE: Your Honor, the second amended complaint does not alter a single word of the defamation claim that's already before the Court. So I'm not quite sure where Mr. Morris is coming from, because that's just simply not accurate. That defamation issue and the issuance of the remittitur has nothing to do with this motion to amend with respect to Las Vegas Sands and Sands China.

What Mr. Morris is really trying to do, I guess, is

argue that the stay only applies to Mr. Jacobs but it doesn't apply to the defendants, because he says, well, we want to brief a bunch of merits motions against -- and that's true regardless of whether the second amended complaint is filed or not, apparently, because the defamation claim is completely untouched by it. So that is a complete red herring and an attempt to simply delay what we believe, Your Honor, is inevitable under the law.

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Now, Mr. Jones says that we are the parties here in engaged in double speak about what's the proper scope of the stay. And we certainly disagree with that, Your Honor. point out in our reply brief, this is an issue that they took the position. This Court expressed some concern about that in the past. We think that that is wrong. We have acknowledged that that's what the Court's view was, and if we misinterpreted the Court, then so be it. But the fact of the matter is we're bringing this motion. And you'll notice they don't address the point we make about the caselaw that we cite that specifically says that the stay cannot impact our ability to amend on this particular issue, because it relates to the Court's personal jurisdiction determination. And, as which, the Supreme Court's stay order cannot and should not be interpreted as somehow precluding it.

Now, if the Court is of the view that it did in the past, well, we think that that is mistaken, and we are asking

the Court to rectify that. If we misinterpreted what your view was in the past, well, then, that was our mistake. But nonetheless, with all due respect, an absurd argument of judicial estoppel? We're not the parties who obtained any benefit from this position. The party here who's trying to engage in flip-flopping is the party who was here before telling you that the stay didn't apply to their proposed amendments. So --

THE COURT: My concern, though, Mr. Bice, is a little different. I have thought that with respect to merits issues I should not be doing additional work given the language of the writ that was issued to me. When I am looking at many of the allegations that you've included in the second amended complaint it reinforces those concerns, although they do in some ways relate to the jurisdictional issues, which is why we're having this discussion this morning.

And so my concern whether we're opening a can of worms that can be opened a little bit later, after I've clarified some of the jurisdictional issues.

MR. BICE: I don't -- you know, the problem that that presents for us is we're going to hear Sands China claim that, well, you know, specific jurisdiction has to be addressed on a claim-specific basis. That's exactly what their argument has been. And now they're saying, well, that claim isn't currently before the Court because you haven't

allowed them to amend, so you can't use that as one of the bases for determining specific jurisdiction over Sands China. And we think that that, of course, exactly reverses the position that the Court is supposed to be in when it's making the determination. The Court has to look at what are the claims that are being asserted, do those claims arise out of contacts that were performed in the state of Nevada. And on these claims the answer to that is yes. And that's why an amendment of this is appropriate.

I understand the Court's concerns about, well, we can't get into the merits. And we agree with that issue, because that's ultimately what the Supreme Court has said. But the Supreme Court's stay should not be interpreted to say that Jacobs can't amend his claims to add additional causes of action which further reinforce this personal jurisdiction over Sands China. Because if that's the ruling, Your Honor, then, of course, we're now in a catch-22; the Court says, well, you can't bring in these claims that enhance the jurisdictional debate that directly relate to it but I'm going to take up whether or not Sands China is subject to personal jurisdiction before the Court.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, Mr. Bice. It's a very difficult issue, but I understand what you're saying. And the difficulty relates to the nature of the stay that was issued in conjunction with the writ. But

that's a different issue. Anything else?

MR. BICE: Your Honor, that's why we cite, I believe -- I don't remember exactly, I can look them up -- the case we cited that specifically address this is that unless the remand mandate from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, in this case because these are federal cases, specifically dictate otherwise, parties are free to amend their complaint and amend their pleadings. And here there is nothing in that order that can be interpreted or should be interpreted as saying that Jacobs can't amend his complaint specifically as to additional claims that were gleaned out of jurisdictional discovery that go directly to the issue that the Supreme Court told this Court to address, which is what contacts did Sands China have in the state of Nevada.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to grant the motion, with the exception to the fifth claim for relief against Adelson. I agree that it is premature at this time for that claim to be addressed. You can address that after the remittitur is received.

With respect to the new claims, because they appear to relate to jurisdictional issues that I am supposed to be determining, while they may also deal with merits issues, I'm going to allow the amendment, because we have to address the

jurisdictional issues.

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, I have a question from Las Vegas Sands' standpoint. Am I then permitted to file motions to dismiss?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. PEEK: Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I just -- a point of clarification, because it didn't really come up until after rebuttal. But the one question I have, and it kind of relates to this issue of the defamation against Mr. Adelson, is these all -- these new claims relate to defamation. That's what they're all grounded on. And it seems to me that until -- and this goes to another motion we have this morning, and I just thought I'd bring it up now, but I would like to --

THE COURT: I'm not to that one yet.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand. But it implicates that motion and whether or not -- what relief or what ruling the Court makes with respect to that motion. So I just want to at least make the Court aware I think that there are issues there that relate to that that I would like to at least --

THE COURT: I know there are issues there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- be able to revisit this ruling with the Court when we get to that point, that's all.

THE COURT: Well, I anticipate that after the new complaint is filed I'm going to see a plethora of motions to

dismiss on numerous issues, including the defamation issues as amended and the issues that sort of pervade some of those claims in the complaint.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Fine, Your Honor. Again, I just at least wanted to raise this point with the Court.

THE COURT: I'm not to that motion. I'm going to let you talk in a minute, but I'm not quite there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, if we could go to the motion to reconsider the dismissal of the defamation claims against defendants Sands and Sands China.

MR. BICE: Yes. Your Honor, this motion, according to the defendants, is both simultaneously too late and simultaneously too early is their position with respect to it, and I think that pretty much proves our point, because that — the motion is accurate. The Court had dismissed the defamation claim on the litigation privilege, the Nevada Supreme Court has overturned that ruling, and then their position was, well, you've got to wait for the rehearing to be decided. That was it. Now that that's been decided adverse to them, now, well, now you shouldn't consider this for — I don't know what reason — the remittitur hasn't issued. But, again, that has nothing to do with Sands China or Las Vegas Sands Corporation, Your Honor. The issue has been briefed, as we point out, and a lot of caselaw on this point that Supreme

Court decisions are binding authority unless the opinion has been withdrawn. Not only has the opinion not been withdrawn, the petition for rehearing was denied.

With respect to Mr. Adelson, he doesn't have any dog in this fight. He claims -- it's odd, because he's claiming he's not before the Court right now because the remittitur hasn't issued, but he wants to be heard on motions that don't pertain to him. And so we do object to that practice.

But the point of the matter --

THE COURT: You know I'm always going to let everybody wants to talk talk.

MR. BICE: I know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, it's just the way I am.

MR. BICE: I know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. BICE: But our point here is the basis for the Court's dismissal of those claims against Sands China and against Las Vegas Sands has been reversed by the Supreme Court. Those claims now — we are entitled to have them reinstated. And now is an appropriate time to reinstate them, because, again, they specifically tie back into the jurisdictional debate with respect to Sands China.

Now, I've heard that we're going to hear some claim that Mr. Adelson wasn't speaking on behalf of Sands China, which we think will prove interesting if that's going to be

their position, since he's -- the defamatory statement was he claimed that we have developed a number of reasons for Mr.

Jacobs's termination when they are simultaneously representing to the Court that Mr. Jacobs was terminated by Sands China.

So that will prove interesting if that becomes their latest story. But, again, that's a premature issue.

Right now the Supreme Court has ruled, the petition for rehearing has been denied, and we are entitled to have the defamation claims reinstated so that we can -- because, again, it ties back to the jurisdictional issue, Your Honor, with respect to Sands China.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BICE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, Mr. Peek.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

I actually -- in one of those rare occasions I think I actually agree with Mr. Bice about something. He says that we argue that their motion is both too late and too early. Well, in fact it is, both of those things. The claims were dismissed, they did not move for reconsideration at the time, and --

THE COURT: But don't we have a change in law of the state of Nevada?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, we have a change in the status of the case, I agree with that based on the Supreme

Court ruling. They had a right to make their motion. They didn't make it, so that's undisputable. They talk about inherent authority, and they talk about cases from other jurisdictions that talk about what a summary judgment means. We certainly think those cases are clearly distinguishable, and I can go through that if the Court wants me to take the time to do it. But all you have to do is look at them. Even the cases they cite from the Nevada cases to talk about other issues, not a reconsideration of interlocutory order. So they don't have any case authority. They're basically relying on this so-called inherent authority of you to do what they want you to do.

But, Your Honor, I've been in this situation where this very thing has happened. And they have to -- at least as far as I've seen in other matters, they have to wait until the case is over, and then they have a right to appeal that issue. So that's why it's too early. That's why it's premature. They have -- they lost the issue-

THE COURT: But I've I got the right not to get reversed again when I know it's wrong, because they already issued a written decision saying, Judge, you've got to consider these other things.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, here's the problem with that argument, Your Honor. We never addressed -- "we" being Sands China. Sands China was never given the opportunity to

address the specific other issues that were raised. And we would --

THE COURT: Well, absolutely you get to have that right in the renewed motion to dismiss that you're going to file when the second amended complaint is actually served.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, here's what I see as the procedural problem with that. They didn't move pursuant to 54(b) to take that issue up.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. RANDALL JONES: They picked their poison, Judge.

And from my perspective --

THE COURT: It wasn't final, so it's interlocutory, and I can change it at any time if I want.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, ultimately I guess you're the judge, so you can make your rulings however you want to make them. But it would seem to me that if they wanted to appeal that issue they could have done exactly what they did with Mr. Adelson. They could have asked you to certify it pursuant to 54(b), which presumably you would have done, because you did it on the other issue. And they didn't do that. And so there should be no, if you will, attempt for them now to come back after the fact and say, well, we got this one reversed, let's go back to where we were before with these other matters that we did not either reconsider or move to certify.

So, Your Honor, I -- well, I obviously understand from the Court that -- put it another way. It's pretty obvious you're going to grant this motion, but we want to make sure we have a full opportunity --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- to brief these issues that were never briefed and decided by the Court before.

THE COURT: Absolutely. I'm not precluding anybody from filing anything in their motions to dismiss that I know are going to be filed soon.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Peek.

MR. PEEK: I really have nothing to add, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The motion's granted given the Supreme Court's opinion with respect to the Adelson defamation claim, because in my mind they made a clarification of the law that affects my prior decision, and I'm going to learn from that opinion.

If we could now --

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, just as sort of a procedural issue, because we still have the issue of the motion to amend and the fifth claim for relief and Adelson, and so I'm just trying to kind of put all the pieces of that puzzle together.

THE COURT: I allowed them to amend the fifth claim for relief, except as to Mr. Adelson. That means when it's

served on you you want to file your motion to dismiss.

MR. PEEK: Now that we have this motion to reconsider so we still get that opportunity, then, once the -- if and when you allow an amendment on the fifth claim for relief, that would then trigger the motion to dismiss on --

THE COURT: I did allow the amendment on the fifth claim for relief, just not as against Mr. Adelson yet because of the remittitur issue.

MR. PEEK: Okav.

THE COURT: Though you will file whatever fulsome motion you think is appropriate, Mr. Peek and Mr. Jones and Mr. Morris, and then I'll --

MR. PEEK: Want to just make sure I clarify, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right. Do you want to talk about the motion to extend the stay?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, as you've already noted, you have now received some direction from the Supreme Court as to what you believe you're supposed to do as we proceed with this matter. And one of the things that we believe was instructive and is important and relevant to this motion that we've filed is a determination of prior to any jurisdictional discovery hearing -- or, excuse me, any sanction hearing in particular some further briefing to determine what documents, if any, that have been requested --

THE COURT: I thought was going to do an in-camera review based upon their opinion. That's what I have written down to discuss at the end of today's hearing.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I do want to discuss that issue, Your Honor. What I was first referring to is the Macau documents.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And the Supreme Court has essentially adopted the <u>Internationale versus Rogers</u>.

THE COURT: That's part of my balancing test when I consider Rule 37 sanctions, which I said when you guys were here the last time.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand. So I certainly would ask this Court if we extend the stay as it relates to the sanctions hearing to allow us to brief those issues, because we think those issues need to be briefed before any such hearing, any sanctions hearing. Those are obviously very important issues to all concerned, including the Court, and that we now have a test that this Court is directed to follow that we need to address before we ever get to that hearing. That is certainly our position. We think that's a necessary prerequisite before we get to that point. And so we would ask that the sanction hearing be stayed until we're allowed to do that.

THE COURT: Well, I have to stay the sanctions

hearing. I was going to stay the sanctions hearing and not schedule it until after I finish the in-camera review. So I think the two things — if you want to file more briefs on the Macau stuff, I'm always happy to read your briefs. The problem I have is I'm going to have what is going to be a very difficult task before me. I'm doing an in-camera review given the instructions by the Nevada Supreme Court that merely having a cc on a document isn't enough for a claim of attorney-client privilege, which means I have to make a very careful review of the contents of each of the communications.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I was -- actually I did plan to bring that up. That's, what, Footnote 17, I believe, of --

THE COURT: So, I mean, I've got some things on my plate that I need to be handling, and I'm going to -- it's going to take me a little while to do the in-camera review. It will take me longer than it usually does, because I'm also getting ready for the CityCenter trial at the same time. I have 6,000 people who filled out ability to serve questionnaires, and next week 300-and-some will fill out the first batch of the longer questionnaires. So I've got some things. So I think you have time to do some briefing, because I'm not going to schedule the sanctions hearing or the evidentiary hearing until I finish the in-camera review. So if you want to do briefing, I'm always going to consider briefing, Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. Well --

THE COURT: So if you want to file a motion for instructions or whatever you want to call it, I'm happy to read it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So that brings up the ultimate issue. With the ruling of the Supreme Court we now have an issue to produce these documents and whether we need to produce them immediately. We would ask the stay be extended with respect to production of the Macau documents until we've had the opportunity to do this briefing based upon these five factors, in particular factor number one, which essentially goes to relevance, and we think that there are certainly some significant issues that need to be addressed there with respect to these Macau documents, especially in light of the new nerve theory center -- nerve center theory, excuse me, that the plaintiff now seems to be asserting.

So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think that's part of their at home analysis. I think it's all wrapped up together, which is one of the reasons I denied both the motions for summary judgment, because there appear to be genuine issues of material fact as to where Sands China is at home.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood. And so my point is simply that, in other words, we have a ruling that was from last -- well, the spring of 2013 with respect to the Macau

documents. We would simply ask that the Court extend that stay until we finish this process out and we've been allowed to do this briefing.

THE COURT: Let just ask you a question. How long is it going to take you to do that briefing? Your part. Not Mr. Bice's part, just your part.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I would say, Your Honor, we would like at least two weeks, if not three weeks.

THE COURT: So you want to file a brief in three weeks or so.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes.

THE COURT: And then Mr. Bice will have three or four weeks to file a brief, and then you'll file another brief, then I'll have a hearing. So if we're talking about 60 days or 75 days or even 90 days, I think it's going to fall in the same realm as this in-camera review of the Jacobs drive that I'm going to have to now do. So if you want to file a motion, I'm happy to discuss it with you if that's what you want to do --

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's what we're asking.

THE COURT: -- and allow you a little bit of time before you produce those documents. I've already made a determination you should produce them. You said you're not going to. I said, okay, that's bad, I'm going to sanction you. So if you still don't want to produce them, that's okay,

I understand, but it's part of the analysis I go through when I get to the sanctions hearing. Like I said before, I've got to balance those issues.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor. And so

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor. And so with the time frame the Court's provided, certainly 60 to 90 days, I think that's certainly acceptable. We would ask that the stay be extended for that time period. And we --

THE COURT: And the only thing you're asking to be stayed is my holding the sanctions hearing.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I'm asking the Court to stay two things, to stay the sanctions hearing during that time period -- we would actually like -- we think that the appropriate order of discussion would be the jurisdictional hearing first. Because if the Court is --

THE COURT: No. We're doing the sanctions hearing first.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, Your Honor, at a minimum, then, we would ask that if the Court is unwilling to consider doing the sanctions hearing second, then we would ask that the Court do these two hearings simultaneously.

THE COURT: That may happen. Or I may do them seriatim --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- because they have overlapping issues.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- there's a reason for that,

and the reason for that -- not, you know, just because we'd like to do it that way, the sanctions analysis is going to be driven, we believe, by a substantial -- in a substantial way by the jurisdictional analysis. And in fact if we're correct that jurisdiction against Sands China is not appropriate, that will have a substantial impact, we would hope, on this Court's decision as to whether or not any sanction is appropriate. And so to do it otherwise would not be fair to Sands China under the circumstances.

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THE COURT: Okay. There's going to be a sanction, because I already had a hearing and I made a determination there is a sanction. The question is the level of the sanction, which is what I'm doing the hearing, and that relates to the balancing that I have to do under Rule 37, because you guys decided not to comply with an order after you had notice and an opportunity to have everything that I wanted to consider related to those documents. And it's okay. I issued an order, it was in writing, you guys decided not to In fact, some of the sanctions that were required appeal it. under it were paid. And then we had an issue that you just didn't want to comply, and so you redacted additional stuff. And that's okay. You can make that decision. But making those decisions have consequences, and that's what my sanctions hearing is about.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I understand. I

want to make sure it's clear for the record we just didn't decide not to comply with that order. There were compelling reasons which we hope this Court would take into account in any sanctions hearing whenever it's decided.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And so with respect to this process we are simply saying that the jurisdictional issues and analysis will certainly have implications on any sanction this Court might consider. We think that that is the most appropriate way. If not having the sanctions hearing second, that at a minimum these should happen seriatim as you've said you were willing to consider. We would ask the Court to do that, and we would ask that the Court, since the Court hasn't made a ruling on sanction -- it doesn't sound like the Court is willing to do that until it's heard, have the actual hearing.

THE COURT: I'm not going to choose the type of sanctions until I have the hearing and have the opportunity to have the evidence I need to make the balancing determination that I always make under Rule 37.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So that is -- we're requesting that the Court continue the stay with respect to the -- any sanctions hearing whether or not any sanctions occur before that time -- it sounds like the Court is going to do that -- and at a minimum that these hearings occur simultaneously or

seriatim -- in seriatim, as you say, and that -- I think that's our position, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks.

Mr. Peek, you don't want to add anything?

MR. PEEK: No, Your Honor, because this really is a Sands China issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bice, anything you want to say?

MR. BICE: I apologize Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to say anything?

MR. BICE: I do. I apologize.

Your Honor, if this argument sounds familiar to the Court, it certainly sounds familiar to us, because it's -- basically it's a repeat of Ms. Glaser's position long ago before we knew about the documents being in Las Vegas. As you'll recall, she wanted -- please, we implore you, please hold this evidentiary hearing before what we knew were documents that hadn't been disclosed. And you're basically getting the same pitch today. This motion, Your Honor, on a stay is moot. The Supreme Court has rejected their contention about the MPDPA as being a defense to their production. As you accurately point out, they have made a choice to violate the Court's order, and what they're saying is, well, we think that we have a sufficient excuse. Well, that's not simply a question about what's going to be the degree of sanction,

because we certainly dispute that. In fact, we're going to show you as part of that evidentiary hearing the representations that they made to the Supreme Court about what your order meant completely neutered it. And so we don't think that this was some, well, we had compelling reasons under the MPDPA to do it; their position to the Supreme Court was your order actually only applied to documents that were already in the United States, the very same documents that they previously told you the MPDPA doesn't even apply to once they're in the United States.

That's why this issue about the sanctions is appropriate and it's important and it goes to -- it has to precede the evidentiary hearing, because one of the things obviously we're going to be seeking are some evidentiary sanctions as a result of that issue based upon the personal jurisdiction debate.

And so the basis -- there is no basis to stay. This Court is going to schedule the evidentiary hearing on this issue when it has time to do that, and that's when it should be addressed. Because we have an additional issue coming back to this issue about the in-camera inspection. As the Court knows, one of the issues in the other writ where the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court and said that you have to look at these things --

THE COURT: They agree with Mr. Peek.

MR. BICE: They agree with Mr. Peek.

THE COURT: For the record, they agreed with Mr.

Peek.

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MR. BICE: They did. And will acknowledge that no matter how badly it --

MR. PEEK: Does it really hurt, Todd?

MR. BICE: -- causes me pain in the throat, they did agree with Mr. Peek's position on this. I acknowledge that, Your Honor. But what they also said was -- because you'll -as Her Honor will recall, our principal position on this was that they had long ago waived any claim of privilege. And the Supreme Court even made the point in it's Footnote Number 9 that the District Court is going to have to -- that being Her Honor, is going to have to make findings of fact about that So as part of the sanctions hearing -- and again, very issue. we think that this may moot much of the in-camera review that Her Honor is planning to undertake, but that's obviously up to Her Honor. But, nonetheless, as part of that sanctions hearing that the Court is planning we also think that we have to have a hearing on our position, the very first position we advanced on this issue, is that they long ago waived any entitlement to claim privilege regardless of who was the holder. The Supreme Court in its decision merely addresses who can, quote, unquote, "waive the privilege" or who can use these documents affirmatively assuming that there is a

privilege to assert. Our point, as the Court will recall, was they don't even have the ability to assert that, because they've acknowledged that they knew about these documents for a long, long time, and in fact they've always insinuated, and the Court's even made comment on it, that they somehow they knew what he took with him at the time of his departure, and did nothing about it for more than a year, which under analogous federal caselaw the courts have consistently said that is a complete and wholesale waiver of any claim of privilege.

So we're going to be asking the Court as part of that evidentiary hearing about the sanctions aspect to be holding an evidentiary privilege also -- or an evidentiary hearing also about the waiver that we maintain existed, which we also think would moot much of the Court's need to conduct that in-camera review. And that's why we would ask to do that more promptly, rather than later, because it might streamline the process and it might save the Court some time on it. Because if the Court agrees with us on that waiver issue, the question about in-camera review would not be necessary.

So at this point, Your Honor, this motion for stay is moot and it just needs to be denied.

THE COURT: We're really talking about scheduling now.

MR. BICE: Exactly. That's right. But I don't want

there to be -- I mean, the concern I have is that they try and 2 use -- get you to say, well, I'm going to grant a stay. There's no basis for a stay. The Supreme Court rejected their 3 position, and now --5 THE COURT: Well, I have a stay on merits discovery. 6 MR. BICE: What's that? 7 THE COURT: I still have a stay on merits discovery. 8 MR. BICE: That's true. I thank the Court for its 9 time. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, anything else? 11 MR. RANDALL JONES: Just briefly, Your Honor. I'm 12 compelled to just disagree with most of what Mr. Bice said about what we've done and what --13 14 THE COURT: Except that Mr. Peek was right. 15 MR. RANDALL JONES: Except for Mr. Peek was right. 16 I would agree with that part of his discussion. 17 Your Honor, without wanting to argue the issues of 18 sanctions or not, that's not the issue today, although certainly that's a subject of the issue today. We certainly 19 20 disagree that we have waived any rights to privilege, and --21 THE COURT: Don't you think we should brief it? 22 know we've briefed it a little before, but, instead of me 23 pulling those briefs out of the file again, don't you think you'd rather brief it again?' 24 25 MR. RANDALL JONES: We certainly would, Your Honor.

And that's part of what we're asking and one of the justifications for extending the stay before the Court does anything with respect to sanctions.

And I have to just make the point that I completely disagree with Mr. Bice about truncating the in-camera review process. I think the Supreme Court was very clear about that.

THE COURT: I don't get to do that. I have been told to do it, so I'm going to do it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's the way I understood it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Second time I've been told to do an incamera review, and the last time took me a month of working on that only with the exception of everything else.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I don't want to belabor the point, but to suggest that we have waived that privilege when the Supreme Court specifically said not only have we not waived that privilege, that this Court needs to actually go and look at those documents to see where the privilege was properly asserted.

THE COURT: All right. So the motion is denied as to stay.

But as to the scheduling issues that it relates to I concur with Mr. Jones that it is important that the in-camera review and additional briefing occur prior to the sanctions hearing occurring.

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I am going to conduct the sanctions hearing prior to starting the jurisdictional hearing, but it may be right before. I'm not planning to have a whole lot of time between those, but part of that is going to be my schedule and the status of the briefing that I get. I don't have the briefing yet, so I'm not going to commit to how exactly I'm going to schedule them, but my thought is to do it right before, because I've got witness issues and I've got common issues, and I want to have those people all here at one time, okay. So that's my thought process.

So I'm going to be getting briefs related to the issues on the sanctions, Mr. Jones, you said in about three weeks, we're going to set a hearing there, and then you and Mr. Bice will agree to whatever briefing schedule you do, and then I will move the hearing to accommodate that briefing schedule.

I'm going to get briefs, Mr. Bice, from you on the waiver of the privilege issue. Then you and Mr. Jones are going to agree on whatever schedule you agree to, and then we'll set the hearing for that.

How am I going to get the documents to do the incamera review?

MR. BICE: I'm going to allow Ms. Spinelli to address that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They're on some -- they're in the cloud;

right?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes.

MS. SPINELLI: Your Honor, they're with the Court's vendor, Advance Discovery, so I don't know if -- I notice you do electronic document review for your exhibits, but we could arrange, obviously, a connection with the Court, or --

THE COURT: I need access.

MS. SPINELLI: Yes.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor --

THE COURT: I need whatever the code is.

MS. SPINELLI: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: May I just make a suggestion?
Why don't we get with counsel and try to figure out a protocol that's acceptable to both sides about how we get those documents to the Court. Does that make sense?

THE COURT: Well, but aren't they stored electronically right now?

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's my understanding. They are with Advance Discovery.

THE COURT: I can review them electronically.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I'm just saying, because we haven't talked to Advance Discovery to find out the best way to do that. If we -- if we work together, I think that we could come up with a protocol that's acceptable to both parties, and we can talk to the Court and find out what your

tech people the best way to do this.

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THE COURT: Well, it won't be that hard. I just need the access code.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I don't think so, either, but —
THE COURT: Here's the other two things that I need
in conjunction with that. Because it's been so long since
this motion was originally brought, I need a new version of
the privilege log. I would prefer it in a Excel spreadsheet
format. If you give it to me in Word, I can live with it. I
will not take it in .pdf or paper, because I have to be able
to create my own column as I go through and do the in-camera
review to make a ruling on each of the documents as I review
them. So I need that privilege log in Excel or Word.

With respect to the player list, since there are people that I do not know who are included in the documents, I need an identification of who they are and what their positions are, and if they are counsel, to have that specifically identified and what the scope of their work was. That player list needs to be exchanged so that both sides have the opportunity to view it. I have in prior cases had litigation or arguments about whether people on the players list really were who they said they were. And I anticipate that that may be an issue that we have to address.

MR. PEEK: May I have a moment, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. You can have as many moments as

1 you want, Mr. Peek. 2 (Pause in the proceedings) MR. RANDALL JONES: Mr. Peek raises a question I 3 4 guess of the breadth of the player list is that there are only 5 certain documents in which they objected to an assertion of 6 privilege that are at Advance Discovery. And so --7 MR. BICE: That's not true. We gave some examples of the -- when we filed the motion --8 9 THE COURT: That was my recollection. That was why 10 I was relieved to be able to find a way to make a wholesale 11 decision, which the Supreme Court disagreed with. So I'm 12 going to go through and do an --13 So they're objecting to all of those MR. PEEK: 14 documents upon which we claim a privilege --15 THE COURT: That's what I've always understood. 16 MR. PEEK: -- as opposed to specific ones on the 17 log. 18 THE COURT: That's why I told you I thought this 19 would be a very difficult review for me, because I've always thought I was reviewing it all. 20 21 MR. PEEK: Yeah. I thought that was just a smaller 22 subset of that, Your Honor. So --23 THE COURT: Why do you think I tried to take the 24 easy way out, Mr. Peek?

