In the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST u.a.d. 10/11/16))	Electronically Filed Jan 10 2019 08:07 a.n Elizabeth A. Brown		
SUSAN CHRISTIAN-PAYNE, ROSEMARY KEACH AND RAYMOND CHRISTIAN, JR. Appellants,	Case No.:	Clerk of Supreme Cour		
-vs- ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. and JACQUELINE UTKIN, Respondents.)))			
ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD., Cross-Appellant, -vs- SUSAN CHRISTIAN-PAYNE, ROSEMARY KEACH AND RAYMOND CHRISTIAN, JR. Cross-Respondents,				
and JACQUELINE UTKIN, Respondent.				

APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' APPENDIX - VOLUME 10

Filed by:

/s/ Cary Colt Payne, Esq.

CARY COLT PAYNE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No.: 4357

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DATE	DOCUMENT	Numbered
APPENDI	X VOLUME 1:	
7/13/17	Petition to Assume Jurisdiction of Trust; Confirm Trustees; Instructions, etc.	APP-ROA001-72
8/17/17	Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(1) and NRCP 12 (b)(5)	APP-ROA—73-97
8/22/17	Errata to Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(1) and NRCP 12(b)(5)	APP-ROA—98-101
9/15/17	Supplement and Addendum to Petition to Assume Jurisdiction of Trust; confirm Trustees' Instructions, etc. Alternatively to Reform Trust Agreement	APP-ROA102-105
	Trust Agreement	AFF-KOA102-103
9/15/17	Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	APP-ROA106-115
APPENDI	XX VOLUME 2:	
10/4/17	Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Motion to Dismiss	APP-ROA116-156
10/13/17	Response to Petition to Assume Jurisdiction of Trust; Confirm Trustees; Insturctions, Etc. and Joinder in Motion to Dismiss Pursuant	
	to NRCP 12(b)(1) and NRCP 12(b)(5)	APP-ROA157-165
10/25/17	Accounting	APP-ROA166-173
10/25/17	Inventory and Record of Value	APP-ROA174-184
10/31/17	Notice of Entry of Order	APP-ROA185-193

DATE **DOCUMENT** NUMBERED **APPENDIX VOLUME 3:** Joint Petition for Review of Former Trustees 11/3/17 Refusal to Provide a Proper Accounting Pursuant to NRS 165.143 APP-ROA--194-222 APPENDIX VOLUME 4a: APP-ROA--223-298 11/13/17 Joint Objection to Petition Jurisdiction Etc. Part 1 **APPENDIX VOLUME 4b:** APP-ROA--299-373 11/13/17 Joint Objection to Petition Jurisdiction Etc. Part 2 **APPENDIX VOLUME 5:** Petitioner's Opposition to Motion for 12/4/17 Review/Proper Accounting APP-ROA--374-413 12/14/17 Petitioner's Opposition to Joint Counterpetition to Confirm/Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Etc. Request for Discovery APP-ROA--414-428 **APPENDIX VOLUME 6:** Motion for Compliance with and Enforcement 12/12/17 of Court Order, and for Sanctions Relating Thereto, for Order to show cause why Former Trustees should not be held in Contempt, for Order Compelling Former Trustees to Account, and for Access to and Investment Control of Trust Funds Belonging to the **Christian Family Trust** APP-ROA--429-452

DATE	DOCUMENT	Numbered	
1/4/18	Notice of Suggestion of Death	APP-ROA453-454	
1/11/18	Opposition to Motion for Compliance, Enforcement Sanctions, Contempt, Etc.; Counterpetition for Distribution and Vacating all Pending Matters and Dismiss Trust Proceedings		
APPENDIX VOLUME 7a:			
1/26/18	Petition to Confirm Successor Trustee Part 1	APP-ROA509-539	
APPENDIX	X VOLUME 7b:		
1/26/18	Petition to Confirm Successor Trustee Part 2	APP-ROA540-569	
APPENDIX VOLUME 8:			
2/6/18	Amended Notice of Entry-Omnibus Order	APP-ROA570-576	
2/8/18	Petition for Fees and Costs	APP-ROA577-659	
2/23/18	Notice of Non-Opposition and Limited Joinder to the Petition for Fees and Costs for Anthony L. Barney, LTD	APP-ROA660-663	
2/23/18	Opposition to Petition to Confirm Successor Trustee; Counterpetition for Reinstatement of Petitioners	APP-ROA664-735	
3/8/18	Monte Reason's Application for Reimbursement of Administrative Expenses	APP-ROA736-741	

DATE	DOCUMENT	Numbered
APPENDIX	X VOLUME 9:	
3/9/18	Petitioners Combined Opposition to (1) Barney Firm Petition For Fees, Etc. (2) Monte Reason's Application for Reimbursement	APP-ROA742-840
APPENDIX	X VOLUME 10:	
3/12/18	Reply to Opposition to Petition to Confirm Success Trustee; and Opposition to Counter-Petition for Reinstatement of Petitioners	sor APP-ROA841-848
3/13/18	Response to Opposition to Monte Reason's Application for Reimbursement of Administrative Expenses	APP-ROA849-863
3/13/18	Reply to Petitioner's Combined Opposition to (1) Barney Firm Petition for Fees, Etc., (2) Monte Reason's Application for Reimbursement	APP-ROA864-894
3/15/18	Minutes of Hearing – 4/4/18	APP-ROA895-898
3/29/18	Motion (1) to Expunge Lis Pendens and/or Strike Pleading; and (2) for Preliminary Injunction	APP-ROA899-921
APPENDIX	X VOLUME 11:	
3/30/18	Petitioner's Supplemental Response to Opposition to Petition for Fees (Barney Firm); Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Reopening Discovery	APP-ROA922-960

DATE	DOCUMENT	Numbered	
APPENDIX	X VOLUME 12:		
4/2/18	Motion for Turnover of Assets and to Dissolve the Injunction Over Christian Family Trust Assets	APP-ROA961-998	
4/3/18	Countermotion 1) to Strike Petitioner's Supplemental Response to Opposition to Petition for Fees (Barney Firm); request for Evidentiary Hearing, and Reopening Discovery; 2) To Find the Former Trustees to be Vexatious Litigants, and 3) For sanctions Against Cary Colt Payne Pursuant to NRS 7.085 and EDCR 7.60	APP-ROA999-1036	
APPENDIX VOLUME 13a:			
4/4/18	Hearing Transcript Part 1	APP-ROA-1037-1061	
APPENDIX VOLUME 13b:			
4/4/18	Hearing Transcript Part 2	APP-ROA-1062-1186	
APPENDIX VOLUME 13c:			
4/4/18	Hearing Transcript Part 3	APP-ROA-1087-1111	
APPENDIX VOLUME 13d:			
4/4/18	Hearing Transcript Part 4	APP-ROA-1112-1134	

DATE **DOCUMENT** NUMBERED APPENDIX VOLUME 14a: 4/10/18 Motion for (1) Fees Pursuant to NRS 165.148 (2) Compliance with and Enforcement of Court Order and Sanctions; (3) for Order to Show Cause Why Former Trustees Should Not be Held in Contempt, and (4) for Extension of Discovery APP-ROA-1135-1279 Part 1 APPENDIX VOLUME 14b: 4/10/18 Motion for (1) Fees Pursuant to NRS 165.148 (2) Compliance with and Enforcement of Court Order and Sanctions; (3) for Order to Show Cause Why Former Trustees Should Not be Held in Contempt, and APP-ROA-1180-1224 (4) for Extension of Discovery Part 2 **APPENDIX VOLUME 15:** 4/12/18 Notice of Entry of Order (Barney Petition Fees) APP-ROA-1225-1232 4/19/18 Petitioner's Combined Opposition to (1) Motion to Turnover Assets and Dissolve Injunction over Trust Assets; (2) Motion to 1. Expunge Lis Pendens and 2. Preliminary Injunction and Countermotion for Distribution/ Termination of Trust; Alternatively for Stay/ Set Bond and Set Evidentiary APP-ROA-1233-1254 Hearing 4/19/18 Opposition to Motion for (1) fees, (2) compliance,

Property (2nd request)

(3) for Order to Show Cause and (4) Extension of Discovery, countermotion to Distribute Trust

APP-ROA-1255-1292

DATE **DOCUMENT** NUMBERED **APPENDIX VOLUME 16:** 5/8/18 Response to Combined Opposition to (1) Motion to Turnover Assets and Dissolve Injunction Over Trust Assets; (2) Motion to 1. Expunge Lis Pendens and 2. Preliminary Injunction and Opposition to Countermotion or Distribution/ Termination of Trust; Alternatively for Stay, Set Bond and Set Evidentiary Hearing APP-ROA-1293-1333 5/11/18 Supplement to response to Combined Opposition to (1) Motion to Turnover Assets and Dissolve Injunction Over Trust Assets; (2) Motion to 1. Expunge Lis Pendens and 2. Preliminary Injunction and Opposition to Countermotion for Distribution/Termination of Trust; Alternatively for Stay/Set Bond and APP-ROA-1334-1337 Set Evidentiary Hearing **Hearing Transcript** 5/16/18 APP-ROA-1338-1390 APPENDIX VOLUME 17: Notice of Entry of Order (Utkin suspension) 6/1/18 APP-ROA-1391-1401 10/8/18 Notice of Entry – Probate Commissioner R&R (Hearing re Utkin removal) APP-ROA-1402-1408 11/13/18 Notice of Entry – Order Affirming Probate Commissioner R&R (Utkin removal) APP-ROA-1409-1414

Electronically Filed 3/12/2018 3:00 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

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Attorney for Jacqueline Utkin,
Successor Trustee to the Christian Family Trust
Dated October 11, 2016

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the

THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST

Dept.: (PC-1) 26

Dated October 11, 2016

REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF CO-PETITIONERS

COMES NOW, Jacqueline Utkin ("Utkin"), Successor Trustee to the Christian Family

Trust, dated October 11, 2016 ("CFT"), by and through her attorneys of record, Jerimy Kirschner & Associates, PLLC., and hereby files this Reply to Opposition to Petition to Confirm Successor Trustee; and Opposition to Counter-Petition for Reinstatement of Co-Petitioners ("Reply"). This Reply is made based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the exhibits thereto, the papers and pleadings already on file herein and any oral argument the Court may permit at a hearing of this matter.

Page 1 of 8

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. **INTRODUCTION**

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Fundamentally, this is a Court of law and what has been brought before the court is a trust, a document grounded in contractual law. It is a basic tenant of trust law that a court cannot consider parol evidence to alter the clear terms of a trust. The Nevada Supreme Court reiterated this point again within the last year, finding after de novo review, that a district court erred in considering parol evidence to determine the parties' intent behind a trust when the language of the trust was unambiguous. Klabacka v. Nelson, 394 P.3d 940, 946 (Nev. 2017). ("Additionally, where a written contract is clear and unambiguous on its face, extraneous evidence cannot be introduced to explain its meaning....Extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous written instrument, since all prior negotiations and agreements are deemed to have been merged therein.") (Internal citations omitted).

The Contesting Beneficiaries' opposition and counter-petition ("Opposition") contains not one iota of legal support for their position, while alleging facts that have no bearing on the clear language of the trust instrument. The unambiguous terms of the Trust have been followed by Trustee Utkin and her predecessors, and the result is Trustee Utkin as the current trustee of the CFT. The remaining allegations in the Opposition are at best inadmissible and at worst frivolous. Trustee Utkin served Contesting Beneficiaries with a Rule 11 letter in hopes that they would withdraw their frivolous Opposition and avoid a waste of CFT resources, but they have refused. 1 As such, Trustee Utkin renews her request to have this court confirm her as successor trustee, and to deny Contesting Beneficiaries' countermotion for appointment.

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¹ Trustee Utkin does not herein seek Rule 11 sanctions as she understands the same must be made by separate motion. Trustee Utkin mentions it herein as she delayed her Reply to allow Contesting Beneficiaries as much time as was possible to withdraw the Opposition under the safe harbor, but they have filed to do so.

II. ARGUMENT

A. CONTESTING BENEFICIARIES FAIL TO MAKE EVEN A PRIMA FACIE ARGUMENT FOR THEIR APPOINTMENT.

Contesting Beneficiaries' Opposition does not identify a single provision of the CFT which is ambiguous, enjoins of the appointment of Trustee Utkin, or requires their own reappointment.

Instead, Contesting Beneficiaries' make the boldly unsupported position that Monte Reason's original appointment was somehow invalid:

- "While only 'nominated', given the court involvement at the time, Monte was never confirmed as trustee by the court" Pg. 3, Ln 2-3.
- "The problem is that Monte was never confirmed to be the trustee, therefore never having the authority to bind the trust, and his "nomination" of Ms. Utkin is worthless." Pg. 3, Ln. 5-7
- "He was never confirmed as trustee by the court, and therefore had no court approved authority to even act. If he had no authority to act, by virtue of the court never confirming him as trustee, his nomination of Jacqueline Utkin is equally improper, and her petition should be denied." Pg. 3, Ln. 24-28
- "It has been suggested that as Monte Reason was never confirmed as trustee, (the court initially had a problem with his ability to serve), he had no authority to act, and therefore could not legally nominate Ms. Utkin" Pg. 8, Ln. 13-16

To be clear, Monte Reason became the trustee on June 21, 2017. (*see*, Mot. Pg. 3, Ln. 3-22), while this action was not initiated by Contesting Beneficiaries until July 31, 2017, *i.e.* he was a trustee before this action was filed. There is no prerequisite under Nevada law for a Court to confirm a change in trustee for a trust or confirm appointment of a successor trustee, nor do the Contesting Beneficiaries cite any authority for this position. In fact, a trust can go through multiple changes to trustees without ever involving a court, indeed that is often the main point of a trust.

Even if a Court takes jurisdiction over a trust, there is no legal bar to a trustee exercising his power to appoint a successor trustee absent some injunctive relief. Once again, Contesting Beneficiaries cite no authority for the proposition that Monte Reason's powers as trustee were enjoined merely by them petitioning this Court. Moreover, a cursory review of the record for this

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action will show that no injunction has been asked for or granted. The position has no basis in law or fact.

On the other hand, Trustee Utkin provides a clear line of succession leading to her appointment pursuant to the unambiguous terms of the trust, while the Contesting Beneficiaries cannot point to a single term of the CFE or applicable law which prevents Trustee Utkin from being confirmed as successor trustee. The choice for the Court is clear, Trustee Utkin must be confirmed as the successor trustee.

B. THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST PREVENING APPOINTMENT

Contesting Beneficiaries' assertion that Trustee Utkin's "personal opinions" conflict with her trustee duties is speculative and is not disqualifying in the least. A trustee is not required to like every beneficiary, they only need to abide by the terms of the trust and their fiduciary duties. There is no requirement in the CFE for a trustee to be happy with every beneficiary, so once again Contesting Beneficiaries are reaching outside for parol evidence. Furthermore, they cite no legal authority which would cause a disqualification of Trustee Utkin as a trustee; the argument is a whole cloth fabrication built upon speculation of what "could happen" not an actual event demonstrating a violation of a fiduciary duty. A beneficiary does not get to rewrite a trust merely because they have a personal dispute with the trustee. Trustee Utkin is ready, willing and able to perform her duties as trustee and will not overwrite the terms of the trust for her will.

The claim that Trustee Utkin is attempting to extort an agreement is absurd. She is entitled to the EIN as the trustee and needs it to cash the \$5,000.00 check sent by Contesting Beneficiaries to "Trustee Utkin" which is supposed to be used to preserve trust assets. She will not mix the trust funds with her personal funds to avoid an intermingling allegation, especially when the matter is a contentious as this one. Such precautions should be lauded by Contesting Beneficiaries, but instead they claim the request for an EIN is an extortion and refuse to turn it over.

Contesting Beneficiaries have also requested that she fight the Barney Firm's fees, but have not identified a factual or legal predicate for doing so. Trustor Nancy Christian incurred a substantial amount of debt fighting Contesting Beneficiaries' attempts to invalidate her

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modification of the CFT. The CFT is not an asset protection trust, and the Barney Firm is fully within its rights to pursue creditor claims against Nancy Christian's assets and those of the CFT. Nancy Christian's contractual debt to the Barney firm is not subject to a *Brunzell* factor analysis, which significantly limits the grounds for objections. The debt is only subject to those defenses one would assert to defeat contractual enforcement. Thus, Contesting Beneficiaries are asking Trustee Utkin to pick a losing fight while simultaneously arguing the Trust is incurring too much in attorney's fees.

There is no illicit agreement to avoid contesting the Barney Firm's fees, and in fact the communications cited by Contesting Beneficiaries were disclosed by the Barney Firm as part of its petition for fees. Trustee Utkin has reviewed the billings, and consulted with counsel about the same. The conclusion is that it is a valid debt that can reach assets of the CFT and that fighting payment would result in significant legal fees and a reduced distribution to all CFT beneficiaries. The rationale has legal and factual support, and also keeps the focus on maximizing CFT assets available for distribution. This should be any trustee's goal, not grounds to malign Trustee Utkin.

Moreover, Trustee Utkin has never even hinted that she was conditioning a fight against the Barney Firm on Contesting Beneficiaries' acquiescing to her appointment as trustee. She is trustee based on the unambiguous terms of the CFT and after proper appointment under its terms, there is no need to negotiate for that. The point in asking for Contesting Beneficiaries' support was to keep legal costs down by avoiding needless filings and battles before the court. Contesting Beneficiaries refused, which has now generated this motion-work.

C. THERE IS NOTHING IMPROPER ABOUT TRUSTEE UTKIN'S COUNSEL HAVING PREVIOSLY WORKED WITH THE BARNEY FIRM ON A SEPARATE MATTER.

Trustee Utkin can only guess as to what point the Contesting Beneficiaries are attempting to make about her counsel since they cite no fact or legal authority which acts to disqualify them. Trustee Utkin's counsel has previously co-counseled, and also litigated against, the Barney Firm in different matters; Trustee Utkin's counsel has also litigated against Contesting Beneficiaries' counsel in the past. There is nothing disqualifying about these facts.

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Monte Reason elected to appoint Trustee Utkin as the successor trustee on January 4, 2018 (See, Mtn. Pg. 4, Ln. 17-24, see also Exhibit 6). Since Trustee Utkin is not allowed to represent the trustee pro see, she needed counsel. See, Salman v. Newell, 110 Nev. 1333, 1336, 885 P.2d 607, 608 (1994) ("no rule or statute permits a [non-lawyer] to represent any other person, a company, a trust or any other entity" in either the district court or the Nevada Supreme Court.)(emphasis added). Trustee Utkin thus retained the undersigned, which she had every right to do. There is nothing improper about that representation, and Contesting Beneficiaries do not articulate any legal rationale for disqualification.

Next, Contesting Beneficiaries' suggestion of a "litigation train" is absurd and attempts to cast burden on Nancy Christian for protecting her rights under the CFT. The court will recall the petition challenging her amendment, which was based on inadmissible extrinsic evidence, was made by Contesting Beneficiaries. It was the Contesting Beneficiaries' refusal to turn over trust funds or properly account for them that generated motions to compel. It was Contesting Beneficiaries' repeated challenges to the authority of the prior trustee which generated additional fees. If there is a "litigation train" then Contesting Beneficiaries are its conductor taking everyone else on an unwanted ride through the courts.

D. THERE IS NOTHING FURTHER DISQUALIFYING TRUSTEE UTKIN

Contesting Beneficiaries can point to no violation of a fiduciary duty by Trustee Utkin, instead engaging in circular logic and a Gish gallop which they hope will confuse the court. For example, Contesting Beneficiaries state "[i]t has been suggested that as Monte Reason was never confirmed as trustee, (the court initially had a problem with his ability to serve)," but the only parties suggesting this were themselves, not the court. In fact, they challenged the former trustee's position without any support under the law or the trust itself, i.e. the Contesting Beneficiaries are citing themselves as an authority. Going further, there has no requirement to obtain court approval of Monte Reason as the prior trustee, nor any "backdoor agreement" to pay the Barney Firm. Naked allegations insinuate misconduct are improper, unsupported, and are tantamount to conspiracy theories.

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Finally, demands that Trustee Utkin submit to a physical are absurd and once again unsupported by any fact based in reality. Being older does not disqualify someone from being a trustee, and there is no law or equitable right which allows them to require a physical as a precondition to becoming trustee. If Contesting Beneficiaries are so concerned, they can take Trustee Utkin's deposition, which they are entitled to do as part of discovery. This most recent salvo is as frivolous and vexatious as the rest of their arguments in this matter. As such, it must be denied. CONCLUSION III. Utkin asks this court for an Order confirming that she is the sole trustee of the CFT. DATED this 12th day of March, 2018. JERIMY KIRSCHNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC /s/ Jerimy L. Kirschner, Esq. JERIMY L. KIRSCHNER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12012 5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Suite 320 Las Vegas, NV 89149 Attorney for Jacqueline Utkin, Successor Trustee to the Christian Family Trust Dated October 11, 2016 VERIFICATION OF JACQUELINE UTKIN FOR PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE I, JACQUELINE UTKIN, declare that: 1. I am submitting a" REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF CO-PETITIONERS" 2. I know the contents of the Reply, which I know to be true of my own knowledge, except for those matters stated on information and belief. I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true acqueline HK and correct. 12 /2018 Pacquerine Utkin Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I am an employee of Jerimy Kirschner & Associates, PLLC, and on March 12, 2018, I caused a copy of the foregoing REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF CO-PETITIONERS to be served through the electronic court filing system or via first class, US mail, postage prepaid upon the following persons/entities:

Cary Colt Payne, Esq. Cary Colt Payne, Chtd. 700 S. 8th St. Las Vegas, NV 89101

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Attorney for Susan Christian-Payne, Rosemary Keach and Raymond Christian, Jr.

Joey Powell, Esq. Rushforth, Lee & Kiefer LLP 1707 Village Center Circle, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89134 Attorney for Monte Reason

/s/ Sarah Mintz

An Employee of JERIMY KIRSCHNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of
THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST u.a.d. 10/11/16

Case No. P-17-092512-T Department S/Judge Ochoa (Probate) Clark District Family Domestic

Hearing date: March 15, 2018 Hearing time: 2 p.m.

RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION TO MONTE REASON'S APPLICATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

Monte B. Reason ("Monte"), by and through his counsel of record, Joseph J. Powell, Esq. of Rushforth Lee & Kiefer LLP, hereby submits his Response to the Opposition to his Application for reimbursement of the legal fees and costs he incurred while serving as trustee of the "Christian Family Trust", dated October 11, 2016 (the "Trust"), which is set for hearing on March 15, 2018. On March 9, 2018, Susan Christian-Payne, Rosemary Keach, and Raymond Christian (collectively referred to herein as the "Objectors"), by and through their counsel, Cary Colt Payne, Esq., of Cary Colt Payne, Chtd., filed their "Combined Opposition to (1) Barney Firm Petition for Fees, Etc. (2) Monte Reason's Application for Reimbursement" ("Opposition"). Monte responds to the Opposition as follows:

I. BLATANTLY FALSE STATEMENT AND INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

Unfortunately, the Objectors, through their attorney, continue to make knowingly false statements to this Court in a clear attempt to deceive this Court and manipulate facts that disrupt their contrived, manipulated narrative. It is necessary to analyze all of the misstatements from this outset, as the Opposition is replete with them. The following is a list of the false and intentionally deceptive statements made by the Objectors, which are made with a clear disregard for the ethical duty of candor required to be submitted to this Court:

- 1. Nancy Christian is *merely* a "deceased income beneficiary". **FALSE**.

 Nancy Christian was a co-settlor of the Christian Family Trust (the "Trust"). She co-created the Trust with her late husband, Raymond Christian, Sr. The Trust was just as much her trust as it was her husband's. The Trust was to be administered for her benefit, and her benefit only, during her lifetime, as the surviving co-settlor.
- 2. "When Nancy died her rights in the trust were divested". **FALSE**. A settlor, and then their Estate after death, always has rights and involvement in a trust, through their representative, that they participated in creating. Again, Nancy co-created the Trust. It was her trust. Nancy's rights and remedies regarding her trust and the actions of the Objectors do not suddenly disappear because of her death. The actions taken by the Objectors which deprived her of the use and enjoyment of her trust do not suddenly get swept under the rug because of Nancy's passing, despite how desperately the Objectors wish it were true.
- 3. "Monte Reason was not confirmed by the [Court] as trustee of the trust.

 Because someone was nominated, it does not, with a pending court
 matter, make them a bona fide fiduciary. If so, anyone could simply

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claim they are a trustee". FALSE REPRESENTATION. Reason served as trustee of the Trust based on a nomination for him to serve which was made by Nancy Christian, a co-creator of the Trust, who under the express terms of the Trust had the power and authority to choose any trustee that she wished to serve1. The nomination and acceptance occurred well before there was any pending court proceeding. Monte was able to serve and did serve as trustee without any requirement that this Court, or any court for that matter, first approve his ability to serve. It is a blatant lie to this Court, and a complete violation of the duty of candor to this Court under the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, pursuant to Rule 3.32, to state that a trustee must be confirmed by a court order before they can serve as a trustee. Further, if this blatantly false "requirement" was necessary, then apparently the Objectors were never able to serve as trustees of the Trust, a trust co-created by Nancy Christian, either because no court order was ever signed which approved them to serve as trustee.

- 4. Monte never undertook an affirmative act to serve as trustee. FALSE.
 Monte signed a Certificate of Incumbency on June 21, 2017, in which he affirmatively accepted the nomination of Nancy Christian to serve as trustee of the Trust.
- 5. "The court had issues with Monte's ability to serve in its Decision and Order, filed 10/31/17, and did not confirm his as trustee". **FALSE**. The

[&]quot;After the Death of the first Trustor to die, the surviving Trustor shall have the power to change the Trustee or Successor Trustee of the Trust by an instrument in writing signed by the surviving Trustor and delivered to the Trustee." See Article 9.3 of the Trust.

Rule 3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal.

⁽a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

⁽¹⁾ Make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

Objectors and their counsel know that the Court never voiced any "issues" about Monte in its Decision and Order. Rather, the Court simply included the claims of the Objectors to acknowledge that the Objectors made assertions about Monte being the Trustee. In fact, at the hearing, the Court specifically acknowledged that Monte was the current serving trustee.

- 6. "Nancy did not contribute a single penny or separate property to the trust corpus, . . .". FALSE. The real property located at 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue, Las Vegas, Nevada 89123, with an APN of 177-27-611-254, was purchased by Raymond Christian and Nancy Christian, "as husband and wife as joint tenants" on or about June 11, 2009. A copy of the "Grant, Bargain and Sale Deed" is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. The Dancing Vines Avenue Property was held in joint tenancy until approximately October 19, 2016, a time frame of over 7 years and 3 months, at which point the Property was then jointly transferred to the Trust by settlors of the Trust, Nancy and Raymond. Knowing this stone cold fact, the Objectors, and their counsel, still knowingly made this blatant false statement to this Court in violation of Rule 3.3 of the Nevada Professional Rules of Conduct.
- 7. "When Nancy died, her interest[s] in the trust were divested". FALSE.

 Nancy co-created the Trust. The Trust was her trust and remains her trust. Her requirements and the obligations contained within her trust remain in full force and effect, despite her passing. Further, mistreatment of Nancy and her rights by the Objectors acts do not miraculously vanish and become irrelevant because of her death.

 Lawsuits and claims simply do not become extinguished because of a plaintiff's death. The same applies for a settlor and a beneficiary. To use

the absurd, unfounded logic of the Objectors if Nancy had a pending lawsuit against a defendant for actions in violation of her rights, would the lawsuit suddenly disappear and be unable to be further prosecuted by her representative? Of course not! Just like the Objectors' actions remain subject to scrutiny after Nancy's passing do as well.

8. "When Nancy passed, so did her power to appoint or select a different trustee." "Upon Nancy's death, Monte had no legal right to select a new trustee". FALSE. These two statements, taken together, are intentional misrepresentations of the powers found under the Trust. First, Nancy's right to determine the successor trustees and the plan of succession remain in full force even after her passing. Therefore, to state that her power to decide how succession of trustees would work after her passing is a blatantly false, deceptive statement. Second, the Trust expressly provides that Monte had the power to choose his successor once Wells Fargo chose to decline to serve. Section 8.1 of the Trust expressly provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

8.1 Successor Trustee. In the event of the death or incapacity of any current Trustee, the remaining Trustees shall act as Co-Trustees or sole Trustee, as the case may be. In determining the incapacity of any Trustee serving hereunder, the guidelines set forth in Section 3.1 may be followed. If no Successor Trustee is designated to act in the event of the death, incapacity or resignation of the Trustee then acting, or no Successor Trustee accepts the office, the Trustee then acting may appoint a Successor Trustee. [Emphasis Added]

II. FURTHER ANALYSIS OF BLATANTLY FALSE STATEMENTS AND INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE COURT

A trustee serves upon nomination and acceptance. In typical fashion the Objectors, via their counsel, have falsely claimed to this Court that a trustee cannot legally serve in the office of trustee until they have been confirmed in a court proceeding. Noticeably absent from this claim is even a shred of support for this laughably false claim, that they know is being made to deceive.

RUSHFORTH LEE & KIEFER LLP TRUST AND ESTATE ATTORNEYS As this Court wells knows, pursuant to Nevada law, an intervivos trust does not require any court approval to be created, nor during any part of its administration. Further, any changes to a trust, including the removal and replacement of a trustee, are not statutorily required to be confirmed by a court, at any time. Additionally, a trustee is not required to be confirmed by a court proceeding prior to their service as trustee. Succinctly put, a Nevada court has no jurisdiction over a trust until jurisdiction is first assumed.

