## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation; SANDS CHINA LTD., a Cayman Islands corporation; SHELDON G. ADELSON, in his individual and representative capacity; VENETIAN MACAU, LTD., a Macau corporation, DOES I-X; and ROE CORPORATIONS I-X,

Petitioners,

VS.

CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, THE HONORABLE DAVID BARKER, DISTRICT JUDGE, DEPT. 18,

Respondents,

and STEVEN C. JACOBS,

Real Party in Interest.

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District Court Case Number A627691-B

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS RE ORDERS DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ WITHOUT A HEARING

VOLUME III of XIII (PA491-737)

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### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 25, I certify that I am an employee of MORRIS LAW GROUP; that, in accordance therewith, I caused a copy of the APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS RE ORDERS DENYING MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ WITHOUT A HEARING – VOLUME III OF XIII (PA491-737) to be served as indicated below, on the date and to the addressee(s) shown below:

## VIA HAND DELIVERY (CD)

Chief Judge David Barker Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County, Nevada Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

## Respondent

### VIA ELECTRONIC SERVICE

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DATED this 22nd day of February, 2016.

By: <u>/s/ Fiona Ingalls</u>

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now we have a direct order from you that makes it I think -- and I understand the Court's feelings about the comments about redactions --

THE COURT: Well, but the redactions were everything but the date, basically, Mr. Jones, on most of the documents.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Everything but the date?
THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I would respectfully disagree. I think what it -- the only thing that was redacted was the names of the individuals. The subject matter was not redacted, and or substance of the email was not redacted.

THE COURT: I think on many of the documents there were so many redactions it made the documents impossible to review. But, you know, we didn't go through them all in court, because I didn't have them all with me.

But I certainly understand the issue you're raising now on the Hobson's choice, as you put it. And so if there's anything else you want to add, please let me know. Otherwise, I'm going to listen to Mr. Bice for a while.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I would just -- I would just I guess add to your last point is in my reviewing of documents the only thing that -- there are personal names that are referenced sometimes in the body of the email, and those have been redacted. But, other than that -- and, of course, we did provide a log that went with the redacted documents

that have been redacted thus far that indicated who the sender worked for, what company or business the sender worked for, and who -- the other parties whose names have been redacted from the document worked for. So I do believe, Your Honor, that there is no redaction of the substance of the emails unless some other privilege related to attorney-client-type privilege was asserted, which would obviously have a separate privilege log that would not be related to the redactions per Macanese law. So I -- to my knowledge there's no --

THE COURT: Right. And my prior order -- but my prior order did not preclude you from making redactions on the basis of attorney-client.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's my understanding, Your Honor. So my point is simply that other than the names, the only redactions that occurred that were I believe inconsistent with your order, certainly your most recent order, were redactions of individual names that were done in compliance with the Macanese law. So I just want to be clear about that. That's my understanding. And I've not seen any redactions that would be other than that, except for attorney-client privilege.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bice.

MR. BICE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. We haven't obviously had a chance to submit something in writing to you on this, so I'll just try and [inaudible]. There's no

Hobson's choice here as part of [inaudible], other than they wouldn't produce to us, and it turns out that they had it on August [inaudible], which was even well before the sanctions hearing. All the, you know, representations that turned out not to be true were being unearthed as part of your sanctions hearing [inaudible].

The issue about the MPDPA, I don't need to remind the Court, has been raised over and over and over. You gave instructions to defendants on how to address the issue by way of a log. In fact, you had given them that instruction -- I don't want to say two years ago, Your Honor, because that doesn't seem right, but it was certainly more than a year ago. And that instruction [inaudible] what happened is we were simply misled about where many of the documents were at.

And I think it is worth reminding the defendants here about another representation that they made to you that they now seem to have also sort of selectively forgotten. When the reality started to emerge about where these documents were at, hoe many of them had been transported to the United States, much more than just Mr. Jacobs's [inaudible]. What I think is now sort of now infamous, what they call their joint status conference statements regarding the documents, Your Honor, which they held with you on June 27 -- if you recall, that was one of the revelations about what had happened. Mr. Jacobs's ESI -- United States --

THE LAW CLERK: Mr. Bice, we can't hear you. I don't mean to interrupt. We can't hear you over in the courtroom.

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THE COURT: Oh. I thought it was just my cell phone. So thank you, Max.

MR. BICE: I apologize. Is this better?

THE LAW CLERK: That's much clearer.

MR. BICE: I had my team on the speaker phone here, so I don't know where you couldn't hear me at. But my point was this, Your Honor. Even back in it was June, I believe, June of last year when it started to emerge, the magnitude of the document transfers that had occurred into Las Vegas, they had represented to you in that pleading how they were going to search all these additional custodians for responsive jurisdictional discovery documents and that they would produce them. Those documents aren't even covered by the MPDPA, as they subsequently have admitted. And even to this day that hasn't occurred. And those were all custodians, such as Mark Brown, such as Luis Melo, all of whom those documents have been here now by their own acknowledgement since I believe the end of 2010 and were never searched, as well as Mr. Weber, who was Mr. Jacobs's right-hand man in Macau.

So there is, number one, no Hobson's choice. Number two, any choice that has happened here is because of the Court's sanctions order which was entered clear back in

September because of the defendants' concealment of evidence in the case. So I think it's completely inappropriate to now be seeking an emergency stay of basically an effect of an order that was entered last September.

The real issue here is -- there isn't any basis for a stay. The defendants have acknowledged they're not going to comply with the sanctions ruling. That process should move forward. The Court could enter its ruling, and if they didn't want to challenge that ruling, fine. But this attempt to obtain a stay of it so that they can say, well, we don't have to comply with any order, that is simply prejudicial to Mr. Jacobs. This process has been dragging on. Sands China is who wanted an evidentiary hearing, or so they claim, about jurisdictional -- or this Court's jurisdiction. We get jurisdictional discovery which they have opposed from the beginning, and now they just want to bog the process down even further by saying, well, we should get a stay, we're happy to comply with the Court's sanctions order. There isn't any basis for that.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Bice?

MR. BICE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Cassity was there anything you

wanted to add in addition to what Mr. Jones has said?

MR. CASSITY: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Well, first of all, obviously I disagree that there's a continuing effort to not comply with the Court's orders. That's why we're having this call right now. And I will tell the Court that we are endeavoring to comply with the Court's order as we speak. just -- I verified with my colleagues before we had this call I wanted to get as updated information as I possibly could, and there's been over 100,000 more documents that were hit on in the search of the additional custodians in compliance -- in an attempt to comply with the order, and they found about 21,000 responsive documents. And these are rough numbers, Your Honor. I just want you to be aware of this. We're not ignoring what you've asked us to do, nor would I ever do that or recommend my client do that. Of those approximate 21,000 responsive documents they've found about -- and these are -again, these are the other 20 custodians that the Court ordered us to look at by April 12th. About 12,000 of those documents we believe to be privileged that are nothing to do with redactions or Macanese law, that are actually attorneyclient-privileged-type documents, and about eight to 9,000 that would be produced in unredacted and some redacted format. We don't believe that of those documents -- just so

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you're aware, Your Honor, we don't believe those documents are anything new for the plaintiffs. In other words, they're

I'm getting so far. Most of them -- about a third of them, as I understand it, would be unredacted, and about a third or two thirds would be redacted under Macanese law, but they're -- essentially they're not exact duplicates of other documents that have been produced, but they're on the same subject matter that would just simply be cumulative and not provide any additional information to the plaintiffs. But we're in the process of trying to continue to finish doing that process as we speak.

And we do have an issue. We have an issue of first impression. This issue has never been decided by the Supreme Court. And I just want to mention the <u>Hansen</u> factors. That's whether the opposition to the writ petition would be defeated if the stay is denied. Well, certainly that would be true in this case. And the next factor is whether the petitioner will suffer irreparable or serious injury if the stay is denied. The choice given us -- and I understand Mr. Bice does not think there's any choice here at all. The Court has recognized the choice. And we cited reference in the record where you did acknowledge that we do have a problem with the Macanese Government over this issue. So at least the Court -- even if Mr. Bice has not recognized it, this is a true problem for our client. And then --

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, can I stop you for a minute and make sure that my recollection is correct; because, please

remember, I'm in Washington, D.C., and I did not get to look at my files the day before the hearing, although I was able to reach a brief.

My recollection is that it was disclosed to me that the Macanese Government was going to take no action against either of the defendant entities related to the transport of the hard drives from Macau. Is your client taking a different position at this time, or do you think my recollection is in error?

MR. RANDALL JONES: I don't -- and I'll tell you candidly, Your Honor, my understanding of the situation is generally what you just described. But, again, I was not involved directly in the case at that time. But that's my understanding from reading things.

But what I'm referring to is even at the February 28th hearing where -- and I'm quoting you -- we cited -- we actually attached the transcript. I'm not saying you don't have a problem -- you hadn't have problems in Macau. I certainly understand you may well have problems in Macau with the Macau Government. But that has to do with the --

THE COURT: I guess for the record I was referring to those documents that were still in Macau and had not previously been removed.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And that's what we're talking about specifically with respect to the production that's

happened since the hearing in September and then this new production that we're talking about that have been the subject of redactions, not the hard drive that was removed. That's the subject of our motion as I understand it. And, again, I don't have a perfect understanding of all the facts, unfortunately.

So that's -- that is the heart of our issue, is where we're dealing with these redactions where we have sought specific direction from the Macanese Government. I know the Court's read that letter, and I know your comments about that letter, the translation, and I understand that. But we've also had conversations with the Macanese Government and the lawyers in Macau, and they've indicated this is a violation of both civil and criminal law to produce this information.

So that's why we get back to this question of -- and I'll tell you candidly, Your Honor, we don't want to be in this position. I don't like to be in this position with the Court. But I have an obligation to my client to try to advise them in these very difficult circumstances, and my best advice is I can't tell them to violate your order, and I can't tell them to violate the Chinese law, which is that -- which is, you know, where they're doing business. That's a principal place of business. So that's why we filed a writ. I would have liked to have filed a writ sooner, candidly, so we wouldn't be up against the deadline like we are. But I'm sure

the Court can appreciate that it's not as easy to get those documents drafted and filed as one would like. So that's why we're doing it, you know -- we did it in the last week, as opposed to sooner.

THE COURT: Okay. Can I ask you another question.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Of course.

THE COURT: Since you have filed the petition with the Nevada Supreme Court have you received any communication from them?

MR. RANDALL JONES: We have not, Your Honor. And that was as much to do with my direction as anything. I've told my client -- I've been involved in these writs before on both sides of these issues, and I've told my client we need to ask Judge Gonzalez first as to whether or not she would entertain a stay before we can even begin to think about filing a request for a stay from the Supreme Court.

THE COURT: But there's been no order to answer at this point?

MR. RANDALL JONES: There has not been. No, there has not.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else?

MR. RANDALL JONES: The only other point I would make would again be a reference to <a href="Hansen">Hansen</a>, and I think we comply with the <a href="Hansen">Hansen</a> factors. In quoting <a href="Hansen">Hansen</a>, "When moving for a stay pending an appeal or writ proceeding a

movant does not always have to show a probability of success on the merits, but the movant must present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal question is involved and show that the balance of equities weighs heavily in favor of granting the stay, " end quote.

And so I certainly would ask the Court to acknowledge that it's a serious legal question. I think the Court has already acknowledged that. At least that's my understanding.

THE COURT: I think that was over a year ago I acknowledged that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, that -unfortunately, I can't do anything about that, as you know.
In fact I just got out of a lengthy trial, so I'm trying to
play a lot of catch-up here. But I understand it's a
balancing, and I would -- I would hope that the Court would
understand that this is a question that the Supreme Court
needs to answer, not just now, but I'm sure this issue's going
to come up in the future because of considerations with these
businesses doing -- of some the major industry in our state
doing business overseas, especially in China.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

The motion is granted in part. I am granting a stay on the production of any further documents that are not in the U.S. on the removed hard drive for a period of 45 days while

the Nevada Supreme Court has the opportunity to make a determination as to whether they are going to take briefing on this issue or not.

If you get an order to answer or any further documentation from the Nevada Supreme Court, I will be happy to discuss with you an extension of the stay. But if they have not acted within the 45-day period, I'm probably not going to grant my stay if they haven't even ordered an answer at that point.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor. So just to be clear, make sure I understand what that means, is that with respect to the documents that were not on the hard drive that was removed, and I understand that was the subject of the hearings last summer and then in the fall, so new documents that were produced after that time that had been redacted, you're granting the stay for 45 days until we find out what, if anything, the Supreme Court does.

THE COURT: Correct. And if they order an answer, I will be happy to consider whether I extend the stay.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And then with -- in all other respects, in other words, with respect to the hearing that's coming up -- and just, again, I've got a list here of what I -- what relief --

THE COURT: I'm -- I'm granting the request as to the evidentiary hearing. I'm sorry I missed that. But, yes,

I'm granting the request as to the evidentiary hearing, because I don't think that it's appropriate to go forward when there is a partial stay of the order.

Were there any other specific portions of the order that you were asking me to stay, also, Mr. Jones?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Let me just make sure that I don't miss anything. I'm sure Mr. Bice wants a clarification for all of our sakes, as well.

Well, I guess, no. Staying the evidentiary hearing essentially until at least that 45 days expires, that I think addresses the other issues that were raised in our motion.:

THE COURT: But just so we're clear, Mr. Jones, I am not staying the production of the documents that are on the hard drive that was removed to Las Vegas. And I know there were multiple storage devices based upon the testimony. For purposes of that data that was removed I am not modifying my order of September 14th, 2012. I still want those documents to be produced that were subject to those — that sanction hearing. However, if you have additional privilege issues the respect to those documents, I anticipate you will supply a privilege log with those.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We -- we -- I will -- I note that, Your Honor, as part of the order. And we -- to the extent that we have any other documents that have been found -- I think there were several thousand -- we will produce

those, as well, but have no privilege or redactions on them. We will continue to comply with our obligations under the discovery rules.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else, gentlemen?

MR. BICE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bice.

MR. BICE: Yes. I mean, I'm a little concerned,
Your Honor, about vacating that hearing, because we have the
hearing, we have it scheduled. It's not for a month. You
know, my view would be --

THE COURT: And I've just granted a 45-day stay.

MR. BICE: And my request would be -- is that you modify that. I don't believe that a 45-day stay is appropriate. The Court entered this order I don't know how long ago. If --

THE COURT: September 14th, 2012.

MR. BICE: Exactly. And if the Supreme Court wants to take this matter up, they're going to do so prior to 45 days. And if they don't, then I don't know why we would forfeit the hearing date and schedule that -- because I know how busy the Court's schedule gets. And we've had a lot of trouble trying to get matters on for this case, and I really would prefer -- you know, I would ask that you not force us to forfeit dates when there really isn't any showing that they would be entitled to a stay. I mean, they have made the

choice to redact documents notwithstanding the Court's order, and they did that in January. I understand that they say, well, they don't want to have to continue to do that, and the Court's saying, well, I'll give you a stay if you can convince the Supreme Court that you should be excused from doing so. But that doesn't in any way eliminate the noncompliance with the Court's order from back in December requiring the January 4th production. So I don't know why there would be a stay of a hearing on that. Because all it's -- you know, my client, Your Honor, is really being prejudiced by these constant -- the case doesn't move anywhere because the defendants want a stay of everything, which are orders that have come down because of their own actions. I mean, with all due respect, you know, further delays are a victory for the defendants for noncompliance with orders.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Jones?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. I just -- I certainly disagree with that, and in terms of prejudice Mr. Jacobs's deposition has been stayed, so there's -- and there's no current deposition scheduled. So I just -- I think the Court's ruling was prudent in light of the fact that we have this issue that is before the Supreme Court, and know the Court has very busy schedule, because I have other cases in front of you, but I presume that the Court could put this back on pretty quickly if it needs to.

And the only other concern I would have is, depending on when that happens, it's -- there's a great deal of preparation that needs to be made by both sides if we're going to have a hearing or not. And now knowing if we're going to have to do that up to the date of the hearing puts us all in a kind of continued state of anticipation of whether we need to go or not. So I just think your -- I think that's the prudent thing to do under the circumstances, and I would ask to leave that as part of your order.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Max, can you make sure we vacate the evidentiary hearing.

If there are any further issues that you need my attention, please let me know. Otherwise, I'll probably have a status check with you in about 30 days to see if we have heard anything from the Nevada Supreme Court and where the productions are. But I'm not going to schedule that today. I'm going to wait till I get back in town and can look at the schedule.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, so on behalf of everybody, to the extent we hear anything, the minute we hear anything from the Supreme Court we let all parties and the Court know, as well, so that --

THE COURT: I'd appreciate that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Advise everybody quickly so

1 they'll know about it. And, Your Honor, again, I would be 2 happy to prepare the order, but run it by Mr. Bice and his 3 colleagues before we submit anything to the Court. THE COURT: That would be lovely, Mr. Jones. Thank you. 5 6 Anything else, counsel? 7 MR. RANDALL JONES: Do we have a record this time? 8 THE COURT: Jill, do we have a record today? 9 THE COURT RECORDER: I hope so. 10 THE COURT RECORDER: Yes. 11 THE COURT: Are we in our own courtroom today? 12 THE COURT RECORDER: We are. 13 THE COURT: Then there probably won't be the same 14 problem we had last time. 15 MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. Then I will try to 16 [inaudible] as possible. I will also endeavor to get the 17 transcript so I can look at that before we submit the order. 18 With respect to the order from last week, I have a 19 draft. I will try to get it to Mr. Bice --20 I'll try to get it to you, Todd, this afternoon. 21 MR. BICE: Okay. 22 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'll be back on 23 Monday, so please feel free to send whatever you need over 24 then. 25 Thank you again. And I apologize for our technical

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problems last week. MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you for taking the time out of your day to do this. Thank you. THE COURT: All right. Have a nice evening. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 1:27 P.M. 

#### CERTIFICATION

24 82

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
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STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

VS.

DEPT. NO. XI

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

Defendants

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

## HEARING ON DEFENDANT SANDS CHINA, LTD.'S, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PERSONAL JURISDICTION

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ.

TODD BICE, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

MARK JONES, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014, 8:25 A.M.
2	(Court was called to order)
. 3	THE COURT: So, since you're all here, why couldn't
4	we do the Wynn-Okada today, too, at this morning time?
5	MR. PISANELLI: There's a lot of cats in that group
6	to herd, and we had some conflicts, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Mr. Morris, it's nice to see you again.
8	MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Good to see
9	you.
10	THE COURT: Mr. Jones and Mr. Jones.
11	MR. RANDALL JONES: As always, Your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Jones. It's your motion.
13	MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.
14	THE COURT: I'm assuming by the filing of this that
15	you think the stay that's been imposed does not affect this
16	particular motion given the comments of the Supreme Court in
17	their order.
18	MR. RANDALL JONES: That's actually precisely right.
19	THE COURT: I'm just asking. Okay.
20	MR. RANDALL JONES: Mr. Peek is not here, and I
21	assume he would
22	THE COURT: Is he coming?
23	MR. RANDALL JONES: I assume he was coming for
24	MR. MORRIS: He said he was yesterday.
25	THE COURT: Then I guess I won't do your case,

either.

Is there anybody who everybody's all here? I'll go get some more coffee.

(Court recessed at 8:26 a.m., until 8:30 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Peek. Thank you for joining us.

MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, it's your motion.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, Your Honor, in kind of expanding on the point you made earlier with respect to the stay I would -- I guess I would make the point to the Court that we don't believe -- and I don't want to belabor the point, but the stay applies in this circumstance, and it would seem to be the facts -- or the case that the plaintiffs agree with us, since they've filed a countermotion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: That was one of the reasons I thought. But that brings up another point that I think we all need to be cognizant of, which is our Rule 41(e) issues if the stay does not apply to all issues.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, and, Your Honor, I guess our position would be that as representing Sands China that getting past this issue we would hope that the Court would

agree with our interpretation of <u>Daimler</u> and the <u>Viega</u> cases and the other cases we've cited, and would determine that in fact under the circumstances of this case with the discovery that has been done to date that there is no jurisdiction over Sands China, Ltd., so that that would presumably moot out other issues related to that entity.

So with that said, Judge, the reason we brought this while there was a stay pending and there's writs that are pending is because of a see change in the law. And I'll tell Your Honor this has had a direct impact on me in another case which is cited by us in favor of Sands China, Ltd., where I was actually on the other side of this issue and lost, the Vieqa GmbH case, and it does --

THE COURT: Those were all the yellow brass pipes; right?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And in fact it's my belief, and one of the issues I looked at real hard when that case came down in fact was -- you know, I never like to be in a position where I'm arguing two different sides of the same issue. And in looking at the <u>Vieqa</u> I believe the facts were substantially more favorable to the plaintiffs in that case because of the contacts and because of the involvement of the German entity in the state of Nevada certainly than Sands China is in any

respect in this case, that they were distinguishable, and yet the Supreme Court still found there was no jurisdiction over the German entity. And, Judge, I have to tell you in looking at this, I mean, the <u>Daimler</u> case changed what I understood to be the rules of general jurisdiction that I learned in law school and have been essentially arguing ever since that time.

And so with that said, Judge, I think that in quoting the -- both the <u>Daimler</u> case and <u>Vieqa</u> I think it makes the point. And this is a quote from <u>Vieqa</u>. "Typically a corporation is at home only where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business." And the <u>Daimler</u> court went on to say that, "There could be an exceptional case where a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in the state." The court went on to say, "It is hard to see why much in the way of discovery would be needed to determine where a corporation is at home."

So if that's the standard -- and before I get into the specifics, Judge, you know, I like to always do in my own personal analysis sort of a gut check. And if you look at the facts of this case, the undeniable facts, and in fact we have the complaint, the first amended complaint, paragraph 3, where it was cited by the -- we cited in our motion papers where in paragraph 3 the plaintiff acknowledges that this is a Cayman

Island corporation whose principal place of business is in 1 2 Macau. And all of the undeniable evidence points to that. 3 So I don't know how anybody could argue with a 4 straight face that this entity, Sands China, Ltd., is not 5 doing business in Macau and that is not its home. 6 THE COURT: Well, I don't think the issue is whether 7 it's doing business in Macau. I think we all recognize it does business in Macau. The issue is where this nerve center 8 9 or control center is --10 MR. RANDALL JONES: Okay. Well, let's --11 THE COURT: -- and that's a slightly different 12 issue. MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, let me just, then, ask the 13 14 Court a question. Is the nerve center or this executive --15 THE COURT: "...the center of overall direction, control, and coordination." 16 17 MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. If --18 THE COURT: That's what it says in the Daimler case. 19 MR. RANDALL JONES: In what case? 20 THE COURT: Daimler case. 21 MR. RANDALL JONES: The <u>Daimler</u> case. Yes, Your 22 So if you want to take it to that point right up 23 front, then clearly without question the plaintiffs lose. And 24 they talk about Mr. Adelson being the chairman of the board, who acknowledges that this is where he resides most of the

time, in Las Vegas, and that he has decisions over certain design issues or he's made decisions over certain design issues and that he is, you know, interested in the goings on of the company. He does not run the day-to-day affairs of the business, and there's been no evidence to suggest that he does. He does have involvement in certain aspects that he's acknowledged.

But, Judge, if you want to talk about the nerve center, first of all, we don't think the nerve center test applies whatsoever, because <u>Daimler</u> doesn't talk about nerve center. <u>Daimler</u> does not mention nerve center. The plaintiff references --

THE COURT: They changed the words to "center of overall direction, control, and coordination" from "nerve center."

MR. RANDALL JONES: All right.

THE COURT: And it's okay. I'll use the words they use, but it's basically the same thing.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, the reason I think there's an important distinction is, one, is that there is a reference to "nerve center" in the <u>Hertz</u> case that is referenced by the plaintiffs, which clearly does not apply in this case. That's a diversity action where they're talking about a U.S. corporation and they're trying to define for diversity purposes where the citizenship of that company is. And so

they look at certain types of activities in terms of the nerve center of a domestic corporation, meaning an American corporation, who may be doing business in many states and trying to determine, okay, where is its citizenship. That has nothing to do with general jurisdiction as it relates to this case.

But let's go and look at the analysis you just brought up. If that is true, the <u>Johnson</u> case tells us, and the evidence supports this interpretation, that you have to look at where the board is. This is undeniably a holding company. It owns other companies that are actually the operating companies. And while plaintiff points out a few places in the annual report where it talks about operations, clearly the majority of the annual report talks about the fact that this is a holding company who owns operating entities that actually own the property and manage and run those properties, integrated resorts that have gaming, retail, and entertainment.

So when you look at that what do you have to look at to determine who controls the business? And, as I said,

Johnson -- the Johnson case tells us you have to look at the board. And there's been a number of cases that have referenced that holding and that idea, as well. In other words, it's where the board is that makes the major decisions for the entity. And there's -- again, there's no evidence to

dispute this. And, again, under Rule 56 they have to come forth with some evidence to refute these issues. They have produced no evidence to refute these, and there is nothing in the few privileged documents that have not been produced -- remember, the substance have been produced; we just haven't given the name of some people that are on those documents, as opposed to the internal substantive information of those documents. And there's nothing to suggest after all this discovery, hundreds and hundreds of thousands of pages of discovery, to suggest that the board does not make the major decisions. In fact the annual report tells us that the board makes all of the important, critical decisions for the company.

And then the issue becomes under <u>Johnson</u> where does the board meet. Well, we know from Mr. Adelson's testimony the board has never met in the state of Nevada, just has never done that. We've submitted the invitations to show that during the critical time period, we believe it's ever since then up to the present time, but certainly during the critical time period, 2009 through 2010, when Mr. Levin was there, when he contends that these claims arose, that the board always met either in Macau or in Hong Kong. And, Your Honor, in light of the allegations — which I have to say it would almost seem like Mr. Jacobs is not being completely candid with his counsel, because if you may have noted in the response, they

came back and said, well, that shows where the meetings were noticed. One of the notices, by the way, was signed by Mr. Jacobs himself. But they said, that doesn't prove that anybody ever attended those meetings and that they were actually held in Hong Kong or Macau.

Well, we have -- in light of the circumstances where they have claimed that we can't prove that these board meetings were actually held in Hong Kong and Macau, we have the documents that have been produced. They were produced back in May of 2011 in Sands China, Ltd.'s 16.1 initial list of witnesses and disclosures, which is the attendant list -- attendees list, excuse me. And it shows that Mr. Levin himself attended four out of the six meetings in either Hong Kong or Macau and that in the majority of those meetings every board member attended in person, physically in either Hong Kong or Macau. And Mr. Levin even chaired one of those meetings. Yet their counsel contended in their opposition that there's no proof that these meetings were actually held and people actually attended in either Hong Kong or Macau.

And, Your Honor, I would like to -- these were designated initially as confidential, and under the stipulation that was entered into by the Court we have the ability under that stipulation to de-designate, and I would like to submit these on the record, if I could.

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, any objection? Mr. Pisanelli?

MR. BICE: Yes. I object that they should have —if they were going to rely upon these, they should have done so in their pleadings, Your Honor, and attached them. Our point in our brief was they didn't submit any evidence that anybody actually attended.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  BICE: And they now seem to be trying to remedy that after the fact.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, I'll mark them as a Court's exhibit.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you. And, by the way, Mr. Morris pointed out that I said Mr. Levin attended these meetings. I meant Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs attended the meetings himself on four occasions, and in fact chaired one of those meetings himself. And if I may approach, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may. And we'll mark those as 1.

Thanks. And if you could give a copy to Mr. Bice,
as well.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I did, Your Honor.

As you can see from the document, Your Honor, there's a date when the meeting was held. "B," as you see in the key, which stands for board meeting; it tells who chaired the meeting; and there's a check mark down, and Number 3 shows what the check mark means, has attended the meeting physically. And we've highlighted those meetings on the

second page, as well, the dates of the board meetings, to show 1 2 who was there and whether they attended telephonically or in 3 person. THE COURT: How do you determine if they attended 5 telephonically or in person? 6 MR. RANDALL JONES: If you look on the second page, 7 Your Honor, there's a "T" for those people who attended 8 telephonically. And if you look at the second page at the 9 top, the February 9, 2010, meeting, it was chaired by Mr. 10 Jacobs himself. 11 THE COURT: I only have the 31 December 2010 12 meeting. 13 MR. RANDALL JONES: You don't have the second page? Yes. That's --14 15 THE COURT: Oh. There it is. Okay. They're the 16 top two lines. 17 MR. RANDALL JONES: -- on the top -- the top entry 18 is the -- you'll see in the far left-hand corner date of the 19 meetings. 20 THE COURT: Uh-huh. I see that. 21 MR. RANDALL JONES: February 9, 2010. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 23 MR. RANDALL JONES: So, Your Honor, with respect to that argument, if you want to talk about a so-called nerve 25 center, which we believe that doesn't -- that certainly

Daimler, supports the proposition that a company has to be at home in that jurisdiction. And based on the arguments that counsel has made in the past, they first argue that general —they had general jurisdiction because they had systematic and continuous contacts. That issue has been essentially dispelled by <a href="Daimler">Daimler</a>, and the facts of this case where you have them buying some products from here and having some contracts for goods and services clearly does not make them at home in the state of Nevada. If that were the case, then Daimler AG would have been a resident of the state of California or certainly would have been subject to general jurisdiction. There's no question that they did — had these kind of contacts with the state of California.