MR. PEEK: What's that?

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THE COURT: Never mind. I didn't say anything.

So, Mr. Jones, how long to get me that stuff and come up with some sort of plan for us to figure out how I'm going to perform my obligations of doing an in-camera review?

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MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, can we -- because I'm not the tech person, can we have -- today's Thursday -- can we have -- is it acceptable to the Court to give us week so we can get with our tech people and --

THE COURT: Why don't we give you two?

MR. RANDALL JONES: That would even be better.

THE COURT: Okay. So can I have a status check with you on August 28th for us to talk about the followup to my incamera review. The one thing I would like exchanged at least two days prior to that hearing is your player list, because I think the player list, if there's going to be motion practice related to the identity of those persons or their scope of their work, I want to do it sooner, rather than later, and I want to do it before I start the in-camera review.

MR. RANDALL JONES: At 8:30, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, please. That's what time I try and start my calendars.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Just wanted to verify.

THE COURT: And I apologize to Judge Earl's calendar, which starts at 9:00, because I only had two things this morning.

1	MR. PEEK: So 8:00 o'clock on the 28th?		
2	THE COURT: 8:30, Mr. Peek.		
3	MR. PEEK: 8:30 on the 28th.		
4	MR. PISANELLI: Your Honor, I've got something at		
5	10:00, but can		
6	THE COURT: You don't have to come.		
7	MR. PISANELLI: 8:30 is fine. Any way that we could		
8	know that we go first, since it's just a status conference?		
9	THE COURT: I only have one or two things every		
10	Thursday. It just seems		
11	MR. PISANELLI: Yeah. But if Mr. Peek is on that		
12	one in front of us, that could push us way back into the		
13	afternoon.		
14	MR. PEEK: I'm here on the 29th, I think, Your		
15	Honor.		
16	THE COURT: Are you?		
17	MR. PEEK: On Parametric.		
18	THE COURT: Yeah, probably. Mr. Peek's very happy		
19	with the decision on the privilege for that case, too.		
20	Okay. Anything else? And the DISH Network case.		
21	MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I take it at the		
22	status check that we will have more discussion about		
23	potentially scheduling some hearings in the future.		
24	THE COURT: I'm going to have to get into the		
25	in-camera review before I know when I'm going to be able to		

schedule the hearing, because part of what I've been saying 1 the whole time is those documents that are part of the Jacobs material, if they're going to be released, need to be released 3 prior to the jurisdictional hearing in time for the plaintiff's counsel to be able to review those documents, digest it, and determine if they're going to use them. If 7 they're protected by the privilege, they won't get them. 8 if some of them aren't, they get them ahead of the hearing, and then we're going to have to have a discussion. So until I know how long it's going to take me to do that in-camera 10 review that I've been ordered to do -- and I cannot at this 11 12 point, given my CityCenter trial, just set a month aside like 13 I did the last time was ordered to do this and do it, so it's 14 going to take longer. 15 16 I had is we've submitted competing orders on the summary

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, the only other issue judgment motion.

> THE COURT: I'd love to see them in Word format. MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, we will provide

20 that.

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THE COURT: We've only received one side. So if you would both email them to us.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We submitted ours and provided a copy to the --

MR. BICE: We will get ours to you today, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: If you would both email them to me in Word format.

MR. BICE: We will.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, there was also -THE COURT: Because if I decide I don't like your
order, I cut and paste and change.

MR. RANDALL JONES: There was -- there was a motion to seal, also, and also --

THE COURT: There is a motion to seal and a motion to undesignate as confidential. I was holding that for last.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's the only thing that I'm aware of that still needs to be addressed.

THE COURT: The motion to seal is granted.

The motion to unseal is denied at this time without prejudice to renew it at a later point in time after I finish the jurisdictional hearing. At this point I'm going to leave it sealed.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, my question would be is the protocol -- we presume the protocol is still in place, and we would --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We simply -- if they would sit down with us and have a meet and confer, it may make that motion moot. So we would --

THE COURT: It may.

MR. BICE: Yeah. we

MR. BICE: Yeah, we agree that the protocol is in place, but, unfortunately, every document is designated as confidential in disregard of the order.

THE COURT: I know, Mr. Bice. I know. And I have not at this point gone through and parsed which ones should or should not. At some time, unfortunately, I'm going to probably have to do that if you don't reach an agreement.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, I don't appreciate Mr. Bice's comment "in disregard of the order." We disagree with that statement, as you can imagine.

THE COURT: All right. So some day we're all going to get together and have a nice discussion and work this out. In the meantime, I look forward to seeing you in two weeks at a status check. Have a nice day.

If we receive the remittitur before then, Mr.

Morris, then I will address on fairly short notice the issue related to the fifth claim for relief in the current second amended complaint as against Mr. Adelson.

MR. MORRIS: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:34 A.M.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

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CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN C. JACOBS,	Case No.: Dept. No.:	
	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.:
v.		ORDER OF

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,

Defendants.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT SANDS CHINA, LTD.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND PLAINTIFF'S COUNTERMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A-10-627691

Hearing Date: July 29, 2014
Hearing Time: 8:30 a.m.

AND RELATED CLAIMS

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Before the Court is Defendant Sands China, Ltd.'s ("SCL") Motion for Summary Judgment on Personal Jurisdiction (the "Motion") and Plaintiff Steven C. Jacob's Countermotion for Summary Judgment (the "Countermotion"). Each side agrees that the stay directed by the Nevada Supreme Court does not preclude this Court from resolving the jurisdictional issue by way of summary judgment. Accordingly, on July 29, 2014, the Court heard oral argument and considered all briefing on the Motion and Countermotion and now, being fully informed, and good cause appearing therefor:

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THE COURT RULES as follows:

- 1. Because the Court believes there are genuine issues of material fact, the Court needs to conduct an evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact on the issues of general, specific, and transient jurisdiction with respect to SCL as has been directed by the Nevada Supreme Court.
- 2. For the purposes of general jurisdiction, issues of fact remain including, nonexclusively, the location of the SCL board meetings, where the officers were conducting their business, and where the oversight of day-to-day activities was occurring to make a determination as to where SCL was at home.
- For the purposes of specific jurisdiction, issues of fact remain including, nonexclusively, where SCL's decision-making process occurred, the delivery of that decision-making process, and the impact of the delivery of that decision-making process in Nevada.
- 4. For the purposes of transient jurisdiction, issues of fact remain including, nonexclusively, the extent and nature of Michael Leven's responsibilities and day-to-day activities on behalf of SCL, as he is the individual that was served with Summons and Complaint in this matter.

THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

- 1. Defendants' Motion is DENIED without prejudice; and
- Plaintiff's Countermotion is DENIED without prejudice.

DATED: OOUS 114

THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT-COURT

Respectfully submitted by:

24 PISANELLI BICE PLIC

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James J. Pisanelli, Esq., #4027 Todd L. Bice, Esq., #4534

Debra L. Spinelli, Esq. #9695

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1 TRAN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 * * * * * 5 6 STEVEN C. JACOBS, CASE NO. A-10-627691 7 DEPT. NO. Plaintiff, 8 vs. Transcript of Proceedings 9 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP, SANDS 10 CHINA LTD, 11 Defendants. 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT 13 JUDGE 14 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELEASE OF DOCUMENTS FROM ADVANCED DISCOVERY ON THE GROUNDS OF WAIVER; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ON 15 DEFICIENT PRIVILEGE LOG ON OST THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2014 16 APPEARANCES: 17 18 For the Plaintiff: JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESO. TODD L. BICE, ESQ. 19 JORDAN T. SMITH, ESQ. DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ. 20 For the Defendants: 21 J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ. 22 MARK JONES, ESQ. 23 RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, DISTRICT COURT TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ 24 25 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2014 8:30 A.M.

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THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Peek. How are you today?

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MR. PEEK: Good morning.

6 THE COURT: Mr. Morris called to say he had to be 7 down with Judge Denton, so he was unable to join us and 8 asked us to proceed without him. So, we're here related to some motions that the plaintiffs have filed and I report that I have made absolutely no progress on your case since 11 I've been in the pretrial process of CityCenter. taken the boxes home several times, but I have not gotten 12 13 to them as part of what I'm trying to do with the other 14 case. I keep hoping I'll get to them, but I don't.

MR. PISANELLI: I know that feeling of taking the work home and never quite getting it.

THE COURT: I've got a Yukon and I can only put so much in it and then it comes back on Mondays. Most of it's been read, but you're at the end.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

THE COURT: So, --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Bring -- take my briefcase as well, Your Honor. That's about it.

THE COURT: Well it takes me two trips to load it with the boxes. So, all right. Mr. Pisanelli, are you

going to argue some motions this morning?

MR. PISANELLI: I am.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PISANELLI: Do you have a preference on how we begin?

THE COURT: I don't care which one we start with.

They're basically the same issue. They've been bad again.

Their privilege log is bad. It's taking too long. They're still bad, bad, bad.

MR. PISANELLI: Well, when you put it that way. You're kind of stealing my thunder

THE COURT: I was summarizing the argument.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

Your Honor, I know you hear -- I'm starting, by the way, privilege log deficiencies, and I know you hear this phrase so much you probably consider it to be a cliché at this point, but I'm going to use it anyway because it seems to fit the circumstances that if not know, when?

We know that there are consequences to failing to provide an adequate privilege log. We know it from when we were trained as lawyers just out of law school and we certainly know it from being trained by you in this courtroom. You have some very high standards for all of us to conduct ourselves and we all do. Sometimes it's lawyering, sometimes it's clienting, if that's a word, but

you understand my point. You set a high bar for us here in Business Court and we all -- and when I say we, I mean all of us, at both tables, do our best to try and comply with it.

We've fallen not a little short, about as short as your high standards that I can think of in any case I've ever --

THE COURT: I've had one that's worse.

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MR. PISANELLI: Really? Well, you see more of them than I do. This is as bad as I've gotten. In the totality of circumstances, not just the worst log, but when you take the entire dispute into consideration, that's when I think we get to the point of being comfortable with the fact that what we're asking for is rather harsh.

And I'm not going to repeat everything that's in the briefs, but I think it's important to point out just a couple of very quick facts of why it is not beyond the pale, it is not severe, and it is not overly harsh to say that the rule that you always apply, applies here. And that is that we start with when this log originally was produced, coupled with our very extensive objections, which followed only two weeks later and that's September 26, 2012.

You combine that fact, that we started in 2012, this thing was amended once, called a final log a couple of

months later in December 2012, and all that final really did, as you may recall, is took some stuff off it. Right? But it never addressed all of the deficiencies that we brought to their attention.

And so, we, for two years, were holding on to a log that does very little. It leaves a few clues, I'll give them that credit, here and there of what the actual document was. It leaves a few clues, here and there, of what the underlying premise was for the assertion of the privilege and then that's it.

And we heard, for two years now, Sands China stand behind it, for two years dealing with us. And now all the way up to only a couple of weeks ago before you, I think the quote, something to the effect of: We have carried our prime requirement that we provide a detailed privilege log.

So, we don't have to look to any of the cases that talk about a party that says: Okay, it was a bad first effort, Your Honor, but I fixed it and only two weeks had lapsed, only a month has lapsed, only two months have lapsed, but I fixed it. It was a good faith assertion and the first effort we see from some of the cases where leniency was the rule that was applied and then other times it was the timing of the correction that got some of the parties off the hook for their bad privilege logs.

But here, we have a disastrous one. I think you

may have characterized it as awful, being kind to them, and we had them standing behind stubbornly and defiantly for two solid years only to come in, at the end of the day, looking for the do over. And that's why I started this conversation with the concept that if not now, then when?

THE COURT: Well, sometimes when I give do overs, there are assessments of expenses that are related to it.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: And that may be part of what happens after I finish, if I ever get to it, the in-camera review.

MR. PISANELLI: Right.

THE COURT: And that's, I think, where the issue is -- because it's not necessarily a waiver just because their privilege log is awful, or was awful before they started trying to do a better job.

MR. PISANELLI: Yep.

THE COURT: But it's caused a lot of people a lot of work and this isn't' the first time in this case we've had something like this happen.

MR. PISANELLI: Right.

THE COURT: And so the question is: I understand what you're saying, but isn't the appropriate remedy some sort of recompense for the expense and time that everyone has had to go through?

MR. PISANELLI: But, I mean, how do you put that -

- let me start with the underlying premise. Of course you're right. All right. But we bring this log to your attention that says it may result in the waiver and the may, of course, is the definition that's the key word to all of it, it means you decide.

THE COURT: Judicial discretion.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah. Exactly. It's up to you. I'm not going to pretend it's anything other than your decision and I throw this last fact into context of why now is the time that it's something more than a just a writing a check that seems to be irrelevant to this -- to these parties because no matter how many checks they write for checks, nothing seems to change.

We have, as I've said, a terrible log. We have two years of defiance of standing behind it, but then look at what we've now learned. What was put on the log was so reckless that already, before you started your in-camera review, 50 percent --

THE COURT: Well, no I actually --

MR. PISANELLI: -- of them gone --

THE COURT: -- started it, Mr. Pisanelli.

Remember, I started it and then I said --

MR. PISANELLI: And then you had to stop.

THE COURT: -- it was awful.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

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THE COURT: And then we had a -- somebody decided to take a second look.

MR. PISANELLI: Yep. My point is only before we got any benefit of your work, 50 percent of the 3,000 pages are withdrawn. You have to put, I think, that into context: the timing, the stubbornness to correct, and how bad it was, how reckless -- reckless isn't even the right word. All right. These are skilled attorneys starting at MTO and moving through the roster of people whose fingerprints are on this. These are skilled people who knew what they were doing and before you have taken one document off it, they took 50 percent of the 3,000 page privilege log and said: Yeah, we shouldn't have done that.

So, I won't beat the dead horse. You know what my position is.

THE COURT: I do.

MR. PISANELLI: Today does present the circumstances where I think -- and just let me put the proposal out there and Your Honor, of course, can do with it as you please; but I think the fair proposal, in light of the totality of the circumstances, is that it's a two-step process on your in-camera review. You start at what the privilege log said and if that's not good enough, it's released. If it is good enough in your view, then the in-camera review of the document itself can be analyzed to see

if it should have been on there in the first place, but holding them responsible for what they put on that log in the first instance, I don't think is overly harsh. They didn't correct it. They knew what they were doing and now it's time to pay.

We can't get the two years, really three years, back. We can get some of our attorneys' fees back, and I understand your point, but we can't get the fact that they have stalled this case for three years now and we're still in a jurisdictional phase because we can't seem to get a good faith effort on --

THE COURT: And I still have to do an --

MR. PISANELLI: --

THE COURT: -- evidentiary hearing according to your writ.

MR. PISANELLI: You understand our frustrations. Sometimes --

THE COURT: Oh boy.

MR. PISANELLI: -- we've been boisterous about it. Sometimes we banged our head on the table, sometimes literally, other times figuratively, but you understand our frustration.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. PISANELLI: We think holding Sands China responsible for their own conduct and choices is not overly

harsh and that's all we ask of you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Jones.

Mr. Sorenson, I already handled your case. I'm done. I granted it.

MR. SORENSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I don't want to belabor this either. I think I understand what you're suggesting, but I do think it's important to point out a couple of things that I just think are inaccurate.

First of all, the privilege log, in it and of itself, I don't believe has delayed the evidentiary hearing, certainly not in any material way because there were other issues, as you well know, that had to do with many other writs, that had -- that were really the delay and the delay was as a result of stays that were issued by both this Court and the Supreme Court with respect to how certain things were handled, including discovery.

And I want to point out, you know, Mr. Bice has, I think to his credit, has acknowledged that the Munger Tolles law firm is a very good law firm.

THE COURT: But that's a really awful privilege log to come out of a very good law firm then. I don't know who they send it out to do, but it doesn't appear to have the quality of anybody, except for one firm, that I've ever seen before.

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MR. RANDALL JONES: And I --

THE COURT: And that's a local firm. Sorry.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I assume it's not our

firm, my --

THE COURT: Not yours.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- firm.

THE COURT: Not even a case you're involved in.

MR. RANDALL JONES: But, I do want to point out, in defense of Munger Tolles, and this is something that wed didn't really even get into until this whole issue came up after the Supreme Court ruled on the ruling that you had made about a class of persons -- Mr. Jacobs being allowed to take these documents because, at that point, Judge, --

THE COURT: Not being able to take them. That wasn't what I said.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I'm sorry. Being --

THE COURT: I said being able to review them --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- able to use them.

THE COURT: -- and use them.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I misspoke. That's certainly what I meant and I hope the Court understood what I meant, but the point is is that the privilege log became moot at that point as long as that ruling was out there until we heard what the Supreme Court had to do --

THE COURT: You're right.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- or had to say.

THE COURT: It did. Which is why --

MR. RANDALL JONES: So --

THE COURT: -- I asked when you came back if you wanted a second chance to look at it again and --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And --

THE COURT: -- initially, you guys said: No.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Initial -- well, what I said at the -- when you put that question to me, and I'm happy to stand here in front of you and tell you I said it and why I said it.

When the District Court asks me, and I've got a document which I have not had an opportunity to review, I have not had an opportunity to review the protocol in any detail and you ask me and you -- and I don't blame you for doing it, but you put me on the spot.

THE COURT: Of course I did.

MR. RANDALL JONES: What did you expect me --

THE COURT: That's my job.

MR. RANDALL JONES: What did you expect me to say? I had to stand on the document that our prior counsel had offered to the Court until I knew otherwise and as soon as we knew otherwise, we immediately informed the Court of that and took action to correct the situation.

But getting back to Munger Tolles and the

condition of that initial log. You know, it's easy in hindsight to say: You know, what a bad job they did and how faulty that log was, but if you go back in the context of the time and you look at what they were trying to do at the time they were trying to do it -- we're talking about close to 100,000 documents with a protocol that they did not devise. It was a protocol that was essentially put together Advanced Discovery on the categories and you have to remember, Judge, the way those categories were set up and this had to do with the issue of redaction f the documents is just one example.

If any document in a chain was privileged, whether it be the document that it -- that included an attachment that was not privileged, it had to be -- the only way you could designate it was privileged. If the attachment was privileged but the e-mail that it was attached to was not privileged, then you had to designate it as privileged.

And so, -- and they were working under, in my -- at least from my perspective, with 100,000 documents, pretty extreme time constraints with a protocol that did not allow them all the categories, that's why we had to revise it, to designate these documents in the appropriate fashion so that we didn't run into this mess later on.

And then the question becomes, and I certainly understand their argument, Mr. Jacobs' argument that:

Well, why didn't you fix it? And, as I said before, once you made your ruling that Mr. Jacobs was entitled to review these documents and that there was no privilege because of the class of persons that he was in, what's the point? Should we have -- when it came --

THE COURT: It still doesn't make sense to me and I know the Supreme Court has ruled, but he can't review a document that he's the recipient or the author of. That still doesn't make sense to me, but I understand the ruling.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I understand your statement, Judge, but the bigger point, as it relates to this motion, is: Are sanctions appropriate, of any kind, based upon the timing of these issues? And --

THE COURT: Right now.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And --

THE COURT: At this point, I agree with you they're not and I already told Mr. Pisanelli that. They may be some day.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I -- and because you made that comment, I certainly, at least, want to give you our side of the story or at least our initial side of the story because if this is an argument that needs to be made later, I don't want it to go un --

THE COURT: You know if it becomes an issue later

I'm going to give you an opportunity argue and if it becomes an issue where reviewing the now revised privilege log and revised redacted documents, most of which are sitting in the vestibule of my office at the moment, if it appears to me there has still been such a dramatic shortfall, I think it will be a significant hearing that we have.

If, on the other hand, it looks like that when you got a fresh shot at it that you had an opportunity to do the right thing and you did the right thing and what I've got back there and what's on the Advanced Discovery website are, in fact, arguably privileged, even though I may disagree with some of them that you designated, then it's a different discussion and I talk to Mr. Pisanelli about what the attorneys' fees are that he's incurred in the last few months as a result of this additional delay.

So, --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Judge, --

THE COURT: -- I've got these two different things that I might get, but I've got to finish the review before I can get there and I have to look at them more.

MR. RANDALL JONES: But that's -- I --

THE COURT: And I've told Mr. Pisanelli that. He doesn't like it, but I've got to look at them all.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well -- and, Your Honor, just

for the record, I don't like that you would still consider that there would be any appropriate sanction later on because I do think we've tried as best we could in good faith --

THE COURT: Do you know how many hours I spent on it the first time before you guys decided to redo it?

That's frustrating for a judge who already has limited time, Mr. Jones, to go through that effort, come in and have a discussion with counsel, and then have the recognition that something should be changed and I recognize that from your perspective, you were relying on what you believe to be very competent prior counsel and their work.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I appreciate that, Your Honor, and, by the way, I — we certainly understand you have a busy docket and I would hope that you would understand that we don't want to do anything to increase your burden unnecessarily and to the extent that there was — that did occur, and I certainly saw and heard some of your frustration at some of the hearings leading up to today on this subject, and I — as it relates to prejudice, I understand the Court has been — your — you've told us that you've been significantly inconvenienced and frustrated by this —

THE COURT: Well the biggest part is the --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- process.

THE COURT: -- window I have from when CityCenter decided they wanted to have that month continuance, that window was when I was going to look at these documents. Because of the hiccup, and then the secondary problem with Advanced Discovery when I went on and looked at all the documents and then all of a sudden they get changed in the middle of my review, which I know they still haven't explained, but it happened, has caused me to then have to find another window of time, which may not be until my December break of CityCenter, to be able to sit down there and look at these documents. And that's what the real issue is, Mr. Jones, is the timing issue.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And let me leave you with this. The point about the additional review is to -- and because there's a point they made about we want a do over and change the privilege log. As you know, we're not adding anything to the privilege log. We're taking things away from the log.

THE COURT: Absolutely. And I appreciate that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And so, the point being, hopefully, whatever time was lost by the Court in the review, will be made up by the reduction in the number of documents that you have to review, which we believe will be in excess of 50 percent based on, I think, what we're

seeing so far.

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THE COURT: That's why your brother convinced me to stop the review I was doing because he was telling me it was going to be 30 to 40 percent and then it went up a little bit. So, I'm very glad of the efforts. I'm glad to not have to review all of those documents, but it did cause this timing delay that is a significant issue.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So, I hope the Court would take into account the fact that we have substantially reduced the burden on the Court which would at least lesson the time that it would take to review the documents at the end of the day and I'll leave it at this, Your Honor.

Assuming, because of CityCenter, that we aren't able to get to this evidentiary hearing until well after you've had a chance to review the privileged documents and make your ruling, then there would be no actual privilege -- or prejudice to Mr. Jacobs because he will have had the documents in sufficient time to prepare himself for the evidentiary hearing.

And so, I would ask the Court to keep an open mind about those issues and consider those as well as giving us the opportunity at a later date, if the Court thinks it's necessary, to address this issue again.

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Pisanelli.

MR. PISANELLI: My final points, Your Honor, it always seems -- it's always interesting to me that the party that has caused delay, in this case three years, seems to say no harm, no foul. I guess time is on their side. If this takes 45 years to get to an actual hearing, no harm, no foul because you ultimately got what you fought so hard to get, which, by the way, should have been voluntarily disclosed.

So there is not a lot of credibility that should be given to an argument that they have not caused any prejudice in this case.

I'll leave Your Honor with two points. Counsel tells you that the log deficiencies for two years didn't cause the delay apparently because the other bad things they were doing caused delay. I'm not sure you can ever, with a straight face, say: Don't sanction me for this behavior because it would have happened anyway because I was so bad in the other behavior. They can't really take shelter from their own bad conduct which caused delay.

But, with that said, it's still not true. Recall part of this delay was the assertion of privilege that -- from Sands China, for these documents. They went to the Supreme Court and claimed privilege on documents, now 7,000 of which were never privileged in the first instance and

they released them after the delay had already occurred.

After the Supreme Court sent them back, they released 7,000 documents and said now that there was no causal connection between that improper assertion and the delay -- this current delay that we're suffering. That's just not true.

And, finally, Sands China says that they had no opportunity to review the privilege log and that's why up to only weeks ago they still stood behind them saying that they had met their objection. What is left from that story, Your Honor, is that we had two very important events prior to Sands China standing before you and saying that the log was good enough. One was extensive meet and confers very recently, just before that hearing.

And, most importantly, Ms. Spinelli wrote a thesis on the problems with this privilege log two years ago that were in the possession of all counsel, past and forward. And so to claim that they didn't have a chance to review the log isn't exactly accurate. They chose not to review the log. They chose to ignore all of the deficiencies set forth in Ms. Spinelli's letter and they chose to ignore what we brought to their attention in our meet and confer. To suggest they didn't have a chance, poor Sands China, I don't think really comports with the evidence of what we know here.

Taking all of this into consideration, Your Honor,

I won't beat the dead horse but I think now is the time. They've had more than enough chance. They've done what they can to continue to delay this process and we think there should be some consequences to it.

THE COURT: Okay. The motion is denied without prejudice through after I finish the review of the incamera and redacted documents that -- which the claim of privilege is based.

Is that -- did we basically combine bot of the arguments, Mr. Pisanelli, or do you want to argue the one separately?

MR. PISANELLI: No the other separate one really is a different issue.

THE COURT: I'm happy to listen.

MR. PISANELLI: So this argument of waiver, Your Honor, is founded upon three things, first of which, of course, is the Supreme Court's mandate from its recent opinion issued 2014, this year. The other is the undisputed fact of Jacobs' possession and how long he's had them, the manner in which he's possessed them, and the open notice. And the third, which is as important as those two, is the lack of evidence that was presented to you from Sands China to somehow rebut that they did not waive the attorney-client privilege as it relates to the documents in Mr. Jacobs' possession. You'll note --

THE COURT: You're talking about the delay between Mr. Campbell and Ms. Glaser's communications and disclosures related to the documents?

MR. PISANELLI: We're talking about the delay from when -- it really is prior to, but I'll just, for the sake of debate, say the delay starts when Mr. Jacobs is escorted to the border to leave Macau. That day is when this delay begins, because we know from Patty Glaser's own words, when she first communicates with Mr. Campbell, that she has had communications with people inside of her company that led her to believe that Mr. Jacobs has possession of documents. Her words. That she has, quote:

Reason to believe, based on conversations with existing and former employees and consultants of the company, that Jacobs, her word, had stolen company property, including, but not limited to, --

And then she focused on these investigative reports, which were apparently quite sensitive to them that they wanted back.

The exchange then starts with Mr. Campbell who tells her: Yes, I'll have them and I'll give you the originals back, but understand one thing, Mr. Jacobs, like other executives who have access to privilege communication, and he travels around the world and continues to possess those, and were keeping copies. She

doesn't like that and she complains that not only she wants all copies of the investigative reports back, but she also says that she wants everything back. In other words, she starts a letter writing campaign, a little chest pounding, but doesn't do anything about it.

So, the delay that I'm talking about, Your Honor, is starting from her claim to have actual knowledge that Jacobs is possessing something to standing here today to take an analysis of what did Sands China do between that time in 2010, as we stand here today, what did they do, as the law requires them, to somehow retrieve these documents back from Mr. Jacobs? The answer, at the end of the day, is nothing. They wrote some letters. The law tells us that's not good enough. They communicated: We want our stuff back. You stole them. That's not good enough.