For the Objectors to claim that Monte was not able to accept to the nomination of Nancy Christian to serve as trustee of the Trust until after he was confirmed by a Nevada court is a complete lie and an intentionally false statement to this Court, being made with an intent to deceive, in violation of Rule 3.3 of the Nevada Professional Rules of Conduct. To reiterate, the Objectors provide no support whatsoever for this blatantly false proposition that Monte, or any other trustee, for that matter, cannot assume the position of trustee until they have first been confirmed by a court action. If this was a requirement, certainly the Objectors could cite to a Nevada statute to support this. They do not, and they cannot, because there is no such legal requirement found under Nevada law. However, instead of being honest and upfront with this Court, they continue their pattern of making deceitful statements that they know cannot be legally supported. Accordingly, this type of conduct must be sanctioned by this Court.

As previously stated, if the lie asserted by the Objectors was truthful, then the logical question is "Why was their no legal proceeding to confirm the Objectors prior to their becoming trustees?". If such was the requirement prior to the Objectors becoming trustees of the Trust, then by an extension of their logic, they too could not have legally served as trustees until they there was a court order which allowed them to serve. Clearly, the Objectors did not obtain such court authority so by their same rationale, they were never legally the trustees of the Trust.

Unlike the Objectors, Monte can conclusively establish for this Court that no Nevada court has jurisdiction over a trust until a court accepts jurisdiction over a trust and that decision is not made until a party seeks to have a court accept jurisdiction over a trust that they have some recognizable interest/standing in.

NRS 164.010, which is partially titled "Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction" provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

- 1. **Upon petition** of any person appointed as trustee of an express trust by any written instrument other than a will, or upon petition of a settlor or beneficiary of the trust, the district court of the county in which the trustee resides or conducts business, or in which the trust has been domiciled, **shall consider the application to assume jurisdiction of the trust** as a proceeding in rem.
- 2. **If the court grants the petition**, the court:
 (a) **Has jurisdiction of the trust** as a proceeding in rem:

[Emphasis Added]

As stated, a inter vivos trust is not required to have any part or portion of it monitored by a Nevada court, be it the creation, administration, or distribution. Jurisdiction over a trust is *only* created by the issuance of an express order made by a Nevada court. Therefore, to reiterate, for the Objectors to falsely state that a trustee, including Monte, is only able to serve as a trustee after a court has confirmed such is a willful attempt to deceive this Court and a flagrant violation of Rule 3.3 of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct.

 $\underline{\textit{Monte affirmatively accepted the nomination of his mother and served as}} \\ \underline{\textit{trustee}}$

Monte was nominated by a co-settlor/creator of the Trust to serve as trustee of the Trust. This was done in the "Modification and Designation of Trustee and Successor Trustee" which was executed by Nancy Christian on June 12, 2017 ("Modification and Designation"). Prior to execution by Nancy Christian, the Modification and Designation was independently review by Attorney Sean Tanko and a certificate of independent review was issued by Attorney Tanko on June 6, 2017. Both of those documents have previously been filed multiple times in this matter.

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Acting on the nomination for him to serve as trustee of the Trust made under the Modification and Designation, Monte accepted such nomination and confirmed such acceptance in writing, as required under the Modification and Designation, by executing a Certificate of Incumbency on June 21, 2017 ("Certificate of Incumbency"). The Certificate of Incumbency was promptly recorded with the Clark County Recorder and the Objector's attorney was sent a copy on June 27, 2017 of Certificate of Incumbency by Attorney Powell notifying him of the acceptance of the nomination by Monte. Therefore, not only did Monte affirmatively accept the nomination of the co-settlor, who expressly had the right to do so under the explicit terms of the Trust, the Objectors', and their counsel, were also promptly notified that Monte had become the trustee. The fact that the Objectors did not want to be removed is irrelevant. It was not their choice to make. It was not their trust. Further, as they have repeatedly tried to misrepresent, it was not only their father's trust. It was a co-created trust. Additionally, this Court should sanction the Objectors, along with their counsel, each and every time that they falsely claim that Monte was expressly prohibited, or more aptly that Nancy Christian was prohibited from nominating Monte, to serve as trustee of the Trust. The express terms of the Trust contain no such limitation, nor any insinuation whatsoever.

As this Court well knows, Nevada law follows the "four corners of the document" principle, meaning that the Court must apply the terms of the Trust as the words are written. See *Jones v. First Nat. Bank*, 72 Nev. 121, 123 (1956)³

[&]quot;A court may not vary the terms of a will to conform to the court's views at to the trust testamentary intent. The question before us is not what the testatrix actually intended or what she meant to write. Rather it is confined to a determination of the meaning of the words used by her. As stated by Wigram, (Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of The Determination of Wills, Second American Edition, pages 53 and 54) any evidence is admissible which, in its nature and effect, simply explains what the testator has written; but no evidence can be admissible which, in its nature or effect, is applicable to the purpose of showing merely what he intended to have written. In other words, the question in expounding a will is not-What the testator meant? As distinguished from-What his words express? but simply-What is the meaning of his words?...." Jones v. First Nat. Bank, 72 Nev. 121, 123 (1956)

and Frei ex rel. Litem v. Goodsell, 129 Nev. 403, 409 (2013)4.

Not only was Monte able to serve as trustee, but he served as trustee. And, most importantly, during the time that he served as trustee, he had the right to hire counsel to represent him, which he did when he hired Rushforth Lee & Kiefer LLP ("RLK"). Further, Monte had the right to pay RLK with funds from the Trust, and would have already done so during his tenure at trustee, but for the willful and intentional conversion of the Trust's funds by the Objectors which prevented him from having access to the Trust's funds. Hence, despite the Objectors' claim, RLK does not need, as it is not required, to make any showing under *Brunzell*, as RLK is not applying, and does not need to apply, for the approval of its fees by this Court. The Application is made by Monte for access, via the current trustee, Ms. Utkin, to have RLK paid from the Trust's funds which this Court has locked up and for which Monte had not access to during his tenure as trustee because of the Objectors' wrongful actions.

///

[&]quot;Extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or vary the terms of an unambiguous written instrument," 'since all prior negotiations and agreements are deemed to have been merged therein." Frei ex rel. Litem v. Goodsell, 129 Nev. 403, 409 (2013)

^{(&}quot;If the language of the trust instrument is plain and capable of legal construction, that language determines the force and effect of the instrument ... [and] extrinsic evidence will not be admitted to alter the plain language of the instrument.") Id.

IV. CONCLUSION/PRAYER

Monte Reason hereby requests that this Application be granted and approved in its entirety. Further, all additional legal fees and costs incurred in having to file this Response should also be paid from the Trust by Ms. Utkin, the current trustee of the Trust.

Respectfully submitted by:

Joseph J. Powell

Date State Bar. No. 8875

MAR 1 3 2018

1707 Village Center Circle, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89134-0597

Attorneys for Monte B. Reason

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

20090611-0004162

Fee: \$16.00 RPTT: \$566.10 N/C Fee: \$0.00 06/11/2009 16:20:35 T20090205216 Requestor: OLD REPUBLIC TITLE COMPANY O Debbie Conway JAU Clark County Recorder Pgs: 4

R.P.T.T.: \$566.10 APN: 177-27-611-254

Title Order No. 5115012770 Escrow No. 5115012770-JC

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: Raymond Christian and Nancy I. Christian 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89123

MAIL TAX STATEMENTS TO: Grantee at address above

SPACE ABOVE THIS LINE FOR RECORDER'S USE

GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

FOR A VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6

hereby GRANT(S), BARGAIN(S), SELL(S) AND CONVEY(S) to

Raymond Christian and Nancy I. Christian, husband and wife as , joint tenants

that property in Clark County, Nevada, described as:

*** See "Exhibit A" attached hereto and made a part hereof ***

Dated May 26, 2009

HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6, by Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, as

its attorney-in-fact

Title:

Page 1 of 2

. Containe Hillion marchaean...

By:

GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

State of County of	Arilone Mariene			
This instrume	ent was acknowle	dged before me on	06.024	? f
as A	St Sec	of	Greenpoi	nt Mtgrunding
Signature of	peterial officers			
			JEREMAS LOPEZ-VEG. Notary Public - Arizoni Maricopa County Comm. Expires Mar 26,	
			the same of the sa	

Deremias Lopez-Veya Exp. Mar. 26,2013

Page 2 of 2

GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

ORDER NO.: 5115012770-JC

EXHIBIT A

The land referred to is situated in the County of Clark, City of Las Vegas, State of Nevada, and is described as follows:

Parcel I:

Lot Three Hundred Fifteen (315) in Block One (1) of Silverado South Unit 2, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 84 of Plats, Page 64, in the office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada and amended by Certificate of Amendment recorded June 22, 1998 in Book 980622 as Document No. 01333 and by Certificate of Amendment recorded August 5, 1998 in Book 980805 as Document No. 00558, both of Official Records.

Parcel II:

An easement for ingress and egress over the private streets as delineated on the plat of the final map of Silverado South Unit 2.

STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE FORM

1. Assessor Parcel Number(s) 177-27-611-254	
2. Type of Property a) Vacant Land b) Single Fan c) Condo/Twnhse e) Apt. Bidg g) Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural Agricultural	FOR RECORDER'S OPTIONAL USE ONLY Book: Page: Date of Recording:
Other	Notes:
 Total Value/Sales Price of Property Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of Transfer Tax Value Real Property Transfer Tax Due 	\$111,000.00 f property) () \$111,000.00 \$566.10
4. If Exemption Claimed; a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375. b. Explain Reason for Exemption:	090, Section
375.060 and NRS 375.110, that the information and belief, and can be supported the information provided herein. Furthermore claimed exemption, or other determination of	by documentation if called upon to substantiate e, the parties agree that disallowance of any additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% Pursuant to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller ditional amount owed.
Signature / / /	Capacity: Grantor
Signature / /	Capacity: Grantee
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)
HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-6	Raymond Christian and Nancy I. Christian
2300 Brookstone Centre Parkway	1060 Dancing Vines Avenue
Columbus, GA 31904	Las Vegas, NV 89123
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RE	CORDING (required if not seller or buyer)
Old Republic Title Company of Nevada 8861 W. Sahara Ave. Suite 290 Las Vegas, NV 89117	Escrow #: 5115012770-JC

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

Electronically Filed
3/13/2018 4:55 PM
Steven D. Grierson
CLERK OF THE COURT

1 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, ESQ. NV State Bar No. 8366 2 TIFFANY S. BARNEY, ESQ. NV State Bar No. 9754 3 ZACHARY D. HOLYOAK, ESO. 4 NV State Bar No. 14217 ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD. 5 3317 W. Charleston Boulevard, Suite B Las Vegas, NV 89102-1835 6 Telephone: (702) 438-7878 7 Facsimile: (702) 259-1116 E-Mail: office@anthonybarney.com 8 Prior Attorneys for Nancy Christian, Creditors of The Christian Family Trust 9

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the

Case Number: P-17-092512-T

THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST

Dept.: S

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Dated October 11,2016

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REPLY TO PETITIONER'S COMBINED OPPOSITION TO 1) BARNEY FIRM PETITION FOR FEES, ETC., (2) MONTE REASON'S APPLICATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT

Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., creditor of The Christian Family Trust dated October 11, 2016 ("Trust"), who were the attorneys for the late Nancy Christian ("Nancy" or "Trustor"), hereby files their reply to Susan-Christian Payne, Rosemary Keach, and Raymond Christian's Combined Opposition to Anthony L. Barney, Ltd.'s petition for fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the Trust. This Reply is based upon the pleadings and papers on file herein, the memorandum of points and authorities and exhibits attached hereto, and any oral arguments presented at the time of the hearing.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Cary Colt Payne, Esq., has a modus operandi of arguing everything he possibly can and/or placing anything onto the court record he possibly can (in this and other cases) even if there is no proper legal application or factual basis for such spurious arguments. He does so in an attempt to confuse the judiciary, distract the Court from the real issues of a matter, and to attempt to prevent the appropriate relief from being provided to parties while heavily billing his clients, trusts and/or probate estates. He continues to do so in this matter.

Preliminarily, the Court must be aware that Mr. Payne's entire argument must be rejected in its entirety based upon the following Trust provision:

11.1 Protection. Trustees shall not be liable for any loss or injury to the property at any time held by them hereunder, except only such as may result from their fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence. Every election, determination, or other exercise by Trustees of any discretion vested, either expressly or by implication, in them, pursuant to this Trust Agreement, whether made upon a question actually raised or implied in their acts and proceedings, shall be conclusive and binding upon all parties in interest. (Emphasis added.)

Herein, both of the Successor Trustees have approved the fees of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd. ("ALB Law Firm") because the Trustee had the discretion to do so and, based upon their discretion, their decisions are conclusive and binding upon all parties, including the Petitioners. The only reason these fees were not previously paid during Nancy's life is because Mr. Payne and his clients improperly sequestered the Trust funds and refused to relinquish control to the properly appointed Successor Trustee. Without arguing fraud, willful misconduct, or gross negligence, Mr. Payne and his clients have no legitimate argument to prevent the ALB Law Firm from being paid its fees and costs for the work done on behalf of Nancy Christian in furthering the intents and purposes of the Trust. Because of Mr. Payne's improper sequestration of Trust funds and his client's frivolous arguments regarding the terms of the Trust, the ALB

Law Firm was forced to petition the court for fees and costs to release the fees and costs that are currently frozen pursuant to this Court's order.

Furthermore, Payne's opposition must be rejected because it was severely untimely. ALB Law Firm filed its petition on February 8, 2018 and served petition on Mr. Payne on February 9, 2018. A notice of hearing on the petition was also filed on February 8, 2018 and served on February 9, 2018. Mr. Payne waited 29 days, until March 9, 2018, to file his opposition, thereby limiting the ALB Law Firm's time to respond to less than five (5) judicial days.

EDCR 2.20(e) provides:

Within 10 days after the service of the motion, and 5 days after service of any joinder to the motion, the opposing party must serve and file written notice of nonopposition or opposition thereto, together with a memorandum of points and authorities and supporting affidavits, if any, stating facts showing why the motion and/or joinder should be denied. Failure of the opposing party to serve and file written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion and/or joinder is meritorious and a consent to granting the same.

If the Court treats ALB Law Firm's Petition as a motion, Payne had ten (10) days to file a response to the Petition, which he also failed to do. However, if the Court treats the Petition as a complaint under NRCP 12(a), Mr. Payne had twenty (20) days to file a responsive pleading after service of the Petition.