The second issue they raised is that there was a general jurisdiction because the foreign company had an agent working for it. Daimler dispelled that and said, it doesn't matter. "Even if there's general jurisdiction over the agent," and that's exactly what was going on in California with the Daimler entity in California. The court said, let's presume -- because the California entity didn't dispute it was the agent of the German entity, let's assume that they were, and the court went on to say, well, we're not so sure that they actually were the agent, but let's assume.

THE COURT: Because of the relationship, though,

between the Mercedes-Benz USA and Daimler, it didn't appear that those were related to the atrocities that occurred in Argentina.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, let's --

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THE COURT: Isn't that the analysis they went through in the majority opinion?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, that's certainly part of the analysis. But let's talk about that. There's a couple of different issues that I think you raise there, Judge. One is was there anything that was done in this case alleged by Mr. Jacobs that has any connection to China, either Macau or Hong Kong, or Sands China. Remember, what he's done is he sued my client, Sands China, for breach of an option agreement. didn't sue for wrongful termination. And he appears to conflate those two issues in saying, well, the decision to terminate him -- Mr. Jacobs was made in Nevada, therefore there's jurisdiction over Sands China. Well, that's an absurd proposition, Judge. First of all, we dispute whether or not that decision was made here or other places. But let's just assume for argument's sake it was made here. That decision --Mr. Jacobs himself says he was an employee -- claims he was an employee of Las Vegas Sands, not of Sands China. And what we have is an option agreement that was granted -- was decided to be granted by the remuneration committee in Macau, it was provided to Mr. Jacobs in Macau, it is subject to Macanese

law, it is related to stock that is traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and to the extent that there was a breach of that agreement it occurred in Macau, not in Las Vegas.

And with respect to the decision, assuming again there was a decision in Las Vegas to terminate Mr. Jacobs, think about that. I mean, just think about it in a standard jurisdictional argument. Mr. Jacobs was not a Nevada resident. The cases they cite for this proposition that somehow this wrongful termination relates to a breach of another contract, an unrelated contract, that's where the company went into that other state where jurisdiction was found with a resident from that other state, negotiated a deal with them, and then the breach would have an effect in that resident state.

That's not what happened here. Mr. Jacobs didn't live here, Mr. Jacobs didn't negotiate that contract here, Mr. Jacobs had an agreement that would have been performed in Macau, not in Las Vegas, Nevada, at any time. So that argument flies out the window. There is a basic disconnect between what Mr. Jacobs is trying to allege with respect to the so-called termination and the option agreement that he cannot reconcile ever under any set of facts, I don't care what other discovery he wants to do. So that doesn't help him. So where does that leave him?

And with respect to this agent argument, again, my

client does not do business here, Judge. My client has no revenues from Las Vegas or the state of Nevada, period, my client doesn't own any property here, my client has a noncompetition deed that precludes it from doing business here. Mr. Jacobs isn't here. What is the connection to Nevada? None. None. The only connection he could try to make is that somehow or other his alleged wrongful termination somehow pulls my client from China into the state of Nevada related to an option agreement that he claims was breached in Macau. So that just doesn't work, period, end of story.

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And then this de facto executive headquarters. talked about that a little bit. There is no evidence so you have to suggest there's a de facto executive headquarters here. You have all the major decisions, according to the corporate documents, being made by the board in a holding company. That's occurred -- I don't want to be redundant here, but that has occurred -- all occurred in Macau. now provided the Court the specific documents. But, again, this shouldn't be a surprise to Mr. Jacobs. The reason we didn't supply them earlier is because we didn't realize he was going to take the position that, well, how do we know that people actually attended those meetings in Macau. Again, I don't necessarily blame counsel, but certainly if they would have talked to their client, we would not have had to submit those exhibits, because their client would have told them,

yeah, they did have those meetings, because I was there.

So, Judge, as a matter of law it doesn't matter what other discovery they do, it doesn't matter how they want to twist things, how much invective or hyperbolic rhetoric they throw at the Court. That's what they've got to go on. They come in here and they use all kinds of defamatory comments about my client and the chairman of the company to try to gin up some kind of anger. I think the only way you could look at it and say they're trying to get this Court upset with the defendants so the Court will find jurisdiction. That's not the basis, Judge. That's not the basis for jurisdiction. I don't care how nasty and mean spirited their arguments can get, it does not confer jurisdiction over my client.

So, Your Honor -- do you have any other questions?

I'd be happy to try answer anything else you have.

THE COURT: No. I read the cases last night, and the briefing was excellent on both sides, so --

MR. RANDALL JONES: As I said, I don't see any way

-- I can talk about special jurisdiction. If the Court wants

transient jurisdiction, there's no transient jurisdiction

here. We've got a Nevada case in addition to <u>Daimler</u> that

shows there's no transient jurisdiction, the <u>Freedman</u> case,

Second Judicial District. If you don't have transient

jurisdiction over the resident agent for a corporation who

gets served in this state -- so the corporation gets a

resident agent here, has them here, they get served, and the Supreme Court says that does not confer jurisdiction over the corporation itself, then certainly an employee of the company, even an officer who lives -- happens live here and gets served with a complaint, does not confer transient -- jurisdiction, transient or otherwise, which, by the way, is also provided for in the <u>Daimler</u> case.

And, Judge, if there was any doubt in this Court's mind about whether or not there was jurisdiction in spite of the <u>Daimler</u> decision, which, as we all know, we all have to abide by that decision, our Supreme Court gave this Court additional direction, and it said in the <u>Viega</u> case that if they are not here doing business — if this is not their principal place of business, excuse me, or where they're incorporated, it is presumed that this is not their place of residence and you cannot get jurisdiction over them.

And, again, the special jurisdiction argument I really kind of hit with respect to the type of activities that they contend give rise to special jurisdiction. They just don't work. And, Your Honor, I think it's critically important for this Court to keep in mind when you're making your decision to not conflate the wrongful termination allegations, that that's what they want to do, against Las Vegas Sands Corporation with the breach of an option agreement with Sands China, Ltd., which has nothing to do with where he

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was allegedly terminated. That's a different matter, by the
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    way. We don't think that has anything to do with this whole
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    issue. But certainly the place where he was terminated as a
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    matter of law does not confer jurisdiction, assuming it
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    occurred here, against my client or on my client.
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              THE COURT: Thank you.
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              MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Bice.
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              MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Mr. Bice, is the complaint I'm operating
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    on under the original complaint that was filed?
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              MR. BICE: I apologize, Your Honor. I did not hear
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   you.
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              THE COURT: Is the complaint I'm operating under the
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   original complaint that was filed?
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             MR. BICE: It is I believe the first amended
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   complaint.
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              THE COURT: And when was that filed? Best estimate.
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              MR. BICE: The best estimate is it was the complaint
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   that added the defamation claims. I'm going to look back at
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   my colleagues to see if --
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             MR. PISANELLI: May 2011.
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             MR. BICE: May of 2011, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Thank you.
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             MR. BICE: That is the operative pleading at this
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point in time, Your Honor.

In that regard, Your Honor, just briefly to comment on it since you were told that no one could say with a straight face that Sands China's principal place of business isn't in Macau because we allege that in the complaint, I would ask the Court to actually read paragraph 3. Counsel's just misstating what the document says.

I would note that in paragraph 2 when we're talking about Las Vegas Sands Corporation we specifically allege that its principal place of business is in Las Vegas, Nevada. That is not said -- we do not allege that Sands China's principal of business is in Macau. Quite the contrary. So I'm not quire sure why that statement was said, because it's inaccurate.

THE COURT: It says, "Defendant Sands China, Ltd., is a Cayman Islands corporation and the majority owned subsidiary of LVSC through which [unintelligible] certainly the acts and omissions alleged below, LVSC is the controlling shareholder of Sands China and thus has the ability to exercise control over Sands China's business policies and [unintelligible] Sands China through its subsidiary, Venetian Macau SA, is the holder of a subconcession granted when the Macau Government, that allows defendants to conduct gaming operations in Macau."

MR. BICE: Right. No statement about the principal

place of business being in Macau, as was represented.

But, nonetheless, Your Honor, moving forward, since the defendants are conceding that the stay and the Supreme Court's mandate does not preclude you -- or compel you to hold an evidentiary hearing and that you can resolve this matter by summary judgment, assuming that the traditional rules -- the traditional principles under Rule 56 are followed, let's deal with those just briefly on two specific fronts that we submit are a bar to their present motion, but not a bar to our own. And that is, one, the two stays that they have obtained relative to jurisdictional discovery, as well as to jurisdictional sanctions. They have obtained a stay, as the Court knows, and precluded the Court from cleaning what the Court had scheduled as an evidentiary hearing concerning additional sanctions over their noncompliance with Your Honor's orders regarding the Macau Data Privacy Act.

With respect to that what they're now asking you to do is they're saying, Mr. Jacobs is stayed from seeking the sanctions relief to which he has been entitled to seek now for at least a year, but they are attempting to say that, well, they should be allowed to take advantage of that stay as a shield against themselves, against Mr. Jacobs obtaining any affirmative relief against them, but then they can use it as a sword to say that Mr. Jacobs is precluded from proceeding so that he can. And that again, Your Honor, we cite authority

that says that course of conduct is not permitted.

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So we believe that their motion is procedurally fatal for that fact alone and that there are two stays that they are hiding behind in terms of precluding Mr. Jacobs from obtaining affirmative relief and then saying that, well, but they should somehow be allowed to pursue affirmative relief in their own right notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Jacobs is stayed in that regard.

Second of all, Your Honor, is the only declaration, as we have noted, submitted in support of this motion was that of Mr. Toh, a witness that was not identified by the defendants as one of their jurisdictional witnesses. first time we received that was in response to this motion. And our objection isn't to the authentication aspect of Mr. Toh's declaration, it's -- our objection is that his wholesale conclusion and apparent lack of information about what really -- how Sands China is really being operated and who is really calling the shots and from where those shots are really being called, he submits a declaration first of all that was defective, and they seem to acknowledge that upon information and belief they've now claimed that they have corrected that by just simply saying he's relying upon the universe of internal records that they have not produced, and as well as just make the conclusory assertion that they aren't subject to jurisdiction in Nevada because -- and it's an odd argument,

because they're saying that it's not the standard for jurisdiction, where somebody actually does business, but then they turn around and say his declaration, which is the only declaration and the only actual evidence submitted by them, is somehow dispositive of the jurisdictional point. And, again, we have objected to that declaration. It is an impermissible conclusion.

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Setting those two problems, and I would submit they are fatal problems to their motion, let's turn to the merits in particular, because our countermotion is really the flip side of the same coin. And that comes down to this, Your Honor. Where is Sands China at home? And it's odd, because we're hearing again that we have these vacillating arguments and we're completely lost in the thicket. But funny thing is they filed essentially the same motion as a protective order I think two years ago, it might have been three years ago, making what is really precisely the same argument. Court rejected that for good reason. And we can now see why -- with the jurisdictional discovery that has been obtained why they didn't want those facts to come to light. you you should not look, you should turn away from where actual control, direction, and policy is emanating relative to Sands China. They say that <u>Hertz</u> doesn't apply. Apparently under their argument is that a corporation can be a resident of one state for purposes of diversity, but it wouldn't be

subject to personal jurisdiction in very place where <u>Hertz</u> says that it would be a resident as its principal place of business. I note they cite no authority for that bizarre proposition that the law would work that way, and that's because there isn't any that would support such a sort of tortured proposition about where jurisdiction lies.

The question ultimately becomes, as <u>Daimler</u> says, where is the company's principal place of business. And what the Supreme Court tells us in <u>Hertz</u> and what other courts tell us, and we cite this -- I'm glad that they embraced the <u>Johnson</u> decision, because I'm going to explain to you precisely why the <u>Johnson</u> decision completely guts their argument. They embrace that saying that, well, we're a holding company and under <u>Johnson</u> a holding company is deemed to be at home in the place where the board meetings are actually held. Little problem with <u>Johnson</u>, though, in that regard, and I'll explain that momentarily.

But going on to this they say that you shouldn't look at <u>Hertz</u> and where the principal place of business is because they know where -- who was actually calling the shots, who was giving direction, who was setting policy, and where all those executives are residing at. They're residing right here on Las Vegas Boulevard. And they've known that since the day that this lawsuit was filed. And we know that because their own internal records, not self-serving declarations by

Mr. Toh and not convenient annual reports that they need to file with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange because it's inappropriate for them to be -- being operated out of Nevada when they are in fact registered on the Hong Kong Exchange and have never disclosed that. I get that that's why those documents try and create that picture. But we're here, the Court -- this is summary judgment. We're dealing with admissible evidence, and in fact we cite authorities to you that say these self-serving assertions by parties as to where they decree their principal place of business to be are irrelevant, because of course they decree them. They're trying to avoid jurisdiction.

The question is what does the actual evidence show about who was making the substantive decisions, who was setting policy, and where is that occurring, where is the brains of the entity, where is the nerve center of the entity, where is the actual -- whether you call it de facto or whatever, where's the real headquarters of this entity. Well, we know that. How do we know that? We have emails from people. We have emails from Mike Levin telling everyone Mr. Adelson and Las Vegas make the decisions, input from Macau is expected and appreciated, but all final decisions come from Mr. Adelson and Las Vegas.

Here's another critical one that I think is amusing in light of their contention that the board of directors is

really calling the shots. Does Her Honor recall the email where Mr. Levin sent the email saying one of the problems with Steve Jacobs is that he thought he reported to the board, as opposed to Mr. Adelson? If the board's really calling the shots, why would Mr. Levin be sending an email saying that's the problem with Steve Jacobs, is he thinks he reports to the board? Because the evidence shows the board really isn't the one controlling this company, setting the policy, and directing activities, which, not coincidentally, is precisely why Mike Levin became the acting CEO of it for no additional consideration, because he had been largely fulfilling that role in a -- can't remember the label -- I apologize, Your Honor, I can't remember the label that they used to describe him -- special advisor I think is the labor that they had used. And Mike Levin then becomes the chief executive officer, Your Honor, the person in charge. And where is he based? He's based in Las Vegas. Where is he fulfilling his chief executive officer role as head of the company, head of policy, head of decisions, where the buck stops here? In Las That means that the nerve center of Sands China, as the documents show and as the actual evidence shows, is actually in Las Vegas, because that's where real decisions are being made.

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And that takes us, Your Honor, right to the <u>Johnson</u> decision. <u>Johnson</u> talks about this point. That was a holding

company that had officers I believe it was in Pennsylvania, if my memory is serving me right. And what they argued was, well, that's where the corporate officers are at and so therefore that's where the nerve center is. And the District Court said no, and the Third Circuit affirmed, saying, that's not true in this particular case because in this particular case this holding company did nothing except hold assets, its officers weren't empowered to do anything. So the board was making these decisions, actually running the operations and doing so at board meetings that were being held in Delaware. And so the court said, because of these particular circumstances that's where they are headquartered at and that's where the nerve center is.

Now, contrast that against what Sands China claims its role is. Sands China claims it's actually not just a holding company, but in fact overseeing and controlling the operations of all of the properties in Macau. That's what it has affirmatively represented. And I would note, Your Honor, that's why we cited them the Moore versus Johnson & Johnson decision, which came after Johnson, that specifically talks about the fact of what happens when you have a related company, in this case Las Vegas Sands Corporation and its executives wearing a Sands China hat, according to Mr. Adelson and Mr. Levin. Every time they're in Las Vegas when they're acting on behalf of Sands China, which is fairly constant,

they are wearing a Sands China hat. They switch these hats on and off quite quickly, apparently, throughout the day, but that's their position, and that was their testimony.

But this is what Moore talks about, Your Honor, in terms of -- and this is a less-than-a-year-old decision talking about this very point, they're talking about Johnson.

"Johnson confirms that Hertz is not as formalistic as the plaintiffs contend, that when the facts suggest that a particular corporation does not vest the relevant decision making in its officers, those officers do not compromise the corporation's nerve center. This court's conclusion that executives of a related entity may constitute a corporation's nerve center sits comfortably with the Third Circuit's reasoning and holding in Johnson."

And, of course, that's precisely been our point. This entity is really being directed, policies set, substantive decisions, as the emails confirm, Your Honor. This isn't just Mr. Jacobs making this. Their own internal emails confirm who's actually calling the shots, who's actually making the decisions, and where real policy is being set and dictated from. And that is here in Las Vegas. And under that that's why we have countermoved for summary judgment. You can't contradict your own testimony or that of other officers to try and say, well, now we dispute what Mr. Adelson said, we dispute what the emails show, we dispute what

our own witnesses have ultimately admitted to. And so there's an issue of fact that precludes Mr. Jacobs's countermotion from being granted. We certainly dispute that. They cannot contradict themselves.

That then takes us regardless of general jurisdiction, Your Honor, to the issue about specific jurisdiction. And on this one, you know, Mr. Jones says, well, we're just completely -- I don't remember the exact words he used, but -- actually, I wrote them down, that there's a basic disconnect of our position and this contract. I would submit that the basic disconnect is coming from Sands China, because Sands China apparently wants to forget that its chief executive officer, Mr. Jacobs, was performing those services pursuant to a Nevada contract, that Mr. Levin had to admit in his deposition was negotiated in Nevada, executed in Nevada, and approved by Mr. Levin in Nevada. And, Your Honor, we attached that contract as Exhibit 5 to our reply.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Bice, you are not just arguing general jurisdiction, you are arguing alternatively specific jurisdiction.

MR. BICE: Yes, we are, Your Honor. And that's the --

THE COURT: Okay. I just wanted to confirm that for purposes of our hearing today.

MR. BICE: -- subject of our countermotion, as well.

Our point here being, Your Honor, if you look at Exhibit Number 5, it specifically talks -- and this again -- they tried to deny this originally, and in fact if the Court goes back and looks at Las Vegas Sands Corporation's counterclaim, they claimed that they had no contract with Mr. Jacobs. That's odd, because they filed it with the Securities and Exchange Commission, representing it to be his employment contract. And it specifically talks about the fact that he will be serving as the president and CEO of the Macau listed company, which, of course, as we all know now is what? Sands China, Ltd. He will be reporting to the president and COO of Las Vegas Sands and the chairman of Las Vegas Sands. Again, this is Sands China claiming, well, we don't know -- we have no contacts in Nevada, this dispute doesn't arise out of anything in Nevada. But their -- of course, their chief executive officer is one who has a Nevada employment contract negotiated and specifically talking about his duties and obligations of reporting to Las Vegas Sands executives in Nevada. It talks about his salary. It talks about the very stock options that we're now hearing from these -- from Sands China only pertain to issues in Macau. Well, that's odd, Your Honor, because it specifically talks about the conversion right in the employment agreement and the amounts of the shares. So to sit there and say "the disconnect," I will agree there is a disconnect. But the disconnect is putting

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one's head in the sand, as Sands China has done, and trying to act like it does not know the contract that Mr. Jacobs was operating under and the contract from which the stock options were granted as a result of.

This claim -- because, again, I heard this terminology, as well -- is that these are different, unrelated contracts. Really? That's -- I would submit that tells the Court likely what it really needs to know, is that when Sands China has to come into this court and claim this stock option agreement is unrelated to this employment agreement -- the only reason that the stock option agreement, Your Honor, says on its face, on its face no less, that this is recognition -- I'll just read it so that we don't have a dispute about it. "This is in recognition of his contribution and encouraging continuing dedication." Well, Your Honor, how was this -- it's his role as CEO, and, again, what was his role as CEO pursuant to? It was pursuant to a Nevada contract that had been negotiated, signed in Nevada.

Again on the July 7, this is Exhibit K, Your Honor, this is the statement to Mr. Jacobs. "I am glad to advise that in consideration of your contribution and continued services to Sands China" he gets these stock options. Well, again, Your Honor, how is that these stock -- what services was he providing and what was he providing it under? He was providing it under a Nevada employment contract that Mr. Levin

acknowledges and that they filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. So if there is anyone -- if there is any contention being made here that is absurd, it is that Sands China is trying to pretend like this stock option agreement does not somehow grow out of the Nevada employment contract and that it is not a result of that breach of contract that does not give rise to the claim for breach of the stock options when it is specifically referenced.

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And that, then, Your Honor, turns us to -- and these facts are undisputed, because they don't bother to submit -even Mr. Toh doesn't know anything about this. So the facts about the termination, Your Honor, they can't deny that that entire scheme was carried out here by people, according to Mr. Adelson and Mr. Levin, wearing their Sands China hats. had those hats on the whole time that they were undertaking this activity. So these gentlemen, acting as the brains and the nerve center of Sands China, are in Las Vegas, directing all of these teams, legal, public relations, et cetera, having to manufacture fake Sands China letterhead in Las Vegas because they didn't have any, to make it look Sands China was taking this action in Nevada, that it was signed in Nevada, Your Honor, that's where the breach occurred, that's where the scheme was, and that's what happened. And you won't see a single declaration from anyone disputing any of those facts, because they were all admitted to in the depositions by Mr.

Levin and Mr. Adelson and the other executives that were involved.

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When you take that -- as Mr. Levin acknowledged, Your Honor, the only connection to Mr. Jacobs's termination that was had in Macau is that Mr. Levin, because he had been a long-time friend of Mr. Jacobs, wanted to give him the news personally, so he hopped on a plane to go tell him, as opposed to picking up the phone, like Mr. Adelson had wanted Mr. Levin to do. That's the extent of the Macau connection to this termination. This entire event happened in Nevada, which carried out from Nevada, and every substantive event of it occurred in Nevada, save and except for Mike Levin getting on a plane in Las Vegas and flying to Macau to basically announce the decision that had been made in Nevada. And that's all that they did. According to Sands China, well, it's not where you make the decision, it's not where you implement it, it's where you announce it that somehow is the breach and subjects you to jurisdiction. That, I would submit, is the absurdity of their position, Your Honor.

That then takes us, Your Honor -- because of that, and there are no material facts that they dispute any of those events happening, because they can't, all they're arguing is the law, the legal consequences of it, that's why they are subject to specific jurisdiction here over the breach of that agreement, because, Your Honor, we point out what the Ninth

Circuit says about this. "Specific jurisdiction is established when someone conducts activities in the forum," which is we have Mr. Levin and Mr. Adelson admitting, we had on our Sands China hats when we were undertaking this activity relative to Mr. Jacobs, "the claim arises out of or relates to those forum-related activities," the Ninth Circuit tells us. Well, is there any dispute anywhere that but for this termination that was hatched and executed here in Nevada that there would not have been a breach? Of course not. So does the cause of action relate to those Nevada-based activities by people wearing a Sands China hat, according to them? Of course it does.

Then, Your Honor, the burden shifts to them. Because those two factors are satisfied, the burden shifts to them to make a compelling case that exercising jurisdiction over them arising out of those circumstances is constitutionally unreasonable. They don't even attempt to do that, because they know that they cannot. That being the case, Your Honor, they are subject to specific jurisdiction, as well, over the claim that Mr. Jacobs has asserted in the current complaint. As you know, coming up before you is an additional amended complaint that asserts some additional claims. It's not before you today.

But, nonetheless, that then takes us to transient jurisdiction, Your Honor. And the only thing I'm going to say

about transient jurisdiction, the argument is, well, it's not sufficient to have just a registered agent subject then to jurisdiction. We agree. We have never disputed that. It's a whole different matter, however, Your Honor, and we cite the caselaw dealing with this, when you have an executive in the jurisdiction who the company has appointed as the chief executive officer to operate the company from the jurisdiction. This is not a paid-for corporate service up in Carson City where you just go off and drop the papers with them. This is an executive operating as the chief executive of Sands China from Las Vegas, performing those services on a daily basis from Las Vegas. He is the head of the company under corporate law, and he is based in Las Vegas and operating there. And that's where he was served.

We cite you to Wyoming Supreme Court's decision of a partnership where the managing partner was in the jurisdiction performing services, was served, and the court said that satisfies due process, because they were there on business, performing services for the company.

That's particularly the case here, Your Honor, considering that it was Sands China's decision to invest Mr. Levin with that title and with that authority and making him basically in charge of the company.

One last thing, Your Honor, before I sit down. On the attendance records --

THE COURT: Court's Exhibit 1.

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MR. BICE: -- Court's Exhibit 1, I'll withdraw my objection, and I ask the Court to actually look at it. And don't just look at the highlight that was given to you. Look at all of the board meetings --

THE COURT: You want me to look at all the "Ts" that were there and -

MR. BICE: Yeah. Look at all the --

THE COURT: I saw them, Mr. Bice.

MR. BICE: Look at all the board meetings, Your Honor -- no, just with Mr. Adelson, Your Honor. Because they're not highlighted. We have four highlights, but there are four other board meetings that are not highlighted, and he was there by telephone on all of them. In fact, if you add them all up, Mr. Adelson was there in Macau as chairman 10 percent of the time. I mean, my math's not that great, but it certainly -- it certainly isn't even close to a majority. I think it was two out of -- one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. Oh. So, no, it's more than that. 20 percent, little over 20 percent. The point being here, Your Honor, is, again, where is this company -- where does the evidence, not argument, not self-serving statements from Ben Toh or any self-serving report that they need to cite from themselves, where does the actual evidence show that Sands China is being the corporate nerve center, control, direction,

setting of policy is actually occurring? That is occurring in Las Vegas by people sitting on the Las Vegas Strip and giving those directions, and that means they are subject to jurisdiction -- general jurisdiction. But there can't be any argument about specific jurisdiction unless one wants to argue by simply ignoring what the documents and the contracts say. I thank the Court for its time.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

The first point I want to make, Judge, is that one of the first points that Mr. Bice raised is you've heard this argument before. Well, first of all, you've heard this argument -- some of this argument before some time ago, but that was before <a href="Daimler">Daimler</a> --

THE COURT: It was.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- and that was before <u>Viega</u>.

And, as I said earlier, I believe and I think that most people that I know that practice law when they read those cases believe that is a see change with respect to jurisdiction and how --

THE COURT: I think most people agree with you, including me.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So there's a big difference about your decision then and your decision now in the context

of those cases.

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But since the last issue raised by Mr. Bice was the board meetings, again, there is clearly a disconnect here without question. Mr. Bice seems to think that if they're telephonic board meetings that somehow or other that means that there's no legitimacy to the board meetings. Your Honor --

THE COURT: I don't think from a corporate governance standpoint he's saying that. I think he's saying it from an at-home evaluation standpoint.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I would submit to Your Honor that is an absurd proposition. If you're talking about a mom and pop company that has meetings that's a Nevada company --I'll tell you right now I'm on the board of my law school. I typically attend, because I don't live in California, by telephone, as do several other board members who live in New York and Texas and Hawaii. So in this day and age to suggest that somehow that the board meeting is actually held in California -- and that's what happened in this case; all of those board meetings happened either in Macau or in Hong Kong, and a lot of people phoned in to participate. And there is caselaw that we have cited, many cases we have cited where the courts have acknowledged that very point, that we no longer communicate by telegraph or pony express. In this day and age in the global economy that we have to suggest that

participating in a board meeting, whether you're a chairman or not, somehow makes the board meetings illegitimate is, I will say, using this word as being used a lot around here today, an absurd proposition.

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And, Judge, the only way to look at this case -- Mr. Bice wants to talk about some specific issues, and I want to go through some of those things. He wants to talk about certain -- a couple of emails that he thinks makes his case. Your Honor, what you have to do to do this analysis, and I think this is patently clear from Daimler and the Viega cases, you have to look at the big picture, you have to take the issues in their totality. The fact that there are some emails that Mr. Levin talks about the chairman wants to be involved in those decisions and make the final decision, well, as we pointed out in our brief, those were design issues, a very specific issue that Mr. Adelson had a particular interest in. And what you don't see is whether or not those are even required to be board decisions as a general proposition. So the --

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, let me ask you the question.
MR. RANDALL JONES: Okay.

THE COURT: Is it your position that the sole determinative factor in determining where a corporation is at home is the location of its board meetings?

MR. RANDALL JONES: No. I certainly don't.

THE COURT: Okay. What other factors do you think are important for consideration?

MR. RANDALL JONES: I think all of the factors.

That it has no property in this state, that it has an agreement that says it cannot do business in this state. And there's been no -- other than Mr. Jacobs, there's been no allegation by anybody else, no stockholder has sued saying, oh, Sands China is doing business in Nevada. It has no revenues from the state of Nevada. And that's irrefutable. He doesn't -- you know, he points, well, self-serving statements in an annual report. Well, Your Honor, I think that's again another kind of absurd proposition, to suggest that an annual report can't be relied upon, because, as we all know, if you say something that's a material misstatement in an annual report, you can be sued by shareholders. There's been -- other than --

THE COURT: Yes, you can.

MR. RANDALL JONES: As this Court well knows.

Other than Mr. Jacobs's allegation, there's no allegation that Sands China is doing business in the state of Nevada that I'm aware of. And so when you look at the totality of the circumstances it just doesn't add up, especially when you look at the <u>Daimler</u> case and <u>Viega</u>.

I would also point out that Mr. -- in that vein Mr. Bice talks about the Toh affidavit, and he suggests that the

Toh affidavit is, again, self-serving and it's the only evidence we have that shows that we don't do any business here. He obviously doesn't recall another affidavit that was submitted and attached to the motion to dismiss filed back in December of 2010 that says essentially the same thing by Ann Marie Sault [phonetic]. So this is a position that has been consistent, and the actual evidence, other than a few cherry-picked emails, suggest that in fact -- well, all the evidence shows that they don't do business here in spite of the fact that they have some high-level executives that happen to live here.