They actually even filed, somewhere along the way, motions in limine not to use them in the evidentiary hearing, but you don't see a motion anywhere from Sands China over that entire period of time going all the way back to 2010 that they did anything about it.

What they did do --

THE COURT: Is have their friends at Las Vegas Sands file something.

MR. PISANELLI: Do you remember that?

THE COURT: I don't remember anything about it.

MR. PISANELLI: The first time Patty Glaser --1 2 THE COURT: Oh please. Please don't point at Mr. He's here for something else. 3 Kostrinksy. 4 MR. PISANELLI: And what a remarkable coincidence 5 that is. 6 So you remember it. Patty Glaser was in the front 7 row pretending not to be the puppet master on that motion because Sands --8 MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I'm going to 9 object. 10 MR. PISANELLI: -- didn't want to come up in front 11 12 13 MR. RANDALL JONES: These pejorative comments 14 about counsel are inappropriate and Mr. Pisanelli --15 THE COURT: Overruled. 16 MR. RANDALL JONES: -- likes to --17 MR. PISANELLI: Thank you. 18 MR. RANDALL JONES: -- do it. 19 THE COURT: Overruled. 20 MR. PISANELLI: And then the next time Sands China 21 came in here to sanction me and Todd Bice because we had 22 actually bate stamped the documents that they had already 23 disclosed, then Mr. Ma was in the back of the room, but 24 never coming across the bar to actually assert what their

company was obligated to assert as a retrieval of their

documents. It never happened in this case. So --

THE COURT: Well don't you think this goes to maybe if they ask for that affirmative relief there might be jurisdiction against them?

MR. PISANELLI: Of course that's the --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I was just --

MR. PISANELLI: -- reason they did it, but --

THE COURT: -- trying to make --

MR. PISANELLI: -- do they get to --

THE COURT: -- sure we all understand what the real reason is.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure. But there's a consequence to that choice, too, right? That we have a company who now claims that someone else was doing their bidding for them and they even tried to claim that -- I think it was the Teleglobe [phonetic] case that companies can do that. Interestingly enough, Teleglobe [phonetic] said the exact opposite. We can't ignore the corporate forum when one party wants to gain an advantage here, avoiding personal jurisdiction, and pretend like it's one company so that their parent can go in and make their fight.

There's one party who owns these documents. That party was a -- in the audience. They weren't a participant. They didn't come in here and ask you for any relief. In other words, they didn't do what the law

requires them to do. And so we stand here today with what has to be a concession that Sands China did nothing.

And so, the second part of the analysis then has to be: How long did they do nothing? Even if we give them credit for what their parent did, which really was only one motion that went nowhere, that was still a two month delay by their analysis. But the truth of the matter is they haven't shown anything, by way of evidence, of how long they've actually known.

Recall what I said at the beginning. Patty Glaser tells Don Campbell immediately when Steve Jacobs in 2010 is discharged that we want our stuff back. They then, in this case, cite to Patty Glaser and her statements, not sworn statements, her statements at this very podium to say that we didn't know until Colby Williams wrote a letter saying I have privileged material and immaterial information, they let them know. And they equate and ask Your Honor to assume that the date that Colby Williams discovers there may be privileged information is the same day that they discovered that we had, Mr. Jacobs had privileged information.

The question then has to be: What evidence do you have Sands China, what evidence have you presented to this Court, to prove that those are the same dates? Because it's inconsistent with Patty Glaser -- with what Patty

Glaser said a year earlier, two years earlier, or a year earlier, going all the way back to June of 2010.

Instead of giving the declaration from those past and former employees that she talked about in June of 2010, they ignore those. They don't even give a declaration from Patty Glaser herself. They simply give the in court statements at this podium when she said to you: Your Honor, we didn't know until Colby Williams sent that letter. I can give you some sworn testimony if you want it. All right. I want it. And I imagine Your Honor wants it.

Where is it? Where has Sands China met its evidentiary burden, as they're obligated to do, to show you two things: When it was when they knew that Steve Jacobs, like virtually every other executive in the world, is in the possession of documents that he, as you said, communicated with, on, he was a recipient of them, he was an author of some of them? Where is the evidence of when they knew that when they took him to the border with his laptop in hand that they didn't know it was on that laptop? Where's their evidence of that? It's absent. All we have is Patty Glaser's words.

And then the second step is where is the evidence of what they did to protect it? Their burden. We've cited cases from federal courts, from state courts, from the Nevada Supreme Court. It's everywhere. It's their burden

to show that this information remained confidential and that they were very protective of it and tried to get it back.

The second --

THE COURT: Don't you think the efforts of Las

Vegas Sands in trying to protect that information is

something that I should consider for purposes of the

evidentiary hearing as opposed for the waiver? Because we

have the same similar argument about: Okay, so we have Las

Vegas Sands still pulling all the strings here, which has

been your argument throughout.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: That's why I have additional evidence by what's happened in my courtroom --

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- about what's part of that jurisdictional argument. Isn't that how you are more effectively --

MR. PISANELLI: I think --

THE COURT: -- able to use that?

MR. PISANELLI: I think the answer, Your Honor, has to be both. It has to be both that the way they're — the parent is conducting their business in the jurisdiction has to be taken into consideration of whether that company is subject to jurisdiction of this Court, but we also have

to say that these documents, really that are at issue, which we haven't yet had to deal with yet, the documents in possession of Mr. Jacobs that are at issue of the very claims that we someday litigate, that has to be governed by Sands China's behavior.

If here is a privilege there, we have to decide:

Does Sands China try and set the default setting as no disclosure, unless there's an at issue waiver? Do they get that default setting if they never protected the documents in the first place? In other words, Sands China treated these documents from day one, when they escorted Mr. Jacobs to the border, they treated these documents as rightly in his possession. We know that because they didn't do anything to get them back.

As I said earlier, there's no evidence in the record of when they knew and so we have to assume that the evidence that they didn't give us, the evidence that Patty Glaser alluded to twice in a letter to Campbell and later in this courtroom, since they didn't present it to you, we have to conclude that it's bad for them and that all evidence will point to what we probably all assume, that they knew even before Jacobs was terminated what he possessed.

And so the second step then is: What did they do to protect it? If the answer is nothing, you've sat on

your hands for two years and done nothing, then the law tells us that there is a waiver there and Mr. Jacobs can defend himself with the same evidence that they're in possession of and show that these communications that go to the heart of the issues in this case are not only rightly in his possession, but can rightly be reviewed by his lawyers and presented to Your Honor or someday a jury to show that the claims and the defenses put forth by Sands China in this case are frivolous.

That's really, at the end of the day, what we're doing. It's that they're trying to hide the truth. Right? That's what a privilege is and I'm not making it up and counsel can be angry that that's pejorative, too, but the Supreme -- our Supreme Court and every court in the land says that we interpret attorney-client -- the assertion of the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it impedes the search for the truth and that's what we're doing here.

They are trying to take relevant and material evidence that will go the heart of this case, take them out of the picture so that the truth will be something short of a clean and clear picture. That's why every court that addresses privilege says: Very, very narrow interpretation. That's why every court that addresses this issue for parties like Sands China, that does nothing, nothing to protect the privilege, if it existed in the

first place, it's been waived.

So it' a very long-winded way of answering your question -- say that it's both. That it has to be taken into consideration as a factor for personal jurisdiction in this courtroom and there -- it should be released so that we can use that evidence both in the jurisdictional debate and the merits debate.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Well, Mr. Pisanelli is right about one thing. He is right. I am angry. I'm angry when they try to take the law, as I certainly understand it, and has been interpreted by every judge and the Discovery Commissioner --

THE COURT: Well but here's --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- that I've been in front of

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THE COURT: Here's the deal, Mr. Jones. Do you know who tried to get the documents back from Mr. Jacobs? Do you know who it was? It was Justin Jones. Remember? Justin filed -- well, you weren't here yet. Steve remembers. It was Justin Jones because we had a stay in place and we had some issues, so he filed a separate lawsuit.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand -- I've seen the record. I've read the record.

THE COURT: On behalf of Las Vegas Sands, not Sands China.

MR. RANDALL JONES: This was totally appropriate under the circumstances.

THE COURT: And why?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Because in those documents, Your Honor, were documents that related to privilege between Las Vegas Sands and Mr. -- and other parties.

So there were -- in other words, Las Vegas Sands had a dog in that fight.

THE COURT: Well, sure. They had the drive at their office.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, they had a dog in the fight because they had privileged documents they wanted to protect, but in addition to that, less than a month later, on September 28th, Las Vegas -- or Sands China, Limited, filed its own motion with this Court and you brought up an issue that Mr. Pisanelli had to admit because you, essentially, put it to him that the reason that Sands China was hesitant initially to get into that fight is because they didn't want to have to play the game of gothca with Mr. Jacobs and his counsel.

So, -- and the Court certainly understood --

THE COURT: I recognize that.

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MR. RANDALL JONES: So, you have a party who has standing to bring that motion who brings and we -- I'm certainly happy to go through that timeline because I think that timeline not only belies everything that Mr. Pisanelli has said, it shows that Mr. Pisanelli more so, in my opinion, than his predecessor counsel, directly violated the rules that I think I'm supposed to comply with.

Well let me ask you, Your Honor. Am I to be -understand from you, and I've been in this situation with you before on both sides of this issue, that I can receive privileged documents from a third party or my client, for that matter, and that I can keep these documents and I can call up the other sides and say: I've got some of your documents. I'm not going to tell you what they are, how many they are, but I can tell you this. I've looked at them a little bit and I -- enough to determine there are privileged documents in here and even though you've demanded a four -- excuse me, eight months before that if that client has any documents of my client, that you give them back immediately, even though that's happened, I get to tell the other attorney: Look, I've got these privileged documents. I don't know how many there are in there, but I'm going to keep them. And --

THE COURT: You and I both know there's ethical

issues there --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, there are.

THE COURT: -- and Nevada has not adopted clawback as part of its --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well --

THE COURT: -- rules and --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- what Nevada has adopted --

THE COURT: -- until Nevada has adopted clawback, there is a very gray ambiguity there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, Judge, we have the --

THE COURT: But there's a --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- Merits and Sitive

[phonetic] case that says what a duty of a lawyer is under
these circumstances and I certainly don't believe that in
this case that duty was followed. In addition to
professional -- Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4B,
which also requires full disclosure.

Now, what did my client get? Let's talk about his timeline. That's an absurdity. It -- all you've got to do is read the letter that Ms. Glaser sent. She said: We think you have -- we have reason to believe you have three reports and it may have other stuff. May, don't know, but may. But if you have those three reports, we want them back and, by the way, if you have anything else, give it back to us.

So, counsel's on notice. Counsel sends a letter. This is November 23rd of 2010. Counsel sends a letter and says: I don't know what you're talking about. I haven't even had a chance to talk to my client, but I'll look into it and let you know. And he writes back and says: Well, I do apparently have one report but I'm keeping it. I'll give you the original, but I'm keeping a copy and I'll talk to him about other stuff, but -- and this is where Mr. Pisanelli has the audacity to say that we disclosed all of these documents where Mr. -- relying on Mr. Campbell's statement that -- and, by the way, I wouldn't be surprised if he has other documents. Terminated employees, in my experience, often, often being the operative word here, have a multitude of documents they keep. So they -- we may have more.

That is blatantly not sufficient under the Merits and Sitive [phonetic] case.

Now, I'll give Mr. Campbell the benefit of the doubt that he didn't know what other documents were had because we know in July, July 8th of 2011, Mr. Williams sent an e-mail confirming that they now understood from documents they received a week before. So the week of July 1st, in his e-mail, he says: I've got 11 gigs of ESI and I started looking at some of it and I realized it was privileged and I stopped looking at it because Mr. Campbell

and Mr. Williams are good lawyers and they knew they were risking being disqualified from that case as, by the way, you admonished -- since they like to point at lawyers, you admonished these lawyers that if they wanted to go and look at this stuff while these motions were pending, they were risking being disqualified.

THE COURT: I did tell them that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, you did. And guess what they didn't do, at least allegedly, unless Mr. Pisanelli wants to get up here and admit something to the Court? They didn't look at them.

So, what has happened with this disclosure?

Nothing. We have a motion by my client, Sands China, within three months of having this issue and, by the way, there were at least three meet and confers by August 3rd of 2011 about this issue --

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, Ms. Glaser stood here probably fifteen times and told me there was no way she was producing any documents and no way she was doing anything until I resolved the Motion to Dismiss.

I don't know if you know the history, but it was -

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, I don't know the history like you do. I certainly try to get caught up on the history, but with respect to this issue of whether

or not they complied with their duty, Mr. Pisanelli wants to --

THE COURT: No, I --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- turn the duties around.

THE COURT: -- understand they have duties. You both have duties. And it's a --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And it's --

THE COURT: -- complex issue and the problem in this case is I had somebody who didn't want to participate in that process.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, you've addressed that issue. You addressed that issue, what? About two years ago now. And I understand the Court still has concerns about that issue, that is not what we're talking about today.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Ms. Glaser said, as I understood it, after July 8th of 2011, they did look into what Mr. Jacobs may have taken, we have a different word for what he did, taken from the company. And we had no knowledge of ESI having been taken from the company until after Mr. Williams, Colby Williams, sent that e-mail on July 8th.

And, by the way, as you may recall, he said they think they have 11 gigabytes of documents, undefined. On

May 6th, I think, is when they sent their original disclosures and they have a paragraph that says: Oh, by the way, in addition to about 237 documents, which were all kind of plain vanilla stuff, we also have some ESI. Didn't say what it was, didn't say how much it was, until July 8th and they were only off by about 32 gigs. Instead 11 gigs, I think it was 44 gigs it ultimately ended up being, without any description of what it was, how they got it, when they got it, what was privileged or -- excuse me, other than the fact that it apparently -- some of it was privileged, which is in direct violation of Nevada Supreme Court precedent, the *Merits* [phonetic] case as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct.

So, if anybody should be outraged here it should be my client. You can't shift the burden, which is all they want to do.

And here's the dilemma we are faced with, Judge. There were some mistakes made. There were some mistakes made early on in the discovery process by my client. The Court has addressed those mistakes, but -- through an evidentiary hearing and this Court has said we're going to deal with that at some point in time, but what's -- the problem we're facing, and I understand Mr. Pisanelli's strategy and Mr. Bice's strategy, but it's to essentially take events that happened in the past and relive them every

single hearing we're in front of you on and to try to say:
These guys are bad guys, they can never be reformed, and
we're going to hold it against them until the end of the
case.

And Mr. Pisanelli, I remember one of the first cases I got here in and he made some pejorative counsel about new counsel. I'm sure these are just the new people on the block on a long string of bad counsel that they've had and they'll be gone shortly thereafter. Well guess what?

THE COURT: I just smiled because I knew you guys were going to look at it with a fresh set of eyes.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And we did, Judge, and we're still here and we are trying to make sure -- and I'm not -- I'm telling you right now in open court we're not perfect and we're probably going to make some mistakes in the future, but I can guarantee the Court this. We are going to do everything we can to make sure we do it right and if we make a mistake, we're going to do everything we can to bring it to your attention immediately and to correct it.

And if -- I hope, I hope the Court has enough experience with me and my brother and Mr. Peek and Mr. Morris to give us some benefit of the doubt that we are going to comply with our ethical obligations and our duties to the Court and to opposing counsel and to the opposing

party, and we are going to do what we can to make sure that we comply with the rules and mitigate any errors that may have been made in the past, which I believe we have done and I would ask this Court. Do not let Mr. Pisanelli turn the rules on their head and make it my client's burden for something they were remiss at.

And to suggest, in spite of the lengthy case law we've suggested -- or showed to the Court otherwise, to suggest that the alleged three month delay from July 8th to September 28th or so is sufficient to have created a waiver is an absurdity.

First of all, three months, we've got cases we've cited where they went a couple of years and the Court made reference to the fact that in those cases where the parties agreed not to review the documents during the interim period, which is exactly what happened here, there could be no waiver because there was an agreement by counsel. In this case, Mr. Williams and Mr. Campbell, who we trusted when he told us he wasn't going to review the documents, we believed tehm.

And so there was -- and we told them, after three meet and confers where we couldn't reach an agreement about getting the documents back, and they agreed to continue to abstain from reviewing the documents, we would file the appropriate motions, which happened by September 28th in the

case of Sands China. It happened in early September in the case of Las Vegas Sands.

know, there was an interim order that said you're not going to look at those documents until we get some further direction from the Supreme Court. And then we had the Advanced Discovery protocol in place by December. To suggest that during that time, from July 8th when we actually knew the extent of the documents, to then suggest there's a wholesale waiver of all the privilege of all those documents, when they agreed never to look at those documents without further order of the Court, and then we have an order imposing a prohibition on them reviewing them, is an absurdity and turns the rules on their head.

And if that's the rule, then I assume I can tell Ms. Bulla next time my client gets documents from the opposing party that are privileged, that, by the way, Judge Gonzalez told me I don't have to give those back to you and I can look at them. That is what Mr. Pisanelli is suggesting. And if so, I can't wait to get a case with Mr. Pisanelli where his client's documents are provided to me by my client that include all kinds of privileged documents.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Pisanelli, do you want to wrap up quickly?

MR. PISANELLI: Sands China doth protest too much,

Your Honor. We hear lots of arguments about the Merits

[phonetic] decision. The Merits [phonetic] decision

doesn't have anything to do with this case. The Merits

[phonetic] decision has to do whether there's lawyer

misconduct on not disclosing to the other side what you may

have. It doesn't even touch upon the issue of the burdens

of the party who claims a privilege to produce evidence

about when they knew and what they did to retrieve it.

It's completely a red herring that has nothing to do with

anything.

It's also interesting to point out that in one breath, they say that merits controls this issue, that there was attorney misconduct. I'm not sure if he's saying it was me or Don and Colby, but is he upset that we didn't tell them every document we had? Because I think if I did tell them every document that we had, we necessarily would have had to read those documents and then we'd be hearing a different argument: How dare you read the documents and now we want you disqualified. So the point of it is it's a circular argument that has nothing to do with Sands China. It's Sands China's behavior that is the focus of our motion.

And so, I will repeat, I heard a lot of argument.

I heard a lot of anger coming from Sands China, but this is what I didn't hear. Where is their evidence about when they knew what Steve Jacobs had? Silence. Where is the even argument -- where is the point to the record of when they came to this courtroom to retrieve it? Silence.

Instead, he pointed to you to two motions: A motion in limine, which is not a motion to retrieve their documents, and I think he overlooked a motion for sanctions that Sands China filed against us for alleged -- for using documents that were privileged but they seem to forget, you may remember that motion that there -- it was based upon document that they put in the record attached to their own motion and then tried to have us sanctioned for referencing their motion.

So, that's the totality of what they did to protect themselves. No evidence. Nothing to protect themselves.

The Supreme Court told us this year, Your Honor, at footnote 9, in this case, the following.

THE COURT: Yeah, because only one judge can have two writs issued against her on the same day. Same day.

MR. PISANELLI: We direct the District Court to make findings of fact and resolve whether Sands waived any privileges.

That's what they told you to do. In order to make

findings of fact and resolve whether Sands China waived any privileges, we needed to see Sands China's evidence of when they knew. It never came. All we had was reference to Patty Glaser's argument in this courtroom. We needed to see where it was they came to this courtroom and asked for the documents to be returned. It never happened. There's only one conclusion available. It doesn't matter how loudly you yell, it doesn't matter how angry you get, there's only one conclusion available and that is that they waived.

If they think that Colby Williams, or Don
Campbell, or me, or Todd Bice, or Debbie Spinelli, or all
of us should somehow be sanctioned under the Merits
[phonetic] decision, then I invite them to file that motion
and we'll have that debate at the appropriate time. But
whether that happens or not, has nothing to do with whether
Sands China protected what they claim to be privileged
documents. The clear answer to that question is: No, they
did not.

THE COURT: And it's your position that in order to protect the documents, they would have had to file something in Nevada which would have caused them to submit to the jurisdiction of Nevada?

MR. PISANELLI: I think they had to do something and they did nothing. So I think they needed to come into

this courtroom, yes. Would that effort been dispositive as to the personal jurisdiction? I don't know. That's not before us now. It certainly would have been a subject of debate, but they did nothing.

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Yeah, it's -- and, again, the smartest person on our team, reminds us that in her letter to Don Campbell, Patty Glaser threatened that if I don't get my records back, I'm either coming to Las Vegas or Macau to get them back. They didn't go to Macau. Certainly no argument ever could have been made that by going to Macau to get relief from a Macau Court that they would have been -- subjected themselves to jurisdiction here or waiving some right not to subject themselves here. They didn't do anything. They didn't come to you. They didn't go to Macau. Didn't go anywhere.

So it's -- we're left with no evidence of when they knew and what has to be a conceded point that they did nothing.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm going to take this under submission. I need to think about it some more. I'm going to schedule it on October 24th on my chambers calendar for decision.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I just point out that the document that Ms. Glaser requested back was the one report that they admitted they had.

THE COURT: No, I know what report it is.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So if there's any argument of waiver, it's as to a couple of reports, period.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a nice day.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 9:25 A.M.

* * * * *

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the aboveentitled matter.

AFFIRMATION

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

CLERK OF THE COURT

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DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN C. JACOBS,

Plaintiff,

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation; SHELDON G. ADELSON, in his individual and representative capacity; DOES I-X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X,

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A627691-B DEPT NO.: XI

SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER

Date: Time:

AND ALL RELATED MATTERS.

On March 27, 2013, this Court entered an order requiring Defendant Sands China Ltd. ("SCL") to expand its search for documents responsive to Plaintiff's jurisdictional discovery requests to include documents held by 20 custodians that Plaintiff had identified in a July 2011

KEMP, JONES & COULTHARD, LLP

letter.¹ The March 27 Order expressly precluded SCL or Defendant Las Vegas Sands Corp. ("LVSC") "from redacting or withholding documents based upon the MPDPA." 3/27/13 Order at 3. The Court stayed its Order to the extent that it required production of documents from Macau pending a decision on Defendants' Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus. After the Nevada Supreme Court denied that Petition on August 7, 2014, the Court declined to continue its stay.

As explained in greater detail below, SCL has produced approximately 4,100 new documents in response to the unstayed portion of the Court's March 27 Order, none of which have any MPDPA redactions. There are an additional 7,600 non-privileged documents that were subject to the now-vacated stay. Because it is clear that those documents are either wholly irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue or entirely cumulative of documents that Plaintiff already has, SCL urges the Court to reconsider its order requiring SCL to produce additional documents from Macau without any MPDPA redactions.

This Motion is based upon the following memorandum of points and authorities, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and any oral argument that the Court may allow.

DATED this 17 day of October, 2014.

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¹ That letter identified the custodians whose documents Plaintiff wanted SCL to search in the first phase of merits discovery.

NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: ALL INTERESTED PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27 ORDER

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2011, the Court granted Plaintiff the right to take limited document discovery and four depositions (of Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay) to support his jurisdictional theories. The document discovery the Court allowed was all designed to support Plaintiff's various theories of general jurisdiction:

• First, Plaintiff argued that SCL's "primary officers are directing the management and control of that company from the offices [of LVSC] here on Las Vegas Boulevard." 9/27/11 H'rng Tr. at 21:8-10. Based on that theory, the Court allowed Plaintiff to seek documents to determine where SCL Board meetings were held and where directors were located if they attended by phone (Request #6), and when and how often the four deponents and other LVSC employees traveled to China on SCL-related business (Request #7). Plaintiff also sought documents related to Mr. Leven's service as acting CEO of SCL and/or Executive Director of the SCL Board (Request #9).

References to "Requests" are to the numbered paragraphs in the Court's March 8, 2012 Order, which memorialized its rulings on Plaintiff's requested discovery.

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Second, Plaintiff claimed that SCL had sufficient contacts in Nevada to be deemed to be doing business here. 9/27/11 H'rng Tr. at 24:14. Based on that theory, the Court allowed Plaintiff to obtain copies of contracts that SCL had entered into with entities based in or doing business in Nevada, including the shared services and other agreements between SCL and LVSC, as well as documents reflecting work performed by or on behalf of SCL in Nevada. See Requests # 10, 11, 13, and 16.

Third, Plaintiff argued that LVSC acted as SCL's agent and that LVSC's contacts with Nevada could therefore be attributed to SCL. In support of that theory, Plaintiff was allowed to seek documents reflecting services performed by LVSC or its executives on behalf of SCL, as well as documents reflecting amounts (if any) that SCL paid to LVSC executives to reimburse them for work performed for SCL. See Requests # 12, 15, and

In December 2011, Plaintiff issued 24 Requests for Production of Documents ("RFPs") to SCL (and separately to LVSC as well) based on the categories of documents the Court had permitted him to discover. See Ex. A hereto. To date, Defendants have produced nearly 34,000 documents in response to those RFPs, consisting of almost 240,000 pages. LVSC produced about 24,000 documents (168,000 pages), while SCL has produced close to 10,000 documents (totaling about 71,000 pages). Of the SCL documents, around 4700 were originally produced from Macau in early 2013 with personal data redacted; LVSC was subsequently able to find duplicates of more than 2100 of those documents in the United States, which were then produced in unredacted form. It is that January 2013 production that is the subject of the sanctions hearing the Court intends to conduct.

SCL's January 2013 production was based on a search of documents held by eight custodians, in addition to Jacobs himself. In its March 27 Order, the Court directed SCL to expand its search (i) to include 14 additional custodians (based on Jacobs' original list of merits custodians) and (ii) to search the documents of each of the 20 custodians Jacobs had designated for documents responsive to each of Plaintiff's 24 RFPs. The Court permitted SCL to redact or withhold documents on privilege grounds or on the ground that they were "responsive to meritbased discovery but not jurisdictional discovery," provided that SCL logged all such documents for Plaintiff's and the Court's review. March 27 Order at 2:24. As noted above, the March 27 Order prohibits any MPDPA redactions to comply with Macau's data privacy laws. Id. at 3.

On April 5, 2013, Defendants filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or Mandamus in the Nevada Supreme Court seeking review of the March 27 Order; at the same time, Defendants cakempiones.com

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sought a stay of the Court's Order pending the Nevada Supreme Court's decision. The Court granted a partial stay, staying SCL's obligation to produce documents from Macau "that were not included on any electronic storage device brought to the United States as referenced at the September 2012, sanction hearing." May 13, 2013 Order at 2.

Defendants fully complied with the portions of the Court's March 27 Order that were not stayed. The expanded list of custodians included four individuals who reside outside of Macau-SCL's three outside directors (Iain Bruce, David Turnbull, and Rachel Chiang) and Andrew MacDonald, who is the Executive Vice President of Casino Operations at Marina Bay Sands in Singapore. SCL produced all of these custodians' non-privileged documents without any MPDPA redactions. In addition, some documents for two other custodians (Luis Melo, the former general counsel of SCL and for SCL's subsidiary, Venetian Macau Ltd. ("VML"), and Eric Chiu, VML's President of Asian Development) were included on the electronic storage devices that were referred to at the September 2012 hearing. Defendants produced those documents as well, to the extent they were not privileged, without any personal data redactions. In all, SCL produced approximately 3400 documents from these sources. It also produced a privilege log and a "relevancy" log for these searches; the relevancy log identified documents that had been located through a computerized search of the custodians described above using the search terms Defendants had previously provided to Plaintiff and the Court, but were nevertheless not responsive to Plaintiff's RFPs.3

Finally, Defendants searched LVSC's database for additional responsive documents. They did that by transporting LVSC's database to Macau, asking VML to run searches of the custodians in Macau on its own database, and then running a computerized search to find duplicates in the LVSC database. LVSC's database contained 725 such documents, which were produced to Plaintiff without MPDPA redactions. Defendants have thus produced a total of

It is possible that some of these documents may be relevant to the merits, but they were withheld because they were deemed non-responsive to Plaintiff's specific jurisdictional RFPs—and not because any determination was made that they were responsive to merits-based rather than jurisdictional discovery.

approximately 4,100 documents without MPDPA redactions in response to the Court's March 27 Order.