Even under the most generous possible timing calculations and including an additional three (3) days under NRCP 6, Mr. Payne had until March 5, 2018 to file a responsive pleading to the Amended Petition. Mr. Payne simply failed to do so. The only way Mr. Payne could have extended the time for filing his opposition is through Nevada Assembly Bill 314 ("AB 314") at Section 34 which was adopted into Nevada and which provides:

Notwithstanding any provision in this title, if an act is authorized or required to be performed at or within a specified period pursuant to this chapter: 1. The period may be extended upon the agreement of all interested persons, by written stipulation of counsel

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filed in the action; or 2. The court, for good cause shown, may at any time: (a) Regardless of whether there has been a motion, petition or notice, order that the period be extended if a request for the extension is made before the expiration of the specified period as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; or (b) Upon a motion made after the expiration of the specified period, authorize a person to perform the act if the failure to perform the act in a timely manner was the result of excusable neglect. (Emphasis added)

Mr. Payne failed to seek or obtain agreement from the parties for an extension of time to file. He failed to obtain from the Court an extension of time prior to the expiration of the deadline. Finally, Mr. Payne has failed to make a motion after the deadline to file explaining the excusable neglect which would justify his failure to file a timely opposition. Therefore, Payne's Opposition should be denied in its entirety.

If this Court is even inclined to entertain Mr. Payne's Opposition despite its clear inapplicability and it untimely filing, ALB Law Firm presents the following substantive reply to Payne's arguments. In response, to Mr. Payne's scattered, spurious, and incorrect arguments, the ALB Law Firm, will first provide the Court with the incorrect statements Cary Colt Payne, Esq. (on behalf of his clients) has made in his Combined Opposition and then explain with facts and law why he is incorrect. The ALB Law Firm is providing this information in such a way as to simplify the issues for the Judge since Cary Colt Payne, Esq., has attempted to make this issue much more factually or legally complex than it actually is. Please note that the ALB Law Firm is only responding to the objections raised toward the ALB Law Firm and not the objections raised against Monte Reason, whose legal counsel has already responded in this matter.

A. Incorrect Factual and Legal Conclusions by Cary Colt Payne, Esq.

The following statements are incorrect and/or are founded upon incorrect assumptions made by Cary Colt Payne, Esq. ("Mr. Payne") and his incorrect allegations and incorrect reading of the Trust, case law and statutory authority in the order that they were presented in his objection. The sections below that will correct the following sanctionable and false representations made by Mr. Payne to this Court. The following are a list of Mr. Payne's falsehoods and section denoting its necessary correction:

- 1. ALB Law Firm has no legal standing to bring the petition. Correction in Section B(I).
- 2. There is no contractual right nor statutory authority to award legal fees to the creditors of a dead income beneficiary. Correction in Section B(I)
- 3. The Christian Family Trust is a "directed (discretionary) trust". Correction in Section B(II)
- 4. When Nancy died, all of her rights in the trust were "divested". Correction in Section B(III)
- 5. ALB Law Firm failed to mitigate its damages. Correction in Section B (III)
- 6. The Christian Family Trust is a "form of directed (discretionary) trust with a spendthrift provision." Correction in Section B(II)
- 7. The Trust only provided that Petitioners may pay Nancy, who only held a right to income during her life. Correction in Section B(II)
- 8. The Trust does not hold community property. Correction in Section B(II)
- ALB Law Firm is not a creditor of the Christian Family Trust. Correction in Section
 B)(I)
- 10. Nancy did not contribute a "single penny" or separate property to the trust corpus.

 Correction in Section B(II)
- 11. Any purported community property "claim" must first be brought in Nancy's personal estate. Correction in Section B(III)
- 12. Nancy's assertions are hearsay. Correction in Section B(IV).

- 13. Trust property should be distributed prior to Nancy's death. Correction in Section B (IV).
- 14. The Trust has no provision to pay any of Nancy's creditors. Correction in Section B(II).
- 15. ALB Law Firm is a nonprobate transferee pursuant to NRS 111.779. Correction in Section B(III)
- 16. The Trust is required to follow the creditor claim process of NRS Title 12 (probate) to be able to be paid from the Christian Family Trust. Correction in Section B(III).
- 17. Mr. Payne provides the incorrect opinion and holding of the *In the Matter of Jane Tiffany Living Trust*. Correction in Section B(III)
- 18. Mr. Payne attempts to ignore the Trust provision that evidences that the spendthrift provision does not apply to the "Trustor's interest in the Trust estate". Correction in Section B(II)
- 19. Nancy only had a mere right to income during her lifetime. Correction in Section B(I) and B(II)
- 20. Nancy did not contribute any of her personal property whatsoever to the trust, and she had no other "ownership interest". Correction in Section B(II)
- 21. Nancy "only had a beneficial right to income, subject to the sole discretion of the trustees, making this Trust a discretionary trust, and therefore had absolutely no ownership interest in the Trust for any creditor to reach or be paid." Correction in Section B(II)
- 22. Because Nancy did not transfer any trust assets into her personal name, the assets of the trust are precluded from the debts or claims of Nancy's creditors. Correction in Section B(I).

- 23. NRS 163.5559 is applicable in the context that ALB Law Firm cannot seek fees from settlor (while ignoring the qualifying provision of this statute that allow ALB Law Firm to seek fees). Corrected in Section B(I).
- 24. Brock v. Premier Trust, Inc., applies to Nancy, a Trustor, although the case deals with beneficiaries. Correction in Section B (III).
- 25. After Nancy validly changed her trustee, that ALB Law Firm put up road blocks against Petitioners obtaining distributions before Nancy's death. Correction in Section B(IV)
- 26. There was a scrivener's error in the Christian Family Trust despite his clients being at the table with Nancy and negotiating the terms of the trust. Correction in Section B(IV)
- 27. David Grant, Esq., is an essential witness to prevent the payment of fees. Correction in Section B(IV).
- 28. A Trustor working in conjunction with the newly appointed trustee is suspect or invalid. Section B(IV).
- 29. Following the provisions of the trust in nominating successor trustees for the trust is invalid. Correction in Section B(IV)
- 30. A trustee must be confirmed in court for their actions to be valid, (while failing to reveal to this Court that his clients were never confirmed as trustees in this Court).
- 31. Monte Reason did not have the power to nominate a successor trustee (when the trust provisions allow for it upon his resignation and the declination of the successor trustee to serve). Correction in Section B(IV)
- 32. There was some sort of informal agreement in advance for the confirmation of a new trustee. Correction in Section B(IV)

- 33. NRS 163.417 prevents the court from requiring payment to creditors. Correction in Section B (IV)
- 34. Alleged block billing prevents the ALB Law Firm from obtaining their fee. Correction in Section B(V).
- 35. The retainer agreement is a pre-requisite before obtaining fees. Correction in Section B(V).
- 36. There is a blurring of lines between attorneys and clients in this matter. Correction in Section B(V).

All of these statements are incorrect statements of law and fact. Thus, Cary Colt Payne and his clients' Objection is further proof of their continued behavior to divert trust funds to their own pockets while forcing the Nancy as Trustor of the Trust to retain counsel to be able to even obtain the assets of the Trust to which she was entitled. Unfortunately, the Petitioners made sure that Nancy died without enjoying the benefits the Trust or living in an adequate home to which she was entitled under the terms of the Trust.

B. Corresponding Corrections to the Misrepresentations of Facts and Law

I. ALB Law Firm has standing in this matter as a creditor of Nancy Christian and has a statutory right to seek fees.

NRS 132.390(c)(8) specifically provides that a creditor of the settlor whose claim has been accepted by the Trustee is an interested person as to a Trust.¹ Here, ALB Law Firm's claim has been accepted by both Successor Trustees of the Trust and the only reason the fees were not previously paid during the life of the Trustor is because Mr. Payne and his clients have

¹ For the purposes of this title, a person is an interested person with respect to:... at trust, if the person:... Is a creditor of the settlor who has a claim which has been accepted by the trustee.

improperly sequestered the Trust funds and have caused the Court to freeze all Trust assets based upon their frivolous claims.

Furthermore, NRS 164.025(3) allows for the following:

A person having a claim, due or to become due, against a settlor or the trust must file the claim with the trustee within 90 days after the mailing, for those required to be mailed, or 90 days after publication of the first notice to creditors. Any claim against the trust estate not filed within that time is forever barred. After the expiration of the time, the trustee may distribute the assets of the trust to its beneficiaries without personal liability to any creditor who has failed to file a claim with the trustee.

Herein, the statute allows for ALB Law Firm to file a claim with this Court. This statute also provides ALB Law Firm with standing to make its claim against the Trust.

NRS 163.5559(1) also provides for a creditor of a settlor to seek to satisfy a claim against the settlor from the assets of a trust, because, herein, Nancy's interest was (1) not solely the existence of a discretionary power granted to a person other than the settlor by the terms of the trust or by operation of law or (2) not to reimburse the settlor for any tax on trust income or principal which is payable by the settlor under the law imposing such tax. Herein, Nancy's debts were acquired in furtherance of exercising her rights provided under the Trust instrument. The Trust not only provided for income (which was at the Trustee's discretion) but also gave her the absolute right (which was not discretionary) to live in the residence. The applicable Trust provision is as follows:

4.4 Use of Residence. Until the Survivor's death, the Trustee shall allow the Survivor to occupy and use any residence used by either or both Trusters as a residence at the time of the Decedent's death. The Trustee shall, **at the direction of the Survivor**, sell any such residence, and if the Survivor so directs, use the proceeds therefrom to purchase or build another residence for the Survivor. The Survivor shall not be required to pay rent or account for the use of any residence. (Emphasis added.)

Therefore, Nancy directed the Trustee as to the use, sale and building of a residence for her. She also did not have to pay rent or account for her use of any residence.

In other words, ALB Law Firm is Nancy's creditor, has standing pursuant to NRS 132.390(c)(8) and 164.025(3) and does not fall under the two criteria in NRS 165.5559(1). The services provided by the ALB Law Firm integral to the very exercise of the Trustor's rights under the Trust which were being denied by the Petitioners. Thus, ALB Law Firm can seek to satisfy its claims against the settlor from the assets of the trust and has standing in this matter to do so.

II. The Christian Family Trust is not a directed trust and while, it has a spendthrift provision, it is inapplicable to Nancy, a settlor.

Second, regarding the terms of the Trust, which is Mr. Payne's most "important" contention, Mr. Payne indicates on at least two occasions the trust is a "directed (discretionary) trust", which is incorrect. Mr. Payne provides much confusion with his incorporation of a "directed" with "discretionary" and his whole argument should be aborted, because it is inherently flawed.

A directed trust is a trust in which the trustee is directed by a number of other trust participants in implementing the execution of trust terms, such as an investment trust adviser (see NRS 163.5543), distribution trust adviser (NRS 165.5545), or trust protector (NRS 163.5547). Pursuant to NRS 163.5548, the trustee is a "directed fiduciary" with respect to any action that the fiduciary:

- 1. Has no power to take under the terms of the governing instrument;
- 2. Is mandated by the governing instrument and for which the fiduciary has no discretion to act otherwise; and
- 3. Is directed to take or prohibited from taking by a directing trust adviser.

The Trustee is then not liable for any losses that result from complying with a direction of a trust adviser.² Herein, the Petitioners admit that they all had discretion in providing for Nancy's

² NRS 163.5549 Limitations on liability of directed fiduciary.

income; therefore, by their own admission, they were not being directed by anyone in refusing to provide even a penny of trust funds to Nancy. In other words, they were not "directed fiduciaries" because they were not receiving direction from other fiduciary, including a trust investment adviser, a distribution trust adviser or a trust protector – they were admittedly exercising their own discretion in refusing to provide income to Nancy. The Trust was not a directed trust; and, unfortunately, Mr. Payne attempts to confuse the court with his language.

Furthermore, indicating that the trust was purely discretionary is also incorrect. While the Trust did provide discretion for the trustee in terms of income payments to Nancy, there was no discretion as it pertained to the residence. See Section 4.4 of the Trust quoted above. Nancy was to provide direction to the Trustee as to the use and sale of the residence, including the building of a new residence. Nancy was not required to pay rent or account for her use of <u>any</u> residence. Therefore, the Trust cannot be classified as a "discretionary trust" as to Nancy's interest in the residence.

Lastly, while Mr. Payne quotes the language of the spendthrift provision he fails to highlight the most glaring provision in the Trust document:

14.2 Spendthrift Provision. No interest in the principal or income of any trust created under this Trust Instrument shall be anticipated, assigned, encumbered or subjected to creditors' claims or legal process before actual receipt by a beneficiary. *This provision shall not apply to a Trustor's interest in the Trust estate.* The income and principal of this Trust shall be paid over to the beneficiary at the time and in the manner provided by the terms of this Trust, and not upon any written or oral order, nor upon any assignment or transfer by the beneficiary, nor by operation of law. (Emphasis added.)

^{1.} A directed fiduciary is not liable, individually or as a fiduciary for any loss which results from:

⁽a) Complying with a direction of a directing trust adviser, whether the direction is to act or to not act; or

⁽b) Failing to take any action proposed by a directed fiduciary if the action:

⁽¹⁾ Required the approval, consent or authorization of a person who did not provide the approval, consent or authorization; or

⁽²⁾ Was contingent upon a condition that was not met or satisfied.

^{2.} A directed fiduciary is not liable for any obligation to perform an investment or suitability review, inquiry or investigation or to make any recommendation or evaluation with respect to any investment, to the extent that the investment is made by a directing trust adviser.

Of course, because of this provision, Mr. Payne attempts to improperly indicate that the Trust does not own community property or Nancy did not contribute a "single penny" or separate property to the trust corpus. As Mr. Payne typically recycles his misrepresentative arguments, this particular argument was foreseen by ALB Law Firm (see discussion in Petition regarding nature of trust property), and the ALB Law Firm previously reminded the Court of the preamble to the Trust which states as follows:

The property comprising the original Trust estate, during the joint lives of the Trustors, shall retain its character as their community property or separate property, as designated on the document of transfer or conveyance. Property subsequently received by the Trustees during the joint lives of the Trustors shall have the separate or community character designated on the document of transfer or conveyance. (Emphasis added).

As can be seen by the Dancing Vines Property alone, this asset was held in joint tenancy between Nancy and Raymond Christian, Sr., before it was put into the Trust.³ Also, the personal property located in the Dancing Vines Property was community property. Furthermore, under NRS 123.220 all property acquired during the marriage is considered community property. Mr. Payne and his clients have provided no evidence to rebut this presumption for the community property, notwithstanding the wholesale failure to address Nancy's separate property interests in the Trust. Therefore, Mr. Payne and his client's assertions that Nancy did not contribute to the Trust is a blatant misrepresentation and fails to even address the time-honored rebuttable presumption in Nevada of a spouse's right to community property. Mr. Payne is simply attempting to get around the spendthrift provision by bulldozing his way through public policy, Nevada community property rights, and Nancy's separate property rights

³ See Grant Bargain and Sale Deed attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit 1.

in the Trust. The spendthrift provision, by its own terms, is inapplicable to Nancy's interest in the Trust estate.