And I would also submit, Your Honor, if this Court basis its decision on the idea that a corporate executive cannot be on multiple boards and have -- essentially make decisions, using the expression to take off the hat and put on another hat, then I would like to see the caselaw that Mr. Bice is suggesting to this Court shows that a corporate executive that serves -- functions on multiple different boards or in multiple different companies by simply residing in a state and making decisions where he says he puts on his other hat all of a sudden confers jurisdiction over that company if they have no other business connection with that state --

THE COURT: Even if that executive residing in our state is making business decisions on a regular basis for the

foreign corporation?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Say that again, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Even if that executive who permanently resides in our state is making business decisions on a regular basis for that foreign corporation? See, that's the issue. If it was just you make it once, you're flying through, you're at Lake Tahoe for the summer and you make one conference call, I think that would be different than if you're making it on a regular basis. And that's where I'm having the concern, Mr. Jones. It seems to be a pervasive decision-making process by executives on behalf of Sands China here. Or at least that's the argument.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's certainly the argument. I would absolutely categorically disagree that there is a pervasive --

THE COURT: No. But I'm asking about the analysis, as opposed to the factual basis. Because the factual basis is a different issue. I don't know that I have the facts before me appropriately to make that determination, but from a legal analysis that jurisdiction, whether you call it transient, general, it wouldn't be specific, but where you have that executive of the foreign corporation in our state making business decisions on behalf of the foreign corporation on a regular business -- on a regular basis from our state, doesn't that confer jurisdiction whether you call it general or

transient?

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MR. RANDALL JONES: Not in the least.

THE COURT: Tell me why.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And  $\underline{\text{Daimler}}$  says categorically that that is not true.

THE COURT: Tell me why.

MR. RANDALL JONES: It's a simple analysis, Judge. In <u>Daimler</u> what is that employee, whether they be the chairman of the board or the CEO or the CFO or anything else? What is that employee? That employee is an agent of the company; correct, Judge?

THE COURT: He'd have to be; right?

MR. RANDALL JONES: He'd have to be an agent.

THE COURT: Or an employee.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And what <u>Daimler</u> say? <u>Daimler</u> says it doesn't matter -- it categorically says it does not matter if that agent resides in that forum and the agent himself would be subject to general jurisdiction.

THE COURT: But then we have our Nevada Supreme Court in the <u>Viega</u> case talking about the importance of evaluating that agency relationship. And if the parent is making absolutely no decisions other than having a member of its board sit on the subsidiary and not directing day-to-day operations, then, as in that case, it's appropriate not to exercise jurisdiction. But it seems to me in reading these

cases I have to at least make that factual inquiry.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Judge, again, I think -- well, first of all, as we all know, the <u>Viega</u> case helps explain the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of <u>Daimler</u>.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

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MR. RANDALL JONES: <u>Daimler</u> is clear on its face on this point, absolutely clear. It says unequivocally that even if the agent is subject to general jurisdiction himself or itself, whether it be an employee or another company, that does not confer general jurisdiction over the entity.

THE COURT: But the Nevada Supreme Court is the boss of me, and they have said in that <u>Viega</u> decision in the footnote, "As stated earlier in this opinion, an agency relationship might be used to establish contacts sufficient for specific jurisdiction so long as the contacts as an agent led to the claims at hand." And that goes with Mr. Bice's --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, let's talk about specific, then. Let's talk about specific. Because what you just said -- and, by the way, I would disagree, Your Honor, respectfully. The U.S. Supreme Court trumps the Nevada Supreme Court on this subject.

THE COURT: You know, the Nevada Supreme Court doesn't do what the Federal Courts say they should do a lot in criminal cases, and so I am very aware that frequently it doesn't matter what they say in the Ninth Circuit, the U.S.

Supreme Court; I've got to go with what the Nevada Supreme Court says, because they will send it back and tell me to do it over again.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And that may be true. But, as you recall, the <u>Daimler</u> case was a California case.

THE COURT: Out of the Ninth Circuit.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, understood. But my point is that ultimately on this issue I would believe that the U.S. Supreme Court would trump everybody. But, be that as it may, let's go with your argument about the <u>Viega</u> case.

THE COURT: It's not my argument. I'm reading from the opinion in your case -- your other case.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I appreciate that. I shouldn't have used that terminology. Using that argument, Judge, that the only way I could interpret that whatsoever -- and, by the way, I disagree that that's what it says. But if you could agree with it at all, it's as relates to specific jurisdiction. It doesn't talk about general jurisdiction. And specific jurisdiction you could always find jurisdiction if you can connect specific facts to a particular party that relate to the action itself.

And so, again, there's a disconnect. I understand Mr. Bice wants to get up here and say, oh, his employment, his wrongful termination is so tied in, so critically connected to the option agreement that they are the basis of our specific

jurisdiction for the company itself. I categorically disagree with that proposition. They are two different things.

So -- and, by the way, I want for the record to be clear. We dispute that all the decisions to terminate Mr.

Jacobs were here in -- made here in Nevada. I disagree with that. But that's -- it's irrelevant to the discussion. And I know Mr. Bice is very adamant about that being the case and he thinks the evidence shows that. I disagree. But that's not important. That is irrelevant to the discussion that you want to inquire about, Judge. The question is -- the only way they can make that connection is through the wrongful termination, assuming it occurred. And that doesn't have anything to do with the fact that he -- again, let's take all of the facts that he claims to be true as true for argument's sake, that he negotiated the employment agreement in Las Vegas, that --

THE COURT: And the only person he's sued on that claim is Las Vegas Sands.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's right. That's right.

THE COURT: And the option he sued both Las Vegas
Sands and Sands China --

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's right.

THE COURT: -- under the current amended complaint.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's right. So -- but let's just take for argument's sake everything that Mr. Bice contends is true as true, that he negotiated that agreement in

Las Vegas, the employment agreement; that he was terminated in Las Vegas from his employment agreement. Those are the connections; right? I mean, he didn't perform his employment agreement. I don't think even Mr. Jacobs would say, I came to Las Vegas and lived here and I did all my duties, performed all my duties and services under that employment agreement in Las Vegas. He's not saying that. So what -- his connection to the employment agreement is that he negotiated it here, it was signed by Las Vegas Sands here, according to him -- just so you know, Judge, he contends in the complaint, he signed it, as well. We've never seen -- to this day never seen a signed copy by Mr. Jacobs. But, be that as it may, again, taking these as undisputed facts for argument's sake, he signed it -- the Las Vegas Sands signed it here, he negotiated it here, and that he was allegedly terminated from it here. So what? What does that have to do with a option agreement that was negotiated in China, was provided to him in China, that he allegedly accepted in China when he was a resident of China, that he was performing work in China in connection with trying to get those options, and that he admits he was terminated -- the option agreement was terminated in China. He didn't -- with respect to the option agreement he didn't come to Nevada to negotiate it, he was not a resident. activities by Mr. Jacobs were directed towards the state of Nevada with respect to that option agreement.

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performance of that option agreement did not affect Nevada.

And you can't get away with that. I don't care what kind of rhetoric you want to use. They cannot convince anybody, because there are no facts to support it, that the option agreement has a connection to the state of Nevada. That would not confer specific jurisdiction.

And, again, ultimately presumably the Supreme Court's going to tell us who's right on this issue, but I will never agree with Mr. Bice that that option agreement has anything to do with the state of Nevada. His termination of his employment is a separate issue, period.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And with respect to the transient jurisdiction the same argument holds. <u>Daimler</u> tells us, and I believe that there's nothing in the <u>Viega</u> case that would suggest otherwise -- and, Judge, in a global economy think of what Mr. -- the can of worms that Mr. Bice is opening up here if he's right.

THE COURT: And that seems to be the biggest analysis from the  $\underline{\text{Daimler}}$ , is the transnational issues.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And it is.

THE COURT: It's a huge issue.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And in fact we argued those issues in the  $\underline{\text{Viega}}$  case and we lost them. And we had I believe substantially more contacts with the state of Nevada.

That company owned a facility in Reno. That company on its Website talked about doing business in the state of Nevada and how much business it did here, plumbing thousands of homes under the name of the German entity. It promoted itself in the state of Nevada with its product. And the Supreme Court said, no, they are not at home in the state of Nevada.

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So let's take the totality of the circumstances. I believe these are undisputable facts. We have a company that is a holding company, in spite of what Mr. Bice says, it is set up as a holding company. It owns stock in other companies that actually run the businesses. So we know for a fact any businesses that Sands China owns and runs are in Macau, with property in Macau; we know its revenue is all generated from there, there's no dispute that there's no revenue generated from here; there's no dispute that the board -- well, I don't think there's a dispute. There's certainly no evidence, competent evidence under Rule 56(f) that the company has its board meetings in Macau or Hong Kong. Bice has even conceded the point by accepting the offer of Court Exhibit 1. So we have a noncompetition agreement that is in place, we have annual reports that all relate to it. And what is the connection to Nevada that they can point to? They can point to two things that they rely their entire proposition on, two things, that the chairman of the board of Las Vegas Sands and Sands China resides here and that Mr.

Levin for some period of time was acting CEO and he resided here. That's what they could point to. That's it. And so under either the <u>Viega</u> case or the <u>Daimler</u> case you would have to determine as a matter of law that those two executives living here and having obviously a role to play, a significant role or insignificant role, either one, makes the company at home in the state of Nevada in spite of all the other evidence, principal place of business, place of incorporation, noncompetition agreement, no revenue being generated here, no property, board meetings, all that other evidence goes by the wayside.

That's why I said, Judge, I always like to do a gut check when I have any case, and I look at that and I look at the totality of the circumstances and I say to myself, could any right-minded person — and I know Mr. Bice is an advocate. He's a very good advocate. I understand why he's making as strong an argument as he is. He's got a case to try to argue. But if you look at it objectively, which is what the Court's supposed to do, and you look at the totality of those circumstances, I don't see how anybody in their right mind could say that Sands China, Ltd., based on all the available facts is at home in the state of Nevada under the definitions that have been given to you by both the Nevada Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court. It just doesn't add up, Judge.

And, again, you can take all of his arguments at face value and assume they're true. He's got two executives that live here, and in this modern global economy that's the basis on which he says in spite of everything else about how these companies work?

THE COURT: Well, not just that they live here. His argument is that they live here and they do business on behalf of the foreign entity and direct its conduct. That's his argument.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And <u>Daimler</u> says, as you acknowledge, an agent is an employee of the company, including the chairman and the CEO, they're agents. And <u>Daimler</u> says even if those agents are subject to general jurisdiction themselves -- and as we know in the <u>Daimler</u> case, the California company conceded that it had jurisdiction in the case. So even --

THE COURT: Even though the Supreme Court disagreed with whether they should have conceded that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, but -- and that's a good point. Because the Supreme Court said, we don't even think that the California courts have conceded that point. But they took it at face value. But they said, clearly, clearly, even if that company did have -- was subject to general jurisdiction and was the agent for the German entity, it did not confer general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction over

the German entity.

And that's what you're dealing with here, Judge.

Again, if you get caught up in the weeds -- and, again, Mr.

Bice does a great job of pointing out these little bitty

pieces of fact to say, why, this is critical, this is the

nerve center. That's an absurdity, too. If you think of the

operation of that gigantic company in China and think that Las

Vegas is the nerve center because two executives reside here,

then I respectfully disagree, and I don't think that our

Supreme Court is ever going to agree with that proposition.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, since you have a countermotion, you get the last word.

MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, if they're going to play up this holding company status, how many employees actually executive does
Sands China even have? They're telling you that two that are really calling the shots here in Nevada is somehow -- that's a minuscule amount. Well, holding companies, as the whole point of the <u>Johnson</u> decision is, is that the holding company typically doesn't have any executives to be making the decisions. So one must wonder, well, if you're claiming now that you're a holding company and that Mr. Adelson and Mr.

Levin, who are here exercising all this authority as evidenced

by their own contemporaneous emails and their own sworn admissions under deposition, that they're not somehow exercising ultimate control, authority, direction over the company's policy and affairs, then who is? They now tell you, well, it's the board and the board is meeting from all over the world, but since we set up a phone bank in Macau and/or Hong Kong, I guess it's in one of those two alternative places, which, again, isn't the law.

Interestingly, I heard this argument, agents don't matter. Well, Your Honor, agents are the nerve center.

Corporations act through agents. They have to. A chairman, a chief executive officer, the CFO, however many officers you have, they're all agents, Your Honor. You have to look at what those agents are doing in the forum to determine who is really making -- controlling this entity and from where.

Where is it at home? It is not where its day-to-day operations are, it's not where the gambling is occurring. And we cite caselaw that says you don't look at that, what you look at is --

THE COURT: But the gambling is occurring under a different subsidiary.

MR. BICE: Exactly, according to them.

THE COURT: It's the licensee of the Macanese Government.

MR. BICE: Right. All of that stuff should be

irrelevant, because they don't have -- those are not their businesses. They insist that those are separate and distinct entities. So they can't be citing their subsidiary's contacts in Macau as somehow being their own. In fact, by all accounts there's no indication other than that this entity, the actual brains of it, who is calling the shots are being made over here.

THE COURT: By "over here" you mean Las Vegas Boulevard?

MR. BICE: I mean over here on Las Vegas Boulevard.

THE COURT: The record doesn't show when you point,

Mr. Bice.

MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's why I was clarifying. Sorry.

MR. BICE: I understand the point.

And that's why we cite to you -- Mr. Jones says, well, they don't cite any authority for this. This is exactly what the Moore case says. Moore involved a situation where a large corporation, Your Honor, a holding company nonetheless, and the entity -- but the entity actually -- the executives weren't the ones actually calling the shots. In fact, what the court pointed out in that case is after evidence was heard it was revealed that other executives of a related company were the ones actually setting policy, making the substantive decisions, and controlling what events were going on. And the

court said, thus, those executives of that related entity constitute the nerve center of the corporation, which means that's where it is just to jurisdiction at. And that has been — I think been largely our point regardless of the labels that are thrown around, essentially since this case was commenced relative to the subject matter of general jurisdiction.

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Then we go to specific. Your Honor, there's no --Mr. Jones says there's no evidence. He says he disputes that everything about this termination happened in Macau -- or happened in Las Vegas. He can dispute it all he'd like, but he is required -- if he's going to say that there's a material issue of fact on that issue in the face of the evidence we have presented, he is required to have presented that evidence. And you will see none. Zero. Because there is no evidence from anyone disputing what Mr. Levin admitted, what Mr. Adelson admitted, what Mr. Goldstein admitted, and what their own internal documents from their own in-house counsel showed what was really going on. All Mr. Levin could say, Your Honor, is, well, I got on a plane after the decision -after the letter had been signed and the decision had been made to go hand it to Steve Jacobs. That's the extent of the Macau connection to this termination. And that's exactly what the evidence shows. And there is zero evidence to the contrary in the record, which is why we are entitled to

summary judgment on that. To come into court and say, well, I vehemently dispute that, I firmly dispute it, is not a basis to impose summary judgment. You have to have actual evidence.

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THE COURT: For that specific jurisdiction to be undertaken by this Court it has to be related to a particular claim.

MR. BICE: That's right. And it has to be related to a particular claim. And how does -- Your Honor, what is the breach of the stock option agreement? Look at the agreement, his employment agreement, Your Honor. And that is Exhibit 5 to our reply. It specifically talks about all of these options and the conversions of them. It specifically talks about, again, him serving as the CEO of a Macau-listed company. It talks about -- look at Item Number 4 in the agreement governed by Nevada law. "The options will be converted into the IPO of the new Macau-based entity -- the future Macau entity operations in Macau," which, as you know now, became Sands China. That's why it was pursuant to this agreement he was performing the services that then gave rise to the option agreement. And when was the option agreement breached? It was breached the very moment this document was breached, because they all grow out of one another, they all are interrelated. And that's what -- they can try and act like that's not true, but the facts are exactly otherwise. You only have to look at the document to know that that's the

case and look at the option agreement which specifically recites it is in recognition of the services that he provided, services that he provided under this document that they filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, that they negotiated in Nevada and signed in Nevada. And so when they breached -- when they falsely and fraudulent terminated him with this plan and these activities that they undertook in Nevada, that was the breach of the option agreement. And that's where they breached it, and that's when they breached it. The fact that they -- I don't care if they flew to Macau six months later and handed him the letter or announced it in the newspaper and didn't even hand him the letter. The fact of the breach occurred in Nevada by executives wearing their Sands China hat, carrying out this scheme as alleged in the complaint to deprive him of the rights to which he was entitled under that employment agreement and the related stock option agreement. Those breaches occurred in the state of Nevada by executives acting for Sands China in Nevada, and that gives rise to specific jurisdiction under the law. there's no evidence presented by the defendants -- by Sands China to the contrary. It's only argument by their counsel. And that's not a basis to defeat summary judgment. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bice.

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MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I just want a point

of clarification. Since Mr. Bice said there's no evidence that we disputed where the termination occurred, I do want to refer the Court to Footnote Number 10.

THE COURT: I'm not worried about it, Mr. Jones. Thanks.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Pardon me? All right. Well, it's Footnote 10 on page 19. We did -- and we cite to the depo testimony.

THE COURT: Because the parties have agreed that the stay does not apply to this particular motion and that they are seeking me to make factual findings under <u>Daimler</u> as to whether Sands China's contacts with Nevada would resolve the jurisdictional issue, I am addressing this motion despite the stay the Nevada Supreme Court has issued.

Here I have three bases of jurisdiction that is being asserted by the plaintiffs. I have a general jurisdiction issue, a specific jurisdictional issue, and transient jurisdictional issues. Basically all of those issues have factual disputes related to them.

I need to conduct an evidentiary hearing under which
I can make factual findings that have been requested by the
Nevada Supreme Court as to. for purposes of general
jurisdiction, not only whether -- the location of the Sands
China board meetings, but also where the officers were
conducting their business, and oversight of day-to-day

activities were occurring for Sands China, Ltd., to make a determination as to where Sands China, Ltd., was at home.

With respect to specific jurisdiction there are clearly factual issues and disputes among the parties as to where are the decision-making process and the delivery of that decision-making process and the impact of the delivery of that decision-making process was made, so I need to have an evidentiary hearing.

With respect to transient jurisdiction, in order for transient jurisdiction to apply factual issues as to the extent and nature of Mr. Levin and Mr. Adelson's responsibilities and day-to-day activities on behalf of Sands China, Ltd. -- I guess it's just Mr. Levin, since he's the one who was served -- are appropriate for me to deal with at the evidentiary hearing.

So if somebody will one day resolve the issues on the privilege issue that I have previously addressed and is up on a writ with the Nevada Supreme Court, I would be happy to conduct in evidentiary hearing.

Anything else?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, is the Court just going to issue an order, then?

THE COURT: No. One of you is going to draft it. I said you have genuine issues of material fact, but I tried to give you my reasons --

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- so if some day we have an evidentiary hearing, because it's only been two years and we still haven't resolved the issues on the documents, some day we'll have an evidentiary hearing, and I want to be able to refresh my mind as to the things I was thinking of today when I said we would have it. Because I read a lot of cases last night.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Can I propose this, then?

Should I -- I would get a copy of the Court's comments, so

I'll get the transcript, and from that I will draft an order
and I will run it by Mr. Bice for his review.

THE COURT: That sounds lovely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MARK JONES: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. MARK JONES: -- I'm sorry. If I may. Another issue, I mean, to the extent you haven't already considered this, I was going to remind the Court that we had requested oral argument for the two motions that are set on chambers calendar on Friday.

THE COURT: Oh. I haven't even seen Friday's calendar yet. Do you want me to move those to oral argument?

MR. MARK JONES: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Do you want me to move them to the oral calendar?

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              MR. MARK JONES: We have requested those on both of
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    those motions.
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              THE COURT: Sure. What day do you want to do it?
    Okay. Put down your stuff and look at your calendars.
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    trial, so I haven't looked at Friday's calendar yet.
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                      (Pause in the proceedings)
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              THE COURT: So do you want to do it on the 14th,
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    your first day back, Mr. Bice?
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              MR. BICE: That would be fine, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: How about I move all the motions that
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    are on the chambers calendar for the next several weeks to
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    August 13th.
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              MR. RANDALL JONES: 14th.
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              THE COURT: 14th.
                                 Sorry.
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              MR. BICE: Hold on one second, Your Honor, please.
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              THE COURT: I've got 8/1, 8/8, and 8/15. I've got
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    three sets of motions that are on chambers calendar.
    as well hold them all at the same time.
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              THE CLERK: All would be on August 14 at 8:30.
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              THE COURT: Unless Mr. Bice changes his mind.
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              MR. BICE: I think that'll work, Your Honor.
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    14th?
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              THE COURT: Yes, please.
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              MR. RANDALL JONES: 8:30 calendar; right, Your
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    Honor?
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THE COURT: Yes. And I do and try call everybody
else who's on the calendar before I have you argue, because I
know how important these issues are and why it takes a long
time to argue.

MR. MARK JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else? Have a lovely day. And

THE COURT: Anything else? Have a lovely day. And again I want to compliment counsel on the very fine briefing. It was very well done.

THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:53 A.M.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### **CERTIFICATION**

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

#### **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

# 130 Nev., Advance Opinion 6

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., A NEVADA CORPORATION; AND SANDS CHINA LTD., A CAYMAN ISLANDS CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GOFF GONZALEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE. Respondents, and STEVEN C. JACOBS, Real Party in Interest.

No. 62944

FILED

AUG 0 7 2014

CLERK OF SUPPLEME COURT
BY CHIEF DEPUT CLERK

Original petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a district court order finding that petitioners violated a discovery order and scheduling an evidentiary hearing to determine appropriate sanctions.

## Petition denied.

Morris Law Group and Steve L. Morris and Rosa Solis-Rainey, Las Vegas; Kemp, Jones & Coulthard, LLP, and J. Randall Jones and Mark M. Jones, Las Vegas; Holland & Hart LLP and J. Stephen Peek and Robert J. Cassity, Las Vegas, for Petitioners.

Pisanelli Bice PLLC and Todd L. Bice, James J. Pisanelli, and Debra L. Spinelli, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

(O) 1947A •

4-26860

## BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 1

#### **OPINION**

By the Court, GIBBONS, C.J.:

In this opinion, we consider whether a Nevada district court may properly issue a discovery order that compels a litigant to violate a foreign international privacy statute. We conclude that the mere existence of an applicable foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering foreign parties to comply with Nevada discovery rules. Thus, civil litigants may not utilize foreign international privacy statutes as a shield to excuse their compliance with discovery obligations in Nevada courts. existence of an international privacy statute is relevant to a district court's sanctions analysis if the court's discovery order is disobeyed. Here, the district court properly employed this framework when it found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse petitioners from complying with the district court's discovery order. And because the district court has not yet held the hearing to determine if, and the extent to which, sanctions may be warranted, our intervention at this juncture would be inappropriate. We therefore deny this writ petition.





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The Honorable Kristina Pickering and the Honorable Ron Parraguirre, Justices, voluntarily recused themselves from participation in the decision of this matter.

## FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises out of real party in interest Steven C. Jacobs's termination as president and chief executive officer of petitioner Sands China. After his termination, Jacobs filed a complaint against petitioners Las Vegas Sands Corp. (LVSC) and Sands China Ltd., as well as nonparty to this writ petition, Sheldon Adelson, the chief executive officer of LVSC (collectively, Sands). Jacobs alleged that Sands breached his employment contract by refusing to award him promised stock options, among other things.

Almost three years ago, this court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Sands China and directed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing and issue findings as to whether Sands China is subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. See Sands China Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, Docket No. 58294 (Order Granting Petition for Writ of Mandamus, August 26, 2011). Due to a string of jurisdictional discovery disputes that have arisen since that order was issued, the district court has yet to hold the hearing.

Throughout jurisdictional discovery, Sands China has maintained that it cannot disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). Approximately 11 months into jurisdictional discovery, however, Sands disclosed for the first time that, notwithstanding the MPDPA's prohibitions, a large number of documents contained on hard drives used by Jacobs and copies of Jacobs's emails had been transported from Sands China in Macau to LVSC in the

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA



United States.<sup>2</sup> In response to Sands's revelation, the district court sua sponte ordered a sanctions hearing. Based on testimony at that hearing, the district court determined that the transferred documents were knowingly transferred to LVSC's in-house counsel in Las Vegas and that the data was then placed on a server at LVSC's Las Vegas property. The district court also found that both in-house and outside counsel were aware of the existence of the transferred documents but had been concealing the transfer from the district court.

Based on these findings, the district court found that Sands's failure to disclose the transferred documents was "repetitive and abusive," deliberate, done in order to stall jurisdictional discovery, and led to unnecessary motion practice and a multitude of needless hearings. The district court issued an order in September 2012 that, among other things, precluded Sands from raising the MPDPA "as an objection or as a defense to admission, disclosure or production of any documents." Sands did not challenge this sanctions order in this court.

Subsequently, Sands filed a report detailing its Macau-related document production. Sands's report indicated that, with respect to all of the documents that it had produced from Macau, it had redacted personal data contained in the documents based on MPDPA restrictions prior to providing the documents to Jacobs. In response to Sands's redactions





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Sands stated that the presence of the documents in the United States was not disclosed at an earlier time because the documents were brought to the United States mistakenly, and Sands had been seeking guidance from the Macau authorities on whether they could be disclosed under the MPDPA.

based on the MPDPA, Jacobs moved for NRCP 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court's September 2012 order.

The district court held a hearing on Jacobs's motion for sanctions, at which the court stated that the redactions appeared to violate the September 2012 order. In its defense, Sands argued that the September 2012 order had prohibited it from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to "admission, disclosure or production" of documents, but not as a basis for *redacting* documents. The district court disagreed with Sands's interpretation of the sanctions order, noting:

I certainly understand [the Macau government has] raised issues with you. But as a sanction for the inappropriate conduct that's happened in this case, in this case you've lost the ability to use that as a defense. I know that there may be some balancing that I do when I'm looking at appropriate sanctions under the Rule 37 standard as to why your client may have chosen to use that method to violate my order. And I'll balance that and I'll look at it and I'll consider those issues.

Based on the above findings, the district court entered an order concluding that Jacobs had "made a prima facie showing as to a violation of [the district] [c]ourt's orders which warrants an evidentiary hearing" regarding whether and the extent to which NRCP 37 sanctions were warranted. The district court set an evidentiary hearing, but before this hearing was held, Sands filed this writ petition, asking that this court direct the district court to vacate its order setting the evidentiary hearing.

#### DISCUSSION

A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist.

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Court, 128 Nev. \_\_\_, \_\_\_, 289 P.3d 201, 204 (2012). A writ of prohibition may be warranted when the district court exceeds its jurisdiction. Id. Although a writ of prohibition is a more appropriate remedy for the prevention of improper discovery, writ relief is generally unavailable to review discovery orders. Id.; see also Valley Health Sys., L.L.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. \_\_\_, \_\_\_, 252 P.3d 676, 679 (2011) (providing that exceptions to this general rule exist when (1) the trial court issues a blanket discovery order without regard to relevance, or (2) a discovery order requires disclosure of privileged information). Nevertheless, "in certain cases, consideration of a writ petition raising a discovery issue may be appropriate if an important issue of law needs clarification and public policy is served by this court's invocation of its original jurisdiction . . . . " Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 Nev. \_\_\_, 313 P.3d 875, 878 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted." Valley Health, 127 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 252 P.3d at 678.

In its writ petition, Sands argues generally that this court's intervention is warranted because the district court has improperly subjected Sands to discovery sanctions based solely on Sands's attempts to comply with the MPDPA. Sands has not persuasively argued that either of this court's two generally recognized exceptions for entertaining a writ petition challenging a discovery order apply. See Valley Health, 127 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 252 P.3d at 679. Nevertheless, the question of whether a Nevada district court may effectively force a litigant to choose between violating a discovery order or a foreign privacy statute raises public policy concerns and presents an important issue of law that has relevance beyond the

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA parties to the underlying litigation and cannot be adequately addressed on appeal. Therefore, we elect to entertain the petition. See Aspen Fin. Servs., 129 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 313 P.3d at 878.

Foreign international privacy statutes cannot be used by litigants to circumvent Nevada discovery rules, but should be considered in a district court's sanctions analysis

The intersection between Nevada discovery rules and international privacy laws is an issue of first impression in Nevada. The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to discover any nonprivileged evidence that is relevant to any claims or defenses at issue in a given action. NRCP 26(b)(1). On the other hand, many foreign nations have created nondisclosure laws that prohibit international entities from producing various types of documents in litigation. See generally Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 Yale L.J. 612 (1979).

The United States Supreme Court has evaluated the intersection between these two competing interests and determined that such a privacy statute does not, by itself, excuse a party from complying with a discovery order. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987) ("It is well settled that such statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate that statute." (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204-06 (1958))). Generally, courts in similar situations have considered a variety of factors, including (1) "the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested"; (2) "the degree of specificity of the request"; (3) "whether the information originated in the

SUPREME COURT OF NEVAGA



United States"; (4) "the availability of alternative means of securing the information"; and (5) "the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located." Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 442(1)(c) (1987); see also Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). But there is some disagreement as to when courts should evaluate such factors.