The Nevada Supreme Court denied Defendants' Petition in an August 7, 2014 Order. That Order provided significant guidance with respect to the factors the Court must consider in deciding what sanctions, if any, are appropriate in light of SCL's redaction of personal information from the documents it produced from Macau in January 2013. The Supreme Court held that a district court is required to balance these factors in deciding whether and the extent to which any sanctions should be imposed; at the same time, the Court noted that district courts have "wide discretion" to consider foreign privacy statutes in "deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from some other sources." August 7 Order at 9 n.4.

Since this Court declined to further extend its stay, SCL has been working to prepare the documents that were subject to the now-vacated stay for production. Computerized searches of the expanded custodians in Macau turned up over 60,000 potentially responsive documents; a review of those documents in Macau by Macanese lawyers indicated that approximately 8,000 were responsive. Those documents were then redacted to remove all personal information; the redacted documents were transferred to the United States and reviewed for both responsiveness and privilege. That further review resulted in the identification of about 7,600 non-privileged documents for production. As discussed in greater detail below, the overwhelming majority of those documents relate to work that LVSC did for or on behalf of SCL-documents that are no longer relevant because they relate only to Plaintiff's now-abandoned "agency" theory of general jurisdiction.

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⁴ Those factors include: "(1) 'the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested'; (2) 'the degree of specificity of the request'; (3) 'whether the information originated in the United States'; (4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information'; and (5) 'the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located." April 7 Order at 7-8 (quoting the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(1)(c) (1987)).

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SCL is ready to produce the remaining 7,600 documents, but seeks reconsideration of the Court's March 27 Order to the extent that Order prohibits SCL from redacting any personal data from those documents to comply with the requirements of Macau's data privacy laws.

As SCL has previously explained, in November 2012, VML received permission from Macau's Office of Personal Data Protection ("OPDP") to conduct a computerized review of the documents it controls so that SCL could respond to the jurisdictional discovery in this case. However, the OPDP conditioned that permission on VML's agreement that (i) only Macanese lawyers would review documents in their unredacted form and (ii) those lawyers would redact all personal information or obtain specific consents from the individuals whose personal information appeared in the documents before the documents were transferred to the United States for production to plaintiff. When SCL asked VML to produce documents in a compressed, holiday-shortened period of time in order to comply with this Court's December 18, 2012 Order, it did not ask VML to secure consents from individuals whose personal data appeared in the documents identified as responsive. Given the press of time and the number of individuals involved, it was not practical to obtain a large number of consents. That was particularly true in light of the MPDPA's requirement that each individual "freely" give "specific" and "informed" consent to have his or her personal data processed. The OPDP had specifically warned VML that "in the employment relation, it is particularly important to pay special attentions to whether the data subject is influenced by his or her employer and might not freely make choices," See OPDP August 8, 2012 Letter (Ex. D hereto) at 10-11. Thus, it was impossible for VML to broadly solicit blanket consents. In addition, the Court's comments at the December 18, 2012 hearing appeared to suggest that SCL could redact documents it produced from Macau in order to comply with the MPDPA. See 12/18/12 Hearing Tr. at 26:13-27:18.

Immediately after SCL produced approximately 4700 documents in redacted form in early January 2013, Defendants took a number of steps to provide Plaintiff with as much information as possible about those documents. First, at SCL's request, LVSC undertook a laborious search for duplicate documents in LVSC's database, which could be produced to

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Plaintiff in unredacted form.⁵ That process led to the production of 2100 unredacted duplicates or near-duplicates, leaving only about 2600 redacted documents from the January 2013 production. Second, VML's Macanese lawyers created a redaction log, which enables Plaintiff to determine who employed the individuals whose names were redacted from the remaining 2600 documents. Finally, in their February 25, 2013 Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for NRCP 37 Sanctions (at 11, 24-25), Defendants offered to conduct additional searches or seek consents if Plaintiff identified redacted documents that were important to his jurisdictional case. Plaintiff never took Defendants up on either offer.

In light of the recent narrowing of Plaintiff's theories of general jurisdiction to a single "nerve center" theory, Defendants have taken yet another step to provide Plaintiff with additional, unredacted documents by securing MPDPA consents from the four individuals whose depositions Plaintiff took—Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay. Defendants also asked Jacobs to provide his consent to have his own name and other personal information unredacted from documents produced from Macau, but he declined to do so.6 In light of the consents they have received, VML's Macau attorneys have re-reviewed all of the redacted documents that contain the names or email addresses of the four deponents and have "unreducted" all references to their personal information.

SCL is prepared to produce the remaining documents from Macau with personal data redacted except for the personal data for which VML received consents, along with a redaction log that will once again allow Plaintiff to determine who employed the individuals whose names and other personal data have been redacted. Before it does so, however, SCL urges the Court to reconsider its March 27 Order to produce additional documents without any MPDPA redactions

That process involved identifying unique text in a redacted document, searching LVSC's database in an attempt to find a document with the same words, and then manually comparing any documents found by LVSC with the redacted document to see if there was an apparent match. Defendants have not undertaken this time-consuming process for the redacted documents whose production was previously stayed, but would do so if Plaintiff identifies documents that are relevant to the issue of jurisdiction.

⁶ Jacobs' counsel sought to defend his refusal to consent by claiming that this Court's prior orders somehow precluded SCL from seeking consents. That is nonsense. Nothing in this Court's orders precludes SCL from attempting to comply with both this Court's order to produce documents in

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in light of (i) the Supreme Court's August 7 Order, (ii) the dramatic narrowing of Plaintiff's theories of general jurisdiction that has occurred since this Court issued its Order in March 2013, and (iii) the nature of the documents at issue, most of which have no conceivable relevance to Plaintiff's new, pared-down jurisdictional theories and/or are entirely cumulative of documents that Plaintiff has already received.

П.

ARGUMENT

The Court Has The Power To Entertain SCL's Motion To Reconsider.

In August 2014, this Court reconsidered its June 2011 Order dismissing Plaintiff's defamation claims against LVSC and SCL. In support of his motion to reconsider, Plaintiff argued that this Court has inherent authority to reconsider earlier interlocutory rulings and that "filt is appropriate to grant reconsideration based upon new issues of law or an intervening change in controlling law." Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of Defamation Claims Against Defendants Las Vegas Sands Corp. and Sands China Ltd., filed 7/1/2104, at 5-6. The same analysis applies here. The Court has the power to reconsider its March 27 Order in light of changes in the legal landscape, which even Plaintiff apparently acknowledges have eliminated two of his three general jurisdiction theories. In addition, the Court can and should reconsider its decision in light of the Nevada Supreme Court's August 7 Order, which requires the Court to consider the impact of foreign data privacy laws in deciding whether and how to sanction a party for disobeying a discovery order and recognizes that the district court has the discretion to do so in fashioning its discovery rulings.

As demonstrated below, it has become apparent that the vast bulk of the documents the March 27 Order required SCL to produce from Macau are no longer relevant to any viable theory of jurisdiction. And to the extent any such documents could be deemed relevant, they are entirely cumulative of hundreds, if not thousands, of documents that Plaintiff already has (or will soon have) that provide him with all of the evidence he needs. Under those circumstances,

unredacted form and Macau's data privacy laws by securing appropriate consents.

SCL urges the Court to exercise its discretion to reconsider its March 27 Order to the extent necessary to avoid putting SCL in a position where it is forced to choose between either disobeying a directive issued by this Court or attempting to force its subsidiary, VML, to violate the laws of its home jurisdiction.

B. The Documents Yet To Be Produced Are Either Wholly Irrelevant To Plaintiff's Remaining "Nerve Center" Theory Of General Jurisdiction Or Are Simply Cumulative.

1. What LVSC Did "On Behalf Of" SCL Is Irrelevant.

In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014), Plaintiff had no choice but to abandon his "agency" theory of jurisdiction. That theory was based on the premise that SCL would be subject to general jurisdiction in Nevada if LVSC acted as its agent because LVSC is subject to general jurisdiction here. *Daimler AG* specifically rejects this argument, holding that the presence of an agent doing the principal's business in the jurisdiction is *not* enough to give rise to general jurisdiction over the principal. Instead, the critical question is whether the principal itself is "at home" in the jurisdiction—either because it is incorporated or has its principal place of business there. 134 S.Ct. at 759-60. Many of Plaintiff's RFPs sought evidence to support his agency theory by asking for documents reflecting "services performed by LVSC (including LVSC's executives and/or employees and/or consultants and/or agents) for or on behalf of Sands China" with respect to particular issues, such as site development, marketing, recruiting and the like. *See* Ex. A, RFPs ## 10-15, 21; 22; *see also* RFP # 23 (seeking documents relating to reimbursement of LVSC executives for work performed for or on behalf of SCL).

The overwhelming majority of documents that SCL has yet to produce under the March 27 Order are responsive to these kinds of RFPs, which seek documents relating to the services LVSC provided to or on behalf of SCL. Specifically:

- almost 1800 documents are responsive to RFP # 11, which seeks documents reflecting
 "services performed by LVSC (including LVSC's executives and/or employees and/or
 consultants and/or agents) for or on behalf of Sands China related to and/or concerning
 site design and development oversight of Parcels 5 and 6";
- almost 1500 documents are responsive to RFP # 21, which seeks documents reflecting "communications by and between Sands China and/or LVSC (including LVSC's

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executives and/or employees and/or consultants and/or agents) and site designers. developers, and specialists for Parcels 5 and 6":

- more than 2800 documents are responsive to RFP # 22, which is a catch-all request for documents reflecting any "services performed by LVSC (including LVSC's executives and/or employees and/or consultants and/or agents) for or on behalf of Sands China" during the period January 1, 2009, to October 10, 2010; and
- about 350 documents are responsive to RFP #13, which seeks documents reflecting "services performed by LVSC (including LVSC's executives and/or employees and/or consultants and/or agents) for or on behalf of Sands China related to and/or concerning marketing of Sands China properties.'

That the great bulk of the documents are limited to these categories is not surprising. given the identity of the additional custodians in Macau. A number of the added custodians were VML executives who were responsible for construction or design, including Ian Humphreys (VML's Vice President of Construction (Asia)) and Iain Fairbain (VML's Director of Design), or for VML's operations, including Pete Wu (VML's Vice President of Operations), Andrew Billany (VML's Vice President of P2 & Paiza Macao Operations), and Kerry Andrewartha (VML's Director of Casino Operations). Plaintiff also sought documents from VML's Vice President of Strategic Marketing, Allidad Tash. All of these individuals would have had contacts with services LVSC provided to SCL because, under the Shared Services Agreement, LVSC provided SCL and its subsidiaries with Design, Development and Construction Consultancy Services (for which SCL expected to pay about \$5 million in 2010). as well as Global Procurement and Consultancy Services, and Administrative Services. See Shared Services Agreement, attached hereto as Ex. B, at 3, 20; SCL's Nov. 10, 2010 HK Stock Exchange filing regarding Continuing Connected Transactions, attached hereto as Ex. C.8 That

Documents were responsive to more than one request; thus, there is necessarily some double-counting embedded in these figures. Another approximately 170 documents are responsive to one or more of the following RFPs: RFP #10 (agreements between LVSC and SCL); RFP #12 (documents reflecting services performed by LVSC for or on behalf of SCL related to recruitment or interviewing of potential SCL executives); RFP #14 (documents relating to LVSC's involvement on behalf of SCL with respect to a potential joint venture with Harrah's); and RFP #23 (seeking documents relating to reimbursement of LVSC executives or other employees or consultants for services provided to SCL). No additional documents were found responsive to RFP #15, which sought documents relating to LVSC's services on behalf of SCL concerning the negotiation of the sale of SCL's interests in sites to SJM.

SCL entered into the Shared Services Agreement with LVSC when it launched its IPO in 2009. The

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LVSC provided such services to SCL says nothing about where SCL's "nerve center" was located—even assuming that a "nerve center" test applies in identifying SCL's principal place of business. Thus, the vast bulk of the documents yet to be produced from Macau would be wholly irrelevant to Plaintiff's sole remaining theory of general jurisdictional.

In any event, to the extent such documents might have some conceivable utility in pinpointing SCL's "nerve center," Plaintiff does not need the documents from Macau. Defendants have already produced over 9000 unreducted documents responsive to these requests. Furthermore, the bulk of those documents (approximately 7000) came from LVSC which, according to Plaintiff, was calling the shots from Las Vegas. If Plaintiff cannot make his case based on documents that were produced out of Las Vegas, he cannot possibly do so based on documents that were located in Macau. That is particularly true now that SCL has secured consents from Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay and their names will not be redacted from any of the documents produced out of Macau.

As to the remaining personal data that VML is required to redact, SCL stands ready to give Plaintiff a redaction log that will enable Plaintiff to determine what entity employed the parties whose names were redacted. That should give Plaintiff all of the information he needs to evaluate the documents himself. But, as SCL has said all along, if Plaintiff identifies any documents as to which the redacted names are actually relevant to jurisdiction, Defendants will do all they can to find duplicates or near-duplicates in the United States or to obtain consents to the disclosure of the redacted personal data.

"whereas" clause of that Agreement specifically notes that VML had "benefited" in the past from services provided by LVSC and its subsidiaries "[b]oth in the construction and operation of" the casinos. hotels, integrated resorts and associated facilities that had already been built in Macau, that VML was in the process of developing and constructing additional facilities on parcels 5 and 6, and that SCL wanted to continue to benefit from LVSC's services, which were to be made available on "competitive terms." Ex. B at 3. The two largest categories of services LVSC was expected to provide were (i) "[d]esign. development and construction consultancy services with respect to the design, development and construction of casinos, casino hotel and integrated resort projects" and (ii) "[j]oint international

marketing services targeting VIP players and premium players" who would want to patronize properties in Macau and the U.S. and "[r]etail leasing, management and marketing services related to the retail malls owned or operated" by SCL and its subsidiaries. Id. at 20.

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2. Where SCL Purchased Goods Or Services Is Also Irrelevant.

About 90 of the documents that have yet to be produced are responsive to Plaintiff's various RFPs (## 8, 17-19) seeking documents relating to SCL's purchases of goods or services from Nevada-based companies, including Bally's, Harrah's, and Cirque de Soleil. Under Daimler AG, however, general jurisdiction cannot be based on the fact that SCL bought goods and services from, or communicated with, companies that are headquartered in Nevada. See also Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16163, at *16-17 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2014). 10 Thus, all of these documents are wholly irrelevant.

There are about another 100 additional documents responsive to RFP #7's request for documents relating to the location of the negotiation and execution of agreements to provide funding for SCL, including its IPO documents. These documents too are entirely irrelevant. Where SCL got its funding has nothing to do with where it is "at home" or where its "nerve center" is located. Also irrelevant are the dozen or so as-yet-unproduced documents responsive to RFP # 20, which seeks communications by and between SCL or LVSC and potential lenders for the underwriting of Parcels 5 and 6. Again, where SCL got its financing is irrelevant. So too is any assistance LVSC provided to SCL in an attempt to obtain financing for one of its major projects. A parent company's involvement in its subsidiary's "financing and macromanagement" is utterly routine and typical of the parent-subsidiary relationship, Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001), and therefore cannot provide a basis for a claim that SCL was somehow operated and controlled from Las Vegas.

No additional documents were found that were responsive to RFP #16, which sought documents reflecting communications by SCL or any entity acting on its behalf with BASE Entertainment.

¹⁰ In Martinez, the Ninth Circuit described Daimler AG as establishing a "demanding standard for general jurisdiction over a corporation" and held that evidence that the defendant (a French corporation) had signed contracts to sell airplanes worth \$225-\$450 million to a California company, had contracts to purchase components from 11 California companies, and sent representatives to California to attend conferences and promote its products was "plainly insufficient to subject [the defendant] to general jurisdiction in California."

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3. Documents Relating To LVSC Executives' Travel To China And The Location Of Board Meetings Are Entirely Cumulative.

The additional searches in Macau produced a relatively small number of additional documents relating to the location of the SCL Board meetings (RFP #1, approximately 140 documents) and to travels by Messrs. Adelson, Leven and other LVSC executives to Macau or Hong Kong (RFPs ## 2-5, about 150 documents). By their very nature, these RFPs seek answers to objective questions about when and where meetings were held and individuals traveled, which are capable of being definitively answered with a minimum of documentation. And, since Plaintiff's counsel deposed Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay, they had the opportunity to ask them about both their travels to Macau and Hong Kong and their attendance at SCL Board meetings.

Plaintiff already has numerous documents, including spreadsheets, itineraries and travel logs, that show when Messrs. Adelson, Leven and Goldstein, as well as other LVSC executives and employees, traveled to Macau, China or Hong Kong during the period in question. Because Plaintiff already knows the facts concerning these trips, he has no need for any additional documents from SCL identifying when particular individuals arrived in or left Hong Kong or Macau. That is apparent from the types of documents SCL produced in January 2013, in response to this request—emails in which SCL employees discussed times at which visitors would be picked up or dropped off at the Hong Kong airport or relayed information about visitors' hotel or dinner reservations or meetings while in Macau. All of these kinds of documents are entirely beside the point. Nevertheless, Plaintiff will have these types of documents as well, with the names and other personal information of Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay unredacted.

Plaintiff also does not need any more documents to determine when and where the SCL Board met. Defendants have produced almost 2500 unredacted documents in response to this request, including Board of Directors attendance records (SCL00100030, SCL00100032) and meeting notices, which show precisely where the meetings were held and who attended in

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person and by telephone. 11 Defendants also produced minutes of all of the SCL Board meetings 1 within the period Plaintiff selected, which generally contain information about attendance and 2 whether the meeting was in-person or via teleconference. 12 As these documents show, Jacobs 3 4 himself was present at all of the meetings prior to his termination in July 2010, and thus has personal knowledge of when, where and how the meetings were conducted. 5 SCL Will Be Producing Documents Relating To The Services Mr. Leven 6 And Mr. Goldstein Rendered To SCL In Largely Unredacted Form. 7

Two final RFPs (## 6 and 9) also seek documents that could conceivably be relevant to Plaintiff's new "nerve center" theory. RFP #6 seeks documents reflecting or relating to Mr. Leven's service as a Special Adviser to the SCL Board and later as Acting CEO and an Executive Director. RFP #9 seeks documents relating to work Mr. Goldstein performed for or on behalf of SCL. SCL has now obtained Mr. Leven's and Mr. Goldstein's MPDPA consents and will provide Plaintiff with all documents responsive to these and any other requests without redacting their names (or Mr. Adelson or Mr. Kay's names). That, along with the more than 9,000 unredacted documents Defendants have already produced in response to these two requests out of LVSC's files, should provide Plaintiff with everything he needs to have a complete picture of whatever work Messrs. Leven and Goldstein may have performed during the period in question for SCL.

SCL Should Not Be Burdened With Making A Choice Between Obeving C. This Court's Order Or Trying To Compel Its Operating Subsidiary To Violate Its Obligations Under Macau's Data Privacy Laws.

Although we recognize that the Court is not required to do so, SCL urges it to exercise its discretion to consider the restrictions imposed on VML by Macau's data privacy laws in

¹¹ The meeting notices (LVS00123450, LVS00137693, LVS00137694, LVS00127435, LVS00220725, LVS00220328, LVS00220278, LVS00220243, LVS00240531, LVS00126799, LVS00234165) show that all in-person meetings were held either in Macau or in Hong Kong,

¹² LVSC produced minutes for SCL Board meetings without any MPDPA redactions for the meetings held on October 14, 2009 (LVS00134180), November 8, 2009 (LVS00117204), February 9, 2010 (LVS00133993), March 1, 2010 (LVS00117228), April 14, 2010 (LVS00135122), April 30, 2010 (LVS00117248), May 10, 2010 (LVS00117269), July 23, 2010 (LVS00117233), July 27, 2010 (LVS00117236), and August 26, 2010 (LVS00265528).

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"deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from some other sources." August 7 Supreme Court Order at 9 n.4. For the reasons outlined above, all of the redacted documents yet to be produced in response to the Court's March 27 Order are either irrelevant or cumulative of documents that Plaintiff already has or will shortly havedocuments that are more than enough to enable Plaintiff to make his case on his sole remaining general jurisdiction theory. And an analysis of the five factors that must be applied under the Nevada Supreme Court's August 7 Order in deciding whether sanctions should be imposed also counsels against putting SCL in the position of having to decide whether to disobey this Court's order to produce documents in unredacted form in violation of the MPDPA.

The first factor is whether the information in question is "important" to Plaintiff's attempt to prove that the Court has personal jurisdiction over it. For the reasons outlined above, the information is not only unimportant, it is either entirely irrelevant or wholly unnecessary. This is not a case where there is likely to be a "smoking gun" document somewhere in Macau: if SCL's "nerve center" were in Las Vegas (which it is not), that fact would be apparent from the thousands of documents that have been produced in unredacted form from Las Vegas. Thus, this case is nothing like Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), where the court granted a motion to compel and imposed sanctions when its order was disobeyed, because it found the information withheld to be "essential" to the proof of the opposing parties' claims. Furthermore, by obtaining MPDPA consents from the four individuals Plaintiff himself chose to depose and unredacting all references to those individuals, Defendants have ensured that Plaintiff will have any and all documents that have any conceivable relevance to his remaining "nerve center" claim.

The second factor to be considered is whether the requests were "specific," seeking particular information that cannot be obtained from other sources. Here too, the answer is "no": Plaintiff sought broad categories of information, most of which is no longer relevant and all of which is obtainable from other sources that are not subject to the MPDPA.

The third factor is where the redacted documents originated. This is not a case where a U.S. entity was trying to protect documents that originated in the United States from disclosure.

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Here, the documents all originate in Macau and the new custodians whose documents have yet to be produced are all located in Macau. As noted above, all of the new custodians whose documents are located in Macau are or were employees of VML, which does business only in Macau and holds a gambling concession issued by the Macanese government.

The fourth factor is whether Plaintiff has alternative avenues for obtaining the discovery he seeks. Here, Plaintiff has already obtained thousands of unredacted documents in discovery, most of which are irrelevant to his sole remaining theory of general jurisdiction. To the extent the categories of documents remain relevant, he has all of the information he needs, for example, to determine where SCL's Board meetings were held and when and how often LVSC executives went to Macau and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, Defendants will unredact the names of the key individuals who Plaintiff contends were directing SCL's affairs from Las Vegas. In addition, SCL continues to be willing to attempt to find duplicates or near-duplicates in the United States of particular documents, if Plaintiff can identify specific documents that he believes are important to his jurisdictional case.

Finally, there can be no doubt that VML cannot lawfully provide documents responsive to Plaintiff's requests without first redacting personal data or securing consents. In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that American courts should "take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by [a] foreign litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state."

As we have previously explained to the Court, beginning in May 2011, representatives of VML had a number of communications and meetings with OPDP, which is responsible for administering the MPDPA, regarding the collection, review and transfer of documents to respond to (among other things) production requests made to SCL in this case. In those communications, OPDP instructed VML that personal data of any kind could not be transferred outside of Macau absent either consent by the data subject or advance consent from OPDP. VML sought OPDP's advance consent in a letter dated June 27, 2012. But OPDP denied VML's request on August 8, 2012, telling VML that SCL's lawyers were not even permitted to

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review documents in Macau that are subject to the MPDPA in order to determine whether they are responsive to U.S. discovery requests.

After this Court issued its September 14, 2012 Order, SCL's new counsel flew to Macau in the hope of persuading OPDP to change its position, which would have made it impossible for SCL to produce any documents from Macau. On November 29, OPDP relented in part, giving VML permission to review documents containing personal data by automated means for responsiveness so long as Macanese lawyers reviewed all potentially responsive documents and redacted any personal data (or obtained individual consents) before those documents were transferred out of Macau.

That the government of Macau is serious about enforcing the MPDPA is apparent not only from the communications between VML and OPDP, but also from public statements government officials have made. In August 2012, LVSC disclosed that VML was under investigation by OPDP for previous data transfers to the United States. On the heels of that announcement, Francis Tam, Macau's Secretary for Economy and Finance, was quoted in the press as stating that if OPDP found "any violation or suspected breach" of the MPDPA, the government "will take appropriate action with no tolerance. Gaming enterprises should pay close attention to and comply with relevant laws and regulations." See Declaration of David Fleming at ¶ 15, Ex. E hereto.

On April 16, 2013, the OPDP concluded its investigation into the 2010 processing and transfer of Plaintiff's email and other electronically stored information to the United States by imposing administrative penalties totaling 40,000 patacas on VML. Although the fine (equivalent to \$5,000) was relatively modest, the warning was unmistakable. OPDP reiterated that a data controller like VML may "transfer the data [outside of Macau] only after notifying [the OPDP], [and] having received a decision or obtained an authorisation from [OPDP]." See Ex. F hereto. Having been the subject of one high-profile investigation, which resulted in a penalty, VML would risk much more severe penalties, including substantially higher penalties and even imprisonment of the responsible parties for up to one year, if it were to transfer documents outside Macau in violation of the conditions OPDP imposed.

Given Plaintiff's pared-down theory of general jurisdiction, the documents already produced, and the nature of the documents that have been identified in response to the Court's March 27 Order, there is simply no good reason to put SCL in the position of having to choose between obeying this Court's Order and trying to compel its subsidiary to violate the MPDP. 13

D. SCL Should Not Be Required To Produce A Relevancy Log.

SCL also urges the Court to rescind its March 27 Order to produce a relevancy log with respect to the documents that were produced from Macau. The relevancy log SCL created for the documents that were already produced, in unredacted form, did not identify any documents that SCL had specifically decided to withhold on the ground that they were relevant to the merits, rather than to jurisdiction. Instead, the log merely explains why documents that were identified through a computerized search using search terms keyed to Plaintiff's 24 RFPs were not in fact responsive to those RFPs. Plaintiff has had that log for close to a year and has not disputed any of the choices Defendants made. Under those circumstances, Plaintiff has no need for a log of the tens of thousands of documents that were initially identified as potentially responsive to Plaintiff's requests in Macau, but then "withheld" on the ground that they were not in fact responsive to any of Plaintiff's RFPs.

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¹³ Although VML is SCL's subsidiary, VML has its own Board with its own fiduciary duties. Because VML is the data controller, it is VML's directors and employees that are potentially at risk. Under those circumstances, it is not clear that SCL has the power to compel VML to violate OPDP's directives,

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, SCL urges the Court to reconsider its March 27 Order to the extent that it requires SCL to produce additional documents from Macau, without MPDPA redactions, and to provide a "relevancy" log.

DATED this day of October, 2014.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 1 th day of October, 2014, the foregoing SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER was served on the following parties through the Court's electronic filing system:

ALL PARTIES ON THE E-SERVICE LIST

An employee of Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP

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CLERK OF THE COURT

Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN C. JACOBS, Plaintiff, LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X. Defendants.