Additionally, under the provisions of Section 4.3 to 4.4 of the Trust, all property not used for "the administrative expenses, the expenses of the last illness and funeral of the Decedent and any debt owed by the Decedent" after the Decedent's death, was transferred to the Survivor's share of the Trust. Therefore, upon the death of the Decedent, all property became Nancy's property for purpose of Section 14.2 of the Trust. Contrary to Mr. Payne's assertion, all of the assets of the Trust are subject to approved claims of the creditors of Nancy, the last settlor to die.

Furthermore, ALB Law Firm is not required file in Nancy's probate estate before obtaining relief in the trust matter because the Dancing Vines Property was a combination of community property and Nancy's separate property. This Court can take judicial notice of this fact pursuant to NRS 47.130 that the Dancing Vines property was jointly owned by Nancy and Raymond Christian from the filing of the Grant Bargain and Sale Deed recorded as Instrument#20161019-0000692 on October 19, 2016.⁴ Therefore, Mr. Payne's incorrect and sanctionable assertions that Nancy did not contribute property to the trust is easily refuted by public record and such a finding does not need to be made in the probate estate.

Nancy had a separate property interest in the Dancing Vines property, which upon its sale, the proceeds were used to purchase the Bluffpoint Property and/or segregated from the other Trust property. Nancy gave directions prior to her death regarding the Bluffpoint Property and her wish to obtain another residence, which was far from the Petitioners (the Petitioners live

⁴ Id.

 in close proximity to the Bluffpoint Property). Nancy and the Trust were attempting to realize Nancy's wishes pursuant to the terms of the Trust when she died.

III. ALB Law Firm's claims are appropriate in the trust matter and not solely to the probate estate.

Because of Nancy's death, Mr. Payne believes that claims against the Trust magically disappear and must be brought and settled in her probate estate. His feigned logic and argument are completely contrary to Nevada law and are vexatious. For just one example, NRS 164.025(1) is specifically used "after the death of the settlor of the trust". It requires the trustee of a nontestamentary trust (which the Christian Family Trust is) to publish notice to creditors after the death of the settlor of the trust and requires creditors to make their claims within ninety (90) days. The Nevada Legislature contemplated settling the claims of creditors of a trust and its settlor(s) after the death of a settlor. This is basic trust law in the state of Nevada.

Secondly, Mr. Payne's assumption that Nancy's rights are divested from the trust upon her death are misplaced given the fact that Nevada law specifically allows for the creditor's claims. Nancy's rights or claims are not extinguished solely because of her death and, notably, Nancy has asserted claims of undue influence and fraud against Petitioners which claims survive her death.

Additionally, Mr. Payne's cited case law and statutes are inapplicable. First, his citation to *In the Matter of the Jane Tiffany Living Trust*, 177 P. 3d 1060 (Nev. 2008) and his quote is completely inaccurate. The "creditor" of the estate was barred from seeking her claim in another case because she did not seek her claim in the trust proceeding. Herein, ALB Law Firm is seeking its relief in the trust proceeding, therefore, Mr. Payne's direction that ALB Law Firm must seek relief in the Nevada estate from this case is completely misguided or calculated

as a fraud upon this Court. ALB Law Firm would be faced with the same creditor dismissal in that case if it were to bring its Trust claims in another action when they are appropriately before the Court in the Trust proceeding.

Furthermore, Mr. Payne's citation to *Brock v. Premier Trust, Inc.*, 390 P.3d 646 (Nev. 2017), deals with beneficiaries and their creditors – not the Settlor's creditors. Therefore, the case is inapplicable to Nancy who was a settlor or Trustor of the Trust.

Third, his citation to NRS 111.779 is inapplicable because ALB Law Firm is not a nonprobate transferee. It is clear that Mr. Payne is attempting to inundate this Court with red herrings and inapplicable case law and statutes to confuse and mislead the Court.

Fourth, Mr. Payne's allegation that NRS 163.417 does not allow the court to order payment to creditors is a blatant misrepresentation of the law. NRS 163.417 actually states:

A creditor may not exercise, and a court may not order the exercise of:

- (a) A power of appointment or any other power concerning a trust that is held by a beneficiary;
- (b) Any power listed in NRS 163.5553 that is held by a trust protector as defined in NRS 163.5547 or any other person;
- (c) A trustee's discretion to:
 - (1) Distribute any discretionary interest;
 - (2) Distribute any mandatory interest which is past due directly to a creditor; or
 - (3) Take any other authorized action in a specific way; or
- (d) A power to distribute a beneficial interest of a trustee solely because the beneficiary is a trustee.

Nothing in NRS 163.417 prevents a court from requiring payment of otherwise valid claims against the Trust or the Settlor(s) of the Trust. Rather the statute limits the court's ability to force a beneficiary or trustee to exercise powers granted them under the terms of the Trust. However, even if NRS 163.417 means what Mr. Payne alleges (which it clearly does not), the Successor Trustee has already approved the amounts due and owing to ALB Law Firm based on

⁵ See NRS 164.025(3).

the broad discretion granted her under the terms of the Trust. Therefore, rather than ordering the exercise of a power or discretion, the Court is merely respecting the conclusive decision of the Trustee made pursuant to Section 11.1 of the Trust.

Curiously, Mr. Payne indicates that because Nancy did not transfer any Trust assets into her personal name, the assets of the Trust are precluded from the debts or claims of Nancy's creditors. However, ALB Law Firm is performing work on behalf of Nancy as Settlor/Trustor of her Trust, therefore, Mr. Payne's own legal conclusion is not applicable. Furthermore, Mr. Payne is wrongfully attempting to negate the provisions of NRS 164.025 with such a conclusion when ALB Law Firm was performing work on behalf of Nancy in furtherance of the provisions of the Trust.

Mr. Payne is no stranger to such misrepresentation and vexatious behavior, and the ALB Law Firm is available to provide this Court upon request with prior written reports and recommendations which have recommended extreme monetary sanctions against Mr. Payne personally under the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure for similar prior misconduct in other Trust matters.⁶

Simply put, ALB Law Firm is a creditor and is seeking to assert its claim in this matter against the Trust because of its actions on behalf of Nancy in furtherance of the terms of the

⁶ NRS 155.165 (1) The court may find that a person, including, without limitation, a personal representative or trustee, is a vexatious litigant if the person files a petition, objection, motion or other pleading which is without merit, intended to harass or annoy the personal representative or a trustee or intended to unreasonably oppose or frustrate the efforts of an interested person who is acting in good faith to enforce his or her rights. The court may find that a personal representative or trustee is a vexatious litigant if the personal representative or trustee has expended the funds of the estate or trust to unreasonably oppose the good faith efforts of an interested person to enforce his or her rights. In determining whether the person is a vexatious litigant, the court may take into consideration whether the person has previously filed pleadings in a proceeding that were without merit, intended to harass or annoy a fiduciary or intended to unreasonably oppose or frustrate the efforts of an interested person who is acting in good faith to enforce his or her rights. (2) If a court finds that a person is a vexatious litigant pursuant to subsection 1, the court may impose sanctions on the person in an amount sufficient to reimburse the estate or trust for all or part of the expenses, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees,

Trust. The acting Trustees have all approved the fees and costs herein, which they have the discretion to do pursuant to the terms of the Trust, and thus ALB Law Firm is a proper creditor for purposes of payment.

IV. The Trust Terms do not provide for distributions to beneficiaries before Nancy's death, but do provide for the power to change trustee or nominations of successor trustees.

Before Nancy's death, Nancy without undue influence and of her own free will, changed her Trustee due to Petitioners' mistreatment of her. Her verified statements are not hearsay as Mr. Payne would like this Court to conclude. Nancy's facts and statements were verified by her in every petition she filed. Furthermore, because she has now passed away, her verified statements would fall under the hearsay exception because she is no longer available as a witness. As noted many times before, Nancy was given the power to change her trustee and did so. Thereafter, Petitioners engaged in a course of action which would thwart Nancy's ability to obtain funds from her Trust and prevented her from living in a home to which she had been accustomed to living.

Furthermore, the Petitioners purposefully misread the Trust terms in an attempt to have this Court refuse to provide relief to the appropriate parties. Basically, the Petitioners sought to have this Court to rewrite the terms of the Trust to benefit them or continue to use this Court's resources to delay beneficial use of the Trust to Nancy. They were successful in delaying these proceedings to the point that Nancy died before receiving her requested relief. Unfortunately, they now continue to argue their various tortured interpretations of the Trust in purported pre-

²⁷ incurred by the estate or trust to respond to the petition, objection, motion or other pleading and for any other pecuniary losses which are associated with the actions of the vexatious litigant. (Emphasis added).

⁷ See Certificate of Independent Review attached as Exhibit H to Joint Objection and Joint Counterpetition filed on November 13, 2017.

⁸ See NRS 51.075.

death distributions to them from the Trust owned real property and in Nancy's power to change trustee.

The Former Trustees requested that they receive distributions under the Trust, when there is no distribution authorized under the terms of the Trust to any person other than Nancy until after her death. Trust provision 6.1 indicates as follows (without including the distributive provisions):

6.1 Specific Bequest <u>Upon the death of both Trustors</u>, the Trustee shall first sell the Trustors' primary residence located at 1060 Dancing Vines, Ave., Las Vegas, Nevada, and the proceeds from the sale of such home shall be distributed as follows: (Emphasis added).

In requesting that this Court distribute the proceeds from the Dancing Vines property, the Petitioners were willing to create a taxable event to Nancy, although trusts, including this Trust, are created to reduce or eliminate taxes. Petitioners alleged that ALB Law Firm put up "road blocks" against obtaining distributions when it is the Trust provision itself that would prevent the distributions to Petitioners before Nancy's death. The ALB Law Firm was and has been simply attempting to obtain compliance with the terms of the Trust, while Petitioners have only done what is in their own best interest resulting in a breach their duty of loyalty under the terms of the Trust.

Even if there was a right to pre-death distributions to the Petitioners, which there clearly is not, it should also be noted that in Section 7.1, there is a Delay of Distribution provision which allows the delay of distribution to any beneficiary who is:

- (b) If said causes for delayed distribution are never removed, then the Trust share of that beneficiary shall continue until the death of the beneficiary and then be distributed as provided in this Trust Instrument. The causes of such delay in the distribution shall be limited to any of the following:
- (1) The current involvement of the beneficiary in a divorce proceeding or a bankruptcy or other insolvency proceedings.

Herein, Susan Christian-Payne is currently going through a divorce (Case #D-17-561332-D) wherein her husband has stated that the "the only recent (within the last two years) contentious disagreement between the parties arose as a result of issues related to MYLES' [Susan Christian-Payne's son's] interest in SUSAN's parents estate." Notably, Susan Christian-Payne caused Myles, her own son, to be removed from beneficiary designations and included herself as Trustee of the Trust because she would be a potential beneficiary after the death of the Trustors. Such a dispute would warrant a delay in distribution to the beneficiaries – or at least Susan Christian-Payne.

Lastly, as stated many times before, Section 9.3 provides Nancy the absolute power to change the trustee of the Trust as follows:

9.3 Power to Change Trustee. During the joint lifetime of the Trustors, Trustors may change the Trustee or Successor Trustee of this Trust by an instrument in writing, signed by both Trustors, and delivered to the Trustee. In the event that either Trustor should become incapacitated, the other Trustor shall retain the power to change the Trustee of Successor Trustee of this Trust by an instrument in writing, signed by such Trustor and delivered to the Trustee. **After the death of the first Trustor to die, the surviving Trustor shall have the power to change the Trustee or Successor Trustee of the Trust by an instrument in writing signed by the surviving Trustor and delivered to the Trustee. (Emphasis added).**

Herein, Nancy was following the provisions of the Trust when she designated another trustee. She had the power to do so under the Trust instrument. In an attempt to undermine this Trust provision, Petitioners falsely claim there was a scrivener's error in the Trust, although Petitioners "sat at the table and negotiated the terms of the Trust." David Grant's testimony is unnecessary given the unambiguousness of the Trust document itself and the facts presented to this Court, including Petitioners own revelations that they, themselves negotiated the terms of the Trust. Most importantly, David Grant is not an essential witness to prevent the payment of

⁹ See Page 4, lines 9-11 of Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Child Custody and Child Support and

fees and costs to ALB Law Firm. This issue has nothing to do with the present petition, but again Mr. Payne attempts to misuse this Court's resources to create an issue where there is none.

Additionally, Mr. Payne attempts to claim that a trustor working in conjunction with a trustee is suspect or invalid. Most trustors and trustees communicate or have a relationship – this does not mean that the trustee fails to fulfill his or her fiduciary duties. Mr. Payne's connotation is simply improper innuendo.

Most importantly, Mr. Payne believes that for a trustee's actions to be valid, they must be nominated or confirmed by a court. Petitioners themselves were never confirmed by this Court to act on behalf of the Trust; therefore, pursuant to Mr. Payne's argument, all of the Petitioner's actions were unauthorized from October 2016 to June 2017. They should not have sold the Dancing Vines Property, they shouldn't have purchased the Bluffpoint Drive Property, they shouldn't have changed beneficiary designations from Nancy to the Trust, they should not have sequestered trust funds to Mr. Payne's IOLTA account, they should not have prevented the successor trustee from obtaining trust funds, etc. Mr. Payne's logic is simply unfounded and should be ignored.

Just as Nancy Christian had the ability to change her trustee pursuant to the Trust terms, Monte Reason had the power to nominate a successor trustee pursuant to Section 8.1 of the Trust and under the instrument executed by Nancy to appoint him. 11 Therefore, Monte Reason was simply following the testamentary documents created by Nancy Christian. In particular, the Modification and Designation of Successor Trustee was and is valid and Nancy was not under any undue influence when she created this instrument.

Countermotion for Temporary Orders filed January 18, 2018 in Case #D-17-561322-D. ¹⁰ See Video Transcript of October 19, 2017 hearing at 2:33 p.m.

Without any factual basis, Mr. Payne engages in a conspiracy type theory to allege that the attorneys and clients in this matter had some behind-the-scenes agreement. This is false and Mr. Payne has absolutely no facts to support his conspiracy theory.

Mr. Payne and his clients tortured interpretations of the Trust should be ignored. As is characteristic of Mr. Payne, he is simply attempting to distract this Court from allowing fees and costs to be distributed from the Trust despite the conclusive determination that the Successor Trustees have both approved the fees and costs. The terms of the Trust and our cited Nevada statutes allow for payment of the (Nancy's) settlor's creditors.