Some jurisdictions, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, generally evaluate these factors both when deciding whether to issue an order compelling production of documents located in a foreign nation and when issuing sanctions for noncompliance of that order. *Linde*, 269 F.R.D. at 196.<sup>3</sup>

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has espoused an approach in which a court's analysis of the foreign law issue is only relevant to the imposition of sanctions for a party's disobedience, and not in evaluating whether to issue the discovery order. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1976). The Tenth Circuit noted that in Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court





<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Even within the Second Circuit, there is some uncertainty as to when a court should apply these factors. See In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 361, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he modern trend holds that the mere existence of foreign blocking statutes does not prevent a U.S. court from ordering discovery although it may be more important to the question of sanctions in the event that a discovery order is disobeyed by reason of a blocking statute." (quoting In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 196 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2000))).

stated that a party's reasons for failing to comply with a production order "can hardly affect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to the path which the [d]istrict [c]ourt might follow in dealing with [the party's] failure to comply." Id. at 341 (quoting Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 208). Based on this language, the Tenth Circuit determined that a court should only consider the foreign privacy law when determining if sanctions are appropriate. Id.; see also Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 81 (1964) ("The effect of those laws is considered in determining what sanction to impose for noncompliance with the order, rather than regarded as a reason for refusing to order production").

In our view, the Tenth Circuit's approach is more in line with Supreme Court precedent.<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Arthur Andersen, 546 F.2d at 341-42; In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977); Timothy G. Smith, Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-Production, 14 Va. J. Int'l L., 747, 753 (1974) (noting that Second Circuit cases failed to observe the Supreme Court's distinction between a court's power to compel discovery and the appropriate sanctions if a party failed to comply). We



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>That is not to say that Nevada courts should never consider a foreign privacy statute in issuing a discovery order. Certainly, a district court has wide discretion to consider a number of factors in deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from some other sources. NRCP 26(b)(2). Thus, it would be well within the district court's discretion to account for such a foreign law in its analysis, but we decline to adopt the Second Circuit's requirement of a full multifactor analysis in ordering the production of such documents.

are persuaded by the Tenth Circuit's approach, and conclude that the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute itself does not preclude Nevada courts from ordering foreign parties to comply with Nevada discovery rules. Rather, the existence of an international privacy statute is relevant to the district court's sanctions analysis in the event that its order is disobeyed. *Arthur Andersen*, 546 F.2d at 341-42.

Here, Sands argues that the district court never purported to balance any of the relevant factors before concluding that its MPDPA redactions were sanctionable. But in our view, the district court has yet to have that opportunity. The district court has properly indicated that it would "balance" Sands's desire to comply with the MPDPA with other factors at the yet-to-be-held sanctions hearing. Thus, Sands has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction or arbitrarily or capriciously exercised its discretion. Aspen Fin. Servs., 128 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 289 P.3d at 204; Valley Health, 127 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 252 P.3d at 678. Because we are confident that the district court will evaluate the relevant factors noted above in determining what sanctions, if any, are appropriate when it eventually holds the evidentiary hearing, we decline to preempt the district court's consideration of these issues by entertaining the additional arguments raised in Sands's writ petition. 5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The majority of Sands's briefing argues that the district court improperly (1) ordered discovery of documents that had no relevance to the issue of personal jurisdiction, and (2) concluded that Sands violated the technical wording of the September 2012 sanctions order. Although this first contention arguably falls within Valley Health's first exception, see 127 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 252 P.3d at 679, the documentation accompanying Sands's writ petition does not clearly support the contention. Id. at \_\_\_\_, continued on next page . . .





## CONCLUSION

Having considered the parties' filings and the attached documents, we conclude that our intervention by extraordinary relief is not warranted. Specifically, we conclude that the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules. Rather, the existence of such a statute becomes relevant to the district court's sanctions analysis in the event that its discovery order is disobeyed. Here, to the extent that the challenged order declined to excuse petitioners for their noncompliance with the district court's previous order, the district court did not act in excess of its jurisdiction or arbitrarily or capriciously. And because the district court properly indicated that it intended to "balance" Sands's desire to comply with the foreign privacy law in determining whether discovery sanctions are warranted, our intervention at this time would inappropriately preempt

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA



 $<sup>\</sup>dots$  continued

<sup>252</sup> P.3d at 678 ("The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted."). In fact, the district court specifically noted that Sands may withhold all documents that were only relevant to merits discovery and thus irrelevant to the district court's jurisdiction over Sands China. Sands's second contention does not fall within either of Valley Health's two exceptions, and Sands does not argue otherwise. Id. at \_\_\_\_, 252 P.3d at 679. Further, neither issue raises public policy concerns or presents an important issue of law that has relevance beyond the parties to the underlying litigation. Aspen Fin. Servs., 129 Nev. at \_\_\_\_, 313 P.3d at 878. As a result, we decline to entertain Sands's remaining arguments.

the district court's planned hearing. As a result, we deny Sands's petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus.

Liton, C.J.

Gibbons

We concur:

Hardesty, J

Doug AS, J

Douglas , J

J. J.

Saitta

Supreme Cour of Nevada CHERRY, J., concurring in the result:

I agree with the majority that our intervention by extraordinary relief is not warranted at this time. However, I do not believe that a lengthy opinion by four members of this court on the conduct leading up to the sanctions hearing, or on the factors that the district court should consider when exercising its discretion in imposing future sanctions, is necessary or appropriate at this juncture of this case, when a thorough and fact-finding evidentiary hearing has not yet been conducted by the district court.

It is premature for this court to anticipate, project, or predict the totality of findings that the district court may make after the conclusion of any evidentiary hearing. At such time as findings of fact and conclusions of law are finalized by the district court, then—and only then—should an appropriate disposition be rendered in the form of a published opinion and made public.

Cherry

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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CLERK OF THE COURT

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
\* \* \* \* \*

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

vs.

DEPT. NO. XI

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

Defendants

. . . . . . . . . . .

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

## HEARING ON MOTIONS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

TODD BICE, ESQ.

DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ. JORDAN SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

MARK JONES, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 2014, 8:40 A.M.
2	(Court was called to order)
3	THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands. Good morning.
4	MR. RANDALL JONES: Good morning, Your Honor.
5	MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor.
6	MR. PEEK: Good morning, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: Does everybody have a copy of the Nevada
8	Supreme Court's order denying a rehearing dated August 7th?
9	MR. BICE: We do.
10	MR. PEEK: Yes, Your Honor, I do.
11	THE COURT: Okay. So that slightly impacts some of
12	the things we're going to talk about today. And I appreciate
13	your supplemental brief after the orders.
14	Okay. Does everybody want to identify themselves
15	for purposes of the record, since Tina is not my usual clerk.
16	MR. BICE: Yes. Good morning, Your Honor. Todd
17	Bice on behalf of plaintiff Steven Jacobs.
18	MR. PISANELLI: Good morning, Your Honor. James
19	Pisanelli on behalf of Steven Jacobs.
20	MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Jordan Smith
21	on behalf of Steven Jacobs.
22	MS. SPINELLI: Good morning, Your Honor. Debra
23	Spinelli on behalf of Mr. Jacobs.
24	MR. RANDALL JONES: Good morning, Your Honor.
25	Randall Jones and Mark Jones on behalf of Sands China Limited.

MR. MORRIS: Good morning, Your Honor. Steve Morris on behalf of Sheldon Adelson.

MR. PEEK: And good morning, Your Honor. Stephen
Peek on behalf of the Las Vegas Sands and Sands China Limited.

THE COURT: All right. Which motion would you like to start with, the motion to amend the complaint?

MR. BICE: I leave it to the Court's pleasure.

THE COURT: Let's go to the motion to amend the complaint first.

MR. BICE: Okay. Your Honor, as you are aware, at this juncture, notwithstanding the fact of the age of this case --

(Pause in the proceedings)

THE COURT: All right. Let's go.

MR. BICE: Your Honor, notwithstanding the age of this case, as Your Honor is very familiar with it, Sands China has not filed an answer in this action, and we have sought to amend the complaint. And we would submit, Your Honor, that Sands China as the basis for its opposition to this amendment is in fact contrary to its arguments about jurisdiction. What it is insisting to this Court is that it has to look at each particular cause of action now in order to assess particularly with respect to specific jurisdiction. And to do that the Court obviously needs to then have before it all potential claims that are being asserted or are going to be asserted in

order to assess that specific jurisdiction issue.

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But now they come to you and they say, well, you shouldn't, because the stay precludes you from allowing Mr. Jacobs to amend his complaint. And our position on that, Your Honor, as we put forth in our pleadings, is I think very straightforward, is the merits stay does not in any way preclude these types of amendments, because these types of amendments directly relate to, to use the Supreme Court's words, matters relating to the determination of personal jurisdiction. We have learned through the jurisdictional discovery of a lot of facts concerning the activities that Sands China was undertaking in cooperating with LVSC in Las Vegas and undertaking those actions that give rise to the claims. And so therefore we are seeking to amendment to assert those causes of action to have them before the Court, because that necessarily with respect to specific jurisdiction plays a role in this Court's ultimate determination on the jurisdictional question. And the Supreme Court's order, Your Honor, does not say -- and we cite caselaw for you for this proposition -- does not say anything that precludes Mr. Jacobs from making an amendment, either expressly or even implicitly. We would submit to the contrary by necessary implication of its directive that the Court entertain matters that are relating to the determination of personal jurisdiction an amendment that adds causes of action specifically predicated

upon Sands China's Nevada activities are appropriate. I thank the Court.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Who wants to speak relative to opposition to the motion?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I will speak on behalf of Sands China, Your Honor.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I noted -- good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Jones. How are you today?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, thank you.

I would note that Mr. Bice said that -- very unequivocally that merits stay does not stay these types of amendments. And as we noted in our opposition on page 4, and I'm quoting here, Mr. Bice said that, "At this point the merits stay precludes Jacobs from amending his complaint," end quote. He went on to say, "But when that is gone he will be -- we will be amending his complaint to assert, among other things, claims for abuse of process against both Sands China and LVSC," end quote. And at the Supreme Court argument he repeated this point by saying, quote, "Presently the District Court views the merits stay as prohibiting Jacobs from amending his complaint even to augment his claims which would reinforce his theories for jurisdiction," end quote. That's

Exhibit B at page 21, note 11.

So Mr. Bice has acknowledged to this Court and the Supreme Court that the stay does include amending the complaint, including augmenting his theories of jurisdiction. It cannot get any more clear than that. And I don't know how he can come in here and say the exact opposite is a justification for his attempts to now amend the complaint.

And there are other issues implicated by this, as well, Your Honor, but the <u>Daimler</u> case tells us, as you know, we have issues about -- we have to consider the issues about where the defendant was at home.

THE COURT: And have fun defining "at home."

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, that's going to be an interesting discussion, Your Honor. We think it's pretty straightforward. We obviously have a disagreement with Mr. Bice about that subject. But with respect to specific jurisdiction, which appears to be what he is trying to do now with his amendment with these new claims, at least that's what he appears to be saying in his motion, first of all, we believe they have waived any arguments about specific jurisdiction. And that I think is something the Court needs to consider in making a decision with respect to this motion in addition to the fact that Mr. Bice has acknowledged that he can't do what he's now trying to do and should be judicially estopped from trying to do it, but even if he was allowed to

assert these new claims against Sands China related to specific jurisdiction, as the Court knows, you still have to make an independent decision with respect to specific jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, which would take us back to his original breach of contract claim and specific jurisdiction.

So his new claims do nothing -- that was one of his arguments, these new claims reinforce his existing arguments for jurisdiction. And they don't. Because they have to be looked at independently. So they don't do anything to reinforce his original claims for specific jurisdiction, assuming he actually had made those claims.

But, Your Honor, that also raises another issue, that if he was allowed to amend at this late point in time -- and he started out his discussion by saying, we're way far into this, it's been years and years. We all know the history. It certainly has been a long time. So --

THE COURT: And you missed part of it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I did miss part of it. He wants to now amend the complaint to add two new claims, and we would then have a right, obviously, to respond to those claims, assuming the Court allowed them. And I can assure the Court that we would be looking very carefully at a motion to dismiss, which would further delay what Mr. Bice says he wants to do right away, which is have a hearing on jurisdiction.

1 So, you know, Mr. Bice loves to get up here and make 2 pejorative statements about my client and the other parties in 3 this case at every opportunity. And one of the things he 4 loves to harp on is that he claims we've continued to cause 5 delay. What he's doing now is an attempt to delay this process further. And so we would like to get to the 6 7 jurisdictional hearing as soon as possible, because we think 8 there is no jurisdiction against Sands China. So this attempt 9 at this late date will simply further delay this process, and 10 we think it is not justified or appropriate. And Mr. Bice, up until this recent motion, had said it was not only not 11 appropriate, but he couldn't do it and that you have said he couldn't do it before. So we would believe that the stay does 13 14 prohibit that and that there's no justification for it 15 otherwise. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 MR. PEEK: Your Honor, I have nothing to add on 17 behalf of Las Vegas Sands --18 THE COURT: Thank you. 19 MR. PEEK: -- other than what has been argued by Mr. 20 Jones. 21 THE COURT: And, Mr. Morris, this issue doesn't 22 impact you, does it? 23 MR. MORRIS: Well, when we started -- opened this

I think it does have some relationship, but I'll --

hearing you remarked about denial of rehearing on August the

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1 we're now addressing the second amended complaint or the 2 proposed --Э THE COURT: Yes. I'm not at the motion for 4 reconsideration of the defamation issues yet, which is a 5 different motion. MR. MORRIS: Well, I'll speak in response to that. 6 7 But I still -- what I have to say does pertain to --8 THE COURT: I'm happy to listen. 9 MR. MORRIS: Well, okay. If you're happy to 10 listen --11 THE COURT: And I know that all these other people in the audience are happy to listen, too. 13 MR. MORRIS: I'm happy to speak. 14 MR. PEEK: We might get some CLE from it, Your 15 Honor. 16 MR. MORRIS: Your Honor, with respect to the 17 defamation, that claim in the second amended complaint -- or 18 the proposed second amended complaint not only adds -- puts 19 Mr. Adelson back in the case, but it makes claims against Las 20 Vegas Sands and Sands China. I point this out because you 21 have raised it at the outset, and I think it's of 22 significance. 23 With respect to reinstatement of this defamation 24 claim this is premature. The remittitur from the Supreme

Court has not issued. There's 25 days from August the 7th.

So until that occurs, Your Honor, there isn't any occasion with respect to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain a motion to dismiss.

But, having said that, I was not here, and I'm sorry that I wasn't now, in the meeting before last when a point came up that I think is of some consequence. We wish to file a motion to -- against the proposed second amended complaint when it is appropriate to do so, and that is when remittitur has run.

THE COURT: So you're saying it's not appropriate to do that until September.

MR. MORRIS: Yes, that's my point. And we would like to -- and that motion, of course, because it is against the defamation claim and it brings up and we'll bring before you a point that the Supreme Court addressed in its decision, it's four-three decision reversing dismissal of the defamation claim in 2012, it brings up the <a href="Anzelone">Anzelone</a> case and conditional privilege, and we would like the opportunity, since you are the person who in the first instance will consider the applicability of that privilege, we would like the opportunity to move against the filing of this second amended complaint on the ground that the conditional privilege applies, which is a point that the Supreme Court said you did not address, and it is among those things that the Court said --

THE COURT: That's what happens when I decide it's

an absolute privilege. I don't look at the conditional privilege.

MR. MORRIS: Of course. And I'm not quarrelling with that. But we made alternative arguments before you and before the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court said -- in substance what the Supreme Court said is, take it to Judge Gonzalez first.

THE COURT: They said that in three opinions. So we're going to talk about some of those others in a minute.

So your position, Mr. Morris, is because the second amended complaint attempts to resolve the defamation issue which was on appeal and which is now the subject of soon-to-be remitted, we should delay consideration of this because of the fifth cause of action?

MR. MORRIS: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bice.

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MR. BICE: Your Honor, the second amended complaint does not alter a single word of the defamation claim that's already before the Court. So I'm not quite sure where Mr. Morris is coming from, because that's just simply not accurate. That defamation issue and the issuance of the remittitur has nothing to do with this motion to amend with respect to Las Vegas Sands and Sands China.

What Mr. Morris is really trying to do, I guess, is

argue that the stay only applies to Mr. Jacobs but it doesn't apply to the defendants, because he says, well, we want to brief a bunch of merits motions against -- and that's true regardless of whether the second amended complaint is filed or not, apparently, because the defamation claim is completely untouched by it. So that is a complete red herring and an attempt to simply delay what we believe, Your Honor, is inevitable under the law.

Now, Mr. Jones says that we are the parties here in engaged in double speak about what's the proper scope of the stay. And we certainly disagree with that, Your Honor. As we point out in our reply brief, this is an issue that they took the position. This Court expressed some concern about that in the past. We think that is wrong. We have acknowledged that that's what the Court's view was, and if we misinterpreted the Court, then so be it. But the fact of the matter is we're bringing this motion. And you'll notice they don't address the point we make about the caselaw that we cite that specifically says that the stay cannot impact our ability to amend on this particular issue, because it relates to the Court's personal jurisdiction determination. And, as which, the Supreme Court's stay order cannot and should not be interpreted as somehow precluding it.

Now, if the Court is of the view that it did in the past, well, we think that that is mistaken, and we are asking

the Court to rectify that. If we misinterpreted what your view was in the past, well, then, that was our mistake. But, nonetheless, with all due respect, an absurd argument of judicial estoppel? We're not the parties who obtained any benefit from this position. The party here who's trying to engage in flip-flopping is the party who was here before telling you that the stay didn't apply to their proposed amendments. So --

THE COURT: My concern, though, Mr. Bice, is a little different. I have thought that with respect to merits issues I should not be doing additional work given the language of the writ that was issued to me. When I am looking at many of the allegations that you've included in the second amended complaint it reinforces those concerns, although they do in some ways relate to the jurisdictional issues, which is why we're having this discussion this morning.

And so my concern whether we're opening a can of worms that can be opened a little bit later, after I've clarified some of the jurisdictional issues.

MR. BICE: I don't -- you know, the problem that that presents for us is we're going to hear Sands China claim that, well, you know, specific jurisdiction has to be addressed on a claim-specific basis. That's exactly what their argument has been. And now they're saying, well, that claim isn't currently before the Court because you haven't

allowed them to amend, so you can't use that as one of the bases for determining specific jurisdiction over Sands China. And we think that that, of course, exactly reverses the position that the Court is supposed to be in when it's making the determination. The Court has to look at what are the claims that are being asserted, do those claims arise out of contacts that were performed in the state of Nevada. And on these claims the answer to that is yes. And that's why an amendment of this is appropriate.

I understand the Court's concerns about, well, we can't get into the merits. And we agree with that issue, because that's ultimately what the Supreme Court has said. But the Supreme Court's stay should not be interpreted to say that Jacobs can't amend his claims to add additional causes of action which further reinforce this personal jurisdiction over Sands China. Because if that's the ruling, Your Honor, then, of course, we're now in a catch-22; the Court says, well, you can't bring in these claims that enhance the jurisdictional debate that directly relate to it but I'm going to take up whether or not Sands China is subject to personal jurisdiction before the Court.

THE COURT: I understand what you're saying, Mr. Bice. It's a very difficult issue, but I understand what you're saying. And the difficulty relates to the nature of the stay that was issued in conjunction with the writ. But

that's a different issue. Anything else?

MR. BICE: Your Honor, that's why we cite, I believe -- I don't remember exactly, I can look them up -- the case we cited that specifically address this is that unless the remand mandate from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, in this case because these are federal cases, specifically dictate otherwise, parties are free to amend their complaint and amend their pleadings. And here there is nothing in that order that can be interpreted or should be interpreted as saying that Jacobs can't amend his complaint specifically as to additional claims that were gleaned out of jurisdictional discovery that go directly to the issue that the Supreme Court told this Court to address, which is what contacts did Sands China have in the state of Nevada.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to grant the motion, with the exception to the fifth claim for relief against Adelson. I agree that it is premature at this time for that claim to be addressed. You can address that after the remittitur is received.

With respect to the new claims, because they appear to relate to jurisdictional issues that I am supposed to be determining, while they may also deal with merits issues, I'm going to allow the amendment, because we have to address the

1 jurisdictional issues.

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, I have a question from Las Vegas Sands' standpoint. Am I then permitted to file motions to dismiss?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. PEEK: Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I just -- a point of clarification, because it didn't really come up until after rebuttal. But the one question I have, and it kind of relates to this issue of the defamation against Mr. Adelson, is these all -- these new claims relate to defamation. That's what they're all grounded on. And it seems to me that until -- and this goes to another motion we have this morning, and I just thought I'd bring it up now, but I would like to --

THE COURT: I'm not to that one yet.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand. But it implicates that motion and whether or not -- what relief or what ruling the Court makes with respect to that motion. So I just want to at least make the Court aware I think that there are issues there that relate to that that I would like to at least --

THE COURT: I know there are issues there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- be able to revisit this ruling with the Court when we get to that point, that's all.

THE COURT: Well, I anticipate that after the new complaint is filed I'm going to see a plethora of motions to

dismiss on numerous issues, including the defamation issues as amended and the issues that sort of pervade some of those claims in the complaint.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Fine, Your Honor. Again, I just at least wanted to raise this point with the Court.

THE COURT: I'm not to that motion. I'm going to let you talk in a minute, but I'm not quite there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, if we could go to the motion to reconsider the dismissal of the defamation claims against defendants Sands and Sands China.

MR. BICE: Yes. Your Honor, this motion, according to the defendants, is both simultaneously too late and simultaneously too early is their position with respect to it, and I think that pretty much proves our point, because that — the motion is accurate. The Court had dismissed the defamation claim on the litigation privilege, the Nevada Supreme Court has overturned that ruling, and then their position was, well, you've got to wait for the rehearing to be decided. That was it. Now that that's been decided adverse to them, now, well, now you shouldn't consider this for — I don't know what reason — the remittitur hasn't issued. But, again, that has nothing to do with Sands China or Las Vegas Sands Corporation, Your Honor. The issue has been briefed, as we point out, and a lot of caselaw on this point that Supreme

Court decisions are binding authority unless the opinion has been withdrawn. Not only has the opinion not been withdrawn, the petition for rehearing was denied.

With respect to Mr. Adelson, he doesn't have any dog in this fight. He claims -- it's odd, because he's claiming he's not before the Court right now because the remittitur hasn't issued, but he wants to be heard on motions that don't pertain to him. And so we do object to that practice.

But the point of the matter --

THE COURT: You know I'm always going to let everybody wants to talk talk.

MR. BICE: I know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, it's just the way I am.

MR. BICE: I know, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MR. BICE: But our point here is the basis for the Court's dismissal of those claims against Sands China and against Las Vegas Sands has been reversed by the Supreme Court. Those claims now — we are entitled to have them reinstated. And now is an appropriate time to reinstate them, because, again, they specifically tie back into the jurisdictional debate with respect to Sands China.

Now, I've heard that we're going to hear some claim that Mr. Adelson wasn't speaking on behalf of Sands China, which we think will prove interesting if that's going to be

their position, since he's -- the defamatory statement was he claimed that we have developed a number of reasons for Mr. Jacobs's termination when they are simultaneously representing to the Court that Mr. Jacobs was terminated by Sands China. So that will prove interesting if that becomes their latest story. But, again, that's a premature issue.

Right now the Supreme Court has ruled, the petition for rehearing has been denied, and we are entitled to have the defamation claims reinstated so that we can -- because, again, it ties back to the jurisdictional issue, Your Honor, with respect to Sands China.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. BICE: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, Mr. Peek.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you, Your Honor.

I actually -- in one of those rare occasions I think I actually agree with Mr. Bice about something. He says that we argue that their motion is both too late and too early. Well, in fact it is, both of those things. The claims were dismissed, they did not move for reconsideration at the time, and --

THE COURT: But don't we have a change in law of the state of Nevada?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, we have a change in the status of the case, I agree with that based on the Supreme

Court ruling. They had a right to make their motion. They didn't make it, so that's undisputable. They talk about inherent authority, and they talk about cases from other jurisdictions that talk about what a summary judgment means. We certainly think those cases are clearly distinguishable, and I can go through that if the Court wants me to take the time to do it. But all you have to do is look at them. Even the cases they cite from the Nevada cases to talk about other issues, not a reconsideration of interlocutory order. So they don't have any case authority. They're basically relying on this so-called inherent authority of you to do what they want you to do.

But, Your Honor, I've been in this situation where this very thing has happened. And they have to -- at least as far as I've seen in other matters, they have to wait until the case is over, and then they have a right to appeal that issue. So that's why it's too early. That's why it's premature. They have -- they lost the issue-

THE COURT: But I've I got the right not to get reversed again when I know it's wrong, because they already issued a written decision saying, Judge, you've got to consider these other things.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, here's the problem with that argument, Your Honor. We never addressed -- "we" being Sands China. Sands China was never given the opportunity to

address the specific other issues that were raised. And we would --

THE COURT: Well, absolutely you get to have that right in the renewed motion to dismiss that you're going to file when the second amended complaint is actually served.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, here's what I see as the procedural problem with that. They didn't move pursuant to 54(b) to take that issue up.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. RANDALL JONES: They picked their poison, Judge.

And from my perspective --

THE COURT: It wasn't final, so it's interlocutory, and I can change it at any time if I want.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, ultimately I guess you're the judge, so you can make your rulings however you want to make them. But it would seem to me that if they wanted to appeal that issue they could have done exactly what they did with Mr. Adelson. They could have asked you to certify it pursuant to 54(b), which presumably you would have done, because you did it on the other issue. And they didn't do that. And so there should be no, if you will, attempt for them now to come back after the fact and say, well, we got this one reversed, let's go back to where we were before with these other matters that we did not either reconsider or move to certify.

So, Your Honor, I -- well, I obviously understand from the Court that -- put it another way. It's pretty obvious you're going to grant this motion, but we want to make sure we have a full opportunity --

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- to brief these issues that were never briefed and decided by the Court before.

THE COURT: Absolutely. I'm not precluding anybody from filing anything in their motions to dismiss that I know are going to be filed soon.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Peek.

MR. PEEK: I really have nothing to add, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. The motion's granted given the Supreme Court's opinion with respect to the Adelson defamation claim, because in my mind they made a clarification of the law that affects my prior decision, and I'm going to learn from that opinion.

If we could now --

MR. PEEK: Your Honor, just as sort of a procedural issue, because we still have the issue of the motion to amend and the fifth claim for relief and Adelson, and so I'm just trying to kind of put all the pieces of that puzzle together.

THE COURT: I allowed them to amend the fifth claim for relief, except as to Mr. Adelson. That means when it's

served on you you want to file your motion to dismiss.

MR. PEEK: Now that we have this motion to reconsider so we still get that opportunity, then, once the -- if and when you allow an amendment on the fifth claim for relief, that would then trigger the motion to dismiss on --

THE COURT: I did allow the amendment on the fifth claim for relief, just not as against Mr. Adelson yet because of the remittitur issue.

MR. PEEK: Okay.

THE COURT: Though you will file whatever fulsome motion you think is appropriate, Mr. Peek and Mr. Jones and Mr. Morris, and then I'll --

MR. PEEK: Want to just make sure I clarify, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. All right. Do you want to talk about the motion to extend the stay?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor, as you've already noted, you have now received some direction from the Supreme Court as to what you believe you're supposed to do as we proceed with this matter. And one of the things that we believe was instructive and is important and relevant to this motion that we've filed is a determination of prior to any jurisdictional discovery hearing -- or, excuse me, any sanction hearing in particular some further briefing to determine what documents, if any, that have been requested --

THE COURT: I thought was going to do an in-camera review based upon their opinion. That's what I have written down to discuss at the end of today's hearing.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I do want to discuss that issue, Your Honor. What I was first referring to is the Macau documents.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And the Supreme Court has essentially adopted the <u>Internationale</u> versus Rogers.

THE COURT: That's part of my balancing test when I consider Rule 37 sanctions, which I said when you guys were here the last time.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand. So I certainly would ask this Court if we extend the stay as it relates to the sanctions hearing to allow us to brief those issues, because we think those issues need to be briefed before any such hearing, any sanctions hearing. Those are obviously very important issues to all concerned, including the Court, and that we now have a test that this Court is directed to follow that we need to address before we ever get to that hearing. That is certainly our position. We think that's a necessary prerequisite before we get to that point. And so we would ask that the sanction hearing be stayed until we're allowed to do that.

THE COURT: Well, I have to stay the sanctions

hearing. I was going to stay the sanctions hearing and not schedule it until after I finish the in-camera review. So I think the two things -- if you want to file more briefs on the Macau stuff, I'm always happy to read your briefs. The problem I have is I'm going to have what is going to be a very difficult task before me. I'm doing an in-camera review given the instructions by the Nevada Supreme Court that merely having a cc on a document isn't enough for a claim of attorney-client privilege, which means I have to make a very careful review of the contents of each of the communications.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I was -- actually I did plan to bring that up. That's, what, Footnote 17, I believe, of --

THE COURT: So, I mean, I've got some things on my plate that I need to be handling, and I'm going to -- it's going to take me a little while to do the in-camera review. It will take me longer than it usually does, because I'm also getting ready for the CityCenter trial at the same time. I have 6,000 people who filled out ability to serve questionnaires, and next week 300-and-some will fill out the first batch of the longer questionnaires. So I've got some things. So I think you have time to do some briefing, because I'm not going to schedule the sanctions hearing or the evidentiary hearing until I finish the in-camera review. So if you want to do briefing, I'm always going to consider briefing, Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. Well --

THE COURT: So if you want to file a motion for instructions or whatever you want to call it, I'm happy to read it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So that brings up the ultimate issue. With the ruling of the Supreme Court we now have an issue to produce these documents and whether we need to produce them immediately. We would ask the stay be extended with respect to production of the Macau documents until we've had the opportunity to do this briefing based upon these five factors, in particular factor number one, which essentially goes to relevance, and we think that there are certainly some significant issues that need to be addressed there with respect to these Macau documents, especially in light of the new nerve theory center -- nerve center theory, excuse me, that the plaintiff now seems to be asserting.

So, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I think that's part of their at home analysis. I think it's all wrapped up together, which is one of the reasons I denied both the motions for summary judgment, because there appear to be genuine issues of material fact as to where Sands China is at home.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood. And so my point is simply that, in other words, we have a ruling that was from last -- well, the spring of 2013 with respect to the Macau

documents. We would simply ask that the Court extend that stay until we finish this process out and we've been allowed to do this briefing.

THE COURT: Let just ask you a question. How long is it going to take you to do that briefing? Your part. Not Mr. Bice's part, just your part.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I would say, Your Honor, we would like at least two weeks, if not three weeks.

THE COURT: So you want to file a brief in three weeks or so.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes.

THE COURT: And then Mr. Bice will have three or four weeks to file a brief, and then you'll file another brief, then I'll have a hearing. So if we're talking about 60 days or 75 days or even 90 days, I think it's going to fall in the same realm as this in-camera review of the Jacobs drive that I'm going to have to now do. So if you want to file a motion, I'm happy to discuss it with you if that's what you want to do --

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's what we're asking.

THE COURT: -- and allow you a little bit of time before you produce those documents. I've already made a determination you should produce them. You said you're not going to. I said, okay, that's bad, I'm going to sanction you. So if you still don't want to produce them, that's okay,

1 I understand, but it's part of the analysis I go through when I get to the sanctions hearing. Like I said before, I've got 2 to balance those issues. 3 MR. RANDALL JONES: Understood, Your Honor. And so 4 5 with the time frame the Court's provided, certainly 60 to 90 6 days, I think that's certainly acceptable. We would ask that the stay be extended for that time period. And we --7 8 THE COURT: And the only thing you're asking to be 9 stayed is my holding the sanctions hearing. 10 MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I'm asking the Court to 11 stay two things, to stay the sanctions hearing during that 12 time period -- we would actually like -- we think that the 13 appropriate order of discussion would be the jurisdictional 14 hearing first. Because if the Court is --15 THE COURT: No. We're doing the sanctions hearing 16 first. 17 MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, Your Honor, at a minimum, 18 then, we would ask that if the Court is unwilling to consider 19 doing the sanctions hearing second, then we would ask that the 20 Court do these two hearings simultaneously. 21 THE COURT: That may happen. Or I may do them 22 seriatim --23 MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- because they have overlapping issues.

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- there's a reason for that,

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and the reason for that -- not, you know, just because we'd like to do it that way, the sanctions analysis is going to be driven, we believe, by a substantial -- in a substantial way by the jurisdictional analysis. And in fact if we're correct that jurisdiction against Sands China is not appropriate, that will have a substantial impact, we would hope, on this Court's decision as to whether or not any sanction is appropriate. And so to do it otherwise would not be fair to Sands China under the circumstances.

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THE COURT: Okay. There's going to be a sanction, because I already had a hearing and I made a determination there is a sanction. The question is the level of the sanction, which is what I'm doing the hearing, and that relates to the balancing that I have to do under Rule 37, because you guys decided not to comply with an order after you had notice and an opportunity to have everything that I wanted to consider related to those documents. And it's okay. issued an order, it was in writing, you guys decided not to appeal it. In fact, some of the sanctions that were required under it were paid. And then we had an issue that you just didn't want to comply, and so you redacted additional stuff. And that's okay. You can make that decision. But making those decisions have consequences, and that's what my sanctions hearing is about.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I understand. I

want to make sure it's clear for the record we just didn't decide not to comply with that order. There were compelling reasons which we hope this Court would take into account in any sanctions hearing whenever it's decided.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And so with respect to this process we are simply saying that the jurisdictional issues and analysis will certainly have implications on any sanction this Court might consider. We think that that is the most appropriate way. If not having the sanctions hearing second, that at a minimum these should happen seriatim as you've said you were willing to consider. We would ask the Court to do that, and we would ask that the Court, since the Court hasn't made a ruling on sanction -- it doesn't sound like the Court is willing to do that until it's heard, have the actual hearing.

THE COURT: I'm not going to choose the type of sanctions until I have the hearing and have the opportunity to have the evidence I need to make the balancing determination that I always make under Rule 37.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So that is -- we're requesting that the Court continue the stay with respect to the -- any sanctions hearing whether or not any sanctions occur before that time -- it sounds like the Court is going to do that -- and at a minimum that these hearings occur simultaneously or

seriatim -- in seriatim, as you say, and that -- I think that's our position, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks.

Mr. Peek, you don't want to add anything?

MR. PEEK: No, Your Honor, because this really is a Sands China issue.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Bice, anything you want to say?

MR. BICE: I apologize Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to say anything?

MR. BICE: I do. I apologize.

Your Honor, if this argument sounds familiar to the Court, it certainly sounds familiar to us, because it's -- basically it's a repeat of Ms. Glaser's position long ago before we knew about the documents being in Las Vegas. As you'll recall, she wanted -- please, we implore you, please hold this evidentiary hearing before what we knew were documents that hadn't been disclosed. And you're basically getting the same pitch today. This motion, Your Honor, on a stay is moot. The Supreme Court has rejected their contention about the MPDPA as being a defense to their production. As you accurately point out, they have made a choice to violate the Court's order, and what they're saying is, well, we think that we have a sufficient excuse. Well, that's not simply a question about what's going to be the degree of sanction,

because we certainly dispute that. In fact, we're going to show you as part of that evidentiary hearing the representations that they made to the Supreme Court about what your order meant completely neutered it. And so we don't think that this was some, well, we had compelling reasons under the MPDPA to do it; their position to the Supreme Court was your order actually only applied to documents that were already in the United States, the very same documents that they previously told you the MPDPA doesn't even apply to once they're in the United States.

That's why this issue about the sanctions is appropriate and it's important and it goes to -- it has to precede the evidentiary hearing, because one of the things obviously we're going to be seeking are some evidentiary sanctions as a result of that issue based upon the personal jurisdiction debate.

And so the basis -- there is no basis to stay. This Court is going to schedule the evidentiary hearing on this issue when it has time to do that, and that's when it should be addressed. Because we have an additional issue coming back to this issue about the in-camera inspection. As the Court knows, one of the issues in the other writ where the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court and said that you have to look at these things --

THE COURT: They agree with Mr. Peek.

MR. BICE: They agree with Mr. Peek.

THE COURT: For the record, they agreed with Mr.

Peek.

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MR. BICE: They did. And will acknowledge that no matter how badly it --

MR. PEEK: Does it really hurt, Todd?

MR. BICE: -- causes me pain in the throat, they did agree with Mr. Peek's position on this. I acknowledge that, Your Honor. But what they also said was -- because you'll -as Her Honor will recall, our principal position on this was that they had long ago waived any claim of privilege. And the Supreme Court even made the point in it's Footnote Number 9 that the District Court is going to have to -- that being Her Honor, is going to have to make findings of fact about that very issue. So as part of the sanctions hearing -- and again, we think that this may moot much of the in-camera review that Her Honor is planning to undertake, but that's obviously up to Her Honor. But, nonetheless, as part of that sanctions hearing that the Court is planning we also think that we have to have a hearing on our position, the very first position we advanced on this issue, is that they long ago waived any entitlement to claim privilege regardless of who was the The Supreme Court in its decision merely addresses who can, quote, unquote, "waive the privilege" or who can use these documents affirmatively assuming that there is a

privilege to assert. Our point, as the Court will recall, was they don't even have the ability to assert that, because they've acknowledged that they knew about these documents for a long, long time, and in fact they've always insinuated, and the Court's even made comment on it, that they somehow they knew what he took with him at the time of his departure, and did nothing about it for more than a year, which under analogous federal caselaw the courts have consistently said that is a complete and wholesale waiver of any claim of privilege.

So we're going to be asking the Court as part of that evidentiary hearing about the sanctions aspect to be holding an evidentiary privilege also -- or an evidentiary hearing also about the waiver that we maintain existed, which we also think would moot much of the Court's need to conduct that in-camera review. And that's why we would ask to do that more promptly, rather than later, because it might streamline the process and it might save the Court some time on it.

Because if the Court agrees with us on that waiver issue, the question about in-camera review would not be necessary.

So at this point, Your Honor, this motion for stay is most and it just needs to be denied.

THE COURT: We're really talking about scheduling now.

MR. BICE: Exactly. That's right. But I don't want

there to be -- I mean, the concern I have is that they try and 1 2 use -- get you to say, well, I'm going to grant a stay. 3 There's no basis for a stay. The Supreme Court rejected their 4 position, and now --5 THE COURT: Well, I have a stay on merits discovery. 6 MR. BICE: What's that? 7 THE COURT: I still have a stay on merits discovery. 8 MR. BICE: That's true. I thank the Court for its 9 time. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Jones, anything else? 11 MR. RANDALL JONES: Just briefly, Your Honor. compelled to just disagree with most of what Mr. Bice said 12 13 about what we've done and what --14 THE COURT: Except that Mr. Peek was right. 15 MR. RANDALL JONES: Except for Mr. Peek was right. 16 I would agree with that part of his discussion. 17 Your Honor, without wanting to argue the issues of 18 sanctions or not, that's not the issue today, although 19 certainly that's a subject of the issue today. We certainly 20 disagree that we have waived any rights to privilege, and --21 THE COURT: Don't you think we should brief it? I know we've briefed it a little before, but, instead of me 22 23 pulling those briefs out of the file again, don't you think you'd rather brief it again?' 25 MR. RANDALL JONES: We certainly would, Your Honor.

And that's part of what we're asking and one of the justifications for extending the stay before the Court does anything with respect to sanctions.

And I have to just make the point that I completely disagree with Mr. Bice about truncating the in-camera review process. I think the Supreme Court was very clear about that.

THE COURT: I don't get to do that. I have been told to do it, so I'm going to do it.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  RANDALL JONES: That's the way I understood it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Second time I've been told to do an incamera review, and the last time took me a month of working on that only with the exception of everything else.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I don't want to belabor the point, but to suggest that we have waived that privilege when the Supreme Court specifically said not only have we not waived that privilege, that this Court needs to actually go and look at those documents to see where the privilege was properly asserted.

THE COURT: All right. So the motion is denied as to stay.

But as to the scheduling issues that it relates to I concur with Mr. Jones that it is important that the in-camera review and additional briefing occur prior to the sanctions hearing occurring.

I am going to conduct the sanctions hearing prior to starting the jurisdictional hearing, but it may be right before. I'm not planning to have a whole lot of time between those, but part of that is going to be my schedule and the status of the briefing that I get. I don't have the briefing yet, so I'm not going to commit to how exactly I'm going to schedule them, but my thought is to do it right before, because I've got witness issues and I've got common issues, and I want to have those people all here at one time, okay. So that's my thought process.

So I'm going to be getting briefs related to the issues on the sanctions, Mr. Jones, you said in about three weeks, we're going to set a hearing there, and then you and Mr. Bice will agree to whatever briefing schedule you do, and then I will move the hearing to accommodate that briefing schedule.

I'm going to get briefs, Mr. Bice, from you on the waiver of the privilege issue. Then you and Mr. Jones are going to agree on whatever schedule you agree to, and then we'll set the hearing for that.

How am I going to get the documents to do the incamera review?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  BICE: I'm going to allow Ms. Spinelli to address that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They're on some -- they're in the cloud;

right? 1 2 MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes. 3 MS. SPINELLI: Your Honor, they're with the Court's vendor, Advance Discovery, so I don't know if -- I notice you 4 5 do electronic document review for your exhibits, but we could 6 arrange, obviously, a connection with the Court, or --7 THE COURT: I need access. 8 MS. SPINELLI: Yes. MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor --9 THE COURT: I need whatever the code is. 10 11 MS. SPINELLI: Absolutely. 12 MR. RANDALL JONES: May I just make a suggestion? Why don't we get with counsel and try to figure out a protocol 13 14 that's acceptable to both sides about how we get those documents to the Court. Does that make sense? 15 16 THE COURT: Well, but aren't they stored 17 electronically right now? 18 MR. RANDALL JONES: That's my understanding. 19 are with Advance Discovery. 20 THE COURT: I can review them electronically. 21 MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I'm just saying, because 22 we haven't talked to Advance Discovery to find out the best 23 way to do that. If we -- if we work together, I think that we 24 could come up with a protocol that's acceptable to both

parties, and we can talk to the Court and find out what your

tech people the best way to do this.

THE COURT: Well, it won't be that hard. I just need the access code.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I don't think so, either, but -THE COURT: Here's the other two things that I need
in conjunction with that. Because it's been so long since
this motion was originally brought, I need a new version of
the privilege log. I would prefer it in a Excel spreadsheet
format. If you give it to me in Word, I can live with it. I
will not take it in .pdf or paper, because I have to be able
to create my own column as I go through and do the in-camera
review to make a ruling on each of the documents as I review
them. So I need that privilege log in Excel or Word.

With respect to the player list, since there are people that I do not know who are included in the documents, I need an identification of who they are and what their positions are, and if they are counsel, to have that specifically identified and what the scope of their work was. That player list needs to be exchanged so that both sides have the opportunity to view it. I have in prior cases had litigation or arguments about whether people on the players list really were who they said they were. And I anticipate that that may be an issue that we have to address.

MR. PEEK: May I have a moment, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes. You can have as many moments as

you want, Mr. Peek. 1 2 (Pause in the proceedings) 3 MR. RANDALL JONES: Mr. Peek raises a question I 4 guess of the breadth of the player list is that there are only 5 certain documents in which they objected to an assertion of 6 privilege that are at Advance Discovery. And so --7 MR. BICE: That's not true. We gave some examples 8 of the -- when we filed the motion --9 THE COURT: That was my recollection. That was why I was relieved to be able to find a way to make a wholesale 10 11 decision, which the Supreme Court disagreed with. So I'm 12 going to go through and do an --13 MR. PEEK: So they're objecting to all of those 14 documents upon which we claim a privilege --15 THE COURT: That's what I've always understood. 16 MR. PEEK: -- as opposed to specific ones on the 17 log. 18 THE COURT: That's why I told you I thought this 19 would be a very difficult review for me, because I've always 20 thought I was reviewing it all. MR. PEEK: Yeah. I thought that was just a smaller 21 22 subset of that, Your Honor. So --23 THE COURT: Why do you think I tried to take the 24 easy way out, Mr. Peek? 25 MR. PEEK: What's that?

THE COURT: Never mind. I didn't say anything.

So, Mr. Jones, how long to get me that stuff and come up with some sort of plan for us to figure out how I'm going to perform my obligations of doing an in-camera review?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, can we -- because I'm not the tech person, can we have -- today's Thursday -- can we have -- is it acceptable to the Court to give us week so we can get with our tech people and --

THE COURT: Why don't we give you two?

MR. RANDALL JONES: That would even be better.

THE COURT: Okay. So can I have a status check with you on August 28th for us to talk about the followup to my incamera review. The one thing I would like exchanged at least two days prior to that hearing is your player list, because I think the player list, if there's going to be motion practice related to the identity of those persons or their scope of their work, I want to do it sooner, rather than later, and I want to do it before I start the in-camera review.

MR. RANDALL JONES: At 8:30, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, please. That's what time I try and start my calendars.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Just wanted to verify.

THE COURT: And I apologize to Judge Earl's calendar, which starts at 9:00, because I only had two things this morning.

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              MR. PEEK: So 8:00 o'clock on the 28th?
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              THE COURT: 8:30, Mr. Peek.
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              MR. PEEK: 8:30 on the 28th.
              MR. PISANELLI: Your Honor, I've got something at
 4
 5
    10:00, but can --
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              THE COURT: You don't have to come.
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              MR. PISANELLI: 8:30 is fine. Any way that we could
    know that we go first, since it's just a status conference?
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 9
              THE COURT: I only have one or two things every
    Thursday. It just seems --
             MR. PISANELLI: Yeah. But if Mr. Peek is on that
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12
    one in front of us, that could push us way back into the
   afternoon.
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             MR. PEEK: I'm here on the 29th, I think, Your
15
    Honor.
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              THE COURT: Are you?
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             MR. PEEK: On Parametric.
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             THE COURT: Yeah, probably. Mr. Peek's very happy
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   with the decision on the privilege for that case, too.
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             Okay. Anything else? And the DISH Network case.
             MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, I take it at the
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22
   status check that we will have more discussion about
23
   potentially scheduling some hearings in the future.
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             THE COURT: I'm going to have to get into the
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   in-camera review before I know when I'm going to be able to
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1 schedule the hearing, because part of what I've been saying the whole time is those documents that are part of the Jacobs 2 material, if they're going to be released, need to be released 3 4 prior to the jurisdictional hearing in time for the 5 plaintiff's counsel to be able to review those documents, digest it, and determine if they're going to use them. If 6 7 they're protected by the privilege, they won't get them. But 8 if some of them aren't, they get them ahead of the hearing, 9 and then we're going to have to have a discussion. So until I 10 know how long it's going to take me to do that in-camera review that I've been ordered to do -- and I cannot at this 11 12 point, given my CityCenter trial, just set a month aside like 13 I did the last time was ordered to do this and do it, so it's 14 going to take longer. MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, the only other issue 15 16 I had is we've submitted competing orders on the summary 17 judgment motion. 18 THE COURT: I'd love to see them in Word format. 19 MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, we will provide that. We've only received one side. So if you THE COURT: 22 would both email them to us. MR. RANDALL JONES: We submitted ours and provided a 24 copy to the --MR. BICE: We will get ours to you today, Your

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1 Honor. 2 THE COURT: If you would both email them to me in 3 Word format. MR. BICE: We will. 4 5 MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, there was also --6 THE COURT: Because if I decide I don't like your 7 order, I cut and paste and change. 8 MR. RANDALL JONES: There was -- there was a motion 9 to seal, also, and also --10 THE COURT: There is a motion to seal and a motion 11 to undesignate as confidential. I was holding that for last. 12 MR. RANDALL JONES: That's the only thing that I'm aware of that still needs to be addressed. 13 14 THE COURT: The motion to seal is granted. 15 The motion to unseal is denied at this time without 16 prejudice to renew it at a later point in time after I finish 17 the jurisdictional hearing. At this point I'm going to leave 18 it sealed. 19 MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, my question would be 20 is the protocol -- we presume the protocol is still in place, 21 and we would --22 THE COURT: Absolutely. 23 MR. RANDALL JONES: We simply -- if they would sit 24 down with us and have a meet and confer, it may make that 25 motion moot. So we would --

1 THE COURT: It may. 2 MR. BICE: Yeah, we agree that the protocol is in 3 place, but, unfortunately, every document is designated as 4 confidential in disregard of the order. 5 THE COURT: I know, Mr. Bice. I know. And I have 6 not at this point gone through and parsed which ones should or 7 should not. At some time, unfortunately, I'm going to 8 probably have to do that if you don't reach an agreement. 9 MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, I don't appreciate Mr. Bice's comment "in disregard of the order." We disagree with that statement, as you can imagine. 11 12 THE COURT: All right. So some day we're all going 13 to get together and have a nice discussion and work this out. 14 In the meantime, I look forward to seeing you in two weeks at 15 a status check. Have a nice day. 16 If we receive the remittitur before then, Mr. 17 Morris, then I will address on fairly short notice the issue 18 related to the fifth claim for relief in the current second 19 amended complaint as against Mr. Adelson. MR. MORRIS: Very good. Thank you, Your Honor. 20 21 MR. BICE: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:34 A.M. 23

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## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

## **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

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TRAN

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

DEPT. NO. XI

Transcript of Proceedings

Defendants .

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ESTABLISH PROTOCOL

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

TODD BICE, ESQ. DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ. JORDAN SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ.

JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ. MARK JONES, ESQ.

STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

DEBRA WINN

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2014, 8:30 A.M. 1 (Court was called to order) 2 THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands. 3 Mr. Peek's on the phone. Come on up close so Mr. 4 Peek can hear. 5 6 Mr. Peek, can you hear us? 7 MR. PEEK: Yes, Your Honor. And also I'm joined with Michael Lackey, who is also on the phone with us. 8 9 THE COURT: We would love for you to spell his last 10 name. MR. LACKEY: L-A-C-K-E-Y. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. I am going to start --MR. LACKEY: Good morning. 13 THE COURT: I'm going to start with Mr. Bice and 14 15 have everybody identify themselves. Mr. Peek, if you cannot hear them identifying 16 17 themselves, it will be important for you to say, hey, Judge, I didn't hear anybody, so I can make them move closer so they 18 will be able to hear you on the phone. 19 MR. PEEK: Thank you, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bice. 21 MR. BICE: Good morning, Your Honor. Todd Bice on 22 23 behalf of the plaintiff. MR. PEEK: He's going to have to get closer, Your 24 Honor. It's unusual I couldn't hear Todd, but I couldn't. 25

MR. BICE: Good morning, Your Honor, and Mr. Peek. Todd Bice on behalf of plaintiff. 2 3 MS. SPINELLI: Good morning, Your Honor. Spinelli on behalf of the plaintiff. MR. SMITH: Jordan Smith on behalf of the plaintiff. 5 THE COURT: Huddle around the podium and let's see. 6 Mr. Morris, how about you see if Steve can hear you. 7 MR. MORRIS: Steve Morris for Sheldon Adelson. 8 THE COURT: Did you hear that, Mr. Peek? MR. PEEK: I could hear Steve. 10 MR. RANDALL JONES: Randall and Mark Jones on behalf 11 of Sands China Limited. 12 THE COURT: All right. It's your motion. And I 13 don't know if it's Mark or Randall's motion. 14 MR. RANDALL JONES: It's both our motion. 15 THE COURT: And I did get the opposition and had a 16 chance to review it. 17 MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 18 19 Your Honor, surprising as it may seem, it appears that we have some agreement on some of the issues. In 20 particular I would start with the redactions as an example. 21 And the one question that was left, at least as I understand 22 it, and I was not present, but Mr. Peek was and Mark Jones 23

were present, but the question of the attachments -- I'm

sorry; let me go back for a second -- with respect to the

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redactions whether or not we would have the opportunity to print them out and then actually make the redactions in the hard copies and give those to the Court to review. The other way to possibly do it that's been considered is to do it electronically, which may actually take a longer period of time to do that. So, you know, if there's some kind of a protocol that can be set up so that we could print out the documents that we're going to redact, and that would be the --we'd make a Bates-stamped copy, we would have two copies, one that we would keep, one that we would provide to the Court with the understanding that obviously that we make no other copies, you know, something along those lines. And I don't know if that's acceptable to the Court.

So -- I don't know if you want to take these issue by issue, but that's probably the one issue where it at least appears we have some agreement.

THE COURT: So let me see if I can restate what you said about the redaction issues. Your position is that it will be easier to print them and physically redact them and then deliver the redacted copy to the Court.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yeah. Well, we'd also provide
-- I don't know if the Court needs to have the unredacted copy
or not. That's -- but you'll have access through Advance
Discovery, so you would have both.

THE COURT: Right. So I would have the unredacted

copy electronically and a redacted version that was physically delivered to me.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Right.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So I don't know if you want to address that issue first or --

THE COURT: I don't think there's disagreement on that issue. Is there, Mr. Bice?

MR. BICE: Well, there's a little bit of disagreement, because I've never heard about this let's print them off and redact them and provide a hard copy to the Court and a electronic copy. My understanding --

THE COURT: Well, no. The electronic copy is unredacted.

MR. BICE: I understand that. But my understanding of what was going to be done was we would ask Advance Discovery to create two sets, one set being the redacted set and those of which they are claiming privilege over the entire document; because it makes no sense for you to look at the entire document if they're only claiming privilege over a sentence, a paragraph, whatever. So our -- what we were saying was Advance Discovery creates this bucket over here of the redacted documents, that they go through and mark their redactions, which they can mark them on the electronic version. It'll be in the form of highlighting. That way

you'll actually see it and you can address them in that fashion. And while they're doing that, you will then be looking at the set over which they are claiming entire privilege.

THE COURT: Well, no. I'm going to have both.

Regardless of what way you're going to do it I'm going to have both. The question is do you object to me having a physical copy so as I leaf through the electronic versions going in the order they're listed on the privilege log I say, ah, that one says "redacted," let me look at my stack that's redacted here, ah, that's a redaction, okay, that's what they want to redact, okay.

MR. BICE: Again, whatever works best for the Court. It just seemed from what was described to me, what I thought was going to be easiest was, because it was going to take them some time to do the redaction, they haven't done them.

THE COURT: I'm aware of that.

MR. BICE: So the concern that I have is --

THE COURT: I want the quickest way.

MR. BICE: Yeah. And I thought that we were kind of in agreement that the quickest way was to create two separate sort of buckets, you look at these over here while they're doing these redactions. My view was that they were going to do the redactions on the database in a highlighter format, which I understand can be done. Once you're done with this

set over here, they'll be done with this set over here, and you will then just transition into those, and you can click electronically through the redactions and they won't -- you'll see them, because they'll just be highlighting, and then you can designate what's appropriate, what's not appropriate. That was how I thought it was going to work.

THE COURT: Why do you think it takes longer to do online, rather than paper?

MR. RANDALL JONES: You know, I don't know that it does take longer. I think that if nothing else it may be a more cumbersome process. The other process -- and, again, I wasn't there, but my understanding is that this was discussed and Mr. Bice did not agree to this, but didn't say no to this idea. And so to that extent, you know, maybe there's some confusion. But if we do it the way I'm suggesting, as well, assuming the Court agrees with our redactions, then we have a hard copy that we can provide to them, as well, that has the redactions, there's no question about it. Because otherwise what we're going to have to do is we're going to have to go back in and take the highlighted redacted copy and make it an actual redaction, so there's another step involved in the process. But, Your Honor, this is your call.

THE COURT: What's quickest? That's all I'm looking for, is what's quickest. Because either way is going to work.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I think the way we're suggesting

is quicker, and I think it's more efficient for the Court, because you could have the actual redacted document in the electronic version and see --

THE COURT: How long is it going to take you?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Mr. Lackey is on the phone.

That's one of the reasons he's on the phone, to address those issues.

THE COURT: Ms. Spinelli, let me hear from Mr. Lackey first.

Mr. Lackey, how long is it going to take to get me redacted documents? And however you do it I don't care.

MR. LACKEY: Good morning, Your Honor. We obviously haven't seen the scope of the redactions yet, but talking with the folks who do this a lot, they think that they can get through approximately 20 to 25 documents, based on typical redactions, per hour per reviewer. So the total volume there, the folks in the courtroom may have a better sense of the exact volume of the ADI collection. But that's in general we would use a 20- to 25-document per hour per reviewer estimate of a time frame.

THE COURT: That's actually pretty good.

MR. LACKEY: That is a good quick -- you know, it'd be slow at the start, but after they get used to it a little bit it will pick up, and that's what the experts tell us, it would be around in that range.

MR. MARK JONES: Two people seven to ten days on an 1 estimate of about 2800 redactions. So one person -- it's just 2 two people, seven to nine days, ten days. That's the best 3 estimate. MR. LACKEY: And after they complete, obviously, 5 they'll be a day or so to process it, you know, once those are 6 all there, just the physical processing to get it all done. But that gives you an order of magnitude, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So you're looking at about two weeks if two people are assigned to the task, plus some QA/QC 10 time. 11 MR. LACKEY: Yes, ma'am, I think so. That sounds --12 that sounds about right. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. MARK JONES: Yes, Your Honor. 15 16 THE COURT: Ms. Spinelli. MS. SPINELLI: Your Honor, as someone who frequently 17 reviews documents and in Relativity, which is what the 18 19 platform is for Advance Discovery, there is --MR. PEEK: Your Honor, we can't hear Debbie. 20 THE COURT: Ms. Spinelli, you've got to come to the 21 22 mike at the podium so Mr. Peek can hear you. MS. SPINELLI: As someone who frequently reviews 23 24 documents --THE COURT: Can you hear her now? 25

You've got to speak up now, Ms. Spinelli.

MR. PEEK: You've got to speak up.

MS. SPINELLI: Sorry about that, everybody.

As someone who frequently reviews documents with Mr. Smith over here, I can tell you -- and we use Advance Discovery at our office, Your Honor, which is -- I mean Relativity, which is what Advance Discovery uses, we review documents and highlight them online for the redaction, and they appear kind of with a silhouette that says "redacted" so you can easily review under them. As the person who does a lot of the QC, it's much easier than having to go back and forth between a hard document printed out with a black mark over it that says "redacted." You can do it all online. And that's just the only thing I wanted to say about redactions and two different pieces of paper. I think it's more timely for Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else?