Case No.:

Dept. No.:

AND RELATED CLAIMS

PLAINTIFF STEVEN C. JACOBS' OPPOSITION TO SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE **COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER**

A-10-627691

XI

Hearing Date: November 21, 2014

Hearing Time: In Chambers

INTRODUCTION

Rather than diluting the case for sanctions, Sands China Ltd.'s ("Sands China") Motion for Reconsideration tightens the noose. Sands China unabashedly reiterates its willful noncompliance with the Court's Order by emphasizing that Sands China has no intention of producing unredacted documents. Instead of fulfilling its Court-ordered discovery obligations, Sands China unilaterally declares almost 8,000 documents "irrelevant," "cumulative," and asks to be relieved of even providing a "relevancy log." There has been no intervening change in the law that justifies reconsideration or Sands China's flouting of the Court's March 27, 2013 Order. The withheld documents remain relevant, discoverable, and were ordered produced long ago. And, contrary to

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Sands China's wishes, the MDPDA does not shield relevant and discoverable information; the MDPDA is only relevant to the level of sanction imposed for failing to comply with the discovery obligations set forth in the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Nevada Supreme Court has already ruled, Sands China's use of the MPDPA as a basis to oppose discovery is invalid. Its only relevancy is to the degree of sanctions that Sands China must bear for its continuing flaunting of this Court's orders.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Saga of Sands China's Continuing Discovery Misconduct.

The history of Sands China's discovery abuses is long and well-documented. This Court has already well documented Sands China's surreptitious review of Jacobs' documents in the United States and its lack of candor with Jacobs and this Court. As a result of this Court's detailed findings and the evidenced gleaned at the September 2012 evidentiary hearing, this Court ordered that Sands China is "precluded from raising the MDPA as an objection or as a defense to admission, disclosure or production of any documents." (Decision & Order, Sept. 14, 2012, p. 8, on file.)

But as this Court knows, Sands China continued to flaunt the Court's order. On December 18, 2012, the Court entered an Order requiring Sands China to produce all documents and ESI relevant to jurisdictional discovery by January 4, 2013. (See Order Regarding Pl.'s Renewed Mot. for NRCP 37 Sanctions on Order Shortening Time, March 27, 2013, p. 2, on file.) Despite the apparent ability to comply with the Court's Order to produce documents without redactions by simply obtaining consents from affected individuals, Sands China made no effort to do so. (Mot. at 7:13-14.) On the deadline, Sands China produced what it claimed to be all responsive documents and subsequently filed a status report representing to the Court that Sands China had complied with the Court's Order. (See Order Regarding Pl.'s Renewed Mot. for NRCP 37 Sanctions on Order Shortening Time, March 27, 2013, p. 2, on file.)

However, in direct violation of this Court's September 14 Order, Sands China enlisted the MPDPA as an objection as a basis to redact and not produce compliant documents. As a consequence, Jacobs filed a Motion for NRCP 37 Sanction. (Id.) The Court granted Jacobs'

 Motion and found "Jacobs has made a prima facie showing as to a violation of this Court's orders which warrants an evidentiary hearing." (Id.) The Court ordered Sands China to search and produce records for twenty custodians identified by Jacobs, including Jacobs' Court-approved discovery requests, by April 12, 2013. (Id.) The Court permitted Sands China to withhold documents on the basis of privilege and relevance to merits discovery provided Sands China produced privilege and reduction logs. (Id.)

Further delaying this action, Sands China again sought writ review at the Nevada Supreme Court. In challenging this Court's scheduling of an evidentiary hearing on further sanctions, Sands China further proved its knowing contempt. Sands China asserted that the reason it did not comply with this Court's September 14 Order is because that Order only applied to those documents already located in the United States. (Pet'rs' Notice of Filing in Related Case Re: Correction of Record of March 3, 2014 Oral Argument at 4, March 24, 2014, S. Ct. Case No. 62944, Ex. 1.) Sands China went so far as to represent that this Court's September 14 Order did not concern documents that were still located in Macau. (Id.) But of course, it made this claim after having simultaneously represented to this Court that the MPDPA does not even apply once documents are located in the United States. Thus, they claimed that this Court's September 14 Order was meaningless because it only precluded use of the MPDPA for documents for which the MPDPA has no application. (See Resp. to Pet'rs' Notice of Filing in Related Case Re: Correction of Record of March 3, 2014 Oral Argument, Apr. 3, 2014, S. Ct. Case No. 62944, Ex. 2.) It is just such positioning that underscores Sands China's continuing contempt.

On August 7, 2014, the Nevada Supreme Court denied Sands China's writ petition and endorsed the approach taken by this Court. Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 331 P.3d 876, 877 (2014) ("Here, the district court properly employed this framework when it found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse petitioners from complying with the district court's discovery order."). The Supreme Court held that MPDPA does not relieve a litigant of its obligation to comply with discovery orders. Id., 331 P.3d at 880. Rather, the MPDPA is only relevant to the level of sanction levied for violation of a discovery order. Id.

Contrary to the latest argument advanced by Sands China in hoping to escape sanctions, the MPDPA is not relevant to whether the documents are discoverable; this Court has already rejected that contention, as did the Supreme Court. The only relevance of the MPDPA is as to the degree of the sanctions imposed for Sands China's continuing failure to comply with the Court's Orders.

B. Sands China's Ongoing Disregard of the Court's Discovery Orders.

Following the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, this Court vacated the partial stay of its March 27, 2013 Order. Even though almost three months have elapsed since the Nevada Supreme Court reaffirmed Sands China's obligation to comply with this Court's discovery orders, Sands China still has not produced the remaining documents from Macau without reductions and it has no intention of doing so. Instead, Sands China has continued its violations by reducting the documents it must now produce. (Mot. at 6:12-16 ("Since this Court declined to further extend its stay, SCL has been working to prepare the documents.... Those documents were then reducted to remove all personal information...") (emphasis added).) Sands China has made no effort to locate duplicate documents in LVSC's database to produce without reductions. (Id. at 8 n.5.) Sands China has not bothered to obtain consents from the twenty custodians, except from Adelson, Leven, Goldstein, and Kay. (Id. at 8:6-12.)

In the face of the Court's Order, Sands China maintains that it will only produce documents with personal data redacted. (Id. at 8:18-21 ("SCL is prepared to produce the remaining documents from Macau with personal data redacted...") (emphasis added); id. at 15:6-7 ("SCL Will Be Producing Documents Relating to the Services Mr. Leven and Mr. Goldstein Rendered to SCL In Largely Unredacted Form.") (emphasis added).) Sands China continues to ignore that it is precluded from redacting any documents and its ongoing refusal to abide by the Court's Order warrants sanctions—not reconsideration.

Inexplicably, Sands China was able to review documents devoid of personal identifying information and determine that approximately 400 additional documents should be withheld as privileged, even though the existence of a privilege hinges, in large part, upon the presence of an identifiable attorney or accountant. (Mot. at 6:12-19.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Withheld Documents Remain Discoverable for Jurisdictional Purposes.

Although courts retain inherent authority to reconsider any interlocutory orders at any time before entry of final judgment, reconsideration is only appropriate when there has been a subsequent change in controlling law that renders a prior decision clearly erroneous. Masonry & Tile Contractors Ass'n of S. Nev. v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 113 Nev. 737, 741, 941 P.2d 486, 489 (1997); see also Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976) (new issues of law); Rich v. TASER Int'l, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1094-95 (D. Nev. 2013) (intervening change in controlling law). There has been no change in controlling law that warrants reconsideration of the Court's March 27, 2013 Order, the underlying sanction, or Jacobs' discovery requests.

Sands China argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), renders the withheld documents, and Jacobs' document requests, irrelevant to Jacobs' jurisdictional discovery. Not so. Daimler AG holds that the proper inquiry "is whether that corporation's affiliations with the State are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State." Id. at 761 (quotations omitted). Under Daimler AG, general jurisdiction will be found in the place of incorporation, the principal place of business, and where the corporate "nerve center" is located and primary decisions are made. Id. at 760 (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010)); see also Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92-93 (a corporation's principal place of business is determined by its "nerve center," which is the "place where the corporation's officers direct, control and coordinate the corporation's activities).²

constitute continuous and systematic contacts.") (footnotes omitted).

See also Topp v. CompAir Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 836 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he method for deciding whether a parent is doing business in a state for the purpose of finding personal jurisdiction can be applied to the analogous issue of determining the principal place of business for diversity jurisdiction."); Suzanna Sherry, Don't Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck the Issue in Daimlerchrysler v. Bauman, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 111, 113 (2013) ("A year before Goodyear, Hertz Corp. v. Friend had defined "principal place of business" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction as the corporation's "nerve center [], typically ... [its] headquarters." Putting the two cases together suggests that MBUSA's maintenance of three facilities in California, none of them headquarters or a nerve center, was not sufficient to

As an initial matter, the Nevada Supreme Court has already rejected the prior incantation of Sands China's argument. In January 2014, Sands China filed a Motion to Recall the Mandate with the Supreme Court. Sands China asserted that Daimler AG "compel[ed] the conclusion that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Sands China in this action." (Order Denying Motion to Recall Mandate, May 19, 2014, on file.) The Nevada Supreme Court rejected Sands China's contention and concluded that "even under Daimler AG, factual findings must be made with regard to Sands China's contacts with Nevada in order to resolve the jurisdictional issue." (Id.) All of Jacobs' document requests – and the documents Sands China willingly admits it is withholding – are relevant to assessing personal jurisdiction and ascertaining where Sands China's real "nerve center" is located.

Indeed, this Court has already determined that the documents are relevant and should be produced. (Hr'g Tr. at 27:22-23, Aug. 14, 2014, on file ("I've already made a determination that you should produce them. You said you're not going to. I said, okay, that's bad, I'm going to sanction you.").) Jacobs requested documents related to the location of Sands China's board meetings and participants, executive travel to Macau and China, Leven's service as Executive Director of Sands China, the decision to obtain financing, the execution of contracts with Nevada entities, decisions related to Parcels 5 and 6, and other operational decisions. Documents related to LVSC's actions are hardly "irrelevant" if they show (and they will) that LVSC and Adelson were making all major business decisions and directing Sands China's corporate activities from Las Vegas.

Likewise, documents showing where the decision was made to purchase goods, services, or financing is relevant to determining the location of Sands China's headquarters and nerve center. Merely entering into agreements in the forum may not give rise to general jurisdiction, but demonstrating where the decision was made to enter into the contracts is relevant to establishing a corporation's nerve center.³ In addition to proving that Sands China's actual headquarters is in

Sands China's reliance on *Martinez v. Aero Caribbean*, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014), is misplaced. There, the French company had "no offices, staff, or other physical presence in California, and it [was] not licensed to do business in the state." *Id.* at 1070. Under those circumstances, entering into contracts to purchase, advertising, and visits by representatives were insufficient to confer general jurisdiction. *Id.*

Las Vegas, all of the document requests are relevant to demonstrating that Sands China's activities in the forum are of a sufficient magnitude to confer general jurisdiction. Daimler AG reaffirmed that "a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State." 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Min. Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). The withheld documents are relevant and discoverable and must be produced.⁴

Moreover, Jacobs has not "abandon[ed] his 'agency' theory of jurisdiction. (Mot. at 10:9.) Daimler AG did not foreclose the possibility that the actions of a corporation's agent may give rise to general jurisdiction. The Supreme Court only rejected the Ninth Circuit's "less rigorous" approach based upon the "importance" of the activity and hypothetical readiness to perform. See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 759 ("Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego But we need not pass judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction, for in no event can the appeals court's analysis be sustained.") (emphasis added). Sands China recognizes that "[m]any of [Jacobs'] RFPs sought evidence to support his agency theory " (Mot. at 10:16-17.) Thus, Sands China concedes the documents' relevancy and discoverability.

B. Sands China Cannot Unilaterally Limit Jacobs' Discovery.

Next, Sands China advances the argument of all parties facing sanctions for their discovery noncompliance – claiming that the Court should just take its word for it that Jacobs "has all the evidence he needs" or that "Plaintiff does not need the documents from Macau." (Mot. at 9:26, 12:6.)⁵ Conveniently, Sands China wants to limit discovery to only the documents that it chooses to produce. It is this same cavalier approach to discovery that caused Sands China

Tellingly, Sands China does not suggest that Jacobs' discovery requests and the withheld documents are not relevant to Jacobs' specific jurisdiction claims. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Req. # 22.)

⁽Id. at 12:9-11 ("If Plaintiff cannot make his case based on the documents that were produced out of Las Vegas, he cannot possibly do so based on documents that were located in Macau."); id. at 12:15-16 ("[H]e has no need for any additional documents from SCL identifying when individuals arrived in or left Hong Kong or Macau."); Id. at 14:24-25 ("Plaintiff also does not need any more documents to determine when and where the SCL Board met.").)

to be sanctioned in the first place. Nevertheless, the scope of relevancy during discovery is much broader than relevancy at trial. F.T.C. v. AMG Servs., Inc., 291 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D. Nev. 2013). "The objecting party must specifically detail the reasons why each request is irrelevant and may not rely on boilerplate, generalized, conclusory, or speculative arguments." Id. (quotations omitted). Further, document productions are not cumulative simply because depositions have occurred. See Byrd v. D.C., 259 F.R.D. 1, 4-5 (D. D.C. 2009) (additional depositions were not cumulative or duplicative of investigative reports and documents).

All of the documents sought by Jacobs are relevant to the Court's jurisdictional determination. And, the documents withheld by Sands China are not cumulative merely because four individuals have been deposed. Jacobs is entitled to discover documents (which he knows exist) demonstrating that most executives attended Sands China board meetings by phone from Las Vegas, rarely went to Macau or Hong Kong, and Sands China's nerve center is located on Las Vegas Boulevard. Jacobs can present his proof in any admissible form and is not limited to the form that Sands China prefers because it wants to ignore a sanction imposed by this Court.

C. The MDPDA Does Not Limit the Scope of Relevant Discovery.

Sands China now begs the Court "to avoid putting SCL in a position where it is forced to choose between either disobeying a directive issued by this Court or attempting to force its subsidiary, VML, to violate the laws of its home jurisdiction." (Mot. at 10:2-4.) But of course, this manufactured catch-22 is the product of Sands China's own misconduct, misleading the Court about the presence of Jacobs' ESI in the United States and earning the sanction that was imposed. Contrary to Sands China's hopes and wants, it cannot simply beg off this Court's sanctions because it has bought time through various procedural maneuverings, hoping that the Court's memory of its outrageous deception will somehow wane.

Moreover, the Nevada Supreme Court's August 7, 2014 decision does not constitute an intervening change in law which warrants reconsideration. The Nevada Supreme Court approved this Court's approach of requiring Sands China to produce all relevant documents, while accounting for the MDPDA when issuing any sanction for Sands China's failure to comply. Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 331 P.3d 876, 877 (2014)

("Here, the district court properly employed this framework when it found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse petitioners from complying with the district court's discovery order."). The Nevada Supreme Court determined that this Court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of its jurisdiction by "declin[ing] to excuse petitioners for their noncompliance with the district court's previous order..." Id. at 880. Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision reaffirmed this Court's correct approach.

The Nevada Supreme Court was unequivocal that "the mere existence of an applicable foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering foreign parties to comply with Nevada discovery rules. Thus, civil litigants may not utilize foreign international privacy statutes as a shield to excuse their compliance with discovery obligations in Nevada courts." *Id.* The MDPDA is only "relevant to a district court's sanctions analysis if the court's discovery order is disobeyed." *Id.* Sands China conflates the five factors that are examined when imposing sanctions with the issue of whether the documents should be produced in this first instance. The Nevada Supreme Court specifically rejected this approach. *Id.* at 879-80. The factors do not relate to the documents' discoverability. *Id.* at 880. As explained, the documents are relevant, discoverable, and must be produced without redactions as long ago ordered by this Court. The five factors are only related to the level of sanction that will be imposed and are more appropriately analyzed in the context of the forthcoming evidentiary hearing, not in the context of a Motion to Reconsider.

D. Sands China Did Not Provide a Relevancy Log as Required.

Under the guise of being relieved of the requirement to provide a relevancy log, Sands China admits a further violation of the Court's March 27, 2013 Order. The Court required Sands China to provide a relevancy log for any documents withheld or redacted "because the documents are only relevant to merits-based discovery." (Order Regarding Pl.'s Renewed Motion for NRCP 37 Sanctions on Order Shortening Time, March 27, 2013, on file.) But now, Sands China reveals that "[t]he relevancy log SCL created for the documents that were already produced . . . did not identify any documents that SCL had specifically decided to withhold on the ground that they were relevant to the merits, rather than jurisdiction." (Mot. at 19:7-10.)

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Sands China's failure to provide a relevancy log that identified documents that were being withheld because they are related to merits discovery, instead of jurisdictional discovery, is just another violation of the Court's March 27, 2013 Order. Sadly, Sands China continues to believe that it is above the orders of the Court as well as applicable rules. It simply decrees when it wants to comply. Its ongoing violations cannot be countenanced.

IV. CONCLUSION

Sands China lost the debate about the MPDPA both before this Court as well as the Nevada Supreme Court. Notwithstanding that adverse ruling, it continues to flaunt this Court's September 14 Order to this very day. The stay of that Order long ago dissipated and yet the noncompliance continues. Sands China's request for reconsideration is just a further attempt to delay the consequences of its longstanding misconduct and noncompliance. The motion lacks legal and factual merit and should be denied.

DATED this 3rd day of November, 2014.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

By: /s/ Todd L. Bice

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, and that on this 3rd day of November, 2014, I caused to be served via the Court's E-Filing system, true and correct copies of the above and foregoing PLAINTIFF STEVEN C. JACOBS' OPPOSITION TO SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER properly addressed to the following:

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Alun & Blumm
CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN C. JACOBS.

Plaintiff,

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation; SHELDON G. ADELSON, in his individual and representative capacity; DOES I-X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X,

Defendants.

AND ALL RELATED MATTERS.

CASE NO.: A627691-B DEPT NO.: XI

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER

[ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED]

Date: November 21, 2014 Time: In Chambers

I.

INTRODUCTION

More than three years ago, when Jacobs moved for jurisdictional discovery in September 2011, his counsel stated that he had "tried to narrowly confine what it is that we want to do," so that discovery could be completed before the evidentiary hearing that was then

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scheduled for November 21, 2011. 9/27/11 H'rng Tr., Ex. A hereto, at 20:16-17 (emphasis added). Since then, discovery has mushroomed out of control, as Plaintiff has continued to demand more and more documents. Although changes in the law governing assertions of general jurisdiction have made much of the discovery the Court allowed in its March 27, 2013 Order wholly irrelevant, he continues to insist that he wants "more" and that SCL should be forced to provide it, no matter what costs it may incur or what foreign laws it may violate.

As he typically does, Plaintiff also continues to ignore the extensive document discovery he has already received and to complain that he needs documents he already has. For example, Plaintiff claims that he needs more documents to show a simple objective fact: where attendees at SCL Board meetings were physically located during those meetings. Pl. Opp. at. 8. But, as SCL's Motion to Reconsider points out, Plaintiff already has thousands of unredacted documents that enable him to answer the simple questions on which the Court granted him permission to take document discovery, such as "documents that will establish the date, time, and location of each Sands China Board meeting . . . the location of each Board member, and how they participated in the meeting during the period of January 1, 2009, to October 20, 2010." March 8, 2012 Order, ¶ 6.

Indeed, since Jacobs himself was present at most of those meetings, he knows who was there. What possible reason could he have, other than harassment, to insist that SCL must produce even more documents, so that he has every email dealing with the logistics of SCL Board meetings? And, more to the point of SCL's Motion, why does Plaintiff need the personal information that has been redacted from the utterly routine emails SCL will produce in response to this request-such as emails between SCL employees confirming airport arrivals and pickups and setting up lunches for executives and SCL Board members visiting Macau? Plaintiff's Opposition does not even attempt to answer these fundamental questions. Instead, he offers only erroneous arguments and irrelevant diversions.

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ARGUMENT

Plaintiff Fails to Show that the Remaining Documents from Macau Have Any Relevance to Any Viable Theory of General Jurisdiction.

Plaintiff makes no credible attempt to address the two major arguments made by SCL showing that the documents remaining to be produced from Macau no longer have any jurisdictional significance.1 First, Plaintiff does not directly address SCL's showing that documents relating to the services that LVSC provided to or on behalf SCL-which are the overwhelming majority of documents that SCL has yet to produce—are not relevant to any viable jurisdictional theory under Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). To be sure, Plaintiff claims that he has not abandoned his "agency" theory of jurisdiction. Pl. Opp. at 7. But he nowhere explains how his agency theory differs from the Ninth Circuit theory that he previously relied on—and that the Daimler Court expressly rejected. 134 S.Ct at 759-60. Daimler, the Court held that general jurisdiction over a foreign principal cannot be predicated on the fact that the court has general jurisdiction over the principal's U.S.-based agent. Id. Thus, determining the extent of the services LVSC performed on behalf of SCL as its agent (as Plaintiff sought to do) would not advance the ball one inch: no matter what LVSC did as SCL's purported "agent," that would not be a basis for exercising general jurisdiction over SCL.

Second, Plaintiff fails to address SCL's showing that the actual information redacted from the remaining 7,200 non-privileged documents to be produced out of Macau has no jurisdictional relevance. Instead, Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions of relevance based exclusively on the requested documents, whereas the relevant inquiry should focus on the redacted data. For example, Plaintiff claims that documents relating to board meetings,

Plaintiff says in a footnote (at 7 n.4) that "[t]ellingly" SCL does not argue that his discovery requests and the documents at issue are irrelevant to his theory of specific jurisdiction. That is absurd, As SCL has repeatedly pointed out, Plaintiff's discovery requests were directed only at his general jurisdiction theories. Plaintiff has never sought document discovery related to his specific jurisdiction theory, which revolves around his options agreement with SCL and (according to Plaintiff) his termination. See, e.g., SCL's Revised Pre-Hearing Mem. in Opposition to Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Sanctions, filed October 17, 2014, at 8 n.4.

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executive travel to Macau, Mr. Leven's service as the Executive Director of Sands China, and various decisions concerning Parcels 5 and 6 could show that "LVSC and Adelson" "direct[ed] Sands China's corporate activities from Las Vegas." Pl. Opp. at 4. But Plaintiff fails to explain exactly how the personal data redacted from the Macau documents—dealing with such things as the names and email addresses of SCL's Macau employees--could possibly help him in showing that Las Vegas was the "nerve center" for Sands China's business operations. That is particularly true in light of the consents SCL has obtained from Messrs. Adelson, Leven, Goldstein and Kay. Since they are the ones who supposedly were "directing Sands China's corporate activities from Las Vegas," the fact that their names and other personal information will not be redacted from the documents should address any legitimate concerns Plaintiff might have.2

Similarly, Plaintiff makes the conclusory assertion that documents relating to services provided by LVSC to SCL could be relevant in showing that Las Vegas was Sands China's "headquarters and nerve center." Pl. Opp. at 6. But Plaintiff again makes no attempt to explain how the personal data VML was required to redact from the Macau documents could possibly help him in showing that Las Vegas is the nerve center for Sands China's operations.

Defendants have repeatedly expressed their willingness to work with Plaintiff to provide as much information as they possibly can, whether by seeking consents to unredact personal information in specific documents or by conducting searches in LVSC's database for duplicates or near-duplicates of specific documents. Plaintiff did not take Defendants up on that offer with respect to any of the redacted documents that were produced in January 2013, so LVSC

Plaintiff suggests that SCL could and should have forced all of the custodians who reside in Macau to give consents. Pl. Opp. at 4. But, as SCL pointed out in its Motion to Reconsider, the OPDP has cautioned VML that each individual must "freely" give "specific" and "informed" consent to have his or her personal data processed and specifically warned that "in the employment relation, it is particularly important to pay special attentions to whether the data subject is influenced by his or her employer and might not freely make choices." See OPDP August 8, 2012 Letter (Ex. D to Motion to Reconsider at 10-11). Thus, VML cannot simply command consent. Furthermore, obtaining consents from all of the custodians would not solve the problem of seeking and obtaining consents from the individuals whose names and other personal information appear in each custodian's documents.

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ultimately conducted a painstaking, manual search for duplicates of all of the reducted documents it had produced.3 In their Motion to Reconsider (at 17) Defendants once again pledged to assist Plaintiff with respect to the as-yet unproduced documents from Macau by searching LVSC's database for duplicates or near-duplicates of specific documents. Plaintiff's only response is to argue that LVSC should have conducted such a search for all of the more than 7,000 documents in the production-regardless of their relevance or (more to the point) the relevance of the redacted personal data. That is simply another example of Plaintiff's unreasonable approach to discovery—an approach that has mired the case in collateral issues for years and prevented the Court from even hearing the jurisdictional issues the Supreme Court directed it to decide.

The Court Should Not Ignore The Thousands Of Documents Defendants Have Already Produced.

Plaintiff argues (at 7) that SCL should not be allowed to "unilaterally limit" his discovery and urges the Court to disregard SCL's assertion that Jacobs already has more documents than he could possibly need. Nowhere in his Opposition, however, does Plaintiff challenge SCL's detailed description of the number, nature and source of the thousands of documents Defendants have already produced in response to what was supposed to be limited jurisdictional discovery. Instead, he resorts to diversion, arguing that the documents are not "cumulative merely because four individuals have been deposed." Pl. Opp. at 8. But that is not SCL's argument. SCL did point out that the depositions gave Plaintiff the opportunity to ask simple questions, such as who attended various meetings and whether they did so by phone or in person. But the key point is that Plaintiff has also obtained thousands of documents in response to his RFPs. Plaintiff has never even attempted to explain why the additional

The reason why that is a painstaking, manual process is that LVSC does not have access to the unredacted documents and thus must conduct word searches looking for the use of the same words in documents housed on its database. In his Opposition, Plaintiff insinuates that SCL's U.S. counsel must have seen the unredacted documents in order to put together the privilege log. But, as SCL's Motion to Reconsider explained, an initial draft of the privilege log was created in the U.S. by lawyers who saw only the redacted documents. Then it had to be reviewed by the Macanese lawyers, who are the only ones authorized to review the unredacted

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documents SCL will provide to him are anything other than cumulative of what he already has. And if the documents themselves are entirely cumulative, Plaintiff can have no conceivable need for the redacted personal information in those documents.

In two recent decisions, the Nevada Supreme Court has declined to allow plaintiffs in cases like this to conduct unlimited fishing expeditions in the hope of finding some way to assert general jurisdiction over a non-U.S. parent company based on the parent's relationship with a U.S. subsidiary. See Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 130 Nev.___, 328 P.3d 1152, 1161 (2014) (denying additional discovery, where plaintiff had thus far "shown no more than a typical parent-subsidiary relationship"); Uponor Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District, No. 64121 (Nov. 14, 2014), slip op. at 2 n.1 (same). Had these decisions been issued three years ago, when Plaintiff sought jurisdictional discovery, they would have largely, if not entirely, precluded the discovery Plaintiff sought. At the very least, these cases demonstrate that Plaintiff is not entitled to the unlimited jurisdictional discovery he has demanded.

The Balancing Test Adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court Is Relevant to SCL's Motion

Plaintiff offers no response to SCL's analysis of the five factors in the balancing test the Nevada Supreme Court ordered this Court to consider in deciding whether sanctions should be imposed with respect to SCL's January 2013 production. Plaintiff contends that these factors are relevant only in deciding whether sanctions should be imposed and have no bearing on whether SCL's Motion to Reconsider should be granted. That argument misreads the Nevada Supreme Court's opinion. As SCL's Motion to Reconsider points out, although the Supreme Court held that a district court is not required to utilize the balancing test in deciding whether to compel discovery, it has "wide discretion" to consider foreign privacy statutes in "deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from some other sources." August 7 Order at 9 n.4. That is precisely what SCL is asking the Court to do: to limit discovery that is unduly burdensome, that is cumulative of massive discovery Plaintiff has

documents, to ensure that the privilege was properly asserted.

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already obtained from other sources, and that is now largely irrelevant in light of Daimler. The Court has "wide discretion" to consider whether, under those circumstances, it should force SCL to a choice between violating this Court's order or trying to compel its subsidiary, VML, to violate Macanese law.4 SCL urges the Court to exercise that discretion to grant its Motion to Reconsider.