V. Mr. Payne and Petitioners do not dispute the Brunzell Factors; therefore, fees and costs should be paid.

Although inapplicable to the payment of a creditor's claim under a trust, or even for the payment of attorney's fees from a trust, the ALB Law Firm provided a *Brunzell* and *Cadle* analysis. Notably, Mr. Payne and the Petitioners do not argue the *Brunzell* factors¹² or that ALB Law Firm has failed to meet the requirements of *Cadle*.¹³ They simply object to the payment because of alleged block billing, of not being able to see the retainer agreement and of the alleged "blurring of lines" between attorneys and clients in this matter. However, none of these "concerns" have legal or factual basis nor do they prevent ALB Law Firm from seeking its fees and costs from the Trust.

Unlike the recent changes in guardianship court with AB130, there is no requirement for ALB Law Firm to provide a Notice of Intent to Seek Fees outlining the costs of its attorneys, the billing arrangement, and necessity of services. Furthermore, the trust statutes do not require a

¹¹ See Section 8.1 of the Trust and Modification and Designation of Trustee and Successor Trustee attached and incorporated as Exhibit G to Joint Objection and Joint Counterpetition filed on November 13, 2017.

¹² See Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (Nev. 1969).

¹³ Cadle Co. v. Woods & Erickson, LLP, 345 P.3d 1049, 1051, 2015 Nev. LEXIS 19, *1, 131 Nev. Adv. Rep. 15.

one-tenth breakdown of fees on billing statements. Notably, even with the Notice of Intent to Seek Fees required by AB130, a law firm is not required to include a retainer agreement to be able to be paid from the guardianship estate.

Such requirements are unnecessary in a trust proceeding. ALB Law Firm is not required to provide the heightened requirements as in a guardianship proceeding. Therefore, it can be paid on the reasonable fees and costs that have been provided and to which Mr. Payne and Petitioners did not object based upon *Brunzell* or *Cadle*. Most importantly, both successor trustees have approved the payment to ALB Law Firm and pursuant to Provision 11.1 of the Trust, the Trustee's decision is conclusive and binding upon Petitioners.

Interestingly, Mr. Payne complains that he is unable to obtain the client file from ALB Law Firm. It should be noted that in addition to the privilege issues and confidentiality issues associated with this complaint, ALB Law Firm also has a retaining lien on the entire client file pursuant to NRS 18.015. This prevents any party including a client or the client's successor or representative from obtaining the file. If, as Mr. Payne alleges, Nancy's file is necessary to the underlying case, the objection to fees necessarily prevents any party from obtaining the file from ALB Law Firm.

Lastly, there is absolutely no blurring of lines between attorneys and clients in this matter. Nancy Christian was always the client of ALB Law Firm and Monte Reason was not. Joseph Powell, Esq., was consulted on all matters relating to Trust issues and it is the understanding of the ALB Law Firm that Monte Reason always spoke with his counsel in regarding Trust decisions and related administrative or litigation matters. Jacqueline Utkin was voluntarily contacted before she was represented and provided her declaration in support of Nancy; however, all person-to-person contact ceased when she retained counsel. After

Jacqueline Utkin obtained counsel, ALB Law Firm dealt directly with her counsel as necessary to address outstanding issues.

Mr. Payne's objections are merely illegitimate concerns to distract this Court. ALB Law Firm had its fees and costs approved by the Trustees and Mr. Payne does not substantively oppose these fees and costs. As such, ALB Law Firm should be awarded its fees and cost in this matter.

VI. Mr. Payne's actions in this matter are sanctionable under NRS 7.085 and NRCP Rule 11.

NRS 7.085 provides:

- 1. If a court finds that an attorney has:
 - (a) Filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or
 - (b) Unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
- 2. The court shall liberally construe the provisions of this section in favor of awarding costs, expenses and attorney's fees in all appropriate situations. It is the intent of the Legislature that the court award costs, expenses and attorney's fees pursuant to this section and impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in all appropriate situations to punish for and deter frivolous or vexatious claims and defenses because such claims and defenses overburden limited judicial resources, hinder the timely resolution of meritorious claims and increase the costs of engaging in business and providing professional services to the public.

Furthermore, NRCP 11 provides that upon signing a pleading, or advocating a position, an attorney certifies that the pleading or position is not presented for any improper purpose, that the claims etc., are warranted by existing case law, and that the factual allegations or denials of factual allegations have evidentiary support.

Unfortunately, Mr. Payne's opposition was severely untimely and therefore prevented the ALB Law Firm from provide him with a safe harbor letter under NRCP 11. However, the court may issue an order to show cause to Mr. Payne under NRCP 11(c)(1)(b) and issue sanctions sua sponte. Additionally, NRS 7.085 does not require a safe harbor letter and must be liberally construed to as necessary to punish for and deter vexatious claims.¹⁴

Here, ALB Law Firm has identified for the court at least 36 blatant misrepresentations of law and/or fact by Mr. Payne. Additionally, it appears that other parties have identified misrepresentations by Mr. Payne in other pleadings set for hearing on March 15, 2018. In several instances Mr. Payne's assertions are contradicted by the very citations provided by him. It is clear that Mr. Payne's opposition is not well-grounded in fact and is not warranted by existing case law. Furthermore, Mr. Payne's opposition appears to be for the sole purpose of extending the frivolous litigation initiated by his clients to prevent Nancy from receiving any benefit from the Trust and their continued attempts to prevent the Successor Trustees from acting on behalf of the Trust and fulfill their fiduciary duties. Therefore, this court should require Mr. Payne personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees incurred by ALB Law Firm in responding to his opposition, such costs, fees, and expenses are estimated to be approximately \$2,800.00.

C. Conclusion

As legal counsel for the Trustor of the Trust, the ALB Law Firm sought relief based

¹⁴ Watson Rounds, P.C. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 358 P.3d 228, 232, 2015 Nev. LEXIS 89, *10, 131 Nev. Adv. Rep. 79. "The simplest way to reconcile NRCP 11 and NRS 7.085 is to do what federal courts have done with FRCP 11 and § 1927; treat the rule and statute as independent methods for district courts to award attorney fees for misconduct. Therefore, we conclude NRCP 11 does not supersede NRS 7.085."

upon Nancy's requests in conjunction with the terms of the Trust prior to her passing. Because of the benefit provided to Nancy as Trustor of the Trust in furtherance of the Trust's terms, the Successor Trustees approved the request for payment of fees and costs from the Trust. Pursuant to Trust Provision 11.1 their decision is conclusive and binding upon the Petitioners.

Because the Court required this petition because the trust funds are currently frozen as a result of the Petitioners' sequestration of funds from the Successor Trustees, ALB Law Firm also provided documentation that its work was performed in accordance with the *Brunzell* Factors and the costs were actually incurred pursuant to *Cadle*, which were unopposed. Most importantly, the Trust's terms and Nevada law allow for the payment of Nancy's debts.

Therefore, the law office of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd., respectfully requests that its fees and costs be paid from the Trust, because it is Nancy's (Trustor's) debt. As such, the ALB Law Firm requests this Court make the findings and orders as requested in its petition and unfreeze Nancy's assets in the amount of \$62,105.64 for payment of its fees and costs and order that they be paid from the blocked account. It also requests payment of fees and costs from Cary Colt Payne, Esq., in the approximate amount of \$2,800.00 for the false representations contained in his frivolous and vexatious objection.

DATED this 13th day of March 2018.

Respectfully Submitted,

ANTHONY L. BARNEY, LTD.

Tiffanyl 8. Barney, Esq. NV State Bar No. 9754

3317 W. Charleston Boulevard, Suite B

Las Vegas, NV 89102-1835

(702) 438-7878

Creditors of the Nancy Christian Trust

1	<u>CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE</u>
2	I hereby certify that I am an employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd. and not a party to the
3	above-entitled action. I further certify that on March 13, 2018 I served the foregoing REPLY
5	TO PETITIONER'S COMBINED OPPOSITION TO 1) BARNEY FIRM PETITION
6	FOR FEES, ETC., (2) MONTE REASON'S APPLICATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT
7	on the following parties via electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court filing
8	system, addressed as follows:
9	system, addressed as follows.
10	Cary Colt Payne, Esq.
11	Cary Colt Payne, Chtd.
12	700 S. 8 th St. Las Vegas, NV 89101
13	Attorney for Susan Christian-Payne, Rosemary Keach and Raymond Christian, Jr.
14	Jerimy L. Kirschner, Esq.
15	Jerimy Kirschner & Associates, Ltd. Office
16	5550 Painted Mirage Rd, #320 Las Vegas, NV 89149
17	Attorney for Jacqueline Utkin, Successor Trustee
18	Joseph J. Powell, Esq.
19 20	Rushforth Lee & Kiefer, LLP
21	1707 Village Center Circle, Suite 150 Las Vegas, NV 89134
22	Attorney for Monte Reason, Trustee of the Nancy Christian Trust and Personal
23	Representative of the Estate of Nancy Christian
24	
25	/s/Zachary D. Holyoak An employee of Anthony L. Barney, Ltd.
26	
27	

EXHIBIT 1



APN: 177-27-611-254

When Recorded, Mail to: Grant Morris Dodds 2520 St. Rose Pkwy, Suite 319 Henderson, NV 89074

Mail Tax Statements to: Raymond T. Christian Nancy I. Christian 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue Las Vegas, NV 89183

Inst#: 20161019-0000692 Fees: \$19.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00 RPTT: \$0.00 Ex: #007 10/19/2016 09:18:20 AM

Receipt #: 2905989 Requestor:

GRANT MORRIS DODD (LEGAL

Recorded By: TAH Pgs: 4

DEBBIE CONWAY

CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

GRANT, BARGAIN AND SALE DEED

THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH: That Raymond Christian and Nancy I. Christian, husband and wife as joint tenants, for good and other valuable consideration, do hereby Grant, Bargain, Sell and Convey to ROSEMARY K. CHRISTIAN-KEACH, RAYMOND T. CHRISTIAN, JR. and SUSAN G. CHRISTIAN-PAYNE, Trustees of the CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST, dated October 11, 2016, all of their right, title and interest in that real property situated in the County of CLARK, State of NEVADA, bounded and described as follows:

SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND MADE A PART HEREOF FOR COMPLETE LEGAL DESCRIPTION.

Commonly known as:

1060 Dancing Vines Avenue, Las Vegas, NV

0358

GRANTEE'S ADDRESS: 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue

Las Vegas, NV 89183

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining.

Witness their hands this 11th day of October, 2016.

RAYMOND CHRISTIAN

NANCY I. CHRISTIAN

STATE OF NEVADA) ss

COUNTY OF CLARK

On this 11th day of October, 2016, before me the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for the said County of Clark, State of Nevada, personally appeared RAYMOND CHRISTIAN and NANCY I. CHRISTIAN, personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same in their authorized capacity, and that by their signatures on the instrument, the persons, or the entity upon behalf of which the persons acted, executed the instrument.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

NOTARY PUBLIC

EXHIBIT "A" LEGAL DESCRIPTION

The land referred to is situated in the County of Clark, City of Las Vegas, State of Nevada, and is described as follows:

Parcel I:

Lot Three Hundred Fifteen (315) in Block One (1) of Silverado South Unit 2, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 84 of Plats, Page 64, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada and amended by Certificate of Amendment recorded June 22, 1998 in Book 980622 as Document No. 01333 and by Certificate of Amendment recorded August 5, 1998 in Book 980805 as Document No. 00558, both of Official Records.

Parcel II:

An easement for ingress and egress over the private streets delineated on the plat of the final map of Silverado South Unit 2.

DECLARATION OF VALUE FORM 1. Assessor Parcel Number(s) a) 177-27-611-254 b) _____ c) 2. Type of Property: FOR RECORDER'S OPTION USE ONLY b) X Single Fam. Res. Book: Page: Date of Recording: c)

Condo/Twnhse d) □ 2-4 Plex Notes: e) □ Apt. Bldg f)
Comm'l/Ind'l g)

Agricultural h) ☐ Mobile Home □ Other 3. Total Value/Sales Price of Property \$ 0.00 Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of property) Transfer Tax Value \$ 0.00 Real Property Transfer Tax Due \$ 0.00 4. If Exemption Claimed: a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, Section 07 b. Explain Reason for Exemption: Transfer without consideration to or from a trust. 5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is correct to the best of their information and belief, and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information provided herein. Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any claimed exemption, or other determination of additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the tax due plus interest 1% per month. Pursuant to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly and severally liable for any additional amount owed. Capacity Attorney for Grantor Capacity Signature SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION **BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION** (REQUIRED) (REQUIRED Print Name: CHRISTIAN FAMILY Print Name: RAYMOND CHRISTIAN NANCY I. CHRISTIAN TRUST Address: 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue Address: 1060 Dancing Vines Avenue City: Las Vegas City: Las Vegas Zip: 89183 Zip: 89183 State: NV State: NV COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORDING (required if not seller of buyer) Print Name: Grant Morris Dodds, PLLC Escrow #: Address: 2520 St. Rose Pkwy. #319 City: Henderson State: Nevada Zip: 89074 AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILED

STATE OF NEVADA

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Probate - COURT MINUTES March 15, 2018

Trust/Conservatorships

P-17-092512-T In the Matter of the Trust of:

The Christian Family Trust u.a.d. 10/11/16

March 15, 2018 2:00 PM All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Ochoa, Vincent **COURTROOM:** RJC Courtroom 10A

COURT CLERK: Yvette Clayton

PARTIES:

Jacqueline Utkin, Trustee, not present

Jerimy Kirschner, Attorney, present

Monte Reason, Objector, not present Monte Reason, Objector, not present

Nancy Christian, Other, not present

Tiffany Barney, Attorney, not present

Raymond Christian, Petitioner, not present
Rosemary Keach, Petitioner, not present
Susan Christian Payne, Petitioner, not present
The Christian Family Trust u.a.d. 10/11/16,
Cary Payne, Attorney, present
Cary Payne, Attorney, present
Cary Payne, Attorney, present

Trust, not present

JOURNAL ENTRIES

- PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE...OPPOSITION TO PETITION TO CONFIRM SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE; COUNTER PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF COPETITIONERS...MONTE REASON'S APPLICATION FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES ON OST

Anthony Barney bar # 8366 present Joseph Powell appeared for Monte Reason. Atty Zachary Holyoak, Bar #14217.

PRINT DATE:	03/19/2018	Page 1 of 3	Minutes Date:	March 15, 2018

Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

Mr. Kirshner stated this hearing was to confirm Jacqueline Utkin as successor Trustee and fees.

Arguments by Mr. Kirschner and Mr. Payne regarding the Successor Trustee.

Mr. Payne presented documents that Mr. Barney prepared.

Arguments by Mr. Payne regarding the Ein #.

Mr. Payne addressed the key to the house.

COURT ORDERED, as follows:

The Petition to confirm the Successor Trustee Jacqueline Utkin is GRANTED.

Ein # shall be provided within SEVEN (7) days.

The accounting still has to be provided to Mr. Kirshner.