So I don't care which way you do it. I understand what Ms. Spinelli's saying, but I've done it both ways, and I can do it either way. My question is which is quicker. And it sounds like the redactions online are quicker. It does.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Judge, I think this is your call. We understand --

THE COURT: I want quicker, because I've got to get done before I start CityCenter's motions.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We understand that. So we're not arguing. We just thought, again, we would be more efficient. If the Court thinks another way is more efficient, than that's -- you're the one that's going to have to wade through this stuff, so --

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THE COURT: I think if we can do it online it's going to be a little quicker.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Then what I would --

THE COURT: It doesn't matter to me.

MR. RANDALL JONES: What I would propose, then, is we need to then talk to Advance Discovery and make sure we're all on the same page about this procedure to do it online. And, if I may, Your Honor, impose on Mr. Lackey that we contact Advance Discovery today, that we talk to them about this process, and that we get back to the Court as early as hopefully tomorrow about whether or not there's -- if there are any issues or problem that we perceive with doing it on an online basis. Does that sound acceptable?

THE COURT: That's fine. Okay.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, I guess, if I may, Your Honor.

Mr. Lackey, do you think -- can that be done by your office?

MR. LACKEY: Yeah. I'm happy to do that. Obviously we'll coordinate with Mr. Jones and whomever else wants to

participate.

MR. BICE: Yes, that's fine. We'll make ourselves available today for a call.

THE COURT: Sounds like everybody is very cooperative this morning.

Next? Are you going to update your privilege log on the identifications of some of the folks that are on them so that I don't have to do it twice?

MR. RANDALL JONES: With respect to the players list, we did deliver that I believe on Friday.

THE COURT: Okay. We got it.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And then the other issue was a Excel spreadsheet of the privilege log. We have not provided that to the Court because on Friday we weren't sure what was going to happen at the meet and confer and thought it might change. So we can get that over to the Court by potentially this afternoon or certainly latest tomorrow morning based upon what happens here today.

THE COURT: Why don't you guys have your conference with Advance Discovery and then deliver the Excel spreadsheet after that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Then are there any other issues you want to discuss with me other than how I'm going to get access?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes. With respect to the unobjected-to documents -- and just, again, this is your call.

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24 25 THE COURT: You mean the categories of unobjected-to documents?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes. There are about I think originally 11 categories. The one was denied -- the one objection category was denied by the Supreme Court, so we have 10 left. Of those 10 we have the majority of the documents identified within those other 10 specific objection categories. We have about 5,000 documents that are not within those categories. It's our belief that we have carried our prime requirement that we provide a detailed privilege log. We would presume, then, in that case, since they were not specifically objected to, that those documents would be privileged. I understand Mr. Bice has a different view of that, but I wanted to bring that to the Court's attention. We've got -- just the printout of the document list is about 4 inches high, and it would save the Court considerable time if the Court didn't have to review those, since there was no specific objection. But I wanted to bring that to the Court's attention. They suggested I guess to some extent that I was trying to somehow avoid the obligation to do this in-camera review in our last hearing. I find that ironic. The Court has indicated it wants to save time in this process. We think that would save considerable time. But we understand that's

the Court's call. And if you want to review all 11,000, that's certainly your prerogative. We just believe that under the rule --

THE COURT: I have to review all 11,000. I don't think it's really a lot. I'm going to review all 11,000.

MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. That's fine, Your Honor. We just believe that we have satisfied our burden by providing a detailed privilege log. And so at that point the burden shifts to the plaintiff to object to any designation of privilege, which they have not done for those documents, and therefore we believe that is unnecessary to review those documents.

THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to review them anyway.

MR. RANDALL JONES: All right. You're going to review them. So then let me get on to the next issue.

THE COURT: And I'm not as quick as 25 documents an hour.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I'm certainly not that quick myself. So, with that said, we also have the issue of attachments. And so there is an issue here about since we couldn't tell you what it was about a particular attachment that the original -- when I say "we," prior counsel couldn't tell you based on the way that the log was set up and the categories, we just want to make sure we preserve our ability

to respond to the Court. If the Court says, no, that attachment is not privileged, that we have --

usually as -- when you give me the Excel spreadsheet I set up another column. That column is the one I caption as "Rulings." Frequently for documents that have attachments, as part of my minute order process I will issue a supplemental request to counsel to identify if that attachment has previously been produced to somebody after I've made my initial review, and if it's not been previously produced, to have somebody tell me why you don't think it should be produced now. Because usually the attachments are documents that have already been produced in the litigation in some other format, and I'm trying to make sure that that is the case.

Now, sometimes I get objections from people when I use that process, and then I deal with them as we get there. But I've got to get through the review process to be able to make that initial determination as to whether it looks like it should be produced or not.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And that's -- I just wanted to find out what the Court's protocol is, so to speak.

THE COURT: Unfortunately, it's what I have had to develop in doing numerous in-camera reviews.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I presume that would also

hold true for other documents that you have determined that don't meet the prima facie of showing a privilege that we would at least have an opportunity to respond to those.

THE COURT: Not usually. Usually once I hit the incamera review stage if there is enough information on the privilege log I just rule. Now, you can always ask me for clarification. I've had people ask me for supplementation, I've asked for supplemental information. It just depends on what the documents are.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And that's fine, Your Honor. The point is we just would like to at leave an opportunity, even if it's just, you know, a day or two, to look at that and briefly respond to the Court as to whether or not, you know, we would like to give further information as to the Court — to the Court as to why that is privileged.

THE COURT: I assume all of the information is on your privilege log where it should be.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, we certainly hope it is. But, again, some of this stuff may not be as clear to the Court, having, you know, had to review it under the circumstances you're going to have to review it.

THE COURT: I understand. Here's what I usually do, Mr. Jones. And this is just so everybody's protected. I finish my review, I have the column that is then -- you are provided with the spreadsheet that tells you what the rulings

are. Some of the rulings require further work by you, some of the rulings anticipate you -- from me that you will then produce the documents or not produce the documents when I sustain their objections. I have a period of time before that production is required. If there is something you think needs to happen before that production occurs, I will, of course, entertain any further information. Because the goal here is to do it right.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And that's all we're asking, Judge.

THE COURT: But my concern is I don't want to be doing it three times because the privilege log is so bad. And I've had cases where that happens, and I get frustrated, and then I chart by the entry where I have to go by, and it's usually 50 bucks an entry that's a problem.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We hope that's not going to be case. We don't anticipate that. But in this case, because it's an electronic production and theoretically the day you rule is the day they could get access to the documents, we just want an opportunity --

THE COURT: No, no. I have a time period before the production is required.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's what we're concerned about, Judge. That gives us at least some opportunity to review it and, if appropriate, respond to the Court. And we

understand you're going to want to see legitimate, meritorious issues raised in any --

THE COURT: But the goal was that it was supposed to be raised in the privilege log --

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand.

THE COURT: -- so I don't have to go through this multiple times.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We understand. Again -THE COURT: As I told you the other day, I was on my
third time reviewing the same set of documents because the
privilege log and the documents that came to me were so bad.
And that's a very frustrating process for me to go through.
And that's not your case, but it was an example of how bad
things can be. And given the volume of documents in this
case, I don't want to do them multiple times.

MR. RANDALL JONES: We understand, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If I have to do a couple of them over, that's okay. But I don't want to do a wholesale review. So if you think there is an issue with your privilege log not having enough detail, I'd rather know now, before I start, than later.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, that is -- we don't -- again, this happened with predecessor counsel, who's very, very -- they're very good lawyers. I think Mr. Bice has even worked with them, and he agrees they're good lawyers. But

we're just wanting to make sure we cover all the bases in the event that there may be some question about a particular 3 document that we want to ask the Court to look at a second time. We don't plan to do it wholesale. THE COURT: So instead of giving you three days you 5 6 want me to give you five days before the production of the 7 documents? 8 MR. RANDALL JONES: That would be great, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 9 MR. RANDALL JONES: If we could have five days, I 10 11 think that would be a reasonable amount of time. And if we could do it in a shorter period of time, we'll do it faster 12 13 than the five days. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MR. RANDALL JONES: And with that let me just confer with Mark Jones and see --16 THE COURT: Anything else? 17 (Pause in the proceedings) 18 19 MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, this I think is 20 primarily a Sands China issue with these documents, but I wanted to at least afford to the Court's -- at the Court's --21 22 THE COURT: I was going to ask Mr. Peek if he had 23 anything to say. MR. RANDALL JONES: Okay. Fair enough, Your Honor. 24

Then I think that with that said I think we don't have

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anything else to offer.

 THE COURT: Mr. Peek, is there anything you want to say?

MR. PEEK: No, Your Honor. I'm happy with the procedures that the Court has --

THE COURT: Mr. Bice. So here's what I think is going to happen. I'm going to get an Excel spreadsheet, and I'm going to get access to documents from Advance Discovery. And then I'm going to create my column on the Excel spreadsheet, and as I begin my review of the documents, if it doesn't say "redacted" on it, I'm going to make a ruling. If it does say "redacted," I plan to come back to that document and look at it after the two-week period has done.

MR. BICE: That's right.

THE COURT: Once I've finished going through and making my review I'm going to do a minute order that does all the things I usually do and says, and here's my ruling and you have five days to comply. If in the five-day period of time they think I'm really off base, they're going to do something.

MR. BICE: Understood.

THE COURT: And then we'll talk some more.

MR. BICE: Okay.

THE COURT: What do you think?

MR. BICE: I think -- frankly, Your Honor, I think that's the protocol that we proposed in our opposition and

countermotion, is our position is there should be the two buckets are created, which we're in agreement to, you've got a privilege log that they say satisfies their burden, you look at the privilege log, if you think that the privilege log shows even on its face an adequate basis for a claim of privilege, then you would look at the document and check the claim. If the privilege log is defective on its face on many of these entries, which we feel quite confident the Court is going to recognize when it starts going through this log, the claim fails and the Court doesn't have to waste its time looking through the document when you have a defective assertion on the log. And that's why we have objected to their protocol, which we view is designed to shift the burden of both --

THE COURT: Mr. Bice, this is what I do. And I know it's probably not what you want to hear. But I look at the privilege log, I look at the document, and if it's clear that it's an accountant-client privilege, as opposed to attorney-client that they put, I note on my ruling, look, this isn't the attorney-client, it's the accountant-client privilege.

MR. BICE: And obviously that's not what I'm talking about. I'm just talking about I think you're going to see in this log many bases where there are no recipients designated, no authors designated, nothing from which the privilege log could plausibly substantiate an assertion of privilege. And

that's what I'm saying. I think the law says that the Court does not have to then take on the burden of the party who's claiming privilege having failed to prepare a proper log.

That's up to Her Honor, though. I mean, this is --

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THE COURT: I've got to get through it.

MR. BICE: You will do it as you see appropriate. So I don't think any of us are really saying anything differently, other than we obviously think that the attempt to shift the burden onto us is inappropriate, that the defense is trying to do to claim that because they prepare a log the burden — that anytime a party prepares a log the burden then shifts to their opponent, that there's somehow a prima facie showing — the mere creation of a log is a prima facie showing that shifts the burden onto the opponent to go through it one by one and challenge each document. There is no law anywhere that says that. And in fact we cite you the caselaw that says that's not the law.

THE COURT: Okay. Hold on. I need to talk to Mr. Lackey for a second.

Mr. Lackey, I do not have Relativity installed on my computer, because I don't use Relativity. Am I going to be able to review the documents that Advance Discovery has online without that program?

MR. LACKEY: I don't believe so, Your Honor. I believe we're going to have to get Relativity installed for

you. But I do not believe that's onerous, is my understanding.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LACKEY: And those of you who've had -- someone in the courtroom has had access to the Advance Discovery? I thought I heard someone earlier.

THE COURT: Yes, some people have had access to Advance Discovery. That would be the Sands China folks.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Ms. Spinelli said she's used Advance Discovery, as well, so she --

MS. SPINELLI: I've used Relativity, Your Honor. In our conference call that we had with Advance Discovery they told us that they would just need to connect with you to get you one or two things on your computer software. It shouldn't take long at all, and it'd be quite easy. I think that they can do it remotely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So they're not in .pdfs.

MS. SPINELLI: They are -- well, they're in electronic form, so some are .pdf, some are .tif documents.

THE COURT: What kind of electronic form are they in?

MS. SPINELLI: Their original form. So some are .pdfs, some are emails. They can -- they can put them in whatever form you want, Your Honor, but right now they're not converted into .pdf, they're just originals. So if they were

Mr. Jacobs's in his email account, they're emails. But you can review them -- there's a -- you can click on them in Relativity and review them in kind of like a .pdf form.

THE COURT: Well, I understand. But that means I have to learn a new program, is what I'm saying. And I've had a lot of complaints about Relativity recently from other folks.

MR. BICE: I don't think that's -- they've never indicated that when we were on the call with them. They wanted to know whether you had a PC or a Mac. That's the only question that they posed for us.

THE COURT: But they can't install any software on my computer unless I go through some IT things within my system and I get permission from my IT folks, because I don't have administrative rights to add any program at all on my computer.

MR. BICE: We don't think that that's the case, Your Honor. And if that is somehow the case, I'm sure we can all agree to get Her Honor a completely clean laptop --

THE COURT: I don't want a laptop.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.\ \operatorname{BICE}\colon$  -- with Relativity installed on it so that you could review it.

MS. SPINELLI: One thing that they do, Your Honor, is you can log in remotely to their Relativity site, and so it's like a log-in on the Internet.

THE COURT: Okay. So I don't have to have Relativity installed on my computer, but I do have to use it.

MS. SPINELLI: It's an option. It's an option, but you don't have to. But I do think you have -- it's very easy to learn, I promise, Your Honor. It's a click.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Just briefly, Your Honor. I just want to make it clear that Mr. Bice said about shifting burdens and --

THE COURT: I'm not -- it doesn't matter. I'm going to review them all.

MR. RANDALL JONES: That's fine. But I don't like the comments on the record like that left unsaid. We disagree. The burden has not shifted. We did a privilege log. They then have an obligation to meet and confer with us, which they never did, to talk about the log.

THE COURT: They did Friday.

MR. RANDALL JONES: But we didn't talk about any particular item on the privilege log. So -- we talked about general categories. So we believe then they have an obligation to object. Where they did object we have the burden. But they didn't object to over 5,000 documents. So those should -- again, we assert those should have been agreed to be privileged and they shouldn't have to be gone through by the Court. We understand your ruling.

T	THE COORT: Oray. Does anybody want to do any
2	further briefing on the issue of whether there has been a
3	waiver by the delay in Ms. Glaser asserting the privilege?
4	MR. BICE: Yes. We are filing a motion on that.
5	THE COURT: Okay. When do you want to have that
6	briefed? When are you going to do that? Because that plays
7	into this issue I'm dealing with.
8	MR. BICE: I'm looking at my calendar, Your Honor.
9	Your Honor, we will do our best, and I think we can make it,
LO	to have that motion to you by the 12th.
L1	THE COURT: So you don't anticipate me ruling on
L2	that motion until after I finish the privilege log the
L3	review?
L4	MR. BICE: That is my understanding of what Her
15	Honor had wanted. If I misunderstood that, then that was my
L6	mistake.
.7	THE COURT: No. That's okay.
8.	How long before you do an opposition, do you think,
.9	Mr. Jones? It's on the waiver issue to the delay by Ms.
20	Glaser.
21	MR. RANDALL JONES: Your Honor, 10 days to two
22	weeks.
23	THE COURT: How about the regular briefing schedule?
4	MR. RANDALL JONES: Yeah, I think
:5	THE COURT: Then, Mr. Bice, let's not do it on a

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OST, let's just do it straight briefing. 2 MR. BICE: Understood, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: And that may change how my implementation of my minute order is, because I want to rule 4 on this issue before that. And it may mean that I take a little bit more time reviewing it than I thought I would. And we're all hopeful that this two weeks on the redactions is going to work. I don't think it's going to take me -- it's 8 probably going to take me three or four weeks to get through 10 everything, because I have other obligations. MR. BICE: I'm surprised by that, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Thanks. Anything else? 12 13 MR. BICE: The other obligations, I mean. Thank you, Your Honor. 14 No. 15 THE COURT: Anything else? MR. RANDALL JONES: No, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Mr. Peek, anything else? 17 18 MR. PEEK: Nothing, Your Honor. THE COURT: Goodbye. Have a lovely day. 19 THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 8:59 A.M. 20 21 22 23 24 25

## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

## AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

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1 TRAN **CLERK OF THE COURT** 2 DISTRICT COURT 3 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 4 5 6 STEVEN C. JACOBS, CASE NO. A-10-627691 7 DEPT. NO. XI Plaintiff, 8 VS. Transcript of Proceedings 9 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP, SANDS 10 CHINA LTD, 11 Defendants. 12 BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT 13 JUDGE 14 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RELEASE OF DOCUMENTS FROM ADVANCED DISCOVERY ON THE GROUNDS OF WAIVER; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ON 15 DEFICIENT PRIVILEGE LOG ON OST THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2014 16 APPEARANCES: 17 18 For the Plaintiff: JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ. TODD L. BICE, ESQ. 19 JORDAN T. SMITH, ESQ. DEBRA SPINELLI, ESQ. 20 21 For the Defendants: J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ. JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ. 22 MARK JONES, ESQ. 23 RECORDED BY: JILL HAWKINS, DISTRICT COURT TRANSCRIBED BY: KRISTEN LUNKWITZ 24 25 Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

## THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2014 8:30 A.M.

THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Peek. How are you today?

MR. PEEK: Good morning.

THE COURT: Mr. Morris called to say he had to be down with Judge Denton, so he was unable to join us and asked us to proceed without him. So, we're here related to some motions that the plaintiffs have filed and I report that I have made absolutely no progress on your case since I've been in the pretrial process of CityCenter. I've taken the boxes home several times, but I have not gotten to them as part of what I'm trying to do with the other case. I keep hoping I'll get to them, but I don't.

MR. PISANELLI: I know that feeling of taking the work home and never quite getting it.

THE COURT: I've got a Yukon and I can only put so much in it and then it comes back on Mondays. Most of it's been read, but you're at the end.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

THE COURT: So, --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Bring -- take my briefcase as well, Your Honor. That's about it.

THE COURT: Well it takes me two trips to load it with the boxes. So, all right. Mr. Pisanelli, are you

going to argue some motions this morning?

MR. PISANELLI: I am.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PISANELLI: Do you have a preference on how we begin?

THE COURT: I don't care which one we start with. They're basically the same issue. They've been bad again. Their privilege log is bad. It's taking too long. They're still bad, bad, bad.

MR. PISANELLI: Well, when you put it that way. You're kind of stealing my thunder

THE COURT: I was summarizing the argument.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

Your Honor, I know you hear -- I'm starting, by the way, privilege log deficiencies, and I know you hear this phrase so much you probably consider it to be a cliché at this point, but I'm going to use it anyway because it seems to fit the circumstances that if not know, when?

We know that there are consequences to failing to provide an adequate privilege log. We know it from when we were trained as lawyers just out of law school and we certainly know it from being trained by you in this courtroom. You have some very high standards for all of us to conduct ourselves and we all do. Sometimes it's lawyering, sometimes it's clienting, if that's a word, but

you understand my point. You set a high bar for us here in Business Court and we all -- and when I say we, I mean all of us, at both tables, do our best to try and comply with it.

We've fallen not a little short, about as short as your high standards that I can think of in any case I've ever --

THE COURT: I've had one that's worse.

MR. PISANELLI: Really? Well, you see more of them than I do. This is as bad as I've gotten. In the totality of circumstances, not just the worst log, but when you take the entire dispute into consideration, that's when I think we get to the point of being comfortable with the fact that what we're asking for is rather harsh.

And I'm not going to repeat everything that's in the briefs, but I think it's important to point out just a couple of very quick facts of why it is not beyond the pale, it is not severe, and it is not overly harsh to say that the rule that you always apply, applies here. And that is that we start with when this log originally was produced, coupled with our very extensive objections, which followed only two weeks later and that's September 26, 2012.

You combine that fact, that we started in 2012, this thing was amended once, called a final log a couple of

months later in December 2012, and all that final really did, as you may recall, is took some stuff off it. Right? But it never addressed all of the deficiencies that we brought to their attention.

And so, we, for two years, were holding on to a log that does very little. It leaves a few clues, I'll give them that credit, here and there of what the actual document was. It leaves a few clues, here and there, of what the underlying premise was for the assertion of the privilege and then that's it.

And we heard, for two years now, Sands China stand behind it, for two years dealing with us. And now all the way up to only a couple of weeks ago before you, I think the quote, something to the effect of: We have carried our prime requirement that we provide a detailed privilege log.

So, we don't have to look to any of the cases that talk about a party that says: Okay, it was a bad first effort, Your Honor, but I fixed it and only two weeks had lapsed, only a month has lapsed, only two months have lapsed, but I fixed it. It was a good faith assertion and the first effort we see from some of the cases where leniency was the rule that was applied and then other times it was the timing of the correction that got some of the parties off the hook for their bad privilege logs.

But here, we have a disastrous one. I think you

may have characterized it as awful, being kind to them, and we had them standing behind stubbornly and defiantly for two solid years only to come in, at the end of the day, looking for the do over. And that's why I started this conversation with the concept that if not now, then when?

THE COURT: Well, sometimes when I give do overs, there are assessments of expenses that are related to it.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: And that may be part of what happens after I finish, if I ever get to it, the in-camera review.

MR. PISANELLI: Right.

THE COURT: And that's, I think, where the issue is -- because it's not necessarily a waiver just because their privilege log is awful, or was awful before they started trying to do a better job.

MR. PISANELLI: Yep.

THE COURT: But it's caused a lot of people a lot of work and this isn't' the first time in this case we've had something like this happen.

MR. PISANELLI: Right.

THE COURT: And so the question is: I understand what you're saying, but isn't the appropriate remedy some sort of recompense for the expense and time that everyone has had to go through?

MR. PISANELLI: But, I mean, how do you put that -

- let me start with the underlying premise. Of course you're right. All right. But we bring this log to your attention that says it may result in the waiver and the may, of course, is the definition that's the key word to all of it, it means you decide.

THE COURT: Judicial discretion.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah. Exactly. It's up to you.

I'm not going to pretend it's anything other than your

decision and I throw this last fact into context of why now

is the time that it's something more than a just a writing

a check that seems to be irrelevant to this -- to these

parties because no matter how many checks they write for

checks, nothing seems to change.

We have, as I've said, a terrible log. We have two years of defiance of standing behind it, but then look at what we've now learned. What was put on the log was so reckless that already, before you started your in-camera review, 50 percent --

THE COURT: Well, no I actually --

MR. PISANELLI: -- of them gone --

THE COURT: -- started it, Mr. Pisanelli.

Remember, I started it and then I said --

MR. PISANELLI: And then you had to stop.

THE COURT: -- it was awful.

MR. PISANELLI: Yeah.

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THE COURT: And then we had a -- somebody decided to take a second look.

MR. PISANELLI: Yep. My point is only before we got any benefit of your work, 50 percent of the 3,000 pages are withdrawn. You have to put, I think, that into context: the timing, the stubbornness to correct, and how bad it was, how reckless — reckless isn't even the right word. All right. These are skilled attorneys starting at MTO and moving through the roster of people whose fingerprints are on this. These are skilled people who knew what they were doing and before you have taken one document off it, they took 50 percent of the 3,000 page privilege log and said: Yeah, we shouldn't have done that.

So, I won't beat the dead horse. You know what my position is.

THE COURT: I do.

MR. PISANELLI: Today does present the circumstances where I think -- and just let me put the proposal out there and Your Honor, of course, can do with it as you please; but I think the fair proposal, in light of the totality of the circumstances, is that it's a two-step process on your in-camera review. You start at what the privilege log said and if that's not good enough, it's released. If it is good enough in your view, then the in-camera review of the document itself can be analyzed to see

if it should have been on there in the first place, but holding them responsible for what they put on that log in the first instance, I don't think is overly harsh. They didn't correct it. They knew what they were doing and now it's time to pay.

We can't get the two years, really three years, back. We can get some of our attorneys' fees back, and I understand your point, but we can't get the fact that they have stalled this case for three years now and we're still in a jurisdictional phase because we can't seem to get a good faith effort on --

THE COURT: And I still have to do an --

MR. PISANELLI: --

THE COURT: -- evidentiary hearing according to your writ.

MR. PISANELLI: You understand our frustrations. Sometimes --

THE COURT: Oh boy.

MR. PISANELLI: -- we've been boisterous about it. Sometimes we banged our head on the table, sometimes literally, other times figuratively, but you understand our frustration.

THE COURT: Absolutely.

MR. PISANELLI: We think holding Sands China responsible for their own conduct and choices is not overly

harsh and that's all we ask of you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Jones.

Mr. Sorenson, I already handled your case. I'm

done. I granted it.

MR. SORENSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I don't want to belabor this either. I think I understand what you're suggesting, but I do think it's important to point out a couple of things that I just think are inaccurate.

First of all, the privilege log, in it and of itself, I don't believe has delayed the evidentiary hearing, certainly not in any material way because there were other issues, as you well know, that had to do with many other writs, that had — that were really the delay and the delay was as a result of stays that were issued by both this Court and the Supreme Court with respect to how certain things were handled, including discovery.

And I want to point out, you know, Mr. Bice has, I think to his credit, has acknowledged that the Munger Tolles law firm is a very good law firm.

THE COURT: But that's a really awful privilege log to come out of a very good law firm then. I don't know who they send it out to do, but it doesn't appear to have the quality of anybody, except for one firm, that I've ever seen before.

1 MR. RANDALL JONES: And I --2 THE COURT: And that's a local firm. MR. RANDALL JONES: And I assume it's not our 3 firm, my --4 5 THE COURT: Not yours. 6 MR. RANDALL JONES: -- firm. 7 THE COURT: Not even a case you're involved in. 8 MR. RANDALL JONES: But, I do want to point out, in defense of Munger Tolles, and this is something that wed 10 didn't really even get into until this whole issue came up after the Supreme Court ruled on the ruling that you had 11 12 made about a class of persons -- Mr. Jacobs being allowed to take these documents because, at that point, Judge, --13 14 THE COURT: Not being able to take them. wasn't what I said. 15 16 MR. RANDALL JONES: I'm sorry. Being --17 THE COURT: I said being able to review them --18 MR. RANDALL JONES: -- able to use them. 19 THE COURT: -- and use them. 20 MR. RANDALL JONES: I misspoke. That's certainly 21 what I meant and I hope the Court understood what I meant, 22 but the point is is that the privilege log became moot at

THE COURT: You're right.

heard what the Supreme Court had to do --

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that point as long as that ruling was out there until we

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MR. RANDALL JONES: -- or had to say.

THE COURT: It did. Which is why --

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MR. RANDALL JONES: So --

THE COURT: -- I asked when you came back if you wanted a second chance to look at it again and --

> MR. RANDALL JONES: And --

THE COURT: -- initially, you guys said:

MR. RANDALL JONES: Initial -- well, what I said at the -- when you put that question to me, and I'm happy to stand here in front of you and tell you I said it and why I said it.

When the District Court asks me, and I've got a document which I have not had an opportunity to review, I have not had an opportunity to review the protocol in any detail and you ask me and you -- and I don't blame you for doing it, but you put me on the spot.

THE COURT: Of course I did.

MR. RANDALL JONES: What did you expect me --

THE COURT: That's my job.

MR. RANDALL JONES: What did you expect me to say? I had to stand on the document that our prior counsel had offered to the Court until I knew otherwise and as soon as we knew otherwise, we immediately informed the Court of that and took action to correct the situation.

But getting back to Munger Tolles and the

condition of that initial log. You know, it's easy in hindsight to say: You know, what a bad job they did and how faulty that log was, but if you go back in the context of the time and you look at what they were trying to do at the time they were trying to do it -- we're talking about close to 100,000 documents with a protocol that they did not devise. It was a protocol that was essentially put together Advanced Discovery on the categories and you have to remember, Judge, the way those categories were set up and this had to do with the issue of redaction f the documents is just one example.

If any document in a chain was privileged, whether it be the document that it -- that included an attachment that was not privileged, it had to be -- the only way you could designate it was privileged. If the attachment was privileged but the e-mail that it was attached to was not privileged, then you had to designate it as privileged.

And so, -- and they were working under, in my -- at least from my perspective, with 100,000 documents, pretty extreme time constraints with a protocol that did not allow them all the categories, that's why we had to revise it, to designate these documents in the appropriate fashion so that we didn't run into this mess later on.

And then the question becomes, and I certainly understand their argument, Mr. Jacobs' argument that:

Well, why didn't you fix it? And, as I said before, once you made your ruling that Mr. Jacobs was entitled to review these documents and that there was no privilege because of the class of persons that he was in, what's the point? Should we have -- when it came --

THE COURT: It still doesn't make sense to me and I know the Supreme Court has ruled, but he can't review a document that he's the recipient or the author of. That still doesn't make sense to me, but I understand the ruling.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I understand your statement, Judge, but the bigger point, as it relates to this motion, is: Are sanctions appropriate, of any kind, based upon the timing of these issues? And --

THE COURT: Right now.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And --

THE COURT: At this point, I agree with you they're not and I already told Mr. Pisanelli that. They may be some day.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I -- and because you made that comment, I certainly, at least, want to give you our side of the story or at least our initial side of the story because if this is an argument that needs to be made later, I don't want it to go un --

THE COURT: You know if it becomes an issue later

I'm going to give you an opportunity argue and if it becomes an issue where reviewing the now revised privilege log and revised redacted documents, most of which are sitting in the vestibule of my office at the moment, if it appears to me there has still been such a dramatic shortfall, I think it will be a significant hearing that we have.