D. SCL Should Not Be Required To Produce A Relevancy Log.

The Court's March 27, 2013 Order (at 2-3) directed SCL to provide a "relevancy log," which it defined as a log of "any and all documents withheld or redacted . . . because the documents are only relevant to merits-based discovery." As it turned out, however, SCL produced all non-privileged documents that it concluded were responsive to Plaintiff's RFPs, and did not withhold or redact any responsive documents on the ground that they were "merits" documents. Thus, there was nothing to log. Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, SCL took the extra step of producing a log of all documents it had identified through a computerized search (using search terms keyed to Plaintiff's 24 RFPs) but did not produce because it determined upon further review that those documents were not responsive to Plaintiff's RFPs.

No good deed goes unpunished. Plaintiff hopes that by saying SCL's "relevancy log" did not contain any documents withheld as "merits" documents, the Court will leap to the conclusion that SCL violated its Order. But there is a simple reason why SCL's log did not contain any documents responsive to jurisdiction that were withheld because they were relevant to the merits: no such documents exist. To repeat: SCL did not withhold any documents responsive to Plaintiff's jurisdictional RFPs on the ground that they were relevant to the "merits." The log SCL produced for the January 2013 production simply lists documents that SCL determined to be non-responsive. As even Plaintiff appears to acknowledge, that log serves no purpose and SCL should be excused from providing another one. It is simply absurd for Plaintiff to suggest that SCL be sanctioned for not withholding documents, and for doing

⁴ As SCL pointed out in its Motion to Reconsider, VML is a separate company with its own Board, which has its own fiduciary duties to protect VML's interests. Accordingly, it is not clear that SCL has the power to compel VML to violate OPDP's directives.

more than the Court's order required.

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III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in its Motion to Reconsider, SCL urges the Court to reconsider its March 27 Order to the extent that it requires SCL to produce additional documents from Macau, without MPDPA redactions, and to provide a "relevancy" log.

DATED this 12 day of November, 2014.

J. Randall Jones, Esq Mark M. Jones, Esq.

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Attorneys for Las Vegas Sands Corp. and Sands China,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the // th day of November, 2014, the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF SANDS CHINA LTD.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT'S MARCH 27, 2013 ORDER was served on the following parties through the Court's electronic filing system:

ALL PARTIES ON THE E-SERVICE LIST

An employee of Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLI

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

.

Defendants .

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ.

TODD BICE, ESQ. JORDAN SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

MARK JONES, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

District Court

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014, 8:06 A.M. 1 (Court was called to order) 2 3 THE COURT: Good morning, counsel. 4 MR. BICE: Good morning, Your Honor. MR. PEEK: Good morning, Your Honor. 5 б THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands. 7 (Pause in the proceedings) THE COURT: All right. It's your motion. By the 8 9 way, the Advanced Discovery site hates me, just so we're clear. That Website, I'll never use it again. And it may be 10 just that I'm old and I don't learn new tricks well. 11 12 MR. PEEK: Which Website is that, Your Honor? THE COURT: Advanced Discovery. 13 MR. PEEK: Oh. The Advanced Discovery one. Yeah. 14 MR. JONES: Your Honor, you're younger than I am, 15 16 and so I really try to avoid that. That's why I have very 17 smart young people who understand that stuff. 18 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. JONES: Your Honor, first of all, we appreciate 19 20 you allowing us a hearing on this matter, as opposed to in 21 chambers. THE COURT: It's an important issue, Mr. Jones. 22 Whether I agree to reconsider or not, it's still an important 23 24 issue. 25 MR. JONES: And I appreciate that, Your Honor. And

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I guess it leads me to I guess a point that -- I've practiced
before you for many years, and I've been on both sides of
cases, and I know I think you have a great appreciation of the
discovery process, and I think the point I want to try to make
here, hope to make here is that, you know, discovery is very
important in litigation, but there are appropriate limits to
it. And the reason we're asking you to reconsider just one
part of your March 27, 2013, order as it relates to the
redactions is because of the current circumstances and whether
or not it's appropriate or necessary to essentially order
Sands China to produce the remaining unredacted documents --
excuse me, the remaining redacted documents in unredacted form
in light of the -- what I certainly believe to be a legitimate
concern about the laws of China and Macau. And so, not that
it's hopefully not clear already, but just to make it
abundantly clear, we're asking you to only reconsider that
part of your order that requires us to produce the documents
that -- the remaining redacted documents in an unredacted
form.
          THE COURT: And those redacted documents that you
believe might be affected by the Macau Data Privacy Act.
          MR. JONES:
                      That's right.
          THE COURT:
                      Okay.
          MR. JONES:
                      And I --
          THE COURT: You've got to say that part on the
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 MR. JONES: Yes. And, Judge, just in terms of a history here, you know, this thing has evolved I think beyond anybody's imaginations as to how this whole case has evolved, and when — and by the way, in terms of the motion for reconsideration I think the Court has acknowledged as it relates to the defamation order that you reconsidered from June of 2011 there was a change in the law from the Supreme Court, and that's what we believe has occurred here. Not just a change in the factual situation, but also the change in the law in terms of this further instruction we have from both the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the form of the Viega — the Nevada Supreme Court in the form of the Viega case and the Uponor case, both of which, by the way, I was on the plaintiff's side of.

THE COURT: You were on the losing side, unfortunately.

MR. JONES: I was. And, ironically, I was on the losing side where we were asking that these documents be produced and that we were asking for discovery, and the Supreme Court told us in light of the <u>Daimler</u> case, no, that's not relevant, you don't get it anymore. And we didn't get to do it. And I'll -- obviously I have a biased perspective, because I was involved in those cases and I know the facts I would presume better than anybody else in this courtroom, but

it's my belief that the facts showing the relationship between the foreign entities and the local entities was much stronger to show a connection to Nevada. In the <u>Viega</u> case we actually had a building in the Reno area that they were involved with. Now, of course, the Supreme Court didn't see it that way. That's fine. But the point is that in light of the <u>Daimler</u> case our Nevada Supreme Court has said you have to really look at whether or not this is relevant and it's discoverable from a jurisdictional standpoint of a foreign entity, and they said no.

So let's take a look for a moment at what has been produced. So since the order came out in March of 2013 we have produced another I think it's 4100 documents from Macau that are completely unredacted. So those are new documents. This was based upon the expanded custodian search. And then we've got a remaining I think it's 7100 documents that are redacted in some -- I'm sorry, seventy-six nonprivileged documents that have been produced with redactions. So that as far as we're concerned this is based upon the expanded custodial research that you ordered and the order that says we can produce those documents and withhold privileged, but we had to do a privilege log, but we couldn't redact under the MPDPA. So out of a concern for violating foreign law we've -- we're ready to produce all this additional information, and we've gone back and we've culled through the duplicates, we've

done whatever we can to take documents to Macau and have them looked at by lawyers with the documents produced in the U.S. to see where we can take a document that is redacted in Macau and see if it's also been available in the U.S. Which case we have that duplicate, we have then given it in an unredacted form.

So what we're left with, Judge, is we're left with --

Oh. And the other important point here is with respect to Mr. Adelson, Mr. Leven, Mr. Goldstein, and Mr. Kay we have gotten the consents from them, because they're obviously senior management people. So we got their consents, so we've been able to give those documents completely unredacted, which, by the way, presumably would be of most concern to the plaintiff, because they really are left with, at least as far as I can see, this nerve center type of an argument, as opposed to some of the other theories. I know they say they haven't abandoned them. That's fine and --

THE COURT: I think that's part of the factual analysis, whether you call it the nerve center or not. But it's part of the factual analysis that needs to be made.

MR. JONES: And so the point being is that clearly those people they believe to be the most critical witnesses in the case they've identified. And they've taken those depositions, and clearly they hold important positions within

the company. And they have been -- their documents have been produced with their names on them unredacted. So they have that information.

So what we're left with, Judge, is we're left with essentially documents that have — that only the name, not the content, as you know, or the subject matter that's been redacted. And we're talking about documents literally that show — as an example, we want to have documents that talk about board meetings. Well, there's some reference here to the board meeting because these board members have come in and who's going to pick them up to take them — pick them up from the airport. And we've redacted that name.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, these are business communications. These are not personal privacy issues. If you were talking to me about personal privacy issues that were inadvertently included in business emails, you would have an argument that I would be much more inclined to agree with. And while I understand the government of Macau has their rules, their rules do not operate in Nevada. And a \$5,000 fine and a warning after somebody makes a determination to carry all of the data from Macau to Las Vegas Boulevard South here in Las Vegas, Nevada, may be an appropriate determination for the Macau government. But their rules don't operate here.

MR. JONES: Judge, I understand that. But here's the dilemma, you know. And I was fascinated when I was

watching the case about Pistorius, the guy in South Africa, and I watched how their system worked, and it's --

THE COURT: Different than ours.

MR. JONES: Very different than ours. But that's their system. And some of it was actually not only confusing to me, but seemed somewhat bizarre from my perspective. In fact, I had an opportunity recently to go over to London with the American College, and they had a mock trial in London. It was fascinating. You know, we all come from the perspective of English common law, and they did a civil trial with English lawyers, barristers, and American lawyers.

THE COURT: Did they wear the wigs?

MR. JONES: They did. And they had a United States federal judge, and then they had a senior English judge. And the system there, what I thought was identical to ours, was so much different. And so even though we have that connection with England, we still -- our laws are different and they follow different rules. So essentially that's why I believe the Supreme Court has said you have to do a balancing test.

THE COURT: That's on sanctions. I have to do a balancing test when I get to sanctions. Right now I'm on discovery.

MR. JONES: All right.

THE COURT: Your client can make a business decision after weighing the different interests that it has and do what

it needs to do. I then someday may be further addressing sanctions issues. Someday. Don't know when it's going to be, because I've got to get documents produced first.

MR. JONES: Understood. But let me address your point specifically, then. So what this Court would always have the right to do is to decide what information is relevant and necessary in discovery irrespective of the Macanese privacy laws. So if you look at this -- and this goes to sort of a retailed point where they said, well, you withheld documents, you put together this relevancy list. No, it was not a relevancy list, it was a nonresponsive list. And sort of the no good deed goes unpunished, we went beyond what was required and we produced all relevant documents. What we did not produce -- what we did is we did a list of documents that were not responsive to the 24 requests to produce or had anything to do with those custodians. That what we did -- that's what that list was.

So we have produced what we believe to be all relevant documents. We have redacted a few of them. So my question to the Court is what is -- and I think the Court does have the right and actually I think it's totally appropriate and necessary to balance the interests of the parties. So, for example, I ask this Court if you're balancing the idea of our client, even though we don't necessarily understand why this privacy law exists -- as you said, well, what difference

does it make if you have just the name of somebody. I personally agree with you. I understand your point. Why would that make a difference? But it does make a difference to the Macanese Government. They have said, without that person's express permission you can't produce that information. And so we are faced with this dilemma whether we like it or not, and certainly I know you don't like it, but what's --

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THE COURT: Doesn't matter whether I like it or not. The issue is if it's a business communication that your client is involved with with someone else, one of your employees is involved, and almost all of these are with your own employees who are communicating among each other. That's not something that I am probably going to recognize as an appropriate exercise of your balancing if we ever get there. If you're talking to me about third parties -- for instance, we had some issues of people who became ill while they were visiting the casinos and investigations related to that. If instead the emails relate to those persons' individual health conditions, as opposed to the government investigation related to that outbreak, I think that is a very wise exercise of a data privacy protection that your client may want to rely upon, because it affects a third party not related to this action. You've got all these employees that are your employees that if you don't want to go get their consent that's okay. You have

the ability to get their consent. You can certainly put a little screen on their email every time they sign in that says, I understand that by using the email system I am consenting that my emails are going to not be protected by the Macau Data Privacy Act. You haven't done that. There are lots of ways that your client can deal with this issue from a business perspective. You haven't decided to do it, and that's okay.

MR. JONES: Two things, Judge, two points I would make. First of all, the Macanese Government doesn't recognize this discretion, as you suggested. So that unfortunately is not an option to my client. Secondly, the --

THE COURT: Your client decided to hand-walk all the data out of the country.

MR. JONES: That data has been produced.

THE COURT: I understand. But your client decided to make that decision. So it's sort of hard for me to listen and say, gosh, Judge, we have to abide by the Macau Data Privacy Act when you already decided it didn't really apply to you.

MR. JONES: Well, actually, Judge, that I think was clearly a mistake by the client, and they paid for that mistake. And here's the other problem, is, you know, you make the mistake once, which they did, and they got admonished for it and fined for it. If they make the mistake twice, it

becomes a much more serious concern. And that is the concern that they have had, and that's the concern they've expressed to this Court. So it's not --

THE COURT: I understand.

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MR. JONES: So it's not a hypothetical concern, it's a legitimate concern. You have an actual law in place that says we can't do this.

With respect to your other point, first of all, at least for the record I want to make the point that they're VML employees, they're not Sands China employees. But be that as it may, irrespective of any other argument related to that, this is after the fact. We're not talking about issues going forward in the future. So we can't go back and put a note on their computer screen and say, you know, in the past you did this, we want you to know we're going to produce it because we've now been told we have to produce it. We can't go back there. And more importantly, even if we put -- it's my understanding that even if we put such a disclaimer on the computer screen it doesn't matter under Macanese law. doesn't work. They have to have a certificate that shows they've done it completely voluntarily. And there's this whole issue they have, as is put forth in the brief, of a concern about a coercive effect of an employer saying, look, I want you to do this but I want you to do it voluntarily. And again, whether I agree with it, you agree with it, that is the

way it is. So that's the dilemma we're faced with.

So getting back --

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, most of the documents we're talking about are communications with people here in the United States. They're communications that are going through the Las Vegas Sands servers. It's not like this is all information that is solely housed in Macau. This is information that is being communicated between Macau and Las Vegas. So there's two options. Either we can have Mr. Peek and his client produce it off of the servers or explain to me why it's not there anymore, or your client, who was communicating with people who are not Macanese citizens, can go ahead and produce the information. If you decide you're not, I've got other options, and I can deal with it at a sanctions hearing.

MR. JONES: I think that there's a misunderstanding, first of all, a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the documents. It's my understanding -- and that's what it says actually in the briefs -- that if we have the documents here in unredacted form, in other words, they already exist in the U.S., then we produce them. That's the point where we've gone and where we have given that information. The documents that I believe that are really at issue are internal documents in Macau, employee to employee in Macau.

For instance -- and this is where I think -- Your

Honor, I would think you would understand this point, that if you have somebody -- an employee, say a VML employee writing to another VML employee in Macau saying, Mr. Leven is coming into town today for the board meeting, who's going to pick him up, and that's the subject of that email, so they're two Macanese employees -- excuse me, two Macanese residents that work for the company, so it's a company email, but they're simply saying something to the effect that -- which, by the way, they have that information, they have the substance, they just don't have the names, what is the possible relevance to this case on jurisdiction as to why they need that person's name when it -- that's what we're talking about, Judge. For the most part that's what we're talking about. They have the substance. If they could point out to you an email that goes to a substantive jurisdiction issue, not just that says -somewhere in it they're talking about a board meeting, because some of them do talk about board meetings, where's the board going to have lunch, who's going to pick up the board member at the airport, how --

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THE COURT: Mr. Jones, I would love to be able to say that that category of documents does not need to be produced. But given the information that I went through when I did the original review, not the one when she went back and reviewed the privilege logs and cut a bunch of stuff off, given initial review, I'm not willing to trust them. Now, if

you want to submit those for me to do an in-camera review on whether something is relevant to the jurisdictional issues or not, I've got Mondays available to do stuff like that, and I'm happy to. But I'm not going to rely on your client, who's had a history of not being accurate in the disclosures that they've made in the privilege logs, and I'm talking about your predecessor counsel, not you, and I'm not going to rely—upon them for that.

Now, if what you want me to do is to review them for relevance, I'll review them, I'll get them done. If there's only 7,000 documents, you can get it through it in a day.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I very much appreciate your comment. What we want to try to do is -- and I've said this before and I'm going to say it again, we want to be a transparent as we can with the Court and with opposing counsel. I don't want to be in a position -- I don't ever want to be in a position where the Court feels that my client and I am not producing everything I'm supposed to produce. This is a unique circumstance in my experience in doing this for over 30 years where we have this foreign law that comes into play. And I know it's very troubling to the Court, but I think there is --

THE COURT: It's not troubling to me, Mr. Jones. I am aware of the various Data Privacy Acts that exit in Europe. I'm aware of the different Data Privacy Acts that exist in

Asia. They are very different. And while I certainly understand the importance to those individual countries of protecting their citizens, this is an issue of jurisdictional discovery as to whether the conduct of your client that occurred between citizens of the United States, activities related to citizens of the United States will subject it to jurisdiction.

MR. JONES: And I get that. So getting to your comment, all we want to do is make sure that to the greatest extent possible we can comply with this order -- this Court's order and also comply with Macanese law in a way that gets the other side all information they need for the jurisdictional hearing. And I think that's a fair proposition. And I understand there's been a lot of history and the Court has concerns about the candor of counsel and the client producing this information, but I think things have transpired in the interim that give us a lot more guidance of what we need to do and where we need to go, and I'm asking the Court in reconsideration of the order -- because right now the order is extremely board, it just says, you cannot redact under MPDPA, and we would ask the Court to give us some latitude --

THE COURT: But I gave you other abilities to make redactions [inaudible].

MR. JONES: And we did. And by the way, we did. And we've gone back and we've unredacted thousands of

documents where we found the duplicates, where we found ways to avoid violating the Macanese law and still comply with this Court's order. So we have been trying to do it in good faith and make sure that we don't get our client in trouble with the Macanese Government, but also don't get the client in trouble with you. And that's all we're trying to do, Judge, and we'd just simply like the opportunity to do that.

So we would ask if you would reconsider your order to that extent, that we can then -- maybe what we need to do is like you said, if we need to go through and maybe be more specific as to why a particular document is violative of your order and gives the other side all the information they need to have. And if we could have some kind of order like that, that would certainly be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Pisanelli.

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MR. PISANELLI: So let's remind ourselves, Your Honor, that these problems that we're hearing about this morning are all of Sands China's making, the fact that they were sanctioned for the call it misbehavior and lack of transparency and really untruths that were brought to your attention, it is now being brushed aside as if we were just having a simple new debate over whether the Macau Data Privacy Act should govern how we conduct our discovery here. The problem was resolved by this Court a long time ago through the

sanction that said, you cannot rely upon it anymore, despite that they continue to do so.

It's also a problem of Sands China's making -THE COURT: But you understand that I may make a
determination someday that redacting a bellman's name from an
email may not be enough for a sanction?

MR. PISANELLI: All in the balancing test of -- that you're going to do on what the appropriate sanction should be. I understand that. Just -- you made my point, my primary point already, that being that this is -- those balancing factors have to do with what the sanction will be, not whether it's discoverable.

We also, you know, can't lose sight of the fact that this problem is also of Sands China's making through this dragging this matter out for several years now by pretending to have nothing to do with Nevada when so much evidence that we accumulate daily by pulling teeth, figuratively anyway, we find more and more contacts, and we're still sitting here now years later waiting for 8,000-some-odd documents to be produced that were ordered to be produced long ago.

And so what do we have? The writing's on the wall, right. Your Honor, the reason we're here, and you can see it in their papers, is that Sands China has decided that it will not comply with what you say either for its own business motivations or because it doesn't want a \$5,000 from the Macau

Government or because whatever reason they're not going to disclose, and it doesn't really matter, they have made it clear in their papers they are not going to comply.

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So this motion is an attempt to get you to rewrite the rules. You told us, Judge -- from Sands China's perspective, you told us, Judge, to do not redact for the Macau Data Privacy Act anymore or there will be sanctions, we've done that, we're going to be sanctioned but we're asking you now to reconsider, change the rules so that the sanction will be nothing. That's in essence what we're doing here. And the problem is that they come to you, in our view, with two fundamentally flawed bases for asking you to rewrite the rules of the game and to pretend like the history of this case never happened. The first, of course, is their claim, their self-proclaimed declaration that what we are seeking in these documents are irrelevant because the law has changed. And we heard today a little added supplement on the law changing in both Nevada and at the United States Supreme Court level. have cited to you, you'll see at page 7, starting with the Daimler decision. The Daimler decision didn't, as Counsel would have this Court believe, say that the agency theory is no longer available and therefore our discovery is no longer relevant. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court specifically said that it need not pass on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction. So that issue,

exactly as you said, is one that will be developed on a factual basis when we get to our jurisdictional hearing. The agency theory, just like the nerve center theory, just like specific jurisdiction are all still very much in play despite what Sands China would hope.

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Now, on the Uponor side, an unpublished opinion that we've heard about, and I will never pretend even with my limited involvement in the case to know as much about it as Mr. Jones does, so I'm not going to dare spar him on that. But what I do have the benefit of is actually reading the unpublished opinion that cites the Viega case, and it says quite the contrary about whether the law has changed and whether this agency theory is gone. Court said there in Uponor, when characterizing what it did in Viega, that, "We concluded that in order to assert jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation a parent must do more than show the amount of control typical and a parent-subsidiary relationship. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the parent has moved beyond the establishment of general policy and direction for the subsidiary and in effect taken over performance of the subsidiary's day-to-day operations in carrying out that policy." That doesn't sound like an abrogation of an agency theory to me. Sounds like it's a standard that maybe it's a little more heightened, the same way that the Daimler court did in rejecting the less stringent

standard of the Ninth Circuit. So to claim that now 8,000 documents are irrelevant because we don't have an agency theory anymore, respectfully, is just not the case.

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And the second flaw of their request to rewrite the rules from you is simply that we don't need it, they said. Peppered throughout this motion is Sands China's declaration that we don't need these documents, we have enough already, go ahead and give your best shot with what we decided to give you through our own filters, through our own different sets of lawyers and the judgment that was imposed on discovery responses that you do have you've got enough. And again, respectfully, that's not for Sands China or its counsel or its chairman or its in-the-house lawyers or any of them on this side of the debate tell us what we need. It's for Your Honor to decide. And Your Honor already decided that going on two years ago, the order that they're now asking you to reconsider.

So what do we have left, then? We know that there is no foundation for this request; but what do we have in their papers of what they plan to do? We know, Your Honor, that the order required the production of these documents in March 2013, and we know August of this year the Supreme Court rejected their attempts for a writ to stop the entire process. Now, three months later, we still don't have any documents. But what we do have, you'll see throughout their papers, and

let me just quote a sentence or two, because it is most remarkable thing about this debate, is Sands China telling you at page 6 of their motion that, "The documents were redacted to remove all personal information." That's what it says. "Since this Court declined to further extend a stay, SCL has been working to prepare the documents. Those documents were then redacted."

They then say on page 8, "SCL is prepared to produce the remaining documents from Macau with personal data redacted." And they even said that the four people that they are congratulating themselves over, who they did get consent from, that they're going to produce their documents, quote, "in largely unredacted form."

There's the writing on the wall. They've told you, they've told us that they understand your order but they're not going to comply with it. They went ahead and redacted anyway, and before they give them to us they're asking you to change the rules of the game so that the sanction will be zero, that they end up now going full circle starting with non production, redacting, go through the entire two-year process we did in and out of the Supreme Court only to get to the same exact spot and ask you to say that there will be no consequence for that behavior.

They also went even so far to tell us that when you told them to produce the records of 20 custodians -- and we

all know, Your Honor's already pointed out, that one way to solve this whole thing is get consents even if they had not been sanctioned for all of the bad behavior that we don't need to rehash, they still could have complied with the law by simply getting consents, and they made the efforts to get four. That's it. Now, they said that it's stringent and you have to be careful on how you deal with employees. Fair enough. True statement. But you notice not a single word -- and Counsel will correct me, but not a single word I saw that they tried, that they did anything.

THE COURT: Well, the only people they got consents for are people who live here in the Las Vegas area who are U.S. citizens.

MR. PISANELLI: Four people who by all measures are in charge of the whole mess. So not a surprise that they didn't bother to do that.

They also told us, which was a little confusing to me, they asked for relief not to have to do the relevance log, and then condemn us in their reply by saying how dare we claim that they have to give the relevance log that also was part of Your Honor's order. If there is no relevance log, I guess what they're saying is that every single document at issue goes directly to the issue of jurisdiction. And they're conceding that fact; otherwise we would have had all these documents on some type of log that says that they're merits

based.

So, Your Honor, we know what's going on here. They said that they won't comply, you told them not to redact, and they redacted. You told them to do what they can to get things produced in a timely manner going all the way back to 2013. We now stand here months after the Supreme Court has ruled, still without any documents, still with the same circular arguments that just never seem to get exhausted from Sands China's perspective. They bemoan the fact that this matter has dragged on, but we all know that it's dragged on as an open choice of Sands China. And it's time to put an end to it. There's no reason for reconsideration, there's no change in the law, there's no change in the history of this case, and there certainly hasn't been any change in the behavior of Sands China. They continue to fly by their own rules, and it's time to put an end to it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jones, anything else?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. First of all I would say that I categorically disagree that we fly by our own rules. That's not what's going on here, Judge. And I'll tell you the other thing that Mr. Pisanelli said, is that he said we won't comply. And that's not the case. We can't comply. And there is a --

THE COURT: That's not true, Mr. Jones. The Nevada

Supreme Court said if you make a business decision not to comply, which you are perfectly able to do, your client can make that business decision. I am then to make a balancing test and analyze the issues that you were facing in making that decision in order to determine what appropriate sanctions are. So it's not that you can't comply, it's not that you have to follow the Macau rules. Your client has the right to make a business decision. There may be consequences to that business decision, but you've got the right to make the decision. And then if I decide that the reasons for the business decision were very valid and should be honored given the long history of this case, then maybe your sanction will be very minor. But if you don't go forward and do what you need to do, I'm never going to get to that point of going through that balancing test.

MR. JONES: Well, and, Judge, I want to also address that point about, you know, my being referred to by Mr. Pisanelli as bemoaning the time its taken. We quoted I think it was Mr. Bice way back when when they said they were going to make these very narrow requests related just to jurisdiction. This has blown all out of proportion. Again, I've never seen anything like this. We produced hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. We are now down to about 7600 that have redactions on them of names. They don't have the subject matter redacted, what we're talking about.

And I want to make another point. Mr. Pisanelli said the balancing test only relates to sanctions. That's not true. The court order from August of this year says that, "The District Courts have wide discretion to consider foreign policy statutes in deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from other sources." So that relates to discovery, not just to sanction. And that's what we're asking for here.

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THE COURT: This isn't unduly burdensome. And you're telling me it's not available from other sources.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ JONES: No. And that's actually what I hope I was trying to make \sim

THE COURT: Because if it's in the servers on Las Vegas Boulevard South, we need to make sure that it's been produced.

MR. JONES: They have been. And that's a point I think maybe has been missed by the Court. We're not talking about documents in the U.S. If we have those documents, even if the same document is in Macau that's redacted, we produced it unredacted in the U.S. So they have that. That's where we went and we compared the documents that we had in Macau with what we do already have in the U.S. And if we had it here in unredacted form, we gave -- actually I should say that if we had it here it wasn't redacted, we gave it to them because it was already here. So just so it's clear, Judge, we're only

talking about documents that are in Macau that have otherwise not been produced by some other source unredacted. So we have complied. We're only talking about Macanese documents.