Prior Order is still in effect regarding the blocked trust account.

No Attorney fees shall be awarded until the final decision on whether Monti Reason was the trustee.

Settlement Conference STANDS on 4/3/18 at 10.00 AM.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

FUTURE HEARINGS:

Canceled: March 28, 2018 2:00 PM Petition


Canceled: March 28, 2018 2:00 PM Opposition & Countermotion

April 03, 2018 10:00 AM Settlement Conference

April 04, 2018 2:00 PM Petition RJC Courtroom 10A Ochoa, Vincent Barry-Singer, Frances

PRINT DATE:	03/19/2018	Page 2 of 3	Minutes Date:	March 15, 2018

Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.



PRINT DATE:	03/19/2018	Page 3 of 3	Minutes Date:	March 15, 2018

Notice: Journal entries are prepared by the courtroom clerk and are not the official record of the Court.

JERIMY L. KIRSCHNER, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 12012
JERIMY KIRSCHNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Suite 320
Las Vegas, NV 89149
Telephone:(702) 563-4444
Fax: (702) 563-4445
jerimy@jkirschnerlaw.com

Attorney for Jacqueline Utkin,
Successor Trustee to the Christian Family Trust
Dated October 11, 2016

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of the
THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST

Dept.: S

Dated October 11, 2016

MOTION (1) TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE PLEADING; AND (2) FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTNION

COMES NOW, Jacqueline Utkin ("Trustee Utkin"), Successor Trustee to the Christian Family Trust, Dated October 11, 2016 ("CFT"), by and through her attorneys of record, Jerimy Kirschner & Associates, PLLC., and hereby files this MOTION (1) TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE PLEADING; AND (2) FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTNION ("Motion").

This Motion is made based on the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the exhibits thereto, the papers and pleadings already on file herein and any oral argument the Court may permit at a hearing of this matter.

Page 1 of 9

5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Suite 320 Las Vegas, NV 89149 (702) 563-4444 Fax (702)563-4445

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NOTICE OF MOTION 1 Please take notice that the undersigned will bring the above-entitled MOTION (1) TO 2 EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE PLEADING; AND (2) FOR PRELIMINARY 3 **INJUCTNION** for hearing before Department 26 of the District Court on the ____ day of _____ 4 May 2 ____, 201_8, at the hour of ____ 2:00 pm ___, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard. 5 6 DATED this 14th day of March, 2018. 7 8 JERIMY KIRSCHNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 9 10 /s/ Jerimy L. Kirschner, Esq. _ JERIMY L. KIRSCHNER, ESQ. 11 Nevada Bar No. 12012 5550 Painted Mirage Road, Suite 320 12 Las Vegas, Nevada 89149 Telephone:(702) 563-4444 13 Fax: (702) 563-4445 14 15 16 17

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

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Trustee Utkin seeks an order from this Court expunging the lis pendens filed by Susan Christian-Payne against real property owned by the CFT. At no point has ownership of the property been in dispute. In addition, there is no provision in the CFT mandating distribution of the real property. The lis pendens has slandered the CFT's title to the property, and as such Trustee Utkin files this Motion to expunge lis pendens and also an award of attorneys' fees for the removal of the lis pendens.

II. **BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS**

The CFT was created on or about October 11, 2016. After its creation the then existing trustees, Rosemary K. Christian-Keach, Raymond T. Christian, Jr., and Susan G. Christian-Payne ("RRS Beneficiaries") purchased real property located at 2848 Bluffpoint Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89134, APN: 138-18-611-074, and legally described as:

Parcel I: Lot 195 in Block One 4 of SUN CITY LAS VEGAS - UNIT NO. 25, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 49 of Plats, Page 32, in the Office of the County Recorder, Clark County, Nevada.

Parcel II: Together with an easement for ingress and egress over and across common area Lots A through D.

(herein "Bluffpoint Property"). The Grant, Bargain, Sale Deed shows that the property was purchased for CFT. Exhibit 1 – Bluffpoint Property Deed.

RRS Beneficiaries were removed as trustees by the trustor Nancy Christian, who then appointed Monte Reason ("Monte"). After Monte's resignation Trustee Utkin became the trustee for the CFT, and has been confirmed by this Court for the same.

On January 10, 2018, Susan G. Christian-Payne, through her counsel of record, filed a document in this action titled NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) (NRS Chapter 14) ("Notice of Lis Pendens"). **Exhibit 2 – Notice of Lis Pendens**. This Notice of Lis Pendens was executed by Susan Christian-Payne and provides notice that the Bluffpoint Property was a subject of the above referenced action. *Id.* Although it does not appear to have been

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recorded with the Clark County Record, the Notice of Lis Pendens is a matter of public record, having been filed in this action.

There is no provision in the CFT which mandates the transfer of the Bluffpoint Property to the RRS Beneficiaries or any other beneficiary. The CFT gives its trustee complete discretion of the use of real property in the trust, specifically Section 10.1 (a) provides:

With respect to real property: to sell and to buy real property; to mortgage and/or convey by deed of trust or otherwise encumber any real property now or hereafter owned by this Trust (Including, but not limited to any real property, the Trustee may hereafter acquire or receive and the Trustor's personal residence) to lease, sublease, release; to eject, remove and relieve tenants or other persons from, and recover possession of by all lawful means; to accept real property as a gift or as security for a loan; to collect, sue for, revive and receipt for rents and profits and to conserve, invest or utilize any and all of such rents, profits and receipts for management and conservation, to pay, compromise, or to contest tax assessments and to apply for refunds In connection therewith; to employ laborers; to subdivide, develop, dedicate to public use without consideration, and/or dedicate easements over; to maintain, protect, repair, preserve, insure, build upon, demolish, alter or Improve all or any part thereof; to obtain or vacate plats and adjust boundaries: to adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration; to release or partially release real property from a lien.

Exhibit 3 – CFT.

On March 26, 2018, the RRS Beneficiaries contacted, through counsel, the real estate who was previously listing the Bluffpoint Property stating, they were "the ultimate beneficiaries of this real property, are entitled to occupy and have keys," and then demanded the keys be turned over to them. Exhibit 4 - March 28, 2018 Letter to Real Estate Agent. There is no record, order, or statement in this action that supports the proposition that they are entitled to occupy and have keys for the Bluffpoint Property.

III. **ARGUMENT**

A. EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE PLEADING

The party who recorded the notice of pendency of the action bears the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that: (1) the action is for foreclosure of a mortgage upon real property or affects the title or possession; (2) the action was not brought in bad faith or for an improper motive; (3) the recording party will be able to perform any conditions precedent to the relief

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sought; or (4) the recording party would be injured by any transfer of an interest in the property before the action is concluded. NRS 14.015 (2) (a)-(d).

In addition, the recording party must also establish: (1) the recording party is likely to prevail in the action; or (2) the recording party has a fair chance of success on the merits in the action and the injury suffered from a transfer before completion is sufficiency serious that hardship on the recording party would be greater than the hardship suffered by defendant resulting from the notice of pendency. NRS 14.015 (3) (a)-(b). If the court finds the recording party has failed to establish the above elements the court shall order the cancellation of the notice of pendency. NRS 14.015 (4).

"As a general proposition, lis pendens are not appropriate instruments for use in promoting recoveries in actions for personal or money judgments; rather, their office is to prevent the transfer or loss of real property which is the subject of dispute in the action that provides the basis for the lis pendens." Levinson v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State In & For Cty. of Clark, 109 Nev. 747, 750, 857 P.2d 18, 20 (1993). Levenson favorably cites Burger v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 151 Cal.App.3d 1013, 199 Cal.Rptr. 227, 230 (1984) which explains that:

> Lis pendens is one of the few remaining provisional remedies available at its inception without prior notice to the adversary. Due process is said to be provided for by subsequent notice and an expungement procedure which casts the burden upon the proponent of the lis pendens, but a lis pendens may cause substantial hardship to the property owner before relief can be obtained.

Fundamentally, "[t]here must be some claim of entitlement to the real property affected by the lis pendens" Levinson at 751.

"Generally, an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title is either an action in equity or an action for declaratory relief." Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 321 P.3d 875, 879 (2014). "[W]hen a plaintiff incurs attorney fees as a result of a defendant's intentional effort to cloud title, the plaintiff deserves the fees because he or she had no choice but to litigate." Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 17, 321 P.3d 875, 879 (2014), cf Horgan v. Felton, 123 Nev. 577, 584, 170 P.3d 982, 987 (2007) ("attorney fees are only available as special

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damages in slander of title actions and not simply when a litigant seeks to remove a cloud upon title.").

Herein, Susan G. Christian-Payne's Notice of Lis Pendens lacks a basis in law or fact as she has no equitable right in the Bluffpoint Property. The Notice of Lis Pendens serves as a unilateral, bond free injunction which hinders Trustee Utkin's ability to administer the trust. There is no mandatory distribution for the Bluffpoint Property in the CFT, therefore it is subject to Trustee Utkin's discretion pursuant to Section 10.1 (a) of the CFT. RRS Beneficiaries interference with Trusteee Utkin's custody and control is a *per se* violation of Section 14.4 No Contest provisions. To that extent any lis pendens recorded against the Bluffpoint Property must be expunged, and any pleading putting parties on notice of the contest be stricken since it acts as a slander on title. In addition, Trustee Utkin request that RRS Beneficiaries pay the attorneys fees incurred in bringing this Motion.

B. TRUSTE UTKIN REQUESTS A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ENJOINING RRS BENEFICAIRIES FROM DISTURBING BLUFFPOINT PROPERTY OR INTEREFERRING WITH HER ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASSET

NRS 33.010 provides that an injunction may be granted in the following cases:

- 1. When it shall appear by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and such relief or any part thereof consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually.
- 2. When it shall appear by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of some act, during the litigation, would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff.
- When it shall appear, during the litigation, that the defendant is doing or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiff's rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. NEV. R. Civ P. 65(a)(2). "[A] preliminary injunction may be issued if a plaintiff establishes: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4)

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that an injunction is in the public interest." V'Guara Inc. v. Dec, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (D. Nev. 2013).

Trustee Utkin now asks this Court for an injunction enjoining RRS Beneficiaries from accessing the Bluffpoint Property, hindering its alienation, or otherwise seeking to interfere with Trustee Utkin's administration of the asset.

1. Trustee Utkin has a likelihood of success on the merits;

This Court has already determined that the language of the Trust and the documents leading to appointment of Trustee Utkin are clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, the former trustee, Monte Reason, has already confirmed the CFT's control over the property with the eviction of Raymond Christian Jr. in Justice Court Case No. 17C023096. Finally, the express terms of the CFT provide Trustee Utkin with exclusive control over real property owned by the CFT. See, Exhibit 3, Section 10.1(a).

To the extent Trustee Utkin has to prove a likelihood of success on the merits, success has already occurred. The only remining action is to administer the CFT without further interference from the RRS Beneficiaries.

2. There is a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;

RRS Beneficiaries have resorted to underhanded tactics to regain custody of the Bluffpoint Property which could cause immeasurable harm to the CFT. For example, in their March 26, 2018 letter they state "are entitled to occupy and have keys" which is simply wrong. At no point has this Court ordered this. To the contrary, the RRS Beneficiaries have already been evicted from the property pursuant to a Justice Court order. They also have the declaration from this Court that Trustee Utkin is the trustee which means they have not right to occupy the residence absent her The RRS Beneficiaries actions are unpredictable and they have shown no willingness permission. to abide by the terms of the trust or this Court's January 17, 2018 ruling. As such the harm is impossible to measure and justifies an injunction.

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3. The balance of equities tips in Trustee Utkin's favor;

Trustee Utkin is the trustee of the CFT with the duty to administer the trust according to its terms. The settlors of the CFT intended the trust to speak with one voice and not be subject to vexatious challenges at every turn. Section 14.4 of the Christian Family Trust specifically provides:

> The Trustors specifically desire that this Trust Agreement and these Trusts created herein be administered and distributed without litigation or dispute of any kind. If any beneficiary of these trusts or any other person, whether stranger, relative, or heir, or any legatee or devisee under the Last Will and Testament of either of the Trustors or the successors-in-interest of any such persons, including the Trustors' estates under the intestate laws of the State of Nevada or any other state lawfully or indirectly, singly or in conjunction with another person, seek or establish to assert any claim or claims to the assets of these Trusts established herein, or attach, oppose or seek to set aside the administration and distribution of the Trusts, or to invalidate, impair or set aside its provisions, or to have the same or any part thereof declared null and void or diminished, or to defeat or change any part of the provisions of the Trusts established herein, then in any and all of the above-mentioned cases and events, such person or persons shall receive One Dollar (\$1.00), and no more, in lieu or any interest in the assets of the trusts or interest in income or principal.

See, Exhibit 1. The equities are in favor of allowing the settlors for the CFT final wishes and desires be met and without interference from others.

4. That an injunction is in the public interest.

The public interest is best served by allowing the final desires of trustors to be honored, allowing the trust to speak with one voice, and enforcing the clear unequivocal terms of the trust. To do otherwise creates confusion, undermines the confidence in people's estate planning, and spawns frivolous litigation.

IV. **CONCLUSION**

Trustee Utkin asks for an order from this court expunging any lis pendens filed by RRS Beneficiaries as well as striking any pleading which purports to show a lien on the Bluffpoint Property. In addition, Trustee Utkin asks this Court for a preliminary injunction enjoining the RRS

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1	Beneficiaries from interfering with her administration of the Bluffpoint Property or otherwise
2	trying to gain access to the asset.
3	DATED this 29th day of March, 2018.
4	JERIMY KIRSCHNER & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
5 6 7	/s/ Jerimy L. Kirschner, Esq. JERIMY L. KIRSCHNER, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12012 5550 Painted Mirage Rd., Suite 320
8	Las Vegas, NV 89149 Attorney for Jacqueline Utkin, Successor Trustee to the Christian Family Trust Dated October 11, 2016
10	
11	VERIFICATION OF JACQUELINE UTKIN FOR MOTION (1) TO EXPUNGE LIS
12	PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE PLEADING; AND (2) FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTNION
13	I, JACQUELINE UTKIN, declare that:
15	1. I am submitting a MOTION (1) TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS AND/OR STRIKE
16	PLEADING; AND (2) FOR PRELIMINARY INJUCTNION.
17	2. I know the contents of the Petition, which I know to be true of my own knowledge, except
18	for those matters stated on information and belief.
19	
20	I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Nevada that the foregoing is true
21	and correct.
22	and when.
23	March 29, 2018 Jacqueli / Attai
24 25	
26	Date Sacqueline Utkin
7	

EXHIBIT 1

APN No. 138-18-611-074

RECORDING REQUESTED BY: Equity Title of Nevada

RETURN TO: Equity Title of Nevada 2475 Village View Dr., Suite 250 Henderson, NV 89074 Inst #: 20161209-0003048
Fees: \$20.00 N/C Fee: \$0.00
RPTT: \$0.00 Ex: #003
12/09/2016 02:34:16 PM
Receipt #: 2951368
Requestor:
EQUITY TITLE OF NEVADA
Recorded By: ANI Pgs: 7
DEBBIE CONWAY
CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

GRANT, BARGAIN, SALE DEED

Type of Document

(Example: Declaration of Homestead, Quit Claim Deed, etc.)

THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING RE-RECORDED IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION, INSTRUMENT No. 20161121-0001174

This page added to provide additional information required by NRS 111.312 Sections 1-2. An additional recording fee of \$1.00 will apply.

Inet #: 20161121-0001174 Fees: \$19.00 N/G Fee: \$0.00 RPTT: \$1351.50 Ex: # 11/21/2016 12:05:51 PM

Receipt #: 2934760

Requestor:

EQUITY TITLE OF NEVADA Recorded By: OSA Pgs: 4 DEBBIE CONWAY

CLARK COUNTY RECORDER

RECORDING REQUESTED BY:

EQUITY TITLE OF NEVADA

APN NO.: 138-18-611-074

WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:

Christian Family Trust Dated October 11,

2016

2848 Bluffpoint Drive

Las Vegas, NV 89134

MAIL TAX STATEMENTS TO:

SAME AS ABOVE

Affix RPTT: \$1,351.50

ESCROW NO.: 16840226 TGR

GRANT, BARGAIN, SALE DEED

THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH THAT:

Boyd Lynn Duffin, as Trustee of The Boyd Lynn Duffin Living Trust, dated October 9, 2012

for a valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, does hereby Grant, Bargain Sell and convey to

Rosemary K. Christian-Keach, Raymond T. Christian, Jr., and Susan G. Christian-Payne, trustees of the Christian Family Trust Dated October 11, 2016

all that real property situated in the County of Clark, State of Nevada, described as follows:

See Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof

TOGETHER WITH all and singular the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging to in anywise appertaining.

SUBJECT TO:

- 1. General and special taxes for the current fiscal year.
- 2. Covenants, conditions, restrictions, rights of way, easements and reservations of

SELLER:

The Boyd Lynn Duffin Living Trust,

dated October 9, 2012

Boyd Lynn Duffin, Trustee

STATE OF

COUNTY OF

Personally appeared before me, a Notary Public

Boyd Lynn Duffin, Trustee

Who acknowledged that he executed the above instrument.

My commission expires: ___

SUE BARTER Notary Public - State of Florida Commission # FF 898172 My Comm. Expires Aug 3, 2019


EXHIBIT A Legal Description

Parcel I:

195 4
Lot Machin Block Moof SUN CITY LAS VEGAS – UNIT NO. 25, as shown by map thereof on file in Book 49 of Plats, Page 32, in the Office of the County Recorder of Clark County, Nevada.

Parcel II:

Together with an easement for ingress and egress over and across common area Lots A though D.



STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE FORM 1. Assessor Parcel Number(s) a)138-18-611-074 b) c) d)					
2. Type of Property: a) Vacant Land b) Single Fam. R c) Condo/Twnhse d) 2-4 Plex e) Apt. Bldg f) Comm'l/Ind'l g) Agricultural h) Mobile Home	Book:Page: Date of Recording:				
 a) Total Value/Sales Price of Property b) Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure Only (value of property) c) Transfer Tax Value: d) Real Property Transfer Tax Due 	\$265,000.00 () \$265,000.00 \$\$1,351.50				
 4. If Exemption Claimed: a. Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, S b. Explain Reason for Exemption: 	ection				
The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to NRS 375.060 and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is correct to the best of their information and belief, and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information provided herein. Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any claimed exemption, or other determination of additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly and severally liable for any additional amount owed. Signature: Capacity: Capacity:					
Signature:	Capacity:				
SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Boyd Lynn Duffin, as Trustee of The Boyd Lynn Duffin Living Trust, dated October 9, 2012	BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED) Print Name: Christian Family Trust Dated October 11, 2016				
Address: 543/ DAKLIGHE AVE Address: 2848 Bluffpoint DLIVE City: 1007 MYERS BEACH City: 145 VECAS State: 151 Zip: 3393/ State: 151 Zip: 89/34					
COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORDING (required if not seller or buyer) Print Name: Equity Title of Nevada Escrow #: 16840226 TGR Address: 2475 Village View Dr. City, State & Zip: Henderson, NV 89074 AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED					

STATE OF NEVADA DECLARATION OF VALUE FORM

υ,		111/1	HON OF TABLE		OIL	11		
1.	Asse	ssor	Parcel Number(s))				
	a) <u>1</u> :	38-1	8-611-074					
	b)							
	c)							
	d)							
2.	Type	of I	Property:					
	a)		Vacant Land	b)	$\overline{\mathbf{Q}}$	Single Fam. Res	FOR RECORDER'S OPTIONAL USE C)NL
	c)		Condo/Twnhse	d)		2-4 Plex	Book: Page:	
	e)		Apt. Bldg	f)		Comm'l/Ind'l	Date of Recording:	
	g)		Agricultural	h)		Mobile Home	Notes:	
	<i>U</i> ,		Other					
3.	a)	Tot	al Value/Sales Pr	ice o	f Pro	nnerty	\$ 0.00	
٠.	b)					Only (value of property)	(ı
	c)		insfer Tax Value:	21300		my (, and or property)	\$ 0.00	
	d)		al Property Transf	er Ta	x D	iie	\$ 0.00	

4. If Exemption Claimed:

- Transfer Tax Exemption per NRS 375.090, Section No. 3 Explain Reason for Exemption: RE-RECORDED IN ORDER TO CORRECT THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION, INSTRUMENT No. 20161121-0001174
- 5. Partial Interest: Percentage being transferred: 100%

d) Real Property Transfer Tax Due

The undersigned declares and acknowledges, under penalty of perjury, pursuant to

NRS 375.060 and NRS 375.110, that the information provided is correct to the best of their information and belief, and can be supported by documentation if called upon to substantiate the information provided herein. Furthermore, the parties agree that disallowance of any claimed exemption, or other determination of additional tax due, may result in a penalty of 10% of the tax due plus interest at 1% per month. Pursuant to NRS 375.030, the Buyer and Seller shall be jointly and severally liable for any additional amount owed.

Capacity: Agent Signature: -

SELLER (GRANTOR) INFORMATION (REOUIRED)

Print Name: Boyd Lynn Duffin, as Trustee of The Boyd Lynn Duffin Living Trust, dated October 9, 2012

BUYER (GRANTEE) INFORMATION (REQUIRED)

Print Name: Christian Family Trust Dated October 11, 2016

Address: 5431 Oakridge Avenue Address: 2848 Bluffpoint Drive

City, State & Zip: Fort Meyers, FL 33931 City, State & Zip: Las Vegas, NV 89134

COMPANY/PERSON REQUESTING RECORDING (required if not seller or buyer)

Print Name: Equity Title of Nevada Escrow #: 16840226

Address: 2475 Village View Dr.

City, State & Zip: Henderson, NV 89074

AS A PUBLIC RECORD THIS FORM MAY BE RECORDED/MICROFILMED

EXHIBIT 2

Electronically Filed 1/10/2018 12:51 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

LISP

CARY COLT PAYNE, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 4357 CARY COLT PAYNE, CHTD. 700 South Eighth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 (702) 383-9010 carycoltpaynechtd@yahoo.com Attorney for Petitioners

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

In the Matter of	Case No.: P-17-092512-T
THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST u.a.d. 10/11/16) Dept. No.: PC-1)
SUSAN CHRISTIAN-PAYNE, ROSEMARY KEACH and RAYMOND CHRISTIAN, Petitioners -vs-	· .
NANCY I. CHRISTIAN and MONTE REASON, Objectors	NOTICE OF PENDENCY OF ACTION (LIS PENDENS) (NRS Chapter 14)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a Petition has been filed in the above entitled Court by the foregoing Petitioners. The said premises affected by this action are situate in the State of Nevada, County of Clark, commonly known as: 2848 Bluffpoint Drive, Las Vegas, Nevada 89134, APN: 138-18-611-074, and legally described as:

Lot 195 in Block One 4 of SUN CITY LAS VEGAS - UNIT NO. 25, as Parcel I: shown by map thereof on file in Book 49 of Plats, Page 32, in the Office of the County Recorder, Clark County, Nevada.

Parcel II: Together with an easement for ingress and egress over and across

common area Lots A through D.

Dated: January 9, 2018.

Petitioner



EXHIBIT 3

CARY COLT PAYNE, CHTD.

Attorneys at Law

CARY COLT PAYNE, ESQ. Admitted in Nevada & California

March 26, 2018
Sent via email: Kenneth Manesse@cbvegas.com

Kenneth Manesse Coldwell Banker Premier Realty 8290 W Sahara Ave 100 Ste.#5122 Las Vegas, NV 89117

RE: Christian Family Trust u.a.d. 10/11/16

Case No.: P-17-092512-T 2848 Bluff Point Drive Las Vegas, Nevada

Dear Mr. Manesse:

We understand that you currently hold the listing, for sale, of the above referenced property. Mr. Monte Reason did not have the requisite authority to place the house on the market for sale, and is no longer the "trustee" of the above referenced trust.

Currently, despite the court ordering that the Bluffpoint house not be sold (hearing 1/17/18-copy of minutes attached), the For Sale sign is still outside, and the property is still on the market.

My clients, as the ultimate beneficiaries of this real property, are entitled to occupy and have keys.

Kindly deliver the keys to my office forthwith, and take the property off the market for sale and remove your sign.

Sincerely,

CARY COLT PAYNE, CHTD.

CARY COLT PAYNE, ESQ.

CCP/ma





DISTRICT COURT **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

Probate -

COURT MINUTES

January 17, 2018

Trust/Conservatorships

P-17-092512-T

In the Matter of the Trust of:

The Christian Family Trust u.a.d. 10/11/16

January 17, 2018

2:00 PM

All Pending Motions

HEARD BY: Ochoa, Vincent

COURTROOM: RJC Courtroom 10A

COURT CLERK: Yvette Clayton

PARTIES:

Jacqueline Utkin, Trustee, not present

Monte Reason, Objector, not present

Monte Reason, Objector, not present

Nancy Christian, Other, not present Raymond Christian, Petitioner, not present

Rosemary Keach, Petitioner, present

Susan Christian Payne, Petitioner, present

The Christian Family Trust u.a.d. 10/11/16,

Trust, not present

Jerimy Kirschner, Attorney, present

Tiffany Barney, Attorney, not present

Cary Payne, Attorney, present

Cary Payne, Attorney, present

Cary Payne, Attorney, present

Cary Payne, Attorney, present

IOURNAL ENTRIES

- MOTION FOR COMPLIANCE WITH AND ENFORCEMENT OF COURT ORDER AND FOR SANCTIONS RELATING THERETO, FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY FORMER TRUSTEES SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT, FOR ORDER COMPELLING FORMER TRUSTEES TO ACCOUNT, AND FOR ACCESS TO AND INVESTMENT CONTROL OF TRUST FUNDS BELONGING TO THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY TRUST...JOINT PETITION FOR REVIEW OF FORMER TRUSTEES REFUSAL TO PROVIDE PROPER ACCOUNTING...JOINT OBJECT TO PETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OF TRUST; CONFIRM TRUSTEES; INSTRUCTIONS, ETC. AND JOINT COUNTERPETITION TO ASSUME JURISDICTION IN RE OF THE TRUST, TO CONFIRM TRUSTEE, TO FIND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, CONVERSION, AND FRAUD AGAINST

PRINT DATE:	01/19/2018	Page 1 of 4	Minutes Date:	January 17, 2018
1				<u></u>

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FORMER TRUSTEES, TO INVALIDATE ALL TRANSFERS TO THE FORMER TRUSTEES AS THE PRODUCT OF UNDUE INFLUENCE, TO ORDER THE IMMEDIATE DELIVERY OF ALL TRUST ASSETS, AND TO IMPOSE A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

Joseph Powell appeared for Monte Reason. Atty Zachary Holyoak, Bar #14217.

Mr. Kirschner stated they have accepted appointment of successor trustee and requested the Court ratified the successor trustee. Mr. Payne objected. Mr. Powell stated his client executed a resignation.

Discussion regarding the trust.

Mr. Payne indicated there was two (2) real-estate properties, one here and one in California.

Mr. Kirschner stated there was a house and is subject to utilities liens and he requested money to be release to preserved the house.

Mr. Kirschner and Mr. Payne addressed Bluff Point home in Las Vegas. Mr. Payne requested his client re-occupy the house.

COURT ORDERED, as follows:

Court will take Jurisdiction of the trust.

Mr. Payne shall transfer the money from his trust account into an interest bearing account and it shall be FROZEN within SEVEN (7) banking days and it shall be title in the name of the trust. Once the account is open Mr. Payne shall provide the other attorneys with the account numbers and the amount that was transferred within TWO (2) weeks.

The amount of \$5,000.00 shall be release to pay for whatever property needs to be saved and any bills that needs to be paid, not for administrative expenses or attorney's fees. Mr. Kirschner shall be responsible for the accounting of the \$5,000.00. There shall be no money release without a Petition to the Court.

Mr Kirschner shall write a letter to Mr. Payne requesting what accountings is needed.

The Bluff Point home shall not be sold. Mr. Payne and his clients shall make arrangement to go to the Bluff Point home and remove their property and pictures shall be taken of items in dispute for future litigations.

PRINT DATE:	01/19/2018	Page 2 of 4	Minutes Date:	January 17, 2018

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Mr. Payne shall prepare an Accounting which will include the California property and substantiation of the documents and send the information to Mr. Kirschner within 45 days.

After Mr. Payne submit his accounting, Mr. Powell shall do an accounting within 15 days.

Mr. Payne clients shall be responsible for the California property and paying the bills for California property. Mr. Payne clients shall keep an accounting of the rent collection and the bills.

The home shall not be sold.

Discovery shall be done within 90 days.

Mr. Holyoak shall file a Petition for his Attorney's Fees.

The Order shall reflect the substitution of attorneys.

The Court's Judicial Assistant shall set a Settlement Conference with Justice Becker.

Mr. Kirshcner shall prepare the Order and circulate to the other attorneys in the case.

INTERIM CONDITIONS:

FUTURE HEARINGS:

January 17, 2018 2:00 PM Petition RJC Courtroom 10A

Ochoa, Vincent Clayton, Yvette

January 17, 2018 2:00 PM Motion

RJC Courtroom 10A Ochoa, Vincent Clayton, Yvette

January 17, 2018 2:00 PM Opposition & Countermotion

RJC Courtroom 10A Ochoa, Vincent Clayton, Yvette

PRINT DATE:	01/19/2018	Page 3 of 4	Minutes Date:	January 17, 2018

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