If, on the other hand, it looks like that when you got a fresh shot at it that you had an opportunity to do the right thing and you did the right thing and what I've got back there and what's on the Advanced Discovery website are, in fact, arguably privileged, even though I may disagree with some of them that you designated, then it's a different discussion and I talk to Mr. Pisanelli about what the attorneys' fees are that he's incurred in the last few months as a result of this additional delay.

So, --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Judge, --

THE COURT: -- I've got these two different things that I might get, but I've got to finish the review before I can get there and I have to look at them more.

MR. RANDALL JONES: But that's -- I --

THE COURT: And I've told Mr. Pisanelli that. He doesn't like it, but I've got to look at them all.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well -- and, Your Honor, just

for the record, I don't like that you would still consider that there would be any appropriate sanction later on because I do think we've tried as best we could in good faith --

THE COURT: Do you know how many hours I spent on it the first time before you guys decided to redo it?

That's frustrating for a judge who already has limited time, Mr. Jones, to go through that effort, come in and have a discussion with counsel, and then have the recognition that something should be changed and I recognize that from your perspective, you were relying on what you believe to be very competent prior counsel and their work.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And I appreciate that, Your Honor, and, by the way, I -- we certainly understand you have a busy docket and I would hope that you would understand that we don't want to do anything to increase your burden unnecessarily and to the extent that there was -- that did occur, and I certainly saw and heard some of your frustration at some of the hearings leading up to today on this subject, and I -- as it relates to prejudice, I understand the Court has been -- your -- you've told us that you've been significantly inconvenienced and frustrated by this --

THE COURT: Well the biggest part is the --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- process.

THE COURT: -- window I have from when CityCenter decided they wanted to have that month continuance, that window was when I was going to look at these documents. Because of the hiccup, and then the secondary problem with Advanced Discovery when I went on and looked at all the documents and then all of a sudden they get changed in the middle of my review, which I know they still haven't explained, but it happened, has caused me to then have to find another window of time, which may not be until my December break of CityCenter, to be able to sit down there and look at these documents. And that's what the real issue is, Mr. Jones, is the timing issue.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And let me leave you with this. The point about the additional review is to -- and because there's a point they made about we want a do over and change the privilege log. As you know, we're not adding anything to the privilege log. We're taking things away from the log.

THE COURT: Absolutely. And I appreciate that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And so, the point being, hopefully, whatever time was lost by the Court in the review, will be made up by the reduction in the number of documents that you have to review, which we believe will be in excess of 50 percent based on, I think, what we're

seeing so far.

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THE COURT: That's why your brother convinced me to stop the review I was doing because he was telling me it was going to be 30 to 40 percent and then it went up a little bit. So, I'm very glad of the efforts. I'm glad to not have to review all of those documents, but it did cause this timing delay that is a significant issue.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So, I hope the Court would take into account the fact that we have substantially reduced the burden on the Court which would at least lesson the time that it would take to review the documents at the end of the day and I'll leave it at this, Your Honor.

Assuming, because of CityCenter, that we aren't able to get to this evidentiary hearing until well after you've had a chance to review the privileged documents and make your ruling, then there would be no actual privilege -- or prejudice to Mr. Jacobs because he will have had the documents in sufficient time to prepare himself for the evidentiary hearing.

And so, I would ask the Court to keep an open mind about those issues and consider those as well as giving us the opportunity at a later date, if the Court thinks it's necessary, to address this issue again.

THE COURT: Oh, absolutely.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Pisanelli.

MR. PISANELLI: My final points, Your Honor, it always seems -- it's always interesting to me that the party that has caused delay, in this case three years, seems to say no harm, no foul. I guess time is on their side. If this takes 45 years to get to an actual hearing, no harm, no foul because you ultimately got what you fought so hard to get, which, by the way, should have been voluntarily disclosed.

So there is not a lot of credibility that should be given to an argument that they have not caused any prejudice in this case.

I'll leave Your Honor with two points. Counsel tells you that the log deficiencies for two years didn't cause the delay apparently because the other bad things they were doing caused delay. I'm not sure you can ever, with a straight face, say: Don't sanction me for this behavior because it would have happened anyway because I was so bad in the other behavior. They can't really take shelter from their own bad conduct which caused delay.

But, with that said, it's still not true. Recall part of this delay was the assertion of privilege that -- from Sands China, for these documents. They went to the Supreme Court and claimed privilege on documents, now 7,000 of which were never privileged in the first instance and

they released them after the delay had already occurred.

After the Supreme Court sent them back, they released 7,000 documents and said now that there was no causal connection between that improper assertion and the delay -- this current delay that we're suffering. That's just not true.

And, finally, Sands China says that they had no opportunity to review the privilege log and that's why up to only weeks ago they still stood behind them saying that they had met their objection. What is left from that story, Your Honor, is that we had two very important events prior to Sands China standing before you and saying that the log was good enough. One was extensive meet and confers very recently, just before that hearing.

And, most importantly, Ms. Spinelli wrote a thesis on the problems with this privilege log two years ago that were in the possession of all counsel, past and forward. And so to claim that they didn't have a chance to review the log isn't exactly accurate. They chose not to review the log. They chose to ignore all of the deficiencies set forth in Ms. Spinelli's letter and they chose to ignore what we brought to their attention in our meet and confer. To suggest they didn't have a chance, poor Sands China, I don't think really comports with the evidence of what we know here.

Taking all of this into consideration, Your Honor,

I won't beat the dead horse but I think now is the time. They've had more than enough chance. They've done what they can to continue to delay this process and we think there should be some consequences to it.

THE COURT: Okay. The motion is denied without prejudice through after I finish the review of the incamera and redacted documents that -- which the claim of privilege is based.

Is that -- did we basically combine bot of the arguments, Mr. Pisanelli, or do you want to argue the one separately?

MR. PISANELLI: No the other separate one really is a different issue.

THE COURT: I'm happy to listen.

MR. PISANELLI: So this argument of waiver, Your Honor, is founded upon three things, first of which, of course, is the Supreme Court's mandate from its recent opinion issued 2014, this year. The other is the undisputed fact of Jacobs' possession and how long he's had them, the manner in which he's possessed them, and the open notice. And the third, which is as important as those two, is the lack of evidence that was presented to you from Sands China to somehow rebut that they did not waive the attorney-client privilege as it relates to the documents in Mr. Jacobs' possession. You'll note --

THE COURT: You're talking about the delay between Mr. Campbell and Ms. Glaser's communications and disclosures related to the documents?

MR. PISANELLI: We're talking about the delay from when -- it really is prior to, but I'll just, for the sake of debate, say the delay starts when Mr. Jacobs is escorted to the border to leave Macau. That day is when this delay begins, because we know from Patty Glaser's own words, when she first communicates with Mr. Campbell, that she has had communications with people inside of her company that led her to believe that Mr. Jacobs has possession of documents. Her words. That she has, quote:

Reason to believe, based on conversations with existing and former employees and consultants of the company, that Jacobs, her word, had stolen company property, including, but not limited to, --

And then she focused on these investigative reports, which were apparently quite sensitive to them that they wanted back.

The exchange then starts with Mr. Campbell who tells her: Yes, I'll have them and I'll give you the originals back, but understand one thing, Mr. Jacobs, like other executives who have access to privilege communication, and he travels around the world and continues to possess those, and were keeping copies. She

doesn't like that and she complains that not only she wants all copies of the investigative reports back, but she also says that she wants everything back. In other words, she starts a letter writing campaign, a little chest pounding, but doesn't do anything about it.

So, the delay that I'm talking about, Your Honor, is starting from her claim to have actual knowledge that Jacobs is possessing something to standing here today to take an analysis of what did Sands China do between that time in 2010, as we stand here today, what did they do, as the law requires them, to somehow retrieve these documents back from Mr. Jacobs? The answer, at the end of the day, is nothing. They wrote some letters. The law tells us that's not good enough. They communicated: We want our stuff back. You stole them. That's not good enough.

They actually even filed, somewhere along the way, motions in limine not to use them in the evidentiary hearing, but you don't see a motion anywhere from Sands China over that entire period of time going all the way back to 2010 that they did anything about it.

What they did do --

THE COURT: Is have their friends at Las Vegas Sands file something.

MR. PISANELLI: Do you remember that?

THE COURT: I don't remember anything about it.

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came in here to sanction me and Todd Bice because we had actually bate stamped the documents that they had already disclosed, then Mr. Ma was in the back of the room, but never coming across the bar to actually assert what their company was obligated to assert as a retrieval of their

documents. It never happened in this case. So --

THE COURT: Well don't you think this goes to maybe if they ask for that affirmative relief there might be jurisdiction against them?

MR. PISANELLI: Of course that's the --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I was just --

MR. PISANELLI: -- reason they did it, but --

THE COURT: -- trying to make --

MR. PISANELLI: -- do they get to --

THE COURT: -- sure we all understand what the real reason is.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure. But there's a consequence to that choice, too, right? That we have a company who now claims that someone else was doing their bidding for them and they even tried to claim that -- I think it was the Teleglobe [phonetic] case that companies can do that. Interestingly enough, Teleglobe [phonetic] said the exact opposite. We can't ignore the corporate forum when one party wants to gain an advantage here, avoiding personal jurisdiction, and pretend like it's one company so that their parent can go in and make their fight.

There's one party who owns these documents. That party was a -- in the audience. They weren't a participant. They didn't come in here and ask you for any relief. In other words, they didn't do what the law

requires them to do. And so we stand here today with what has to be a concession that Sands China did nothing.

And so, the second part of the analysis then has to be: How long did they do nothing? Even if we give them credit for what their parent did, which really was only one motion that went nowhere, that was still a two month delay by their analysis. But the truth of the matter is they haven't shown anything, by way of evidence, of how long they've actually known.

Recall what I said at the beginning. Patty Glaser tells Don Campbell immediately when Steve Jacobs in 2010 is discharged that we want our stuff back. They then, in this case, cite to Patty Glaser and her statements, not sworn statements, her statements at this very podium to say that we didn't know until Colby Williams wrote a letter saying I have privileged material and immaterial information, they let them know. And they equate and ask Your Honor to assume that the date that Colby Williams discovers there may be privileged information is the same day that they discovered that we had, Mr. Jacobs had privileged information.

The question then has to be: What evidence do you have Sands China, what evidence have you presented to this Court, to prove that those are the same dates? Because it's inconsistent with Patty Glaser -- with what Patty

Glaser said a year earlier, two years earlier, or a year earlier, going all the way back to June of 2010.

Instead of giving the declaration from those past and former employees that she talked about in June of 2010, they ignore those. They don't even give a declaration from Patty Glaser herself. They simply give the in court statements at this podium when she said to you: Your Honor, we didn't know until Colby Williams sent that letter. I can give you some sworn testimony if you want it. All right. I want it. And I imagine Your Honor wants it.

Where is it? Where has Sands China met its evidentiary burden, as they're obligated to do, to show you two things: When it was when they knew that Steve Jacobs, like virtually every other executive in the world, is in the possession of documents that he, as you said, communicated with, on, he was a recipient of them, he was an author of some of them? Where is the evidence of when they knew that when they took him to the border with his laptop in hand that they didn't know it was on that laptop? Where's their evidence of that? It's absent. All we have is Patty Glaser's words.

And then the second step is where is the evidence of what they did to protect it? Their burden. We've cited cases from federal courts, from state courts, from the Nevada Supreme Court. It's everywhere. It's their burden

to show that this information remained confidential and that they were very protective of it and tried to get it back.

The second --

THE COURT: Don't you think the efforts of Las

Vegas Sands in trying to protect that information is

something that I should consider for purposes of the

evidentiary hearing as opposed for the waiver? Because we

have the same similar argument about: Okay, so we have Las

Vegas Sands still pulling all the strings here, which has

been your argument throughout.

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: That's why I have additional evidence by what's happened in my courtroom --

MR. PISANELLI: Sure.

THE COURT: -- about what's part of that jurisdictional argument. Isn't that how you are more effectively --

MR. PISANELLI: I think --

THE COURT: -- able to use that?

MR. PISANELLI: I think the answer, Your Honor, has to be both. It has to be both that the way they're -the parent is conducting their business in the jurisdiction has to be taken into consideration of whether that company is subject to jurisdiction of this Court, but we also have

to say that these documents, really that are at issue, which we haven't yet had to deal with yet, the documents in possession of Mr. Jacobs that are at issue of the very claims that we someday litigate, that has to be governed by Sands China's behavior.

If here is a privilege there, we have to decide:

Does Sands China try and set the default setting as no

disclosure, unless there's an at issue waiver? Do they get

that default setting if they never protected the documents

in the first place? In other words, Sands China treated

these documents from day one, when they escorted Mr. Jacobs

to the border, they treated these documents as rightly in

his possession. We know that because they didn't do

anything to get them back.

As I said earlier, there's no evidence in the record of when they knew and so we have to assume that the evidence that they didn't give us, the evidence that Patty Glaser alluded to twice in a letter to Campbell and later in this courtroom, since they didn't present it to you, we have to conclude that it's bad for them and that all evidence will point to what we probably all assume, that they knew even before Jacobs was terminated what he possessed.

And so the second step then is: What did they do to protect it? If the answer is nothing, you've sat on

your hands for two years and done nothing, then the law tells us that there is a waiver there and Mr. Jacobs can defend himself with the same evidence that they're in possession of and show that these communications that go to the heart of the issues in this case are not only rightly in his possession, but can rightly be reviewed by his lawyers and presented to Your Honor or someday a jury to show that the claims and the defenses put forth by Sands China in this case are frivolous.

That's really, at the end of the day, what we're doing. It's that they're trying to hide the truth. Right? That's what a privilege is and I'm not making it up and counsel can be angry that that's pejorative, too, but the Supreme — our Supreme Court and every court in the land says that we interpret attorney-client — the assertion of the attorney-client privilege narrowly because it impedes the search for the truth and that's what we're doing here.

They are trying to take relevant and material evidence that will go the heart of this case, take them out of the picture so that the truth will be something short of a clean and clear picture. That's why every court that addresses privilege says: Very, very narrow interpretation. That's why every court that addresses this issue for parties like Sands China, that does nothing, nothing to protect the privilege, if it existed in the

first place, it's been waived.

So it' a very long-winded way of answering your question -- say that it's both. That it has to be taken into consideration as a factor for personal jurisdiction in this courtroom and there -- it should be released so that we can use that evidence both in the jurisdictional debate and the merits debate.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, Your Honor. Well, Mr. Pisanelli is right about one thing. He is right. I am angry. I'm angry when they try to take the law, as I certainly understand it, and has been interpreted by every judge and the Discovery Commissioner --

THE COURT: Well but here's --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- that I've been in front of

THE COURT: Here's the deal, Mr. Jones. Do you know who tried to get the documents back from Mr. Jacobs? Do you know who it was? It was Justin Jones. Remember? Justin filed -- well, you weren't here yet. Steve remembers. It was Justin Jones because we had a stay in place and we had some issues, so he filed a separate lawsuit.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I understand -- I've seen the record. I've read the record.

THE COURT: On behalf of Las Vegas Sands, not Sands China.

MR. RANDALL JONES: This was totally appropriate under the circumstances.

THE COURT: And why?

MR. RANDALL JONES: Because in those documents, Your Honor, were documents that related to privilege between Las Vegas Sands and Mr. -- and other parties.

So there were -- in other words, Las Vegas Sands' had a dog in that fight.

THE COURT: Well, sure. They had the drive at their office.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, they had a dog in the fight because they had privileged documents they wanted to protect, but in addition to that, less than a month later, on September 28<sup>th</sup>, Las Vegas -- or Sands China, Limited, filed its own motion with this Court and you brought up an issue that Mr. Pisanelli had to admit because you, essentially, put it to him that the reason that Sands China was hesitant initially to get into that fight is because they didn't want to have to play the game of gothca with Mr. Jacobs and his counsel.

So, -- and the Court certainly understood --

THE COURT: I recognize that.

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MR. RANDALL JONES: So, you have a party who has standing to bring that motion who brings and we -- I'm certainly happy to go through that timeline because I think that timeline not only belies everything that Mr. Pisanelli has said, it shows that Mr. Pisanelli more so, in my opinion, than his predecessor counsel, directly violated the rules that I think I'm supposed to comply with.

Well let me ask you, Your Honor. Am I to be -understand from you, and I've been in this situation with you before on both sides of this issue, that I can receive privileged documents from a third party or my client, for that matter, and that I can keep these documents and I can call up the other sides and say: I've got some of your documents. I'm not going to tell you what they are, how many they are, but I can tell you this. I've looked at them a little bit and I -- enough to determine there are privileged documents in here and even though you've demanded a four -- excuse me, eight months before that if that client has any documents of my client, that you give them back immediately, even though that's happened, I get to tell the other attorney: Look, I've got these privileged documents. I don't know how many there are in there, but I'm going to keep them. And --

THE COURT: You and I both know there's ethical

issues there --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, there are.

THE COURT: -- and Nevada has not adopted clawback as part of its --

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well --

THE COURT: -- rules and --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- what Nevada has adopted --

THE COURT: -- until Nevada has adopted clawback, there is a very gray ambiguity there.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Well, Judge, we have the --

THE COURT: But there's a --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- Merits and Sitive

[phonetic] case that says what a duty of a lawyer is under these circumstances and I certainly don't believe that in this case that duty was followed. In addition to professional -- Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 4.4B, which also requires full disclosure.

Now, what did my client get? Let's talk about his timeline. That's an absurdity. It -- all you've got to do is read the letter that Ms. Glaser sent. She said: We think you have -- we have reason to believe you have three reports and it may have other stuff. May, don't know, but may. But if you have those three reports, we want them back and, by the way, if you have anything else, give it back to us.

So, counsel's on notice. Counsel sends a letter. This is November 23<sup>rd</sup> of 2010. Counsel sends a letter and says: I don't know what you're talking about. I haven't even had a chance to talk to my client, but I'll look into it and let you know. And he writes back and says: Well, I do apparently have one report but I'm keeping it. I'll give you the original, but I'm keeping a copy and I'll talk to him about other stuff, but -- and this is where Mr. Pisanelli has the audacity to say that we disclosed all of these documents where Mr. -- relying on Mr. Campbell's statement that -- and, by the way, I wouldn't be surprised if he has other documents. Terminated employees, in my experience, often, often being the operative word here, have a multitude of documents they keep. So they -- we may have more.

That is blatantly not sufficient under the Merits and Sitive [phonetic] case.

Now, I'll give Mr. Campbell the benefit of the doubt that he didn't know what other documents were had because we know in July, July 8<sup>th</sup> of 2011, Mr. Williams sent an e-mail confirming that they now understood from documents they received a week before. So the week of July 1<sup>st</sup>, in his e-mail, he says: I've got 11 gigs of ESI and I started looking at some of it and I realized it was privileged and I stopped looking at it because Mr. Campbell

and Mr. Williams are good lawyers and they knew they were risking being disqualified from that case as, by the way, you admonished -- since they like to point at lawyers, you admonished these lawyers that if they wanted to go and look at this stuff while these motions were pending, they were risking being disqualified.

THE COURT: I did tell them that.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Yes, you did. And guess what they didn't do, at least allegedly, unless Mr. Pisanelli wants to get up here and admit something to the Court? They didn't look at them.

So, what has happened with this disclosure?

Nothing. We have a motion by my client, Sands China,
within three months of having this issue and, by the way,
there were at least three meet and confers by August 3<sup>rd</sup> of
2011 about this issue --

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, Ms. Glaser stood here probably fifteen times and told me there was no way she was producing any documents and no way she was doing anything until I resolved the Motion to Dismiss.

I don't know if you know the history, but it was -

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, I don't know the history like you do. I certainly try to get caught up on the history, but with respect to this issue of whether

or not they complied with their duty, Mr. Pisanelli wants to --

THE COURT: No, I --

MR. RANDALL JONES: -- turn the duties around.

THE COURT: -- understand they have duties. You both have duties. And it's a --

MR. RANDALL JONES: And it's --

THE COURT: -- complex issue and the problem in this case is I had somebody who didn't want to participate in that process.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And, Your Honor, you've addressed that issue. You addressed that issue, what? About two years ago now. And I understand the Court still has concerns about that issue, that is not what we're talking about today.

THE COURT: I know.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Ms. Glaser said, as I understood it, after July 8<sup>th</sup> of 2011, they did look into what Mr. Jacobs may have taken, we have a different word for what he did, taken from the company. And we had no knowledge of ESI having been taken from the company until after Mr. Williams, Colby Williams, sent that e-mail on July 8<sup>th</sup>.

And, by the way, as you may recall, he said they think they have 11 gigabytes of documents, undefined. On

May 6<sup>th</sup>, I think, is when they sent their original disclosures and they have a paragraph that says: Oh, by the way, in addition to about 237 documents, which were all kind of plain vanilla stuff, we also have some ESI. Didn't say what it was, didn't say how much it was, until July 8<sup>th</sup> and they were only off by about 32 gigs. Instead 11 gigs, I think it was 44 gigs it ultimately ended up being, without any description of what it was, how they got it, when they got it, what was privileged or -- excuse me, other than the fact that it apparently -- some of it was privileged, which is in direct violation of Nevada Supreme Court precedent, the Merits [phonetic] case as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct.

So, if anybody should be outraged here it should be my client. You can't shift the burden, which is all they want to do.

And here's the dilemma we are faced with, Judge. There were some mistakes made. There were some mistakes made early on in the discovery process by my client. The Court has addressed those mistakes, but -- through an evidentiary hearing and this Court has said we're going to deal with that at some point in time, but what's -- the problem we're facing, and I understand Mr. Pisanelli's strategy and Mr. Bice's strategy, but it's to essentially take events that happened in the past and relive them every

single hearing we're in front of you on and to try to say:
These guys are bad guys, they can never be reformed, and
we're going to hold it against them until the end of the
case.

And Mr. Pisanelli, I remember one of the first cases I got here in and he made some pejorative counsel about new counsel. I'm sure these are just the new people on the block on a long string of bad counsel that they've had and they'll be gone shortly thereafter. Well guess what?

THE COURT: I just smiled because I knew you guys were going to look at it with a fresh set of eyes.

MR. RANDALL JONES: And we did, Judge, and we're still here and we are trying to make sure -- and I'm not -- I'm telling you right now in open court we're not perfect and we're probably going to make some mistakes in the future, but I can guarantee the Court this. We are going to do everything we can to make sure we do it right and if we make a mistake, we're going to do everything we can to bring it to your attention immediately and to correct it.

And if -- I hope, I hope the Court has enough experience with me and my brother and Mr. Peek and Mr. Morris to give us some benefit of the doubt that we are going to comply with our ethical obligations and our duties to the Court and to opposing counsel and to the opposing

party, and we are going to do what we can to make sure that we comply with the rules and mitigate any errors that may have been made in the past, which I believe we have done and I would ask this Court. Do not let Mr. Pisanelli turn the rules on their head and make it my client's burden for something they were remiss at.

And to suggest, in spite of the lengthy case law we've suggested -- or showed to the Court otherwise, to suggest that the alleged three month delay from July 8<sup>th</sup> to September 28<sup>th</sup> or so is sufficient to have created a waiver is an absurdity.

First of all, three months, we've got cases we've cited where they went a couple of years and the Court made reference to the fact that in those cases where the parties agreed not to review the documents during the interim period, which is exactly what happened here, there could be no waiver because there was an agreement by counsel. In this case, Mr. Williams and Mr. Campbell, who we trusted when he told us he wasn't going to review the documents, we believed tehm.

And so there was -- and we told them, after three meet and confers where we couldn't reach an agreement about getting the documents back, and they agreed to continue to abstain from reviewing the documents, we would file the appropriate motions, which happened by September 28<sup>th</sup> in the

case of Sands China. It happened in early September in the case of Las Vegas Sands.

So, to suggest -- and, by the way, as you may know, there was an interim order that said you're not going to look at those documents until we get some further direction from the Supreme Court. And then we had the Advanced Discovery protocol in place by December. To suggest that during that time, from July 8<sup>th</sup> when we actually knew the extent of the documents, to then suggest there's a wholesale waiver of all the privilege of all those documents, when they agreed never to look at those documents without further order of the Court, and then we have an order imposing a prohibition on them reviewing them, is an absurdity and turns the rules on their head.

And if that's the rule, then I assume I can tell Ms. Bulla next time my client gets documents from the opposing party that are privileged, that, by the way, Judge Gonzalez told me I don't have to give those back to you and I can look at them. That is what Mr. Pisanelli is suggesting. And if so, I can't wait to get a case with Mr. Pisanelli where his client's documents are provided to me by my client that include all kinds of privileged documents.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Jones.

Mr. Pisanelli, do you want to wrap up quickly?

MR. PISANELLI: Sands China doth protest too much,

Your Honor. We hear lots of arguments about the Merits

[phonetic] decision. The Merits [phonetic] decision

doesn't have anything to do with this case. The Merits

[phonetic] decision has to do whether there's lawyer

misconduct on not disclosing to the other side what you may

have. It doesn't even touch upon the issue of the burdens

of the party who claims a privilege to produce evidence

about when they knew and what they did to retrieve it.

It's completely a red herring that has nothing to do with

anything.

It's also interesting to point out that in one breath, they say that merits controls this issue, that there was attorney misconduct. I'm not sure if he's saying it was me or Don and Colby, but is he upset that we didn't tell them every document we had? Because I think if I did tell them every document that we had, we necessarily would have had to read those documents and then we'd be hearing a different argument: How dare you read the documents and now we want you disqualified. So the point of it is it's a circular argument that has nothing to do with Sands China. It's Sands China's behavior that is the focus of our motion.

And so, I will repeat, I heard a lot of argument.

I heard a lot of anger coming from Sands China, but this is what I didn't hear. Where is their evidence about when they knew what Steve Jacobs had? Silence. Where is the even argument -- where is the point to the record of when they came to this courtroom to retrieve it? Silence.

Instead, he pointed to you to two motions: A motion in limine, which is not a motion to retrieve their documents, and I think he overlooked a motion for sanctions that Sands China filed against us for alleged -- for using documents that were privileged but they seem to forget, you may remember that motion that there -- it was based upon document that they put in the record attached to their own motion and then tried to have us sanctioned for referencing their motion.

So, that's the totality of what they did to protect themselves. No evidence. Nothing to protect themselves.

The Supreme Court told us this year, Your Honor, at footnote 9, in this case, the following.

THE COURT: Yeah, because only one judge can have two writs issued against her on the same day. Same day.

MR. PISANELLI: We direct the District Court to make findings of fact and resolve whether Sands waived any privileges.

That's what they told you to do. In order to make

findings of fact and resolve whether Sands China waived any privileges, we needed to see Sands China's evidence of when they knew. It never came. All we had was reference to Patty Glaser's argument in this courtroom. We needed to see where it was they came to this courtroom and asked for the documents to be returned. It never happened. There's only one conclusion available. It doesn't matter how loudly you yell, it doesn't matter how angry you get, there's only one conclusion available and that is that they waived.

If they think that Colby Williams, or Don
Campbell, or me, or Todd Bice, or Debbie Spinelli, or all
of us should somehow be sanctioned under the Merits
[phonetic] decision, then I invite them to file that motion
and we'll have that debate at the appropriate time. But
whether that happens or not, has nothing to do with whether
Sands China protected what they claim to be privileged
documents. The clear answer to that question is: No, they
did not.

THE COURT: And it's your position that in order to protect the documents, they would have had to file something in Nevada which would have caused them to submit to the jurisdiction of Nevada?

MR. PISANELLI: I think they had to do something and they did nothing. So I think they needed to come into

1 | this courtroom, yes. Would that effort been dispositive as to the personal jurisdiction? I don't know. That's not before us now. It certainly would have been a subject of debate, but they did nothing.

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Yeah, it's -- and, again, the smartest person on our team, reminds us that in her letter to Don Campbell, Patty Glaser threatened that if I don't get my records back, I'm either coming to Las Vegas or Macau to get them back. They didn't go to Macau. Certainly no argument ever could have been made that by going to Macau to get relief from a Macau Court that they would have been -- subjected themselves to jurisdiction here or waiving some right not to subject themselves here. They didn't do anything. They didn't come to you. They didn't go to Macau. Didn't go anywhere.

So it's -- we're left with no evidence of when they knew and what has to be a conceded point that they did nothing.

> THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm going to take this under submission. I need to think about it some more. I'm going to schedule it on October 24th on my chambers calendar for decision.

> MR. PISANELLI: Thank you.

MR. RANDALL JONES: I just point out that the document that Ms. Glaser requested back was the one report that they admitted they had.

THE COURT: No, I know what report it is.

MR. RANDALL JONES: So if there's any argument of waiver, it's as to a couple of reports, period.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. PISANELLI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have a nice day.

MR. RANDALL JONES: Thank you.

PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 9:25 A.M.

\* \* \* \* \*

## CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the audio-visual recording of the proceedings in the aboveentitled matter.

**AFFIRMATION** 

I affirm that this transcript does not contain the social security or tax identification number of any person or entity.