And with respect to the <u>Daimler</u> issue the point I think is being missed here is -- and I certainly do know what <u>Uponor</u> said. We're talking about an agency theory where -- this is their theory, not our theory. Their theory is Las Vegas Sands is the principal -- excuse me, is the agent of its affiliated company. That's completely opposite of what --

parent-subsidiary relationship is basically what they're saying. And I don't know what the facts are, because someday I'm going to do a jurisdictional hearing and make that determination as your fact finder. But right now we're doing discovery for the jurisdictional hearing, and I am typically, just like in any other case, going to give them a little more latitude than what I might admit at the hearing. Because the question is is it discoverable for purposes of the jurisdictional hearing. And if your client makes a decision to redact the name of the bellman who was instructed to pick up Mr. Leven to bring him to the board meeting, then I'm probably not going to sanction you for redacting that individual's name.

However, if the redactions are more significant and relate to people who are more senior in the operation and who

are people who were directly involved in dealing with Las Vegas Sands and delegating work and adopting a shared services agreement, I think we may have a different issue.

So if what you're asking me to do is to pre judge and tell you what the answer is to how I'm going to sanction your client if they don't comply with the order, I've given you a little bit of guidance.

MR. JONES: And, Judge, really what I was hoping to do is to have you reconsider the fact that the breadth of the order as it is was we thought too board and that in fact under the circumstances of the case as it's evolved with the Nevada Supreme Court decisions in combination with the <u>Daimler</u> case that the information they're seeking now from these emails is essentially what we're talking about is -- will not move their claim forward one iota with respect to jurisdiction.

THE COURT: But you're not the one who gets to make that decision.

MR. JONES: I understand. I understand. And so we're asking that you balance that information again, since we — in terms of the burdensome nature of it and the ability to get it from other sources. We've given the information of other sources, and the burden here is in weighing that burden, which we believe the Supreme Court said you do have discretion to deal with at the discovery stage that the burden is minimal, in fact, we don't think it exists all with respect to

these documents that are still redacted as to Jacobs, and the burden on our client is substantial because it's not just another \$5,000 fine that Mr. Pisanelli said, well, you're subjecting yourself to. The point is that when you violate a law twice -- and this goes to your point. You know, if we essentially say to Macau at this point, well, the Judge told us we had to do it, they're not going to be sympathetic to that. That's the problem. They're going to say, well, you made that choice and you're going to have to pay the consequences and you're a licensee. And so the burden on my client under these circumstances we believe far outweighs the relative burden to Mr. --

THE COURT: Then make that choice and we'll deal with it at the sanctions hearing.

MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, again we would ask you to reconsider your order.

THE COURT: The motion to reconsider is denied. But I thought about it.

Now let me ask a followup question. I went through and did the in-camera review and the review of the redacted documents in camera. I issued some minute orders, and I asked for some supplemental information. I have three supplemental filings. I want to make sure I have everything you were going to give me or you intend to give me. I have one on Campanina Ferrara, I have one on Captain Sick [phonetic], which is

11/10, and then I have another one on Campanina Ferrara, because I didn't realize that you had done one, and another one on the CCKS folks, which was November 18th. Was there any more you intended to give me, or is this it so I can finish up the review? MR. JONES: That's all from us, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Then I'll finish that up. Anything else? MR. JONES: Not today, Your Honor. THE COURT: Have a lovely weekend. Oh. Today's only Tuesday; right? MR. PEEK: Today's only Tuesday, Your Honor. THE PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 8:48 A.M.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
* * * * *

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

Defendants

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION OF NOVEMBER 5, 2014, ORDER

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

TODD BICE, ESQ.

DEBRA L. SPINELLI, ESQ. JORDAN T. SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

IAN P. McGINN, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1 LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2014, 8:04 A.M. 2 (Court was called to order) 3 THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands. Good morning, gentlemen. 5 MR. JONES: Good morning, Your Honor. 6 (Pause in the proceedings) 7 MR. JONES: We will try to make this brief. 8 THE COURT: Well, it's not a complicated issue. 9 MR. JONES: It's not. 10 THE COURT: It's like, Judge, did you know what you 11 were doing last time. And, Your Honor, you know, it's -- as 12 MR. JONES: you said, it's pretty straightforward. These documents were 13 14 not in the possession of Advanced Discovery. They came up, as 15 I see it, as a side issue. And by the name of the motion 16 itself, clearly it's requesting release of Advanced Discovery 17 These are hard-copy documents that have watermarks on them. They -- and really, Judge, what we're just trying to 18 19 do is make sure that the order accurately reflects what the motion -- the relief the motion was seeking. And I don't know 20 that I need to say a whole lot more than that. As you said, 21 22 it's a pretty straightforward issue. THE COURT: Okay. 23 24 MR. JONES: There is a separate motion on that you

probably haven't even seen yet, because it's not fully

1 briefed. It has to do with the confidentiality of these 2 documents. And so --THE COURT: That's a different issue. 3 MR. JONES: It is. Absolutely. And so today all 4 5 we're talking about is just trying to make sure that the 6 record accurately reflects the relief requested, and that's 7 all that we're talking about. 8 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? MR. JONES: That's -- unless you have any other 9 questions, like you said, I think it's pretty straightforward. 11 THE COURT: Fairly easy. That's why I didn't call 12 and move you guys. 13 Mr. Bice, good morning. How are you? 14 MR. BICE: Yes, Your Honor. 15 , THE COURT: Don't you like the lovely chairs that Mr. Ogilvie and his team have chosen to sit in? 16 17 MR. BICE: Yes, they're very nice. They're a lovely 18 color, too. 19 MR. JONES: I just want to know who gets the big TVs 20 when the trial's over. 21 THE COURT: They are actually County TVs. 22 MR. BICE: Your Honor, with respect to the motion I 23 believe that everybody in the courtroom when we were here last 24 time believed that the reports were buried somewhere in this privilege log. The plaintiffs thought that, as did the

defendants, because the defendants are the ones that offered up the reports as the only plausible thing that could have been waived in light of the position that they had taken at their letter. And now they're essentially claiming, well, we should get the benefit because that privilege log is such a mess no one could figure out where and if these reports were somehow buried in that I don't remember how many volumes of log. And so now they're saying, well, because we've now decided that it's not buried in that log anywhere these documents somehow couldn't have been the subject of the motion, even though they took the position when we were here that they were the subject of the motion. We took the position that they were the subject of the motion, and the Court took the position that they were the subject of the motion and ruled accordingly.

And so now all we're saying is the Court has already ruled on this issue. Those documents have -- are in Mr.

Jacobs's possession, except for the one we cannot find. But, nonetheless, their position has been that it is in his possession. And the Court ruled appropriately that you knew that those documents were in his possession, it's confirmed by their own legal counsel Ms. Glaser that she was aware of that fact, and then she and their client made the conscious decision not to take any form of action anywhere concerning their claims of privilege. And so how can they --

1 First of all, Your Honor, if it's not on the privilege log, how is it privileged? That seems to be their 2 3 argument now. And what is the privilege? Have they 4 established any basis for privilege of an investigative report 5 conducted by a non lawyer, a former Hong Kong Police detective 6 I believe is what his role was years ago? 7 So, again, accordingly, Your Honor, the motion --8 the documents were properly before this Court on this waiver question, and the Court has appropriately ruled upon them. All they're essentially trying to do is make us file the exact 10 same motion and have a short do over right again. I mean, if 11 12 the Court tells me, file that on an OST and the Court will 13 hear it next week, fine. But --14 THE COURT: That's what I'm probably going to say, Mr. Bice, because I think it's --15 16 MR. BICE: Well, you know -- but again --17 THE COURT: -- important enough that we do it the 18 right way so that somebody in Carson City doesn't make a 19 decision later that we missed a step. 20 MR. BICE: That's fine, Your Honor. If the Court 21 would like me to, I'll file a motion, and --22 THE COURT: That's what we should do, after reading 23 it. 24 MR. BICE: -- I'll submit it on an OST to you. 25 THE COURT: Okay. So your motion is granted.

However, I've already made factual determinations related to the document, but I understand they may not arguably be covered under the scope of this particular motion. So I'm directing Mr. Bice to file a motion that deals specifically with these particular documents, and then I can enter an appropriate order after I have an opportunity to hear anything else you have to say related to it.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, understood. And I will prepare the order and provide it to Mr. Bice before we submit it to the Court.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, you say --

THE COURT: Wait. There's one other thing. Until a separate order is entered these documents, if they're produced, are going to be treated as confidential until I enter a separate order, okay.

MR. PEEK: Highly confidential, Your Honor?

MR. BICE: They're in Mr. Jacobs's possession today. How can they be highly confidential with just attorneys' eyes only?

THE COURT: I'm not going to call them highly confidential. I'm going to call them confidential. Then at some point you can file motion practice as to other stuff.

But at this point in time I just want to make sure they're not released in the public sphere because of some of the

1 commercially sensitive information that's contained in that. 2 MR. JONES: And, Your Honor, in that regard, as I 3 said, we have a motion pending that's not fully briefed. So 4 we are pursuing that issue. 5 THE COURT: I understand. I'm just trying to make sure that if I enter the order on the OST before that we don't 6 miss a step and for some reason somebody thinks they're not 7 confidential for about five minutes. Sort of what happened over at the U.S. Attorney's Office the other day with that 10 other case. Anything else? Why are you looking at me that way, 11 12 Mr. Peek? MR. PEEK: Actually, Your Honor, I was going to ask 13 14 you a question about another case, but I just -- because I 15 have a hearing on the 15th for which we submitted a 16 stipulation to vacate and to move. 17 THE COURT: Laura says it's moved. 18 MR. PEEK: Okay. Well, we didn't -- I thought it 19 was moved. I just -- we hadn't had the Court sign off on it 20 yet, so I just --21 THE LAW CLERK: It's actually in the box. 22 MR. PEEK: It is in the box? Okay. Thanks. 23 (Off-record colloquy) 24 THE COURT: Okay. 'Bye. 25 MR. PEEK: And, Your Honor, with respect to this

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motion that Mr. Bice is going to file, is that going to be
    heard next week?
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              THE COURT: That's my hope.
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              MR. PEEK: Because I won't be here during that
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    Christmas week. I'd like to spend it with my children in
    Reno.
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              THE COURT: Well, I was going to try and hear Mr.
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    Bice's motion next week. He said he's going to get it over
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    here. It's not a very complicated motion.
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              MR. BICE: I hope to get it over here by tomorrow.
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    Is there a date --
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              You don't want to hold it next week at all?
              MR. PEEK: No, no. I'm fine next week. I just
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    didn't want to do it Christmas week.
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              THE COURT: He wants to hear it next week.
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              MR. BICE: Oh. He wants to. Can we just set a
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    hearing date now?
              THE COURT: You want to hear it next Thursday at
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    8:00 o'clock?
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              MR. BICE: Next Thursday at 8:00 a.m. Will that
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    work?
              THE COURT: We all decided that we'll pick that day.
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              So when it comes in, Laura, remember that's the day
    we picked.
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             MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: And just call it a hearing, Dulce, and then you'll have more than one entry for that day. MR. BICE: Okay. THE COURT: 'Bye. MR. BICE: Thank you. Thank you. MR. PEEK: THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 8:11 A.M.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

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Adelson ("Adelson").

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Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 2 TLB@pisanellibice.com Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 3 DLS@pisanellibice.com Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 JTS@pisanellibice.com 5 PISANELLI BICE PLLC 400 South 7th Street, Third Floor б Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 214-2100 7 Facsimile: (702) 214-2101 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs 9 DISTRICT COURT 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 STEVEN C. JACOBS, Case No.: A-10-627691 Dept. No.: 12 Plaintiff, 13 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a 14 Cayman Islands corporation; SHELDON 15 ADELSON, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, 16 Defendants. 17 18 AND RELATED CLAIMS 19 Plaintiff, for his causes of action against Defendants, alleges and avers as follows: 20 21 **PARTIES** Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs ("Jacobs") is a Florida resident who also maintains a 22 1. 23 residence in Georgia. 2. Defendant Las Vegas Sands Corp. ("LVSC") is a publicly-traded Nevada 24 corporation with its principal place of business in Clark County, Nevada. More than 50% of the 25

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voting power in LVSC is controlled, directly or indirectly, by its Chairman and CEO, Sheldon G.

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- 3. Defendant Sands China Ltd. ("Sands China") is a Cayman Islands corporation and is 70% owned by LVSC. Sands China is publicly traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. While Sands China publicly holds itself out as being headquartered in Macau, its true headquarters are in Las Vegas, where all principle decisions are made and direction is given by executives acting for Sands China.
- Defendant Adelson is a Nevada resident who directs and operates his gaming enterprise from Las Vegas, Nevada.
- 5. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, partnership, associate or otherwise of Defendants named herein as DOES I through X, inclusive, and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive, and each of them are unknown to Plaintiff at this time, and he therefore sues said Defendants and each of them by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will advise this Court and seek leave to amend this Complaint when the names and capacities of each such Defendants have been ascertained. Plaintiff alleges that each said Defendant herein designated as a DOE or ROE is responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to as hereinafter alleged.
- 6. Each Defendant is the agent of the other Defendants such that each Defendant is fully liable and responsible for all the acts and omissions of all of the other Defendants as set forth herein.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 7. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants and the claims set forth herein pursuant to NRS 14.065 on grounds that such jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the Nevada Constitution or United States Constitution.
- 8. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to NRS 13.010 et seq. because the material events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred in Clark County, Nevada.

COMMON ALLEGATIONS

LVSC's Dysfunction and Infighting

- 9. LVSC and its subsidiaries develop and operate large integrated resorts worldwide. The company owns and operates properties in Las Vegas, Nevada, Macau (a Special Administrative Region of China), Singapore, and Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
- The company's Las Vegas properties consist of The Palazzo Resort Hotel Casino,
 The Venetian Resort Hotel Casino, and the Sands Expo and Convention Center.
- 11. Macau, which is located on the South China Sea approximately 37 miles southwest of Hong Kong, was a Portuguese colony for over 400 years, and is the largest and fastest growing gaming market in the world. LVSC opened the Sands Macau, the first Las Vegas-style casino in Macau. Thereafter, LVSC opened the Venetian Macau and the Four Seasons Macau on the Cotai Strip section of Macau where the company has resumed development of additional casino-resort properties.
- 12. Beginning in or about 2008, LVSC's business was in a financial freefall, with its own auditors subsequently issuing a going concern warning to the public. LVSC's problems due to the economic decline were exacerbated when the Chinese government imposed visa restrictions limiting the number of permitted visits by Chinese nationals to Macau. Because Chinese nationals make up more than half the patrons of Macau casinos, China's policy significantly reduced the number of visitors to Macau from mainland China, which adversely impacted tourism and the gaming industry in Macau. LVSC insiders viewed these visa restrictions as a message from the Chinese Central Communist government's displeasure over a number of activities by LVSC and its Chairman, Adelson.
- 13. Indeed, LVSC's Board members and senior executives internally expressed concern over Adelson's oftentimes erratic behavior, but failed to inform shareholders or take corrective action. Adelson's behavior had become so corrosive that some government officials in Macau, one of LVSC's principal markets, were no longer willing to even meet with Adelson. On a fact-finding tour of Asia by select LVSC Board members and senior executives where they met to discuss LVSC's declining fortunes with Asian business leaders and government officials –

a common theme was that Adelson had burned many bridges in Macau and specific reference was made to an often-discussed confrontation between Macau's then-Chief Executive, Edmund Ho, and Adelson. Indeed, in the fact-finding tour's meeting with Chief Executive Ho, he informed the LVSC executives of his views that while Adelson had done much to improve Macau's economic fortunes, the time had come for him to spend more time with his family and leave the company's operations to others. Translated into blunt businessman's terms: Adelson needed to retire.

- 14. Adelson's behavior did not just alienate outsiders, it effectively paralyzed the management's ability to respond to the financial calamity. LVSC faced increased cash flow needs, which, in turn, threatened to trigger a breach of the company's maximum leverage ratio covenant in its U.S. credit facilities. Due to Adelson's erratic behavior, LVSC's then-president and Chief Operating Officer William Weidner ("Weidner") lost confidence in Adelson's abilities, and undertook steps that Adelson would characterize as an attempted coup. Because Adelson controls more than fifty percent (50%) of LVSC's voting power, Adelson forced Weidner's removal from the company so as to preserve his own control.
- 15. Weidner was replaced as President and COO by Michael Leven ("Leven"), a member of LVSC's Board of Directors.
- 16. Because of the dysfunction and paralysis Adelson created, LVSC failed to access capital markets in a timely fashion, which then forced the company to engage in a number of emergency transactions to raise funds in late 2008 and early 2009. Ironically for LVSC's shareholders all of those except for Adelson, that is this unnecessary delay resulted in Adelson's personal wealth as the financing source for a quick influx of liquidity. But, to access those funds, Adelson would charge LVSC a hefty price, obtaining convertible senior notes, preferred shares, and warrants. Later, Adelson would reap a staggering windfall as a result of these highly-favorable (for him) financing terms. Conveniently, Adelson was the principal beneficiary, to the detriment of all other shareholders, of the very financial calamity that he helped create.

LVSC Hires Jacobs to Run Its Macau Operations

- 17. It is in this poisonous environment that Jacobs enters the LVSC picture. Even before Leven became LVSC's President and COO, he had reached out to Jacobs to discuss potential COO candidates to replace Weidner. Leven and Jacobs had known each other for many years having worked together at U.S. Franchise Systems in the 1990's and in subsequent business ventures thereafter. When Leven received an offer from LVSC's Board to become the company's President and COO, he again reached out to Jacobs to discuss the opportunity and the conditions under which he (Leven) would accept the position. The conditions included but were not limited to Leven's compensation package and a commitment from Jacobs to join Leven for a period of 90-120 days to "ensure my [Leven's] success."
- 18. Jacobs travelled to Las Vegas in March 2009 where he met with Leven and Adelson for several days to review the company's Nevada operations. While in Las Vegas, the parties agreed to a consulting contract between LVSC and Jacobs' company, Vagus Group, Inc. Jacobs then began assisting LVSC in restructuring its Las Vegas operations.
- 19. Jacobs, Leven, and Adelson subsequently travelled to Macau to conduct a review of LVSC's operations there. While in Macau, Leven told Jacobs that he wanted to hire him to run LVSC's Macau operations. Jacobs and Leven returned to Las Vegas after spending approximately a week in Macau. Jacobs then spent the bulk of the next 2-3 weeks working on the Las Vegas restructuring program and also negotiating with Leven regarding LVSC's desire to hire him as a full-time executive.
- 20. On May 6, 2009, LVSC announced that Jacobs would become the interim President of Macau Operations. Jacobs was charged with restructuring the financial and operational aspects of the Macau assets. This included, among other things, lowering operating costs, developing and implementing new strategies, building new ties with local and national government officials, and eventually spinning off the Macau assets into a new company to be taken public on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
- 21. Notwithstanding that Jacobs would be spending the majority of his time in Macau focusing on LVSC's operations in that location, he was also required to perform duties in

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Las Vegas including, but not limited to, working with LVSC's Las Vegas staff on reducing costs within the company's Las Vegas operations, consulting on staffing and delayed opening issues related to the company's Marina Bay Sands project in Singapore, and participating in meetings of LVSC's Board of Directors.

- 22. On June 24, 2009, LVSC awarded Jacobs 75,000 stock options in the company to reward him for his past performance as a LVSC team member and to incentivize him to improve his future performance as well as that of the company. LVSC and Jacobs executed a written Nonqualified Stock Option Agreement memorializing the award.
- 23. On or about August 4, 2009, Jacobs received LVSC's "Offer Terms and Conditions" (the "Term Sheet") for the position of "President and CEO Macau[,]" Term Sheet reflected the terms and conditions of employment that had been negotiated by Leven and Jacobs while Jacobs was in Vegas working under the original consulting agreement with LVSC and during his subsequent trips back to Las Vegas. With Adelson's express approval, Leven signed the Term Sheet on or about August 3, 2009, and had his assistant, Patty Murray, email it to Jacobs who was then in Macau. Jacobs signed the Term Sheet accepting the offer contained therein and delivered a copy to LVSC. LVSC's Compensation Committee approved Jacobs' contract on or about August 6, 2009. LVSC thereafter filed a copy of the Term Sheet with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing it as Jacobs' employment contract with LVSC.

Jacobs Saves the Titanic

24. The bases for Jacobs' full-time position were apparent. The accomplishments for the four quarters over which Jacobs had presided created significant value. From an operational perspective, Jacobs and his team removed over \$365 million of costs from LVSC's Macau operations, repaired strained relationships with local and national government officials in Macau who would no longer meet with Adelson due to his obstreperous behavior, and refocused operations on core businesses to drive operating margins and profits, thereby achieving the thenhighest EBITDA figures in the history of the company's Macau operations.

- 25. Due in large part to the success of its Macau operations under Jacobs' direction, LVSC was able to raise over \$4 billion dollars from the capital markets, spin off its Macau operations into a new company Sands China Limited which became publicly traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in late November 2009, and restart construction on a previously stalled expansion project on the Cotai Strip known as "Parcels 5 and 6." Indeed, for the second quarter ending June 2010, net revenue from Macau operations accounted for approximately 65% of LVSC's total net revenue (i.e., \$1.04 billion USD of a total \$1.59 billion USD).
- 26. To put matters in perspective, when Jacobs began performing work for the company in March 2009, LVSC shares were trading at just over \$1.70 per share and its market cap was approximately \$1.1 billion USD. At the time of Jacobs' departure in July 2010, LVSC shares were over \$28 per share and its market cap exceeded \$19 billion USD.
- 27. Jacobs' success was repeatedly confirmed by Board members of LVSC as well as those of the new spinoff, Sands China. When Leven was asked in February 2010 to assess Jacobs' 2009 job performance, he advised: "there is no question as to Steve's performance[;] the Titanic hit the iceberg[,] he arrived and not only saved the passengers[,] he saved the ship." Unremarkably, Jacobs received a full bonus in 2009 and no more than three months later, May, 2010, he was awarded an additional 2.5 million stock options in Sands China. The options had an accelerated vesting period of less than two years.
- 28. But Adelson would make sure that Jacobs was cheated out of what he was owed, a practice that Adelson has honed in dealing with many executives and companies that refused to do as Adelson demanded.

Jacobs' Confrontations with Adelson

29. Jacobs' success was in spite of numerous ongoing debates he had with Adelson, including Adelson's insistence that as Chairman of both LVSC and Sands China, and the primary shareholder, he was ultimately in charge, including on day-to-day operations as well as such minute issues as carpeting, room design, and the choice of paper towel dispensers to be used in the men's room. As Leven would remind Jacobs, both orally and in writing, Adelson was in

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charge and the substantive decisions, including such things as construction in Macau, were controlled and made in Las Vegas: Per my discussion with sga [Adelson] pls be advised that input from anyone [in Macau] is expected and listened to but final design decisions are made by sga and las vegas[.] [T]here appears to be some confusion and I want to clear the matter once and for all [that] everyone has inputed [sic] but sga makes the final decisions[.] 30. But a greater impediment concerned the unlawful and/or unethical business practices put in place by Adelson and/or under his watch, as well as repeated outrageous demands Adelson made to pursue illegal and illegitimate ends. The demands included, but were not limited to: Demands that Jacobs use improper "leverage" against a. senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments in Macau: b. Demands that Jacobs threaten to withhold Sands China business from prominent Chinese banks unless they agreed to use influence with newly-elected senior government officials of Macau in order to obtain Strata-Title for the Four Seasons Apartments and favorable treatment with regards to labor quotas and table limits; C. Demands that secret investigations be performed regarding the business and financial affairs of various high-ranking members of the Macau government so that any negative information obtained could be used to exert "leverage" in order to thwart government regulations/initiatives viewed as adverse to LVSC' s interests: d. Demands that Sands China continue to use the legal services of Macau attorney Leonel Alves despite concerns that Mr. Alves' retention posed serious risks under the criminal provisions of the United States code commonly known as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"); and Demands that Jacobs refrain from disclosing truthful e. and material information to the Board of Directors of Sands China so that it could decide if such information relating to material financial events.

> corporate governance, and corporate independence should be disclosed pursuant to regulations of the

> Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These issues included, but were not limited to, junkets and triads,

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government investigations, Leonel Alves and FCPA concerns, development issues concerning Parcels 3, 7 and 8, and the design, delays and cost overruns associated with the development of Parcels 5 and 6.

- 31. Jacobs reported these improprieties to Leven and LVSC's general counsel, in accordance with LVSC's company whistleblower guidelines.
- 32. When Jacobs objected to and/or refused to carry out Adelson's illegal demands, Adelson repeatedly threatened to terminate Jacobs' employment. This is particularly true in reference to: (i) Jacobs' refusal to comply with Adelson's edict to terminate Sands China's General Counsel, Luis Melo ("Melo"), and his entire legal department and replace him/it with Leonel Alves and his team; (ii) Adelson's refusal to allow Jacobs to present to the Sands China Board information that the company's development of Parcels 5 and 6 was at least 6 months delayed and more than \$300 million USD over-budget due to Adelson-mandated designs and accourrements the Sands China management team did not believe would be successful in the local marketplace; (iii) Adelson's refusal to allow Jacobs to disclose to the Board LVSC findings relating to the allegations contained in a Reuters article that LVSC was conducting business with Chinese organized crime syndicates, known as Triads; and (iv) Adelson's refusal to allow Jacobs to discuss his concerns with the Board regarding the use and rehiring of Leonel Alves after Alves had requested a \$300 million payment for government officials in China,
- 33. During this same time, Jacobs began developing suspicions concerning the propriety of certain financial practices and transactions involving LVSC and other LVSC subsidiaries, including, but not limited to: (i) certain transactions related to Hencing island, the basketball team, the Adelson Center, and the Macau ferry contract which all involved payments that LVSC made; (ii) allegations concerning LVSC's practice of couriering undeclared monies into the United States to repay gambling debts of third parties and/or to be used to fund accounts for non-residents once they arrived in the country; (iii) LVSC's practice referred to as the Affiliate Transaction Advise ("ATA"), which allowed third parties and gamblers to move money into the United States by depositing monies with an LVSC overseas affiliate or marketing office, creating an account in Las Vegas from which the depositor or their designee would be issued chips with which to gamble, and then transferring the "winnings" back offshore either to the original

depositor or to a third party designee not involved in the transaction; (iv) using the ATA process to move monies for known and/or alleged members of Triads; and (v) structuring and/or using offshore subsidiaries to funnel monies onto the gaming floor.

- 34. One such suspicious entity was WDR, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary set up by LVSC at the apparent behest of Robert Goldstein. When Jacobs raised that entity and certain transactions with Sands China's then-existing CFO, he similarly considered the transactions involving WDR as suspicious and expressed concerns over potential money laundering. Of course, Jacobs would be fired before he could further pursue the matter. When LVSC's then-existing CFO, Ken Kay, was asked about WDR at a deposition, he professed to have no knowledge of WDR or what purpose it would serve. But, just a few months after Kay was questioned about WDR, Leven quietly had the entity dissolved.
- 35. Jacobs' disagreements with Adelson came to a head in late June 2010 when they were in Singapore to attend the grand opening of LVSC's Marina Bay Sands. While in Singapore, Jacobs attended several meetings of LVSC executives including Adelson, Leven, Ken Kay (LVSC's Chief Financial Officer), and others. During these meetings, Jacobs disagreed with Adelson's and Leven's desire to expand the ballrooms at Parcels 5 and 6, which would add an incremental cost of approximately \$30 million to a project already significantly over budget when Sands China's existing facilities were already underutilized. In a separate meeting, Jacobs disagreed with Adelson's desire to aggressively grow the junket business within Macau as the margins were low, the decision carried credit risks, and based upon recent investigations by Reuters and others alleging LVSC's involvement with Chinese organized crime groups, known as Triads, connected to the junket business.
- 36. Following these meetings, Jacobs re-raised the issue about the need to advise the Sands China Board of the delays and cost overruns associated with the development of Parcels 5 and 6 in Macau so that a determination could be made of whether the information must be disclosed. Jacobs also raised the need to disclose LVSC's involvement with Triads and the implications of Adelson's desire to grow Sands China's junket business in Macau, as well as Adelson's rehiring of Leonel Alves, given Jacobs' and others' FCPA concerns. Once again,

Adelson reminded Jacobs that he was both the chairman and the controlling shareholder and that Jacobs should "do as I please." This was consistent with Adelson's attitudes and Jacobs' belief that Adelson considered himself untouchable. Indeed, on a prior occasion when Jacobs had voiced his concern over how Nevada's gaming regulators might view Adelson's actions, Adelson scoffed at the suggestion, informing Jacobs that he (Adelson) controlled the regulators, not the other way around.

37. When Jacobs refused, Adelson commenced carrying out a scheme to fire and discredit Jacobs for having the audacity to blow the whistle and confront Adelson. Adelson has admitted his personal animus and malice toward Jacobs even before firing him. Adelson had privately been angling for some excuse to terminate Jacobs.

LVSC and Sands China Implement Adelson's "Exorcism Strategy"

- 38. In or about July 2010, Adelson directed executives from LVSC in Las Vegas, Nevada to begin the process of terminating Jacobs. This process, which would be referred to as the "exorcism strategy," was planned and carried out from Las Vegas and included (1) the creation of fictitious Sands China letterhead upon which a notice of termination was prepared, (2) preparation of the draft press releases with which to publicly announce the termination, and (3) the handling of all legal-related matters for the termination. Again, all of these events took place in Las Vegas, ostensibly by agents acting for both LVSC and Sands China.
- 39. Indeed, it was LVSC in-house attorneys, claiming to be acting on behalf of Sands China, who informed the Sands China Board on or about July 21, 2010, about Adelson's decision to terminate Jacobs, and directed the Board members to sign the corporate documents necessary to effectuate Jacobs' termination. These same attorneys promised to explain the basis for the termination to the Board members during the following week's Board meeting (after the termination took place). Predictably, as Adelson is all-controlling, he took action first and then decreed how the Board thereafter reacted.
- 40. Promptly thereafter, the team that Adelson had placed in charge of overseeing the sham termination Leven, Kenneth Kay (LVSC's CFO), Irwin Siegel (LVSC/Sands China Board member), Gayle Hyman (LVSC's general counsel), Daniel Briggs (LVSC's VP of investor

relations), Ron Reese (LVSC's VP of public relations), Brian Nagel (LVSC's chief of security), Patrick Dumont (LVSC's VP of corporate strategy), and Rom Hendler (LVSC's VP of strategic marketing) – left Las Vegas and went to Macau in furtherance of the scheme.

- 41. On the morning of July 23, 2010, Jacobs attended a meeting with Leven and Siegel, which had been represented to him (albeit falsely) as pertaining to the upcoming Sands China Board meeting. During the meeting, Leven unceremoniously advised Jacobs that he was being terminated effective immediately. When Jacobs asked whether the termination was purportedly "for cause" or not, Leven responded that he was "not sure" but that the severance provisions of the Term Sheet would not be honored. Leven then handed Jacobs the letter drafted by LVSC's attorneys and signed by Adelson advising him of the termination.
- 42. Cognizant that he had no legitimate basis to terminate Jacobs for cause, Adelson authorized and expected Leven to meet with Jacobs and implement the termination strategy. As is now a well-documented Adelson tactic, he had no regard for the contractual terms of Jacobs' employment agreement. Instead, Adelson's tried and true tactic is to demand a discount off of what is contractually owed for a lesser amount. If Jacobs, or anyone else for that matter, will not acquiesce in Adelson's strong arm tactics, Adelson retorts to "sue me, then." And, that is essentially how the Adelson game-plan played out with Jacobs.
- 43. When Leven could not persuade Jacobs to "voluntarily" resign, Jacobs was escorted off the property by two members of security in public view of many company employees, resort guests, and casino patrons. Jacobs was not permitted to return to his office to collect his belongings, but was instead escorted to the border to leave Macau.
- 44. Because Leven had not been able to persuade Jacobs to resign, the next play from the Adelson playbook went into effect fabricating purported cause for the termination. Once again, this aspect of the plan was also carried out in Las Vegas by executives professing to act for both LVSC and Sands China. Indeed, this time they prepared a false letter in Las Vegas and put it on Venetian Macau, Ltd. letterhead and identified twelve manufactured "for cause" reasons for Jacobs' termination. Transparently, one of the purported reasons is an attempt to mask one of Adelson's personal transgressions: The letter absurdly claimed that Jacobs exceeded his authority

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and failed to keep the companies' Boards of Directors informed of important business decisions, Not surprisingly, not only are the after-the-fact excuses a fabrication, they would not constitute "cause" for Jacobs' termination even if they were true, which they are not.

- 45. All but conceding that fact, Adelson would later claim to have developed (i.e., fabricated) some 34 "for cause" reasons for Jacobs' termination.
- 46. Confirming what Jacobs had complained about regarding Adelson's improper demands and concealment of information from the Board, Adelson subsequently arranged the termination of Sands China's then-General Counsel, Luis Melo, and made sure that Leonel Alves was retained to perform services for Sands China despite knowledge of Alves acting with disregard for the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Also with Jacobs' departure, and with complete disregard for internal concerns regarding junket affiliations with Triads, Adelson announced that Sands China would be implementing a new junket strategy whereby it would partner with existing and established junkets to grow its VIP business. In or about the same time frame, LVSC and Sands China also publicly disclosed a material delay in the construction of Parcels 5 and 6 and a cost increase of \$100 million to the project, further confirming the appropriateness of Jacobs' insistence upon disclosure despite Adelson's insistence otherwise.
- 47. Jacobs was not terminated for cause. He was terminated for blowing the whistle on improprieties and placing the interests of shareholders above those of Adelson. Indeed, in just one candid communication Leven sent to executives (including Adelson) just days before Jacobs' termination, Leven claimed that the problem with Jacobs was that "he believes he reports to the board, not the chair [Adelson]."

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract - LVSC)

- 48. Plaintiff restates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein,
- 49. Jacobs and LVSC are parties to various contracts, including the Term Sheet and Nonqualified Stock Option Agreement identified herein.

- 50. The Term Sheet provides, in part, that Jacobs would have a 3-year employment term, that he would earn an annual salary of \$1.3 million plus a 50% bonus upon attainment of certain goals, and that he would receive 500,000 LVSC stock options (in addition to the previously awarded 75,000 LVSC options) to vest in stages over three years.
- 51. The Term Sheet further provides that in the event Jacobs was terminated "Not For Cause," he would be entitled to one year of severance plus accelerated vesting of all his stock options with a one-year right to exercise the options post-termination.
 - 52. Jacobs has performed all of his contractual obligations except where excused.
- 53. LVSC breached by falsely terminating Jacobs for "cause" when, in reality, the purported bases for Jacobs' termination, as identified in the belatedly-manufactured August 5, 2010 letter, are pretextual and in no way constitute "cause."
- 54. On September 24, 2010, Jacobs made proper demand upon LVSC to honor his right to exercise the remaining stock options he had been awarded in the company. LVSC rejected Jacobs' demand and, thus, further breached the Term Sheet and the stock option agreement by failing to honor the vesting and related provisions contained therein based on the pretext that Jacobs was terminated for "cause."
- 55. LVSC has wrongfully characterized Jacobs' termination as one for "cause" in an effort to smear him and deprive him of what he is owed. As a direct and proximate result of LVSC's wrongful termination of Jacobs' employment and failure to honor the "Not For Cause" severance provisions contained in the Term Sheet, Jacobs has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Contract - LVSC and Sands China)

- 56. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 57. On or about May 11, 2010, LVSC caused Sands China to grant 2.5 million Sands China share options to Jacobs. Fifty percent of the options were to vest on January 1, 2011,

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and the other fifty percent was to vest on January 1, 2012. The grant is memorialized by a written agreement between Jacobs and Sands China.

- 58. Pursuant to the Term Sheet agreement between Jacobs and LVSC, Jacobs' stock options are subject to an accelerated vest in the event he is terminated "Not for Cause." The Term Sheet further provides Jacobs with a one-year right to exercise the options post-termination.
 - 59. Jacobs has performed all his contractual obligations except where excused.
- 60. On September 24, 2010, Jacobs made proper demand upon LVSC and Sands China to honor his right to exercise the remaining 2.5 million stock options he had been awarded in Sands China. LVSC and Sands China rejected Jacobs' demand and, thus, further breached the Term Sheet and the Sands China share grant agreement by characterizing Jacobs' termination as being for "cause" when, in reality, the purported bases for Jacobs' termination, as identified in the belatedly-manufactured August 5, 2010 letter, are pretextual and in no way constitute "cause."
- 61. LVSC and Sands China have wrongfully characterized Jacobs' termination as one for "cause" in an effort to deprive him of contractual benefits to which he is otherwise entitled. As a direct and proximate result, Jacobs has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing - LVSC)

- 62. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
 - 63. All contracts in Nevada contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
- 64. The conduct of LVSC described herein including, but not limited to, the improper and illegal demands made upon Jacobs by Adelson, Adelson's continual undermining of Jacobs' authority as the President and CEO of LVSC's Macau operations (and subsequently Sands China). and the wrongful characterization of Jacobs' termination as being for "cause," is unfaithful to the purpose of the agreements between Jacobs and LVSC and was not within the reasonable expectations of Jacobs.

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As a direct and proximate result of LVSC's wrongful conduct, Jacobs has suffered 65. damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy - LVSC)

- 66. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 67. LVSC retaliated against Jacobs by terminating his employment because he (i) objected to and refused to participate in the illegal conduct requested by Adelson, and (ii) attempted to engage in conduct that was required by law and favored by public policy. In so doing, LVSC tortiously discharged Jacobs in violation of public policy.
- 68. As a direct and proximate result of LVSC's tortious discharge, Jacobs has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.
- 69. LVSC's conduct, which was carried out and/or ratified by managerial level agents and employees, was done with malice, fraud and oppression, thereby entitling Jacobs to an award of punitive damages.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Defamation Per Se - Adelson, LVSC, Sands China)

- 70. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 71. In an attempt to cover their tracks and distract from their improper activities, Adelson, LVSC and Sands China have waged a public relations campaign to smear and spread lies about Jacobs. One such instance is a press release made by Adelson, LVSC and Sands China after an adverse court ruling on March 15, 2011. Having been unable to obtain a procedural victory in Court, the Defendants undertook to smear Jacobs in the media, issuing a statement to Alexander Berzon, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, which provided:

"While I have largely stayed silent on the matter to this point, the recycling of his allegations must be addressed," he said "We have a substantial list of reasons why Steve Jacobs was fired for cause and interestingly he has not refuted a single one of them. Instead, he has attempted to explain his

termination by using outright lies and fabrications which seem to have their origins in delusion."

- 72. The Defendants' media campaign stating that; (1) Jacobs was justifiably fired "for cause" and (2) Jacobs had resorted to "outright lies and fabrications" were false and constitute defamation per se.
- 73. All of the offending statements made by Adelson concerning Jacobs and identified in Paragraph 71, *supra*, were (1) false and defamatory; (2) published to a third person or party for the express intent of republication to a worldwide audience; (3) maliciously published knowing their falsity and/or in reckless disregard of the truth thereof; (4) intended to and did in fact harm Jacobs' reputation and good name in his trade, business, profession, and customary corporate office; and (5) were of such a nature that the law presumes significant economic damages.
- 74. Adelson's malicious defamation of Jacobs was made in both his personal as well as his representative capacities as Chairman of the Board of LVSC and as Chairman of the Board of its affiliate, Sands China; both of which ratified and endorsed either explicitly or implicitly Adelson's malicious invective.
- 75. The comments and statements noted in Paragraph 71, *supra*, were made without justification or legal excuse, and were otherwise not privileged because they did not function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation process and did not otherwise serve its purposes.
- 76. As a direct and proximate result of Adelson, LVSC, and Sands China's defamation, Jacobs has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000. Moreover, Jacobs is entitled to the imposition of punitive damages against Adelson, LVSC, and Sands China, said imposition not being subject to any statutory limitations under NRS 42.005.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy - Adelson)

- 77. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 78. Corporate officers, directors and/or agents are personally liable for tortious conduct which they undertake, including engaging in a tortious discharge in violation of public policy.

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79.	Adelson retaliated against Jacobs by terminating his employment because Jacob
(i) objected	to and refused to participate in the illegal conduct demanded by Adelson, and
(ii) attempt	ed to engage in conduct favored by public policy. In so doing, Adelson tortiously
discharged	Jacobs in violation of public policy.

- 80. Adelson terminated Jacobs' employment with the intent to harm Jacobs for refusing to comply with Adelson's illegal and unethical demands.
- 81. Adelson terminated Jacobs' employment for his own personal benefit, and not for the benefit of Sands China, LVSC or their shareholders, to whom Adelson owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty.
- 82. As a direct and proximate result of Adelson's tortious discharge, Jacobs has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.
- 83. Adelson's conduct was done with malice, fraud and oppression, thereby entitling Jacobs to an award of punitive damages.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Aiding and Abetting Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy - Sands China)

- 84. Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set forth herein.
- 85. LVSC and Sands China are separate legal entities, each capable of making agreements.
- LVSC wrongfully terminated Jacobs' employment because he (i) objected to and 86, refused to participate in the illegal conduct requested by Adelson, and (ii) attempted to engage in conduct that was required by law and favored by public policy. In so doing, LVSC tortiously discharged Jacobs in violation of public policy.
- Sands China, through its agents, substantially assisted LVSC's tortious discharge of Jacobs by, among other things, making agreements with LVSC, carrying out overt acts to effectuate the termination and ratifying the termination for the benefit of Adelson and LVSC, and not for the benefit of Sands China's shareholders, to whom they owed a fiduciary duty of loyalty.

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2	damages in a	n amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.
3	89.	Sands China's conduct was undertaken with malice, fraud and oppression, thereby
4	entitling Jaco	bs to an award of punitive damages.
5		EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
6	(Civil Consp	iracy Tortious Discharge in Violation of Public Policy- LVSC and Sands China)
7	90.	Plaintiff incorporates all preceding and subsequent allegations as though fully set
8	forth herein.	
9	91.	LVSC and Sands China are separate legal entities, each capable of making
10	agreements.	
11	92.	LVSC and Sands China agreed, acted in concert and conspired to effectuate
12	Jacobs' tortio	us discharge.
13	93.	LVSC and Sands China intended to harm Jacobs for refusing to follow the illegal
14	and improper	demands of their common-chairman, Adelson.
15	94.	As a direct and proximate result of LVSC's and Sands China's civil conspiracy,
16	Jacobs has su	affered damages in an amount to be proven at trial but in excess of \$10,000.
17	95.	LVSC and Sands China's conduct was done with malice, fraud and oppression,
18	thereby entitl	ing Jacobs to an award of punitive damages.
19		PRAYER FOR RELIEF
20	WHE	REFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as
21	follows:	
22	1.	For compensatory damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00), in an
23	amount to be	proven at trial;
24	2.	For punitive damages in excess of Ten Thousand Dollars (\$10,000.00), in an
25	amount to be	proven at trial;
26	3.	For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, as allowed by law;
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As a direct and proximate result of Sands China's conduct, Jacobs has suffered

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4,	For attorney fees and costs of suit incurred herein, as allowed by law, in an amoun
to be determin	d; and

5. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 22th day of December, 2014.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, and that on this 22nd day of December, 2014, I caused to be served via the Court's E-Filing system, true and correct copies of the above and foregoing THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT properly addressed to the following:

J. Stephen Peek, Esq. 7 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. HOLLAND & HART 8 9555 Hillwood Drive, Second Floor Las Vegas, NV 89134 9 speek@hollandhart.com rcassity@hollandhart.com 10

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J. Randall Jones, Esq. Mark M. Jones, Esq. KEMP, JONES & COULTHARD 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, 17th Floor Las Vegas, NV 89169 iri@kempjones.com mmi@kempjones.com

Steve Morris, Esq. Rosa Solis-Rainey, Esq. MORRIS LAW GROUP 900 Bank of America Plaza 300 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, NV 89101 sm@morrislawgroup.com rsr@morrislawgroup.com

An employee of PISANELLI BICE PLLC

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1 MOT James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 2 JJP@pisanellibice.com Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 3 TLB@pisanellibice.com Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 DLS@pisanellibice.com Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 JTS@pisanellibice.com PISANELLI BICE PLLC 6 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 214-2100 Facsimile: (702) 214-2101 8 Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs 9 10 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 11 STEVEN C. JACOBS, 12 Plaintiff, 13

Case No.: A-10-627691 Dept. No.:

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND TRIAL ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME

AND RELATED CLAIMS

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada

Cayman Islands corporation; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I through X,

Defendants.

corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a

Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs ("Jacobs") hereby moves the Court to set the long-awaited evidentiary hearings on sanctions and jurisdiction. As soon as the Court's in camera review is complete, this matter should be extricated from jurisdictional purgatory so that it may proceed expeditiously. Considering the inordinate amount of delay in this action, Jacobs requests that this Court fast track the evidentiary hearing as well as the trial in this action. Because the parties will be before this Court on motions on January 6, 2015, Jacobs requests that this Court enter an order shortening time to address this Motion at the same time.

DISTRICT COURT

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This Motion is based upon the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities and exhibits thereto, as well as the papers and pleadings on file in this case, and any additional argument this Court chooses to consider at the time of hearing.

By:

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014.

PISANELLI BICE PLLC

James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs

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DECLARATION OF TODD L. BICE, ESO, IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

I, TODD L. BICE, ESQ., being duly sworn, declare as follows:

- I am a partner at the law firm of PISANELLI BICE PLLC, attorneys of record for 1. Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs ("Jacobs") in the above entitled action. I make this Declaration in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Set Evidentiary Hearings and Trial on order shortening time (the "Motion"). I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and I am competent to testify to those facts.
- 2. This action commenced on October 20, 2010 and, as set forth more fully in the Motion, it has been delayed by an extraordinary number of writ proceedings and maneuvering by the Defendants. The Nevada Supreme Court has directed this Court to proceed with evidentiary hearings on jurisdiction and sanctions. Three years have passed since the Nevada Supreme Court ordered the jurisdictional hearing and more than a year and half has expired since the Court first indicated that it would hold another sanctions hearing.
- 3. Now that the CityCenter litigation has been removed from the Court's calendar, and the Court's in camera review of the Advanced Discovery documents is almost complete, Jacobs requests that the Court set the evidentiary hearing immediately and further set a trial date for this long-delayed action.
- 4. The fifth year anniversary for this action will occur in October 2015. No litigant should have to endure the inordinate delays that the Defendants have secured.
- 5. Because the parties will be before this Court on January 6, 2015, Jacobs requests an order shortening time as he anticipates that the Court will address the timing of the evidentiary hearing on that date and Jacobs further wishes to set a firm date for the long awaited trial in this action.
- 6. This request for an order shorting time is not made for any improper purpose and is not meant to vex, harass, or annoy the opposing parties.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014,

TODD L. BICE, ESO.

ORDER SHORTENING TIME

Before this Court is the Request for an Order Shortening Time accompanied by the Declaration of counsel. Good cause appearing, the undersigned counsel will appear at Clark County Regional Justice Center, Eighth Judicial District Court, Las Vegas, Nevada, on the 6 cm., in Department XI, or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, to bring this PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET EVIDENTIARY

HEARINGS AND TRIAL on for hearing.

Respectfully submitted by:

PISANELLI BICE-PLLC

James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Vodd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The Nevada Supreme Court Orders a Jurisdictional Hearing

Jacobs initiated this action against Defendants Las Vegas Sands Corp. ("LVSC") and Sands China on October 20, 2010. (Compl., Oct. 20, 2010, on file.) Both Defendants responded with separate motions to dismiss. (Defs.' Mots. Dismiss, Dec. 22, 2010, on file, respectively.) While LVSC's motion was based upon its assertion that Jacobs had failed to join a necessary and indispensable party, Sands China argued that all claims against it should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, for failure to join a necessary and indispensable party. This Court denied both motions during a March 15, 2011, hearing. (Order Denying Defs.' Mots. Dismiss, Apr. 1, 2011, on file.)

Sands China thereafter sought and obtained a writ of mandamus from the Nevada Supreme Court instructing this Court "to hold an evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction, to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law stating the basis for its decision following that hearing, and to stay the action as set forth in this order until after entry of the district court's personal jurisdiction decision." Sands China Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, No. 58294, 2011 WL 3840329, at *2 (Nev. Aug. 26, 2011). This litigation has been treading water ever since.

B. This Court Orders (Another) Sanctions Hearing

Jacobs will not detail the Defendants' misconduct during jurisdictional discovery which led to this Court's September 2012 sanctions order "preclud[ing] [Sands China] from raising the MDPA as an objection or as a defense to admission, disclosure or production of any documents." (Decision & Order, Sept. 14, 2012, p. 8, on file.) Instead, the present request has its genesis in December 2012, when the Court entered an order requiring Sands China to produce all documents and ESI relevant to jurisdictional discovery by January 4, 2013. (See Order Regarding Pl.'s Renewed Mot. for NRCP 37 Sanctions on Order Shortening Time, March 27, 2013, p. 2, on file.) Despite Sands China's representation in a status report that it had complied with the Court's Order, Sands China employed the MPDPA as a basis to redact and not produce responsive documents.

(See Order Regarding Pl.'s Renewed Mot. for NRCP 37 Sanctions on Order Shortening Time, March 27, 2013, p. 2, on file.)

As a result, Jacobs filed a Motion for NRCP 37 Sanction. (Id.) The Court granted Jacobs' Motion and found "Jacobs has made a prima facie showing as to a violation of this Court's orders which warrants an evidentiary hearing." (Id.) (emphasis added). However, Sands China further delayed these proceedings by again seeking writ review at the Nevada Supreme Court. On August 7, 2014, the Nevada Supreme Court denied Sands China's writ petition and endorsed the approach to the sanctions hearing taken by this Court, Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 61, 331 P.3d 876, 877 (2014) ("Here, the district court properly employed this framework when it found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse petitioners from complying with the district court's discovery order."). The Supreme Court held that MPDPA does not relieve a litigant of its obligation to comply with discovery orders. Id., 331 P.3d at 880. Rather, the MPDPA is only relevant to the level of sanction levied for violation of a discovery order. Id. The Supreme Court encouraged this Court to proceed with its planned evidentiary hearing. Id., 331 P.3d at 880-81.

C. The Nevada Supreme Court Orders an In Camera Review and Requests Findings of Fact Regarding Waiver of Privilege.

In a separate writ proceeding regarding the Advanced Discovery documents, the Nevada Supreme Court instructed this Court to "resolve any disputes regarding Sands's privilege log by conducting an in-camera review of the purportedly privileged documents to determine which documents are actually protected by a privilege." Las Vegas Sands v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 69, 331 P.3d 905, 914 (2014). The Supreme Court also "direct[ed] the district court to make findings of fact and resolve whether Sands waived any privileges" by failing to timely object to Jacobs' possession of Sands China's documents. Id. at n.9, 331 P.3d at 909 n.9.

D. Sands China's Deficient Privilege Log Has Delayed the In Camera Review and Planned Evidentiary Hearings.

Following the Supreme Court's Orders on Sands China's writ petitions, the Court held a hearing on August 8, 2014. At the hearing, the Court indicated that it intends to hold the sanctions hearing before conducting the jurisdictional hearing or, at least, both hearings would occur

 consecutively. (Hr'g Tr. at 28:15-24; 37:1-10, Aug. 8, 2014, on file.) Sands China agreed that the evidentiary hearings should occur "seriatim." (*Id.* at 30:9-12 ("We think that that is the most appropriate way. If not having the sanctions hearing second, that at a minimum these should happen seriatim as you've said you were willing to consider."); *id.* at 30:21-31:2 ("[W]e're requesting. . .at minimum that these hearings occur simultaneously or seriatim - - in seriatim, as you say, and that - - I think that's our position, Your honor.").)

Ironically, Sands China expressed a desire to hold the jurisdictional hearing as soon as possible. (Hr'g Tr. at 8:6-7, Aug. 8, 2014, on file) ("And so we would like to get to the jurisdictional hearing as soon as possible, because we think there is no jurisdiction against Sands China."). Nevertheless, the deplorable state of Sands China's privilege log has exponentially delayed the Court's in camera review and hindered both evidentiary hearings.

A firm and immediate date for evidentiary hearings should be set so that the parties can time their preparations to coincide with the completion of the in camera review and move this case forward.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Evidentiary Hearings Should Be Set Immediately

As a general rule, evidentiary hearings should be held as soon as possible. See Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 883 n.3 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Since an evidentiary hearing should be held as soon as possible, the court notes that the magistrate now has the power to hold such a hearing and recommends that the district court consider that possibility.") (emphasis added); Berrio-Callejas v. United States, 129 F.3d 1252, at *1 (1st Cir. 1997) ("In light of how long this petition has been pending, the court should appoint counsel forthwith and endeavor to hold the evidentiary hearing as soon as possible.").

Here, Sands China's successive writ proceedings have tied this matter in knots for four years and brought this case to a standstill. The jurisdictional hearing has been languishing for

Additionally, the Court requested briefing on the sanctions issue prior to evidentiary hearing. (*Id.* at 37:11-16.) Sands China has already filed its brief, (SCL's Revised Pre-Hearing Memo, Oct. 17, 2014, on file), and Jacobs will file his brief as soon as the evidentiary hearing is set.

more than three years and the evidentiary hearing on sanctions has been delayed for more than a year and a half. These delays have prevented Jacobs from pursuing the merits of his claims. "That the adage 'justice delayed is justice denied' may by now be trite, that makes it no less true." Laforge v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. CIV A 87-6314, 1988 WL 38321, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1988). Jacobs is entitled to his day in court and the evidentiary hearings should be firmly set to place this litigation on the path to a resolution.

B. A Trial Date Should Also Be Set.

The complaint in this matter was filed October 20, 2010. Although a court ordered stay tolls NRCP 41(e)'s five year rule, Boren v. City of N. Las Vegas, 98 Nev. 5, 6, 638 P.2d 404, 405 (1982), that provides no basis for the delay of Jacobs' rights. Considering the inordinate delay, this case should be fast tracked for discovery and trial. A firm trial setting will further discourage more stalling and reduce costs to the litigants and the Court. See R & D Bus. Sys. v. Xerox Corp., 150 F.R.D. 87, 90 (E.D. Tex. 1993) ("The Court notes that numerous commentators have recognized the value of firm trial dates in reducing cost and delay in our civil justice system."). Accordingly, this matter should be firmly set for trial.

III. CONCLUSION

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Based upon the foregoing, Jacobs respectfully requests that the Court schedule the evidentiary hearings on sanctions and jurisdiction as soon as possible and set this matter for trial.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2014.

PISANELIA BICEPLLC

By:

James J. Pisanelli, Esq., Bar No. 4027 Todd L. Bice, Esq., Bar No. 4534 Debra L. Spinelli, Esq., Bar No. 9695 Jordan T. Smith, Esq., Bar No. 12097 400 South 7th Street, Suite 300 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

Attorneys for Plaintiff Steven C. Jacobs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of Pisanelli Bice PLLC, and that on this 24th day of December, 2014, I caused to be served via the Court's E-Filing system, true and correct copies of the above and foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND TRIAL ON ORDER SHORTENING TIME properly addressed to the following:

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