KRISTEN LUNKWITZ

INDEPENDENT TRANSCRIBER

Alun & Chum

TRAN

**CLERK OF THE COURT** 

DISTRICT COURT
CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
\* \* \* \* \*

STEVEN JACOBS

Plaintiff

CASE NO. A-627691

vs.

LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., et al..

DEPT. NO. XI

midd cone., et ai..

Defendants .

Transcript of Proceedings

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

## HEARING ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

JAMES J. PISANELLI, ESQ.

TODD BICE, ESQ.
JORDAN SMITH, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

J. STEPHEN PEEK, ESQ.
JON RANDALL JONES, ESQ.

MARK JONES, ESQ. STEVE L. MORRIS, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINS

FLORENCE HOYT

District Court

Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1	LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014, 8:06 A.M.
2	(Court was called to order)
3	THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.
4	MR. BICE: Good morning, Your Honor.
5	MR. PEEK: Good morning, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Jacobs versus Sands.
7	(Pause in the proceedings)
8	THE COURT: All right. It's your motion. By the
9	way, the Advanced Discovery site hates me, just so we're
10	clear. That Website, I'll never use it again. And it may be
11	just that I'm old and I don't learn new tricks well.
12	MR. PEEK: Which Website is that, Your Honor?
13	THE COURT: Advanced Discovery.
14	MR. PEEK: Oh. The Advanced Discovery one. Yeah.
15	MR. JONES: Your Honor, you're younger than I am,
16	and so I really try to avoid that. That's why I have very
17	smart young people who understand that stuff.
18	THE COURT: Yeah.
19	MR. JONES: Your Honor, first of all, we appreciate
20	you allowing us a hearing on this matter, as opposed to in
21	chambers.
22	THE COURT: It's an important issue, Mr. Jones.
23	Whether I agree to reconsider or not, it's still an important
24	issue.
25	MR. JONES: And I appreciate that, Your Honor. And

I quess it leads me to I quess a point that -- I've practiced before you for many years, and I've been on both sides of cases, and I know I think you have a great appreciation of the discovery process, and I think the point I want to try to make here, hope to make here is that, you know, discovery is very important in litigation, but there are appropriate limits to it. And the reason we're asking you to reconsider just one part of your March 27, 2013, order as it relates to the redactions is because of the current circumstances and whether or not it's appropriate or necessary to essentially order Sands China to produce the remaining unredacted documents -excuse me, the remaining redacted documents in unredacted form in light of the -- what I certainly believe to be a legitimate concern about the laws of China and Macau. And so, not that it's hopefully not clear already, but just to make it abundantly clear, we're asking you to only reconsider that part of your order that requires us to produce the documents that -- the remaining redacted documents in an unredacted form. THE COURT: And those redacted documents that you believe might be affected by the Macau Data Privacy Act.

MR. JONES: That's right.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. JONES: And I --

THE COURT: You've got to say that part on the record.

MR. JONES: Yes. And, Judge, just in terms of a history here, you know, this thing has evolved I think beyond anybody's imaginations as to how this whole case has evolved, and when -- and by the way, in terms of the motion for reconsideration I think the Court has acknowledged as it relates to the defamation order that you reconsidered from June of 2011 there was a change in the law from the Supreme Court, and that's what we believe has occurred here. Not just a change in the factual situation, but also the change in the law in terms of this further instruction we have from both the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the form of the Viega -- the Nevada Supreme Court in the form of the Viega case and the Uponor case, both of which, by the way, I was on the plaintiff's side of.

THE COURT: You were on the losing side, unfortunately.

MR. JONES: I was. And, ironically, I was on the losing side where we were asking that these documents be produced and that we were asking for discovery, and the Supreme Court told us in light of the <u>Daimler</u> case, no, that's not relevant, you don't get it anymore. And we didn't get to do it. And I'll -- obviously I have a biased perspective, because I was involved in those cases and I know the facts I would presume better than anybody else in this courtroom, but

it's my belief that the facts showing the relationship between the foreign entities and the local entities was much stronger to show a connection to Nevada. In the <u>Viega</u> case we actually had a building in the Reno area that they were involved with. Now, of course, the Supreme Court didn't see it that way. That's fine. But the point is that in light of the <u>Daimler</u> case our Nevada Supreme Court has said you have to really look at whether or not this is relevant and it's discoverable from a jurisdictional standpoint of a foreign entity, and they said no.

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So let's take a look for a moment at what has been produced. So since the order came out in March of 2013 we have produced another I think it's 4100 documents from Macau that are completely unredacted. So those are new documents. This was based upon the expanded custodian search. we've got a remaining I think it's 7100 documents that are redacted in some -- I'm sorry, seventy-six nonprivileged documents that have been produced with redactions. So that as far as we're concerned this is based upon the expanded custodial research that you ordered and the order that says we can produce those documents and withhold privileged, but we had to do a privilege log, but we couldn't redact under the MPDPA. So out of a concern for violating foreign law we've -we're ready to produce all this additional information, and we've gone back and we've culled through the duplicates, we've done whatever we can to take documents to Macau and have them looked at by lawyers with the documents produced in the U.S. to see where we can take a document that is redacted in Macau and see if it's also been available in the U.S. Which case we have that duplicate, we have then given it in an unredacted form.

So what we're left with, Judge, is we're left with --

Oh. And the other important point here is with respect to Mr. Adelson, Mr. Leven, Mr. Goldstein, and Mr. Kay we have gotten the consents from them, because they're obviously senior management people. So we got their consents, so we've been able to give those documents completely unredacted, which, by the way, presumably would be of most concern to the plaintiff, because they really are left with, at least as far as I can see, this nerve center type of an argument, as opposed to some of the other theories. I know they say they haven't abandoned them. That's fine and --

THE COURT: I think that's part of the factual analysis, whether you call it the nerve center or not. But it's part of the factual analysis that needs to be made.

MR. JONES: And so the point being is that clearly those people they believe to be the most critical witnesses in the case they've identified. And they've taken those depositions, and clearly they hold important positions within

the company. And they have been -- their documents have been produced with their names on them unredacted. So they have that information.

So what we're left with, Judge, is we're left with essentially documents that have -- that only the name, not the content, as you know, or the subject matter that's been redacted. And we're talking about documents literally that show -- as an example, we want to have documents that talk about board meetings. Well, there's some reference here to the board meeting because these board members have come in and who's going to pick them up to take them -- pick them up from the airport. And we've redacted that name.

THE COURT: Mr. Jones, these are business communications. These are not personal privacy issues. If you were talking to me about personal privacy issues that were inadvertently included in business emails, you would have an argument that I would be much more inclined to agree with. And while I understand the government of Macau has their rules, their rules do not operate in Nevada. And a \$5,000 fine and a warning after somebody makes a determination to carry all of the data from Macau to Las Vegas Boulevard South here in Las Vegas, Nevada, may be an appropriate determination for the Macau government. But their rules don't operate here.

MR. JONES: Judge, I understand that. But here's the dilemma, you know. And I was fascinated when I was

watching the case about Pistorius, the guy in South Africa, and I watched how their system worked, and it's --

THE COURT: Different than ours.

MR. JONES: Very different than ours. But that's their system. And some of it was actually not only confusing to me, but seemed somewhat bizarre from my perspective. In fact, I had an opportunity recently to go over to London with the American College, and they had a mock trial in London. It was fascinating. You know, we all come from the perspective of English common law, and they did a civil trial with English lawyers, barristers, and American lawyers.

THE COURT: Did they wear the wigs?

MR. JONES: They did. And they had a United States federal judge, and then they had a senior English judge. And the system there, what I thought was identical to ours, was so much different. And so even though we have that connection with England, we still -- our laws are different and they follow different rules. So essentially that's why I believe the Supreme Court has said you have to do a balancing test.

THE COURT: That's on sanctions. I have to do a balancing test when I get to sanctions. Right now I'm on discovery.

MR. JONES: All right.

THE COURT: Your client can make a business decision after weighing the different interests that it has and do what

it needs to do. I then someday may be further addressing sanctions issues. Someday. Don't know when it's going to be, because I've got to get documents produced first.

MR. JONES: Understood. But let me address your point specifically, then. So what this Court would always have the right to do is to decide what information is relevant and necessary in discovery irrespective of the Macanese privacy laws. So if you look at this -- and this goes to sort of a retailed point where they said, well, you withheld documents, you put together this relevancy list. No, it was not a relevancy list, it was a nonresponsive list. And sort of the no good deed goes unpunished, we went beyond what was required and we produced all relevant documents. What we did not produce -- what we did is we did a list of documents that were not responsive to the 24 requests to produce or had anything to do with those custodians. That what we did -- that's what that list was.

So we have produced what we believe to be all relevant documents. We have redacted a few of them. So my question to the Court is what is -- and I think the Court does have the right and actually I think it's totally appropriate and necessary to balance the interests of the parties. So, for example, I ask this Court if you're balancing the idea of our client, even though we don't necessarily understand why this privacy law exists -- as you said, well, what difference

does it make if you have just the name of somebody. I personally agree with you. I understand your point. Why would that make a difference? But it does make a difference to the Macanese Government. They have said, without that person's express permission you can't produce that information. And so we are faced with this dilemma whether we like it or not, and certainly I know you don't like it, but what's --

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THE COURT: Doesn't matter whether I like it or not. The issue is if it's a business communication that your client is involved with with someone else, one of your employees is involved, and almost all of these are with your own employees who are communicating among each other. That's not something that I am probably going to recognize as an appropriate exercise of your balancing if we ever get there. If you're talking to me about third parties -- for instance, we had some issues of people who became ill while they were visiting the casinos and investigations related to that. If instead the emails relate to those persons' individual health conditions, as opposed to the government investigation related to that outbreak, I think that is a very wise exercise of a data privacy protection that your client may want to rely upon, because it affects a third party not related to this action. You've got all these employees that are your employees that if you don't want to go get their consent that's okay. You have

the ability to get their consent. You can certainly put a little screen on their email every time they sign in that says, I understand that by using the email system I am consenting that my emails are going to not be protected by the Macau Data Privacy Act. You haven't done that. There are lots of ways that your client can deal with this issue from a business perspective. You haven't decided to do it, and that's okay.

MR. JONES: Two things, Judge, two points I would make. First of all, the Macanese Government doesn't recognize this discretion, as you suggested. So that unfortunately is not an option to my client. Secondly, the --

THE COURT: Your client decided to hand-walk all the data out of the country.

MR. JONES: That data has been produced.

THE COURT: I understand. But your client decided to make that decision. So it's sort of hard for me to listen and say, gosh, Judge, we have to abide by the Macau Data Privacy Act when you already decided it didn't really apply to you.

MR. JONES: Well, actually, Judge, that I think was clearly a mistake by the client, and they paid for that mistake. And here's the other problem, is, you know, you make the mistake once, which they did, and they got admonished for it and fined for it. If they make the mistake twice, it

becomes a much more serious concern. And that is the concern that they have had, and that's the concern they've expressed to this Court. So it's not --

THE COURT: I understand.

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MR. JONES: So it's not a hypothetical concern, it's a legitimate concern. You have an actual law in place that says we can't do this.

With respect to your other point, first of all, at least for the record I want to make the point that they're VML employees, they're not Sands China employees. But be that as it may, irrespective of any other argument related to that, this is after the fact. We're not talking about issues going forward in the future. So we can't go back and put a note on their computer screen and say, you know, in the past you did this, we want you to know we're going to produce it because we've now been told we have to produce it. We can't go back there. And more importantly, even if we put -- it's my understanding that even if we put such a disclaimer on the computer screen it doesn't matter under Macanese law. doesn't work. They have to have a certificate that shows they've done it completely voluntarily. And there's this whole issue they have, as is put forth in the brief, of a concern about a coercive effect of an employer saying, look, I want you to do this but I want you to do it voluntarily. And again, whether I agree with it, you agree with it, that is the

way it is. So that's the dilemma we're faced with.

So getting back --

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THE COURT: Mr. Jones, most of the documents we're talking about are communications with people here in the United States. They're communications that are going through the Las Vegas Sands servers. It's not like this is all information that is solely housed in Macau. This is information that is being communicated between Macau and Las Vegas. So there's two options. Either we can have Mr. Peek and his client produce it off of the servers or explain to me why it's not there anymore, or your client, who was communicating with people who are not Macanese citizens, can go ahead and produce the information. If you decide you're not, I've got other options, and I can deal with it at a sanctions hearing.

MR. JONES: I think that there's a misunderstanding, first of all, a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the documents. It's my understanding -- and that's what it says actually in the briefs -- that if we have the documents here in unredacted form, in other words, they already exist in the U.S., then we produce them. That's the point where we've gone and where we have given that information. The documents that I believe that are really at issue are internal documents in Macau, employee to employee in Macau.

For instance -- and this is where I think -- Your

Honor, I would think you would understand this point, that if you have somebody -- an employee, say a VML employee writing to another VML employee in Macau saying, Mr. Leven is coming into town today for the board meeting, who's going to pick him up, and that's the subject of that email, so they're two Macanese employees -- excuse me, two Macanese residents that work for the company, so it's a company email, but they're simply saying something to the effect that -- which, by the way, they have that information, they have the substance, they just don't have the names, what is the possible relevance to this case on jurisdiction as to why they need that person's name when it -- that's what we're talking about, Judge. the most part that's what we're talking about. They have the substance. If they could point out to you an email that goes to a substantive jurisdiction issue, not just that says -somewhere in it they're talking about a board meeting, because some of them do talk about board meetings, where's the board going to have lunch, who's going to pick up the board member at the airport, how --

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THE COURT: Mr. Jones, I would love to be able to say that that category of documents does not need to be produced. But given the information that I went through when I did the original review, not the one when she went back and reviewed the privilege logs and cut a bunch of stuff off, given initial review, I'm not willing to trust them. Now, if

you want to submit those for me to do an in-camera review on whether something is relevant to the jurisdictional issues or not, I've got Mondays available to do stuff like that, and I'm happy to. But I'm not going to rely on your client, who's had a history of not being accurate in the disclosures that they've made in the privilege logs, and I'm talking about your predecessor counsel, not you, and I'm not going to rely upon them for that.

Now, if what you want me to do is to review them for relevance, I'll review them, I'll get them done. If there's only 7,000 documents, you can get it through it in a day.

MR. JONES: Your Honor, I very much appreciate your comment. What we want to try to do is -- and I've said this before and I'm going to say it again, we want to be a transparent as we can with the Court and with opposing counsel. I don't want to be in a position -- I don't ever want to be in a position where the Court feels that my client and I am not producing everything I'm supposed to produce. This is a unique circumstance in my experience in doing this for over 30 years where we have this foreign law that comes into play. And I know it's very troubling to the Court, but I think there is --

THE COURT: It's not troubling to me, Mr. Jones. I am aware of the various Data Privacy Acts that exit in Europe. I'm aware of the different Data Privacy Acts that exist in

Asia. They are very different. And while I certainly understand the importance to those individual countries of protecting their citizens, this is an issue of jurisdictional discovery as to whether the conduct of your client that occurred between citizens of the United States, activities related to citizens of the United States will subject it to jurisdiction.

MR. JONES: And I get that. So getting to your comment, all we want to do is make sure that to the greatest extent possible we can comply with this order -- this Court's order and also comply with Macanese law in a way that gets the other side all information they need for the jurisdictional hearing. And I think that's a fair proposition. And I understand there's been a lot of history and the Court has concerns about the candor of counsel and the client producing this information, but I think things have transpired in the interim that give us a lot more guidance of what we need to do and where we need to go, and I'm asking the Court in reconsideration of the order -- because right now the order is extremely board, it just says, you cannot redact under MPDPA, and we would ask the Court to give us some latitude --

THE COURT: But I gave you other abilities to make redactions [inaudible].

MR. JONES: And we did. And by the way, we did. And we've gone back and we've unredacted thousands of

documents where we found the duplicates, where we found ways to avoid violating the Macanese law and still comply with this Court's order. So we have been trying to do it in good faith and make sure that we don't get our client in trouble with the Macanese Government, but also don't get the client in trouble with you. And that's all we're trying to do, Judge, and we'd just simply like the opportunity to do that.

So we would ask if you would reconsider your order to that extent, that we can then -- maybe what we need to do is like you said, if we need to go through and maybe be more specific as to why a particular document is violative of your order and gives the other side all the information they need to have. And if we could have some kind of order like that, that would certainly be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. Thanks.

Mr. Pisanelli.

MR. PISANELLI: So let's remind ourselves, Your Honor, that these problems that we're hearing about this morning are all of Sands China's making, the fact that they were sanctioned for the call it misbehavior and lack of transparency and really untruths that were brought to your attention, it is now being brushed aside as if we were just having a simple new debate over whether the Macau Data Privacy Act should govern how we conduct our discovery here. The problem was resolved by this Court a long time ago through the

sanction that said, you cannot rely upon it anymore, despite that they continue to do so.

It's also a problem of Sands China's making -THE COURT: But you understand that I may make a
determination someday that redacting a bellman's name from an
email may not be enough for a sanction?

MR. PISANELLI: All in the balancing test of -- that you're going to do on what the appropriate sanction should be. I understand that. Just -- you made my point, my primary point already, that being that this is -- those balancing factors have to do with what the sanction will be, not whether it's discoverable.

We also, you know, can't lose sight of the fact that this problem is also of Sands China's making through this dragging this matter out for several years now by pretending to have nothing to do with Nevada when so much evidence that we accumulate daily by pulling teeth, figuratively anyway, we find more and more contacts, and we're still sitting here now years later waiting for 8,000-some-odd documents to be produced that were ordered to be produced long ago.

And so what do we have? The writing's on the wall, right. Your Honor, the reason we're here, and you can see it in their papers, is that Sands China has decided that it will not comply with what you say either for its own business motivations or because it doesn't want a \$5,000 from the Macau

Government or because whatever reason they're not going to disclose, and it doesn't really matter, they have made it clear in their papers they are not going to comply.

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So this motion is an attempt to get you to rewrite the rules. You told us, Judge -- from Sands China's perspective, you told us, Judge, to do not redact for the Macau Data Privacy Act anymore or there will be sanctions, we've done that, we're going to be sanctioned but we're asking you now to reconsider, change the rules so that the sanction will be nothing. That's in essence what we're doing here. And the problem is that they come to you, in our view, with two fundamentally flawed bases for asking you to rewrite the rules of the game and to pretend like the history of this case never happened. The first, of course, is their claim, their self-proclaimed declaration that what we are seeking in these documents are irrelevant because the law has changed. And we heard today a little added supplement on the law changing in both Nevada and at the United States Supreme Court level. We have cited to you, you'll see at page 7, starting with the <u>Daimler</u> decision. The <u>Daimler</u> decision didn't, as Counsel would have this Court believe, say that the agency theory is no longer available and therefore our discovery is no longer relevant. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court specifically said that it need not pass on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general jurisdiction. So that issue,

exactly as you said, is one that will be developed on a factual basis when we get to our jurisdictional hearing. The agency theory, just like the nerve center theory, just like specific jurisdiction are all still very much in play despite what Sands China would hope.

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Now, on the Uponor side, an unpublished opinion that we've heard about, and I will never pretend even with my limited involvement in the case to know as much about it as Mr. Jones does, so I'm not going to dare spar him on that. But what I do have the benefit of is actually reading the unpublished opinion that cites the Viega case, and it says quite the contrary about whether the law has changed and whether this agency theory is gone. Court said there in Uponor, when characterizing what it did in Viega, that, "We concluded that in order to assert jurisdiction over the foreign parent corporation a parent must do more than show the amount of control typical and a parent-subsidiary relationship. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the parent has moved beyond the establishment of general policy and direction for the subsidiary and in effect taken over performance of the subsidiary's day-to-day operations in carrying out that policy." That doesn't sound like an abrogation of an agency theory to me. Sounds like it's a standard that maybe it's a little more heightened, the same way that the Daimler court did in rejecting the less stringent

standard of the Ninth Circuit. So to claim that now 8,000 documents are irrelevant because we don't have an agency theory anymore, respectfully, is just not the case.

And the second flaw of their request to rewrite the rules from you is simply that we don't need it, they said. Peppered throughout this motion is Sands China's declaration that we don't need these documents, we have enough already, go ahead and give your best shot with what we decided to give you through our own filters, through our own different sets of lawyers and the judgment that was imposed on discovery responses that you do have you've got enough. And again, respectfully, that's not for Sands China or its counsel or its chairman or its in-the-house lawyers or any of them on this side of the debate tell us what we need. It's for Your Honor to decide. And Your Honor already decided that going on two years ago, the order that they're now asking you to reconsider.

So what do we have left, then? We know that there is no foundation for this request; but what do we have in their papers of what they plan to do? We know, Your Honor, that the order required the production of these documents in March 2013, and we know August of this year the Supreme Court rejected their attempts for a writ to stop the entire process. Now, three months later, we still don't have any documents. But what we do have, you'll see throughout their papers, and

let me just quote a sentence or two, because it is most remarkable thing about this debate, is Sands China telling you at page 6 of their motion that, "The documents were redacted to remove all personal information." That's what it says.

"Since this Court declined to further extend a stay, SCL has been working to prepare the documents. Those documents were then redacted."

They then say on page 8, "SCL is prepared to produce the remaining documents from Macau with personal data redacted." And they even said that the four people that they are congratulating themselves over, who they did get consent from, that they're going to produce their documents, quote, "in largely unredacted form."

There's the writing on the wall. They've told you, they've told us that they understand your order but they're not going to comply with it. They went ahead and redacted anyway, and before they give them to us they're asking you to change the rules of the game so that the sanction will be zero, that they end up now going full circle starting with non production, redacting, go through the entire two-year process we did in and out of the Supreme Court only to get to the same exact spot and ask you to say that there will be no consequence for that behavior.

They also went even so far to tell us that when you told them to produce the records of 20 custodians -- and we

all know, Your Honor's already pointed out, that one way to solve this whole thing is get consents even if they had not been sanctioned for all of the bad behavior that we don't need to rehash, they still could have complied with the law by simply getting consents, and they made the efforts to get four. That's it. Now, they said that it's stringent and you have to be careful on how you deal with employees. Fair enough. True statement. But you notice not a single word -- and Counsel will correct me, but not a single word I saw that they tried, that they did anything.

THE COURT: Well, the only people they got consents for are people who live here in the Las Vegas area who are U.S. citizens.

MR. PISANELLI: Four people who by all measures are in charge of the whole mess. So not a surprise that they didn't bother to do that.

They also told us, which was a little confusing to me, they asked for relief not to have to do the relevance log, and then condemn us in their reply by saying how dare we claim that they have to give the relevance log that also was part of Your Honor's order. If there is no relevance log, I guess what they're saying is that every single document at issue goes directly to the issue of jurisdiction. And they're conceding that fact; otherwise we would have had all these documents on some type of log that says that they're merits

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So, Your Honor, we know what's going on here. said that they won't comply, you told them not to redact, and they redacted. You told them to do what they can to get things produced in a timely manner going all the way back to We now stand here months after the Supreme Court has 2013. ruled, still without any documents, still with the same circular arguments that just never seem to get exhausted from Sands China's perspective. They bemoan the fact that this matter has dragged on, but we all know that it's dragged on as an open choice of Sands China. And it's time to put an end to it. There's no reason for reconsideration, there's no change in the law, there's no change in the history of this case, and there certainly hasn't been any change in the behavior of Sands China. They continue to fly by their own rules, and it's time to put an end to it.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Jones, anything else?

MR. JONES: Yes, Your Honor. First of all I would say that I categorically disagree that we fly by our own rules. That's not what's going on here, Judge. And I'll tell you the other thing that Mr. Pisanelli said, is that he said we won't comply. And that's not the case. We can't comply. And there is a --

THE COURT: That's not true, Mr. Jones. The Nevada

Supreme Court said if you make a business decision not to comply, which you are perfectly able to do, your client can make that business decision. I am then to make a balancing test and analyze the issues that you were facing in making that decision in order to determine what appropriate sanctions are. So it's not that you can't comply, it's not that you have to follow the Macau rules. Your client has the right to make a business decision. There may be consequences to that business decision, but you've got the right to make the decision. And then if I decide that the reasons for the business decision were very valid and should be honored given the long history of this case, then maybe your sanction will be very minor. But if you don't go forward and do what you need to do, I'm never going to get to that point of going through that balancing test.

MR. JONES: Well, and, Judge, I want to also address that point about, you know, my being referred to by Mr. Pisanelli as bemoaning the time its taken. We quoted I think it was Mr. Bice way back when when they said they were going to make these very narrow requests related just to jurisdiction. This has blown all out of proportion. Again, I've never seen anything like this. We produced hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. We are now down to about 7600 that have redactions on them of names. They don't have the subject matter redacted, what we're talking about.

And I want to make another point. Mr. Pisanelli said the balancing test only relates to sanctions. That's not true. The court order from August of this year says that, "The District Courts have wide discretion to consider foreign policy statutes in deciding whether to limit discovery that is either unduly burdensome or obtainable from other sources." So that relates to discovery, not just to sanction. And that's what we're asking for here.

THE COURT: This isn't unduly burdensome. And you're telling me it's not available from other sources.

MR. JONES: No. And that's actually what I hope I was trying to make --

THE COURT: Because if it's in the servers on Las Vegas Boulevard South, we need to make sure that it's been produced.

MR. JONES: They have been. And that's a point I think maybe has been missed by the Court. We're not talking about documents in the U.S. If we have those documents, even if the same document is in Macau that's redacted, we produced it unredacted in the U.S. So they have that. That's where we went and we compared the documents that we had in Macau with what we do already have in the U.S. And if we had it here in unredacted form, we gave -- actually I should say that if we had it here it wasn't redacted, we gave it to them because it was already here. So just so it's clear, Judge, we're only

talking about documents that are in Macau that have otherwise not been produced by some other source unredacted. So we have complied. We're only talking about Macanese documents.

And with respect to the <u>Daimler</u> issue the point I think is being missed here is -- and I certainly do know what <u>Uponor</u> said. We're talking about an agency theory where -- this is their theory, not our theory. Their theory is Las Vegas Sands is the principal -- excuse me, is the agent of its affiliated company. That's completely opposite of what --

parent-subsidiary relationship is basically what they're saying. And I don't know what the facts are, because someday I'm going to do a jurisdictional hearing and make that determination as your fact finder. But right now we're doing discovery for the jurisdictional hearing, and I am typically, just like in any other case, going to give them a little more latitude than what I might admit at the hearing. Because the question is is it discoverable for purposes of the jurisdictional hearing. And if your client makes a decision to redact the name of the bellman who was instructed to pick up Mr. Leven to bring him to the board meeting, then I'm probably not going to sanction you for redacting that individual's name.

However, if the redactions are more significant and relate to people who are more senior in the operation and who

are people who were directly involved in dealing with Las

Vegas Sands and delegating work and adopting a shared services

agreement, I think we may have a different issue.

So if what you're asking me to do is to pre judge and tell you what the answer is to how I'm going to sanction your client if they don't comply with the order, I've given you a little bit of guidance.

MR. JONES: And, Judge, really what I was hoping to do is to have you reconsider the fact that the breadth of the order as it is was we thought too board and that in fact under the circumstances of the case as it's evolved with the Nevada Supreme Court decisions in combination with the <u>Daimler</u> case that the information they're seeking now from these emails is essentially what we're talking about is -- will not move their claim forward one iota with respect to jurisdiction.

THE COURT: But you're not the one who gets to make that decision.

MR. JONES: I understand. I understand. And so we're asking that you balance that information again, since we — in terms of the burdensome nature of it and the ability to get it from other sources. We've given the information of other sources, and the burden here is in weighing that burden, which we believe the Supreme Court said you do have discretion to deal with at the discovery stage that the burden is minimal, in fact, we don't think it exists all with respect to

these documents that are still redacted as to Jacobs, and the burden on our client is substantial because it's not just another \$5,000 fine that Mr. Pisanelli said, well, you're subjecting yourself to. The point is that when you violate a law twice -- and this goes to your point. You know, if we essentially say to Macau at this point, well, the Judge told us we had to do it, they're not going to be sympathetic to that. That's the problem. They're going to say, well, you made that choice and you're going to have to pay the consequences and you're a licensee. And so the burden on my client under these circumstances we believe far outweighs the relative burden to Mr. --

THE COURT: Then make that choice and we'll deal with it at the sanctions hearing.

MR. JONES: Well, Your Honor, again we would ask you to reconsider your order.

THE COURT: The motion to reconsider is denied. But I thought about it.

Now let me ask a followup question. I went through and did the in-camera review and the review of the redacted documents in camera. I issued some minute orders, and I asked for some supplemental information. I have three supplemental filings. I want to make sure I have everything you were going to give me or you intend to give me. I have one on Campanina Ferrara, I have one on Captain Sick [phonetic], which is

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    11/10, and then I have another one on Campanina Ferrara,
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   because I didn't realize that you had done one, and another
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    one on the CCKS folks, which was November 18th. Was there any
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    more you intended to give me, or is this it so I can finish up
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    the review?
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              MR. JONES: That's all from us, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Then I'll finish that up.
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              Anything else?
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              MR. JONES: Not today, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Have a lovely weekend.
                                                   Oh.
                                                        Today's
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    only Tuesday; right?
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              MR. PEEK: Today's only Tuesday, Your Honor.
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                THE PROCEEDING CONCLUDED AT 8:48 A.M.
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## CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

## **AFFIRMATION**

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER