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SUSAN JOVANOVICH, DEPUTY

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Plaintiff,

-VS-

CASE NO: C-13-291374-1

DEPT NO: XII

FREDERICK HAROLD HARRIS JR.,

Defendant.

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO. I)

MEMBERS OF THE JURY:

It is now my duty as judge to instruct you in the law that applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to follow these instructions and to apply the rules of law to the facts as you find them from the evidence.

You must not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law stated in these instructions. Regardless of any opinion you may have as to what the law ought to be, it would be a violation of your oath to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that given in the instructions of the Court.

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INSTRUCTION NO. 2

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction or idea is repeated or stated in different ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and none may be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and regard each in the light of all the others.

The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.

An amended information is but a formal method of accusing a person of a crime and is not of itself any evidence of his guilt.

In this case, it is charged in an amended information that on or between December, 2004 and September 26, 2012, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, said Defendant

COUNT 1 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT

did, on or between August, 2007 and September 26, 2012 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: TAHARAH DUKE, being approximately 8 to 12 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said TAHARAH DUKE to be placed in a situation where she might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by repeatedly beating the said TAHARAH DUKE with a belt.

COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 3 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his

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penis into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 4 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did, on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: TAHARAH DUKE, said child being under the age of fourteen years, by the said Defendant touching and/or rubbing the breast(s) of the said 'TAHARAH DUKE, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 5 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did, on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: TAHARAH DUKE, said child being under the age of fourteen years, by the said Defendant directing and/or causing and/or encouraging the said TAHARAH DUKE to place her hand on his penis and cause her hand to rub up and down, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 6 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 7 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did, on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: TAHARAH DUKE, said child being under the age of fourteen years, by the said Defendant touching and/or rubbing the breast(s) of the said TAHARAH DUKE, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 8 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 9 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: fellatio, by placing his penis on or in the mouth of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 10 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child

under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 11 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 12 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did, on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: TAHARAH DUKE, said child being under the age of fourteen years, by the said Defendant directing and/or causing and/or encouraging the said TAHARAH DUKE to place her hand on his penis and cause her hand to rub up and down, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 13 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or

under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 14 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF

AGE

did on or between October 1, 2010 and September 26, 2012 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TAHARAH DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said TAHARAH DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said TAHARAH DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 15 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT

did, on or between August, 2007 and September 26, 2012 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: TAQUANDA DUKE, being approximately 7 to 11 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said TAQUANDA DUKE to be placed in a situation where she might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by beating the said TAQUANDA DUKE with a belt and/or threatening her with a knife.

COUNT 16 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT

did, on or between August, 2007 and September 26, 2012 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: SHABAZZ DUKE, being approximately 12 to 17 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said SHABAZZ DUKE to be placed in a situation where he might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by repeatedly beating the said SHABAZZ DUKE with a belt and/or repeatedly punching the said SHABAZZ DUKE.

COUNT 17 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT

did, on or between August, 2007 and September 26, 2012 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: MAHLICA DUKE, being approximately 9 to 15 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said MAHLICA DUKE to be placed in a situation where she might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by repeatedly beating the said MAHLICA DUKE with a belt and/or choking her.

COUNT 18 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT

did, on or between January, 2005 and September 26, 2012 willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: VICTORIA DUKE, being approximately 15-18 years of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said VICTORIA DUKE to be placed in a situation where she might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by repeatedly beating the said VICTORIA DUKE with a belt.

COUNT 19 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did, on or between December, 2004 and May, 2005, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away VICTORIA DUKE, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said VICTORIA DUKE against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault and/or lead, take, entice, or carry away or detain VICTORIA DUKE, a minor, with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine said minor from her parent, guardian, or any other person having lawful custody of the said minor and/or perpetrate upon the person of said minor any unlawful act, to wit: sexual assault.

COUNT 20 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14

did on or between December, 2004 and May, 2005 then and there willfully, lewdly, unlawfully, and feloniously commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, a child, to-wit: VICTORIA DUKE, said child being under the age

of fourteen years, by Defendant putting the hand of the said VICTORIA DUKE on his genital area, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of said Defendant, or said child.

COUNT 21 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between December, 2004 and May, 2005 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: digital penetration, by inserting his finger(s) into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 22 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between December, 2004 and May, 2005 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under fourteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 23 - COERCION (SEXUALLY MOTIVATED)

did on or between December, 2004 and May, 2005 then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use physical force, or the immediate threat of such force, against VICTORIA DUKE, with intent to compel her to do, or abstain from doing, an act which she had a right to do, or abstain from doing, by Defendant grabbing the arm of the said VICTORIA DUKE and telling her not to tell anyone or he would beat her, one of the purposes for which the Defendant committed the offense was Defendant's sexual

gratification.

COUNT 24 - ADMINISTRATION OF A DRUG TO AID IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME

did on or between August 1, 2007 and August 31, 2007 then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly administer to VICTORIA DUKE, a controlled substance, anesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with the intent thereby to enable or assist himself to commit a felony, to-wit: Sexual Assault with a Minor Under the Age of 16.

COUNT 25 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did, on or between August 1, 2007 and August 31, 2007, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away VICTORIA DUKE, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said VICTORIA DUKE against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault and/or lead, take, entice, or carry away or detain VICTORIA DUKE, a minor, with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine said minor from her parent, guardian, or any other person having lawful custody of the said minor and/or perpetrate upon the person of said minor any unlawful act, to wit: sexual assault.

COUNT 26 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between August 1, 2007 and August 31, 2007 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 27 - ADMINISTRATION OF A DRUG TO AID IN THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly administer to VICTORIA DUKE, a controlled

substance, anesthetic, or intoxicating agent, with the intent thereby to enable or assist himself to commit a felony, to-wit: Sexual Assault with a Minor Under the Age of 16.

COUNT 28 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did, on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away VICTORIA DUKE, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said VICTORIA DUKE against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault and/or lead, take, entice, or carry away or detain VICTORIA DUKE, a minor, with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine said minor from her parent, guardian, or any other person having lawful custody of the said minor and/or perpetrate upon the person of said minor any unlawful act, to wit: sexual assault.

COUNT 29 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 30 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: anal intercourse, by placing his penis into the anal opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 31 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 32 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: anal intercourse, by placing his penis into the anal opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 33 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing a dildo and/or vibrator into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 34 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by causing

TINA DUKE to place a dildo into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 35 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE

did on or between September 1, 2007 and July 30, 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female child under sixteen years of age, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by causing TINA DUKE to place a dildo into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of the defendants conduct.

COUNT 36 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did in May, 2009 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 37 - FIRST DEGREE KIDNAPPING

did, on or between August 2010 and August 2011 willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and without authority of law, seize, confine, inveigle, entice, decoy, abduct, conceal, kidnap, or carry away VICTORIA DUKE, a human being, with the intent to hold or detain the said VICTORIA DUKE against her will, and without her consent, for the purpose of committing sexual assault.

COUNT 38 - BATTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL ASSAULT

did, on or between August 2010 and August 2011, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use force or violence upon the person of another, to-wit: VICTORIA DUKE, with the intent to commit sexual assault, by grabbing the wrist of the said VICTORIA

DUKE and holding it tight while attempting to cause her to perform fellatio on him.

COUNT 39 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did on or between August 2010 and August 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 40 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did on or between August 2010 and August 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 41 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did on or between August 2011 and December 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject VICTORIA DUKE, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: sexual intercourse, by placing his penis into the genital opening of the said VICTORIA DUKE, against her will, or under conditions in which Defendant knew, or should have known, that the said VICTORIA DUKE was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of Defendant's conduct.

COUNT 42 - PANDERING

did on or between August, 2007 and December 17, 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously induce, persuade, encourage, inveigle, entice, or compel TINA DUKE to become a prostitute, and/or to engage or continue to engage in prostitution, Defendant using physical force or the threat of physical force.

COUNT 43 - SEXUAL ASSAULT

did on or between August 2007 and August 2008 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sexually assault and subject TINA DUKE, a female person, to sexual penetration, to-wit: anal intercourse, by placing his penis into the anal opening of the said TINA DUKE, against her will.

COUNT 44 - LIVING FROM THE EARNINGS OF A PROSTITUTE

did on or between August, 2007 and December 17, 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly accept, receive, levy, or appropriate money, without consideration, from TINA DUKE, the proceeds of prostitution activity.

COUNT 45 - BATTERY BY STRANGULATION

did on or between August, 2007 and December, 2011 then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use force or violence upon the person of another, to-wit: TINA DUKE, by strangulation.

It is the duty of the jury to apply the rules of law contained in these instructions to the facts of the case and determine whether or not the Defendant is guilty of one or more of the offenses charged.

Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact you may find a defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged.

A person who willfully, unlawfully and feloniously causes a child under the age of 18 years to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect is guilty of child abuse.

As used in these instructions:

"Abuse or neglect" means physical or mental injury of a nonaccidental nature of a child under the age of 18 years.

"Physical injury" means:

- (1) Permanent or temporary disfigurement; or
- (2) Impairment of any bodily function or organ of the body.

A person who subjects another person to sexual penetration, against the victim's will, or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his/her conduct, is guilty of sexual assault.

A person who subjects a minor under fourteen years to sexual penetration, against the minor's will, or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the minor is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature or his/her conduct, is guilty of sexual assault with a minor under fourteen years of age.

A person who subjects a minor under sixteen years to sexual penetration, against the minor's will, or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the minor is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his/her conduct, is guilty of sexual assault with a minor under sixteen year of age.

"Sexual penetration" means cunnilingus, fellatio, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person into the genital or anal openings of the body of another, including sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning. Evidence of ejaculation is not necessary.

Digital penetration is the placing of one or more fingers of the perpetrator into the genital or anal opening of another person.

Cunnilingus is a touching of the female sexual organ by the mouth or tongue of another person.

Fellatio is a touching of the penis by the mouth or tongue of another person.

Sexual intercourse is the intrusion, however slight, of the penis into the genital opening of another person.

Anal intercourse is the intrusion, however slight, of the penis into the anal opening of another person.

Physical force is not necessary in the commission of sexual assault. The crucial question is not whether a person was physically forced to engage in a sexual assault but whether the act was committed without his/her consent or under conditions in which the defendant knew or should have known, the person was incapable of giving his/her consent or understanding the nature of the act. There is no consent where a person is induced to submit to the sexual act through fear of death or serious bodily injury.

A person is not required to do more than his/her age, strength, surrounding facts and attending circumstances make it reasonable for him/her to do to manifest opposition to a sexual assault.

Submission is not the equivalent of consent. While consent inevitably involves submission, submission does not inevitably involve consent. Lack of protest by a victim is simply one among the totality of circumstances to be considered by the jury.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If you find the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant subjected another person to sexual penetration, against the victim's will or under conditions in which the perpetrator knew or should have known the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his conduct, then the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty of sexual assault.

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There is no requirement that the testimony of a victim of sexual assault be corroborated, and his/her testimony standing alone, if believed beyond a reasonable doubt, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.

Any person who willfully commits any lewd or lascivious act, other than acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, upon or with any part of the body of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or of that child, is guilty of lewdness with a minor.

The law does not require that the lust, passions or sexual desires of either of such persons actually be aroused, appealed to, or gratified.

NO. 1

To constitute a lewd or lascivious act it is not necessary that the bare skin be touched. The touching may be through the clothing of the child.

Lewdness with a child under the age of 14 years requires an act upon or with the body of a child under the age of 14 years, but does not require physical contact between the perpetrator and the victim.

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Where a child has been the victim of sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 and/or lewdness with a minor under the age of 14, and does not remember the exact date of the act, the State is not required to prove a specific date, but may prove a time frame within which the act took place.

Where multiple sexual acts occur as part of a single criminal encounter a defendant may be found guilty for each separate or different act of sexual assault/lewdness.

Where a defendant commits a specific type of act constituting sexual assault/lewdness he/she may be found guilty of more than one count of that specific type of act of sexual assault/lewdness if:

- 1. There is an interruption between the acts which are of the same specific type;
- 2. Where the acts of the same specific type are interrupted by a different specific type of sexual assault/lewdness; or
- 3. For each separate object manipulated or inserted into the genital or anal opening of another.

Only one sexual assault/lewdness occurs when a defendant's actions were of one specific type of sexual assault/lewdness and those acts were continuous and did not stop between the acts of that specific type.

Every person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, the person:

- 1. For ransom, or reward; or
- 2. For the purpose of committing sexual assault, extortion or robbery upon or from the person; or
- 3. For the purpose of killing the person or inflicting substantial bodily harm upon him; or
- 4. For exact from relatives, friends, or any other person any money or valuable thing for the return or disposition of the kidnapped person; or
- 5. A person who leads, takes, entices, or carries away or detains any minor with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine him from his parents, guardians, or any other person having lawful custody of the minor, or with the intent to hold the minor to unlawful service, or perpetrate upon the person of the minor any unlawful act, is guilty of Kidnapping in the First Degree.

The law does not require the person being kidnapped to be carried away for any minimal distance.

The term "inveigle" means to lead astray by trickery or deceitful persuasion.

If you find the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant willfully seized, confined, inveigled, enticed, decoyed, abducted, concealed, kidnapped, or carried away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, any person:

- 1. For ransom, or reward; or
- 2. For the purpose of committing sexual assault, extortion or robbery upon or from the person; or
- 3. For the purpose of killing the person or inflicting substantial bodily harm upon him or her; or
- 4. To exact from relatives, friends, or any other person any money; or valuable thing for the return or disposition of the kidnapped person; or
- 5. A person who leads, takes, entices, or carries away or detains any minor with the intent to keep, imprison, or confine him from his parents, guardians, or any other person having lawful custody of the minor, or with the intent to hold the minor to unlawful service, or perpetrate upon the person of the minor any unlawful act.

Then the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty of First Degree Kidnapping.

In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of both First Degree Kidnapping and an associated offense of sexual assault, you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt either:

- 1. That the movement of the victim was not incidental to the sexual assault; or
- 2. That the incidental movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the sexual assault, or
- 3. That any incidental movement of the victim substantially exceeded that required to complete the sexual assault; or
- 4. That the victim was physically restrained and such restraint substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim; or
- 5. The movement or restraint had an independent purpose or significance.
- "Physically restrained" includes but is not limited to tying, binding, or taping.

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Any person who, with the intent to compel another to do or abstain from doing an act which the other person has a right to do or abstain from doing, to:

- (A) Use violence or inflict injury upon the person or any of his family, or upon his property, or threaten such violence or injury;
- (B) Deprive the person of any tool, implement or clothing, or hinder him in the use thereof; or
 - (C) Attempt to intimidate the person by threats or force, is guilty of Coercion.

If you find the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant used violence upon another person or threatened violence or injury to another person with the specific intent to compel another to do or abstain from doing an act which such other person has a right to do or abstain from doing, then the defendant is entitled to a verdict of not guilty of Coercion.

Any person who administers to any other person any chloroform, ether, laudanum, or any controlled substance, anesthetic, or intoxicating or emetic agent, with the intent thereby to enable or assist himself to commit a felony, is guilty of Administration of a Drug to Aid in the Commission of a Felony.

Battery is defined as the willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.

Any person who commits a battery upon another with the specific intent to commit a Sexual Assault is guilty of the offense of Battery with Intent to Commit Sexual Assault.

A person who, with physical force or the immediate threat of physical force, induces an adult to unlawfully become a prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution, or to enter any place within this state in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed for the purpose of sexual conduct or prostitution is guilty of Pandering.

"Adult" means a person 18 years of age or older.

"Induce" means to persuade, encourage, inveigle or entice.

"Prostitute" means a male or female person who for a fee, monetary consideration or other thing of value engages in sexual intercourse, oral-genital contact or any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person.

"Prostitution" means engaging in sexual conduct with another person in return for a fee, monetary consideration or other thing of value.

"Sexual conduct" includes sexual intercourse, oral-genital contact or any touching of the sexual organs or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either person. The consent of a victim of Pandering to an act of prostitution is not a defense to the

crime of Pandering.

A person who knowingly accepts, receives, levies or appropriates any money or other valuable thing, without consideration, from the proceeds of any prostitute, is guilty of Living from the Earnings of a Prostitute.

"Strangulation" means intentionally impeding the normal breathing or circulation of the blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck or by blocking the nose or mouth of another person in a manner that creates a risk of death or substantial bodily harm.

It is a defense to the charge of sexual assault that the Defendant entertained a reasonable and good faith belief that the alleged victim consented to engage in sexual intercourse. If you find such reasonable, good faith belief, even if mistaken, you must give the Defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty of sexual assault.

A belief that is based upon ambiguous conduct by the alleged victim that is the product of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of another is not a reasonable and good faith belief.

To constitute the crimes charged, there must exist a union or joint operation of an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.

The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.

Do not confuse intent with motive. Motive is what prompts a person to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the act is done.

Motive is not an element of the crime charged and the State is not required to prove a motive on the part of the Defendant in order to convict. However, you may consider evidence of motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in the case.

The Defendant is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every material element of the crime charged and that the Defendant is the person who committed the offense.

A reasonable doubt is one based on reason. It is not mere possible doubt but is such a doubt as would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life. If the minds of the jurors, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, are in such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable doubt. Doubt to be reasonable must be actual, not mere possibility or speculation.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the Defendant, he is entitled to a verdict of not guilty.

It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. Thus, the decision as to whether he should testify is left to the defendant on the advice and counsel of his attorney. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that he does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.

The evidence which you are to consider in this case consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits, and any facts admitted or agreed to by counsel.

There are two types of evidence; direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is the testimony of a person who claims to have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime which has been charged, such as an eyewitness. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of a chain of facts and circumstances which tend to show whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty. The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, all of the evidence in the case, including the circumstantial evidence, should be considered by you in arriving at your verdict.

Statements, arguments and opinions of counsel are not evidence in the case. However, if the attorneys stipulate to the existence of a fact, you must accept the stipulation as evidence and regard that fact as proved.

You must not speculate to be true any insinuations suggested by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer.

You must disregard any evidence to which an objection was sustained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the court.

Anything you may have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence and must also be disregarded.

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You are here to determine whether the State of Nevada has met its burden of proof from the evidence in the case. You are not called upon to return a verdict as to any other person. So, if the evidence in the case convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the Defendant, you should so find, even though you may believe one or more persons are also guilty.

The credibility or believability of a witness should be determined by his manner upon the stand, his relationship to the parties, his fears, motives, interests or feelings, his opportunity to have observed the matter to which he testified, the reasonableness of his statements and the strength or weakness of his recollections.

If you believe a witness has lied about any material fact in the case, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness or any portion of his testimony which is not proved by other evidence.

A prior inconsistent statement may be considered as substantive evidence that the facts described in the statement actually occurred.

A witness who has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education in a particular science, profession or occupation is an expert witness. An expert witness may give his opinion as to any matter in which he is skilled.

You should consider such expert opinion and weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound.

Although you are to consider only the evidence in the case in reaching a verdict, you must bring to the consideration of the evidence your everyday common sense and judgment as reasonable men and women. Thus, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses testify. You may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence which you feel are justified in the light of common experience, keeping in mind such inferences should not be based on speculation or guess.

A verdict may never be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or public opinion. Your decision should be the product of sincere judgment and sound discretion in accordance with these rules of law.

In your deliberation you may not discuss or consider the subject of punishment, as that is a matter which lies solely with the court. Your duty is confined to the determination of whether the State of Nevada has met its burden of proof as to the Defendant.

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court. During your deliberation, you will have all the exhibits admitted into evidence, these written instructions, and forms of verdict prepared for your convenience. Your verdict must be unanimous. As soon as you agree upon a verdict, the

foreperson shall sign and date the verdict form and return with it to this room.

act as foreperson who will preside over your deliberation, and will be your spokesperson in

When you retire to consider your verdict, you must first select one of your member to

Now you will listen to the arguments of counsel who will endeavor to aid you to reach a proper verdict by refreshing in your minds the evidence and by showing the application thereof to the law; but, whatever counsel may say, you will bear in mind it is your duty to be governed in your deliberation by the evidence as you understand it and remember it to be and by the law as given to you in these instructions, with the sole, fixed and steadfast purpose of doing equal and exact justice between the Defendant and the State of Nevada.

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| 1 | VER | FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON | |
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| 2 | ORIGINAL | L APR 1 5 2014 1:000M | |
| 3 | O I I WILLY | APR 13 2014 1 UU PII) | |
| 4 | | BY SUSAN JOVANOVICH, DEPUTY | |
| 5 | DISTRICT | COURT | |
| 6 | CLARK COUN | | |
| 7 | CLARK COUN | 11, HEYADA | |
| 8 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, | | |
| 9 | Plaintiff, | | |
| 10 | -vs- | CASE NO: C-13-291374-1 | |
| 11 | FREDERICK HAROLD HARRIS JR., | DEPT NO: XII | |
| 12 | Defendant. | | |
| 13 | Defendant. | | |
| 14 15 | <u>VERDICT</u> | | |
| 16 | We, the jury in the above entitled case, find the Defendant FREDERICK HAROLD | | |
| 17 | HARRIS JR., as follows: | | |
| 18 | COUNT 1 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT | | |
| 19 | (please check the appropriate box, selec | ct only one) | |
| 20 | ☐ Guilty of Child Abuse, Ne | glect or Endangerment | |
| 21 | Not Guilty | | |
| 22 | | | |
| 23 | COUNT 2 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A M | MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 24 | AGE | | |
| 25 | (please check the appropriate box, selec | ct only one) | |
| 26 | Guilty of Sexual Assault W | Vith A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age | |
| 27 | ☐ Not Guilty | | |
| 28 | | | |

| 1 | COUNT 3 - | SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF | |
|----|---|---------|---|--|
| 2 | | AGE | | |
| 3 | (pleas | se ched | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 4 | | 区 | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age | |
| 5 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 6 | | | | |
| 7 | <u>COUNT 4</u> - | LEW | DNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 | |
| 8 | (pleas | se chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 9 | | X | Guilty of Lewdness With A Child Under The Age Of 14 | |
| 10 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 11 | | | | |
| 12 | COUNT 5 - LEWDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 | | | |
| 13 | (pleas | se chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 14 | | Ľ | Guilty of Lewdness With A Child Under The Age Of 14 | |
| 15 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 16 | | | | |
| 17 | COUNT 6 - | SEXU | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 18 | _ | AGE | | |
| 19 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | | |
| 20 | | Ø | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age | |
| 21 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 22 | | | | |
| 23 | <u>COUNT 7</u> - | LEWI | ONESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 | |
| 24 | (pleas | e chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 25 | | X | Guilty of Lewdness With A Child Under The Age Of 14 | |
| 26 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 27 | | | | |
| 28 | | | | |

| $_{1}\parallel$ | <u>COUNT 8</u> - | SEXU | JAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
|-----------------|------------------|---------|---|
| 2 | | AGE | |
| 3 | (pleas | e chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 4 | | 区 | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 5 | | | Not Guilty |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | COUNT 9 - | SEXU | JAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
| 8 | | AGE | , |
| 9 | (pleas | se chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 10 | | X | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 11 | | | Not Guilty |
| 12 | i | | |
| 13 | COUNT 10 | - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
| 14 | | AGE | |
| 15 | (plea: | se chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 16 | | X | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 17 | | | Not Guilty |
| 18 | | | |
| 19 | COUNT 11 | - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
| 20 | | AGE | |
| 21 | (plea | se ched | ck the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 22 | | 区 | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 23 | | | Not Guilty |
| 24 | | | |
| 25 | 11 - | | VDNESS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 |
| 26 | (plea | se che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 27 | | X | Guilty of Lewdness With A Child Under The Age Of 14 |
| 28 | | | Not Guilty |

| 1 | COUNT 13 - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF | |
|----|---|---|--|
| 2 | AGE | | |
| 3 | (please chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 4 | X | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age | |
| 5 | | Not Guilty | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | <u>COUNT 14</u> - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 8 | AGE | | |
| 9 | (please chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 10 | | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age | |
| 11 | | Not Guilty | |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | COUNT 15 - CHI | LD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT | |
| 14 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 15 | | Guilty of Child Abuse, Neglect Or Endangerment | |
| 16 | Ø | Not Guilty | |
| 17 | | | |
| 18 | COUNT 16 - CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT | | |
| 19 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 20 | [2] | Guilty of Child Abuse, Neglect Or Endangerment | |
| 21 | | Not Guilty | |
| 22 | | | |
| 23 | <u>COUNT 17</u> - CHI | LD ABUSE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT | |
| 24 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 25 | Jan Aleury | Guilty of Child Abuse, Neglect Or Endangerment | |
| 26 | | Not Guilty | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |

| 1 | COUNT 18 - CHILD AB | USE, NEGLECT OR ENDANGERMENT |
|----|--------------------------|---|
| 2 | <u> </u> | appropriate box, select only one) |
| 3 | ☐ Guilt | y of Child Abuse, Neglect Or Endangerment |
| 4 | ☑ Not 0 | Guilty |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | COUNT 19 - FIRST DEC | |
| 7 | (please check the | appropriate box, select only one) |
| 8 | ☑ Guilt | ty of First Degree Kidnapping |
| 9 | □ Not | Guilty |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | N | SS WITH A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF 14 |
| 12 | | appropriate box, select only one) |
| 13 | ⊠ Guil | ty of Lewdness With A Child Under The Age Of 14 |
| 14 | ☐ Not | Guilty |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | <u>COUNT 21</u> - SEXUAL | ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
| 17 | 11 | |
| 18 | (please check the | appropriate box, select only one) |
| 19 | ∏ Gui | lty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 20 | , Not | Guilty |
| 21 | | TO THE WAY TO THE A DO OF |
| 22 | COUNT 22 - SEXUAL | ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER FOURTEEN YEARS OF |
| 23 | ll . | |
| 24 | | appropriate box, select only one) |
| 25 | ´ | ilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Fourteen Years Of Age |
| 26 | S Not | t Guilty |
| 27 | 7 | |
| 28 | 8 | |

| 1 | <u>COUNT 23</u> - 0 | COE | RCION (Sexually Motivated) | |
|----|---|-------------|--|--|
| 2 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | | |
| 3 | ۵ | ZĮ | Guilty of Coercion (Sexually Motivated) | |
| 4 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 5 | | | | |
| 6 | <u>COUNT 24</u> - A | ADN | MINISTRATION OF A DRUG TO AID IN THE COMMISSION OF A | |
| 7 | C | RIN | ИE | |
| 8 | (please | chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 9 | [x | <u>[</u>] | Guilty of Administration Of A Drug To Aid In The Commission Of A | |
| 10 | | | Crime | |
| 11 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 12 | | | | |
| 13 | <u>COUNT 25</u> - F | TRS | ST DEGREE KIDNAPPING | |
| 14 | (please (| chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 15 | Ģ | ₫ | Guilty of First Degree Kidnapping | |
| 16 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 17 | | | | |
| 18 | COUNT 26 - SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | | | |
| 19 | A | \ GE | | |
| 20 | (please | chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 21 | [| X. | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 22 | | | Not Guilty | |
| 23 | | | | |
| 24 | | | | |
| 25 | | | | |
| 26 | | | | |
| 27 | | | | |
| 28 | | | | |

| 1 | COUNT 27 | ADM | INISTRATION OF A DRUG TO AID IN THE COMMISSION OF A |
|----|----------|-------------|--|
| 2 | | CRIM | |
| 3 | (pleas | e checl | k the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 4 | | | Guilty of Administration Of A Drug To Aid In The Commission Of A |
| 5 | | | Crime |
| 6 | | \boxtimes | Not Guilty |
| 7 | | | |
| 8 | | | T DEGREE KIDNAPPING |
| 9 | (pleas | se chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 10 | | [Z] | Guilty of First Degree Kidnapping |
| 11 | | | Not Guilty |
| 12 | | | TO TOP INTOER GIVTEEN VEARS OF |
| 13 | COUNT 29 | | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF |
| 14 | | AGE | |
| 15 | (plea | se ched | ck the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 16 | | 凶 | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age |
| 17 | | | Not Guilty |
| 18 | | | THE TAXABLE PROPERTY OF THE PR |
| 19 | COUNT 30 | | TUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF |
| 20 | | AGE | |
| 21 | (plea | ise che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) |
| 22 | | | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age |
| 23 | | \square | Not Guilty |
| 24 | | | |
| 25 | | | |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |
| | II | | |

| 1 | COUNT 31 - SEXU | JAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 2 | AGE | | |
| 3 | (please chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 4 | X | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 5 | | Not Guilty | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | COUNT 32 - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 8 | AGE | | |
| 9 | (please chec | k the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 10 | | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 11 | 図 | Not Guilty | |
| 12 | | | |
| 13 | COUNT 33 - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 14 | AGE | | |
| 15 | (please chec | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 16 | 区 | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 17 | | Not Guilty | |
| 18 | | | |
| 19 | COUNT 34 - SEX | UAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | |
| 20 | AGE | | |
| 21 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 22 | × | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 23 | | Not Guilty | |
| 24 | | | |
| 25 | | | |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |

| 1 | COUNT 35 - SEX | KUAL ASSAULT WITH A MINOR UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 2 | AGI | 3 | |
| 3 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 4 | X | Guilty of Sexual Assault With A Minor Under Sixteen Years Of Age | |
| 5 | | Not Guilty | |
| 6 | | | |
| 7 | <u>COUNT 36</u> - SEX | XUAL ASSAULT | |
| 8 | (please che | eck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 9 | 团 | Guilty of Sexual Assault | |
| 10 | | Not Guilty | |
| 11 | | | |
| 12 | <u>COUNT 37</u> - FIR | ST DEGREE KIDNAPPING | |
| 13 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 14 | [X] | Guilty of First Degree Kidnapping | |
| 15 | | Not Guilty | |
| 16 | | | |
| 17 | <u>COUNT 38</u> - BA | TTERY WITH INTENT TO COMMIT SEXUAL ASSAULT | |
| 18 | (please ch | eck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 19 | Ø | Guilty of Battery With Intent To Commit Sexual Assault | |
| 20 | | Not Guilty | |
| 21 | COUNT 39 - SE | XUAL ASSAULT | |
| 22 | (please ch | eck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 23 | 凶 | Guilty of Sexual Assault | |
| 24 | . 🗆 | Not Guilty | |
| 25 | | | |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |

| 1 | <u>COUNT 40</u> - SEX | UAL ASSAULT | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 2 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 3 | Ø | Guilty of Sexual Assault | |
| 4 | | Not Guilty | |
| 5 | | | |
| 6 | <u>COUNT 41</u> - SEX | TUAL ASSAULT | |
| 7 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 8 | 囟 | Guilty of Sexual Assault | |
| 9 | | Not Guilty | |
| 10 | | | |
| 11 | <u>COUNT 42</u> - PAN | DERING | |
| 12 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 13 | 烒 | Guilty of Pandering | |
| 14 | | Not Guilty | |
| 15 | | | |
| 16 | <u>COUNT 43</u> - SEX | CUAL ASSAULT | |
| 17 | (please check the appropriate box, select only one) | | |
| 18 | | Guilty of Sexual Assault | |
| 19 | 区 | Not Guilty | |
| 20 | | | |
| 21 | <u>COUNT 44</u> - LIV | ING FROM THE EARNINGS OF A PROSTITUTE | |
| 22 | (please che | ck the appropriate box, select only one) | |
| 23 | Ø | Guilty of Living From The Earnings Of A Prostitute | |
| 24 | | Not Guilty | |
| 25 | | | |
| 26 | | | |
| 27 | | | |
| 28 | | | |

COUNT 45 - BATTERY BY STRANGULATION (please check the appropriate box, select only one) Guilty of Battery By Strangulation 笖 Not Guilty DATED this 15 day of April, 2014

Electronically Filed 04/28/2014 08:07:26 PM

| 1 | MOT RETSY Allen ESO | |
|----|--|---|
| | BETSY Allen, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6878 CLERK OF THE COURT | |
| 2 | P.O. Box 46991 | |
| 3 | Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 | |
| 4 | (702) 386-9700 Fax (702) 386-4723 | |
| 5 | betsyallenesq@yahoo.com | |
| 6 | Attorney for Defendant FREDRICK HARRIS | |
| l | DISTRICT COURT | |
| 7 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | |
| 8 | THE STATE OF NEVADA,) Case No.: C-13-291374-1 | |
| 9 |) Dept. No. XII Plaintiff, | |
| 10 |) | |
| 11 | vs. | |
| 12 | FREDRICK HARRIS,) | |
| 13 |) Defendant.) | |
| | Delendant.) | |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | <u>DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL</u> | |
| 16 | COMES NOW the Defendant, FREDRICK HARRIS, by and through his attorney, | |
| 17 | BETSY ALLEN, ESQ., and hereby moves this Honorable Court to Grant a New Trial. | |
| 18 | This Motion is based upon the pleading and papers on files herein, the following | |
| 19 | Points and Authorities all as incorporated herein. | |
| 20 | DATED this _28th_ day of April, 2014 | |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | <u>/s/ Betsy Allen</u> Betsy Allen, Esq. | - |
| 23 | Nevada Bar No. 6878 | |
| 24 | | |
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NOTICE OF MOTION

TO: CLARK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY

YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that counsel for the Defendant FREDRICK HARRIS has set this matter for hearing in Department XII on the $\frac{29}{\text{day}}$ day of $\frac{\text{MAY}}{\text{MAY}}$, 2014 at the hour of $\frac{8:30\text{A}}{\text{MAY}}$

DATED THIS _28th___ day of April, 2014

DV: /a/ Patau

BY: /s/ Betsy Allen
BETSY ALLEN, ESQ
Nevada Bar No. 6878
P.O. Box 46991
Las Vegas, Nevada, 89114

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Factual Background

In the instant case, the Defendant, FREDRICK HARRIS, was convicted of 36 out of 45 counts of various charges, including: Sexual Assault on a Minor under Fourteen, Sexual Assault of a Minor under 16, and Lewdness with a Minor.

Legal Argument

NRS 176.515 provides in relevant part that:

- 1. The Court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required as a matter of law or on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
- 2. If trial was by the Court without a jury, the Court may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony on direct the entry of a new judgment.
- 3. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 176.0918, a motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only within 2 years after the verdict or finding of guilt.
- 4. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds must be made within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilt or within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7-day period.¹

A. The Court allowed portions of the statement of co-defendant Lealer Ann Cooks without a finding of reliability

NRS 51.035 states, in pertinent part, that hearsay is not admissible unless it falls within an exception. One of these exceptions is a statement against interest. A statement against interest, in order to be admissible, must, at the time it is made:

- (a) Was so far contrary to the pecuniary or proprietary interests of the declarant;
- (b) So far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability;

¹ Chief Deputy District Attorney Lisa Luzaich graciously granted the Defense until April 28, 2014 to file the aforementioned Motion.

- (c) So far tended to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another; or
- (d) So far tended to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval, that a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. NRS 51.345(1)

During the course of Harris' trial, the State opted to elicit particular statements from Detective Madsen, made by co-defendant Lealer Cooks.² These statements were clearly hearsay, as the State asserted that they were a statement against penal interest(an exception to the hearsay rule).

However, contrary to defense's objections, the Court opted to allow these statements to be elicited. There was no subsequent finding by this Court with regard to whether the statement elicited was trustworthy under *Walker v. State*, 116 Nev. 670, 76(2000).

In the instant case, the statement was made to law enforcement after a lengthy discussion, all of which was recorded. Ms. Cooks stated repeatedly throughout the statement that she did not believe the Duke girls and their claims. Further, part of the statute requires that the report of the abuse have some indicia of reliability and the person must have some belief that the abuse is true.³

Lealer was very clear in her statement that she did not believe the victims in this case. To simply characterize that one particular portion as a "statement against interest"

² Lealer Ann Cooks was charged in case number C290726. She is a co-defendant as she is charged with a failure to report the abuse(Child Abuse & Neglect) arising out of the same allegations levied against Mr. Harris.

³ The Defense was not permitted to bring in information that Cooks was concerned about the Tahara Duke being sexually active with some boy at her school, thus the reason for taking her to the doctor.

was patently incorrect. It was primarily taken out of context, in light of the entire statement, and it was never subjected to a finding of reliability.

For this reason, Harris should received a new trial.

B. Harris should receive a new trial because his statement was altered incorrectly and the jury was precluded from hearing material facts.

During the course of the trial, the State opted to play Harris' statement to the jury.

However, there were parts of the statement that were which should have been played and were material to the defense.

During the course of Harris' statement to Henderson PD, he told the Detective that Victoria had disclosed to him that she had had sex while she lived in Utah.⁴ The State opted to take this portion out, claiming it was subject to rape shield.

NRS 50.090 provides, in pertinent part:

In any prosecution for sexual assault....., the accused may not present evidence of any previous sexual conduct of the victim of the crime to challenge the victim's credibility as a witness unless the prosecutor has presented evidence or the victim has testified concerning such conduct, or the absence of such conduct, in which case the scope of the accused's cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal must be limited to the evidence presented by the prosecutor or the victim.

In the instant case, Victoria Duke was **VERY** clear that she was subjected to a sexual assault almost immediately upon her return from Utah. And furthermore, this sexual assault was her first time having sex.

In Summit v. State, 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374(1985), the Nevada Supreme Court addressed this issue. In Summit, like here, the defense sought to introduce evidence that the victim had prior sexual experience, which would account for her knowledge of sex. The

⁴ Victoria claimed that upon her return from Utah, Harris had taken her virginity.

District Court denied the request. In analyzing the facts and NRS 50.090, the Court decidedly agreed with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Washington, which held that the trial court must undertake to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect and that the inquiry should particularly focus upon "potential prejudice to the truthfinding process itself," i.e., "whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or emotional basis." *Summit* at 1377, citing *State v. Hudlow*, 99 Wash.2d 1, 59 P.2d 514(1983)

In the instant case, there was no balancing at all. The Court simply precluded this portion of the defendant's statement. Her claims of Harris taking her virginity were clearly rebuttable through his own statement to police. The purpose of bringing in the statements was not to attack her credibility but simply to show prior sexual knowledge, which would account for her rendition of the acts itself.

The state further argued that it was self serving. However, if the court were to accept this reasoning, then every statement a defendant makes would be subject to the State's "eraser" with regard to anything they feel is "self serving." The defendant's statement was put into evidence by the State. Portions were redacted regarding a polygraph(which are inadmissible in this state). However, his statement to the police regarding what Victoria had previously told him was certainly relevant. It did not violate rape shield and should not have been subject to the state's "eraser" for reasons which do not comport with his right to confront witnesses pursuant to the 6th Amendment.

C. Victoria Duke made material misrepresentations of what she was doing in California.

During Victoria Duke's testimony, she testified that she was living in California and

going to school. However, after Harris' conviction, counsel for the defense became aware of the fact that Ms. Duke was arrested on two occasions for prostitution. Counsel for Harris confirmed this with the two court entities that are listed on the register of actions.

Certainly, information about Victoria Duke being a prostitute was exceptionally important in this case. She alleged multiple instances of sexual abuse and then lied about what she was doing in California. Certainly her criminal record would have been relevant to this case.

Conclusion

Wherefore, The accused, FREDRICK HARRIS, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to grant his Motion for a new trial. Alternatively, he requests the Court to hold a hearing concerning the matters set forth herein.

DATED _28th_ day of April, 2014

BY: /s/ Betsy Allen, Esq.
BETSY ALLEN, ESQ
Nevada Bar No. 6878
P.O. Box 46991
Las Vegas, Nevada 89114
(702) 386-9700

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that I provided the Clark County District Attorney, specifically Lisa Luzaich, a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion on the 28th day of April, 2014 via email to:

lisa.luzaich@clarkcountyda.com

DATED this 28th day of April, 2014

/s/Betsy Allen
Betsy Allen, Esq.

Electronically Filed 06/13/2014 07:56:15 AM

| 1 | OPPS | | Alun J. Chrim | |
|----|---|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| 2 | STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney | | CLERK OF THE COURT | |
| 3 | Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 LISA LUZAICH | | | |
| 4 | Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005056 | | | |
| 5 | 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 | | | |
| 6 | (702) 671-2500 Attorney for Plaintiff | | | |
| 7 | DAGMAN | | | |
| 8 | DISTRICT COURT | | | |
| 9 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | | |
| 10 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, | | | |
| 11 | Plaintiff, | | | |
| 12 | -VS- | CASE NO: | C-13-291374-1 | |
| 13 | FREDRICK HAROLD HARRIS JR., #0972945 | DEPT NO: | XII | |
| 14 | Defendant. | | | |
| 15 | Defendant. | | | |
| 16 | STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL | | | |
| 17 | | | | |
| 18 | DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 19, 2014 TIME OF HEARING: 8:30 A.M. | | | |
| 19 | COMES NOW, the State of Nevada | , by STEVEN B. | WOLFSON, Clark County | |
| 20 | District Attorney, through LISA LUZAICH | I, Chief Deputy Di | istrict Attorney, and hereby | |
| 21 | submits the attached Points and Authorities | in Opposition to D | Defendant's Motion for New | |
| 22 | Trial. | | | |
| 23 | This opposition is made and based upo | on all the papers and | pleadings on file herein, the | |
| 24 | attached points and authorities in support hereof, and oral argument at the time of hearing, if | | | |
| 25 | deemed necessary by this Honorable Court. | | | |
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| 28 | <i>//</i> | | | |

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 15, 2014, after hearing twelve (12) days of evidence in this case, and after approximately two (2) days of deliberation, the jury found Defendant Frederick Harris ("Defendant") guilty of the following: eleven (11) counts of Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Fourteen Years of Age; five (5) counts of Lewdness With a Child Under the Age of 14; six (6) counts of Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age; four (4) counts of Sexual Assault; four (4) counts of First Degree Kidnapping; one (1) count of Administration of a Drug to Aid in the Commission of a Crime; one (1) count of Coercion (Sexually Motivated); one (1) count of Battery With Intent to Commit Sexual Assault; one (1) count of Child Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment; one (1) count of Pandering; and one (1) count of Living From the Earnings of a Prostitute.

The jury found Defendant not guilty of the following: two (2) counts of Sexual Assault With a Minor Under Sixteen Years of Age; one (1) count of Sexual Assault; one (1) count of Administration of a Drug to Aid in the Commission of a Crime; four (4) counts of Child Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment; and one (1) count of Battery by Strangulation.

Defendant filed the instant Motion for a New Trial on April 28, 2014.

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS DO NOT MEET THE STANDARD REQUIRED TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL

In criminal cases, NRS 176.515 controls when a motion for new trial may be granted. NRS 176.515 provides:

- 1. The court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required as a matter or law or on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
- 2. If trial was by the court without a jury the court may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry of a new judgment.
- 3. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only within 2 years after the verdict or finding of guilty.

4. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds must be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilt or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period.

The trial court has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for new trial. Rippo v. State, 113 Nev. 1239, 946 P.2d 1017 (1997).

a. LEALER COOKS' STATEMENT WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED AS A STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST

Defendant argues that a new trial should be granted under NRS 176.515(4) on the grounds that the Court improperly admitted limited portions of Lealer Cooks' ("Cooks") statement to police as a statement against interest under NRS 51.345.

The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless found to be manifestly wrong. See Cipriano v. State, 111 Nev. 534, 541, 894 P.2d 347, 352 (1995). NRS 51.345 states as follows:

- 1. A statement which at the time of its making:
- (a) Was so far contrary to the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant;
- (b) So far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability;
- (c) So far tended to render invalid a claim by the declarant agains another; or
- (d) So far tended to make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule or social disapproval, that a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true is not admissible under the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused in a criminal case is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

NRS 51.345 (emphasis added).

Defendant's main contention is that this Court erroneously made no finding of reliability under NRS 51.345 and that "the statute requires that the report of the abuse have some indicia of reliability and the person must have some belief that the abuse is true." Defendant's Motion, p. 4. Defendant takes this portion of the statute above out of context and

the requirement of a finding of reliability does not apply to Cooks' statements against interest elicited by the State during trial. It is clear from a thorough reading of NRS 51.345 that the requirement that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement only applies to statements offered to exculpate the accused in a criminal case.

Here, the State elicited Cooks very narrow statements against her interest through Detective Nick Madsen to show that Cooks was aware of Taharah's and Taquandah's disclosure of Defendant's abuse, that Cooks took Taharah to a doctor, and that Cooks ultimately did nothing about the abuse. In support of his argument, Defendant cites Walker v. State, 116 Nev. 670, 6 P.3d 477 (2000). However, Walker specifically deals with statements against interest of a co-defendant sought to be admitted to exculpate the accused. The evidence admitted during the instant trial was in no way offered to exculpate the Defendant. Thus, the Court was not required to make a finding of reliability in order to admit the statements. The Court properly admitted these statements because they so far tended to subject Cooks to criminal liability that a reasonable person in Cooks' position would not have made the statements unless the person believed it to be true.

Indeed, while Cooks was not charged as Defendant's co-defendant, Cooks was prosecuted with regard to the facts of the instant case. Moreover, Cooks and pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford to one (1) count of Child Abuse, Neglect or Endangerment (Category B Felony), in C290726. Specifically, the allegations she pled to were, in part, that she "[kept] Tahara Duke in the home with Frederick Harris after knowing the said Taharah Duke was being molested by Frederick Harris, and her sister had previously been molested by Frederick Harris, and promising but failing to move the said Tahara Duke out of the home resulting in the continuing sexual abuse of Tahara Duke by Frederick Harris." (See Amended Information, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "1"). Cooks was ultimately adjudicated guilty of that offense.

Defendant also contends that Cooks' statement was "taken out of context" and that Cooks was very clear in her statement to police that she did not believe the victims in this case. On cross-examination, the Court allowed Defendant to ask Det. Madsen about Cooks initially

not believing the girls. Defendant further asked if Cooks gave specific instances to Det. Madsen as to why she did not believe the girls. The Court properly excluded the specific examples that Defendant purported to offer because these statements from Cooks were inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within any hearsay exception. Cooks' statements were not taken out of context and the Court allowed Defendant to follow up with regard to whether Cooks did not initially believe Taharah and Taquandah. The statements were properly admitted and this argument fails to show that Defendant is entitled to a new trial.

b. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT WAS PROPERLY REDACTED TO EXCLUDE INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY

Defendant argues that this Court improperly excluded Defendant's statements during his December 18, 2011 interview with law enforcement. The statements that the State reducted that Defendant sought to admit included the following:

Q [Detective Aguiar]: Had she [Victoria] ever had sex with anyone before you?

A [Defendant]: Not that I know of. I don't know.

Q: So you're the first person she's ever had sex with?

A: I know she had sex before because when she came in from Utah she had been having sex. She admitted it that she had been having sex with girl and a friend that used to sneak around after school with out in Utah.

Defendant's Transcribed Statement, p. 90, lns. 8-14. Defendant made these statements after he admitted to having sex with Victoria and her mother, Tina Duke, on two (2) prior occasions. Again, the admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless found to be manifestly wrong. Cipriano, 111 Nev. at 541, 894 P.2d at 352. Defendant argues that the Court did not balance the probative value of these statements against their prejudicial effect and simply precluded this portion of Defendant's statement. Defendant's Motion, p. 6. This Court is very well aware of the law surrounding NRS 50.090 and Summit v. State. These statements were properly excluded by the Court, and as such provide no grounds to grant a motion for new trial.

NRS 50.090 states the following:

In any prosecution for sexual assault or statutory sexual seduction or for attempt to commit or conspiracy to commit either crime, the accused may not present evidence of any previous sexual conduct of the victim of the crime to challenge the victim's credibility as a witness unless the prosecutor has presented evidence or the victim has testified concerning such conduct, or the absence of such conduct, in which case the scope of the accused's cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal must be limited to the evidence presented by the prosecution or victim.

In Summit v. State, 101 Nev. 159, 697 P. 2d 1374 (1985), the Nevada Supreme Court explained the rationale for the rape-shield law codified in NRS 50.090. The Court explained that general use of a female's reputation for morality and chastity would be inadmissible to infer consent or to attack credibility. The Court also explained that the law is designed to protect rape victims from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details of their private lives and to encourage rape victims to disclose crimes, while being free from unnecessary indignities and needless probing into their sexual histories. Specifically, the Court stated:

In 1977 Nevada joined forty-five states and the federal government in passing a "rape shield" statute, limiting inquiry into the sexual history of a complaining witness in a rape or sexual assault case. See J.A. Tanford and A.J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U.Pa.L.Rev. 544, 544 (1980). Such laws have generally been designed to reverse the common law rule applicable in rape cases, that use of evidence of a female complainant's general reputation for morality and chastity was admissible to infer consent and also to attack credibility generally. Thus, for example, it had been held: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that of a woman." State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 132 Mo. 102, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (1895), quoted in State v. Brown, 636 S.W.2d 929, 933 n. 3 (Mo.1982), cert. denied sub nom., Brown v. Missouri, 459 U.S. 1212, 103 S.Ct. 1207, 75 L.Ed.2d 448 (1983). Such statutes as Nevada's have been described as "directed at the misuse of prior sexual conduct evidence based on this antiquated

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and obviously illogical premise." State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.2d 1, 659 P.2d 514, 519 (1983). See also People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (1978). An additional purpose of such statutes is "to protect rape victims from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives.' "124 Cong.Rec. at H 11945 (1978), quoted in Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 45 (4th Cir.1981). Finally, "[t]he restrictions placed on the admissibility of certain evidence by the rape-shield laws will, it was hoped, encourage rape victims to come forward and report the crimes and testify in court protected from unnecessary indignities and needless probing into their respective sexual histories." State v. Lemon, 456 A.2d 261, 264 (R.I.1983). Id.

Defendant's own statements that he "knows" Victoria was having sex in Utah, and that Victoria previously admitted to him that she had sex in Utah are clearly self-serving and there is absolutely no indicia of reliability to these statements. Moreover, these statements are protected under NRS 50.090. Defendant argues that the statements should have been admitted to show that "the victim had prior sexual experience, which would account for her knowledge of sex," and "simply to show prior sexual knowledge, which would account for her rendition of the acts itself." Defendant's Motion, p. 5-6. Victoria Duke was twenty-one (21) years old at the time she testified at trial in this case. The victim in Summit was six (6) years old, and the victim in State v. Howard, 121 N.H. 52, 426 A.2d 457 (1981), referenced in Summit, was twelve (12) years old. Defendant's statements are not specific evidence to challenge "the young complaining witness's credibility, by showing that she had other experiences which could explain the source of her knowledge of the sexual activity she described in her testimony." Summit, 101 Nev. at 163, 697 P.2d at 1377. Victoria was an adult at the time she testified, and on cross-examination of at least one of the State's witnesses, defense counsel elicited the fact that Victoria now has a baby. Defendant's own statements that were sought to be admitted at trial simply do not fall under the exception to rape-shield under Summit and the Court properly excluded them. As such, this argument fails and provides no grounds to grant a new trial.

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c. VICTORIA DUKE DID NOT MAKE ANY MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT SHE WAS ARRESTED FOR PROSTIUTION WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMISSIBLE HAD IT BEEN KNOWN TO EITHER DEFENSE COUNSEL OR THE STATE

Defendant states that "information about Victoria Duke being a prostitute was exceptionally important to the case," and argues that a new trial should be granted because Victoria did not testify that she had been arrested on two (2) occasions for prostitution since moving to California in August 2013, two years after the last incident of sexual assault occurred with the Defendant. Defendant's Motion, p. 7.

Defendant makes the unsupported allegation that Victoria "lied about what she was doing in California." Id. During trial, Victoria testified that she moved to California in August 2013, that she was currently living with her "godmother," and that she was currently attending school to become a medical clinical admissions assistant. Defendant has absolutely nothing to support his claim that Victoria lied in any of these statements. In fact, the State's investigator went to Victoria's school and spoke to an administrator. Additionally, he went to Victoria's address and spoke to Victoria's "godmother."

At the time of trial, neither the State, nor the Defense, were aware that Victoria had been arrested on two occasions for prostitution since Victoria had moved to California in August 2013. The State did run Victoria in SCOPE, its local criminal history database, and there were no arrests listed there. If the State had this information, it would have turned it over to the Defense, but the State did not.

Assuming Defendant's representations are accurate, even if the State had this information, Victoria's (2) prior arrests for prostitution would not have been admissible at trial. The arrests are not relevant because they occurred two years after the last incident of sexual assault occurred with the Defendant. The arrests have no bearing whatsoever with what occurred with Victoria Duke and the Defendant during December 2004 through December 2011, which are the dates encompassed by all of the charges involving Victoria.

Moreover, Defendant does not even set forth a basis that he would have sought to admit this evidence. The defense at trial was that the victims were making their testimony up; the defense was not a consent defense. Victoria's two (2) prior arrests for prostitution are not relevant to the defense set forth during trial. A prior arrest record for prostitution, if found to be relevant, is still subject to considerations of confusion and prejudice under NRS 48.035 and in the appropriate case, a district court could properly exercise its discretion by refusing to admit such evidence. Drake v. State, 108 Nev. 523, 527, 836 P.2d 52, 55 (1992). Even had this Court found Victoria's arrests to somehow be relevant, the evidence would have been excluded because the probative value of the arrests would have been substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and because of the danger the evidence posed of confusing the issues in the case and misleading the jury. Again, Defendant fails to set forth what probative value, if any, this evidence would have had at trial. This argument fails and is not a basis to grant a new trial under NRS 176.515(4).

Insomuch as Defendant's argument is construed as a motion for new trial based upon a claim of newly discovered evidence, NRS 176.515(1) provides that a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The standard for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is that:

(1) the evidence must be newly discovered: (2) it must be material to the defense; (3) it could not have been discovered and produced even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (4) it must not be cumulative; (5) it must indicate that a different result is probable on retrial; (6) it must not simply be an attempt to contradict or discredit a former witness; and (7) it must be the best evidence the case admits.

Hennie v. State, 114 Nev. 1285, 968 P.2d 761 (1998). See also, Callier v. Warden, 111 Nev. 976, 988, 901 P.2d 619, 626 (1995). In order to obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, Defendant must present evidence that satisfies all seven prongs of the test set forth in Callier. Defendant has failed to do so.

As argued above, Defendant fails to meet prong (2) because they have failed to show how this evidence is material to the defense. Additionally, Defendant fails to meet prong (3) because the evidence very clearly could have been produced through the exercise of reasonable

diligence evidenced by the fact that Defendant obtained this information days after the jury's verdict was reached. Defendant also fails to meet prong (5) because the evidence most certainly does not indicate that a different result is probable on retrial considering he has failed to show that the evidence would have been admissible in the first place, and considering the two (2) arrests took place two years after the last incident of sexual assault in this case. Lastly, Defendant fails to show that this evidence is not simply an attempt to contradict or discredit Victoria Duke as a witness, and thus fails to meet prong (6). Because Defendant has failed to meet any of the requirements set forth in Hennie, and he is required to meet all seven (7) requirements to obtain a new trial, he is not entitled to a new trial.

II. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The Nevada Supreme Court has previously stated that requests for evidentiary hearings in motions for new trial should be subject to the same rule as applied to post-conviction petitions. See, Rippo, 113 Nev. at 1250, 946 P.2d at 1024. As applied to post-conviction proceedings, "[a] petitioner for post-conviction relief is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he supports his claims with specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him to relief. The petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the factual allegations are belied or repelled by the record. The petitioner has the burden of establishing the factual allegations in support of his petition." Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 44, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004). Since Defendant has failed to establish that any of his claims would require relief, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.

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CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion for New Trial and his request for an evidentiary hearing be denied. DATED this 13th day of June, 2014. Respectfully submitted, STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 BY /s/ LISA LUZAICH LISA LUZAICH Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005056 **CERTIFICATE OF E-SERVICE** I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 13th day of JUNE 2014, to: BETSY ALLEN, ESQ. betsyallenesq@yahoo.com BY /s/ HOWARD CONRAD Secretary for the District Attorney's Office Special Victims Unit hic/SVU

EXHIBIT "1"

ORIGINAL

1 STEVĖN B. WOLFSON 2 Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 3 LISA LUZAICH Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #5056 200 Lewis Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 5 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 8 9 THE STATE OF NEVADA, 10 11

FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT OUT 29 2013

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

Plaintiff,

Case No:

C-13-290726-1

Dept No:

 $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{x}$

LEALER ANN COOKS. #0701381

Defendant.

AMENDED

INFORMATION

STATE OF NEVADA SS. COUNTY OF CLARK

STEVEN B. WOLFSON, District Attorney within and for the County of Clark, State of Nevada, in the name and by the authority of the State of Nevada, informs the Court:

That LEALER ANN COOKS, the Defendant(s) above named, having committed the crime of CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT, OR ENDANGERMENT (Category B Felony -NRS 200.508), on or between August 1, 2007 and September 30, 2012, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did Angust 1 2008 and December 30 2010, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: VICTORIA DUKE, being approximately 15-18 year(s) of age and/or TAHARE DUKE, being approximately 7-12 year(s) of age and/or MAHLICA DUKE, being approximately 15-17 year(s) of age and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE, being approximately 7-11 year(s) of age and/or SHABAZZ DUKE, being approximately 12-15

PAWPDOC9/INF/303/30371202/DOC

AMENDED BY ORDER OF THE COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON, CLERK OF THE COURT

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year(s) of age, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, and/or cause the said VICTORIA DUKE and/or TAHARE DUKE and/or MAHLICA DUKE and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE and/or SHABAZZ DUKE to be placed in a situation where they might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect, by Defendant being responsible for VICTORIA DUKE'S and/or TAHARE DUKE'S and/or MAHLICA DUKE'S and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE'S and/or SHABAZZ DUKE'S safety, failed to protect VICTORIA DUKE and/or TAHARE DUKE and/or MAHLICA DUKE and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE and/or SHABAZZ DUKE from Fredrick Harris and the physical batteries he committed on the said VICTORIA DUKE and/or TAHARE DUKE and/or MAHLICA DUKE and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE and/or SHABAZZ DUKE and/or MAHLICA DUKE and/or TAQUANDAH DUKE and/or SHABAZZ DUKE and/or by Defendant keeping TAHARE DUKE in the home with Fredrick Harris after knowing the said TAHARE DUKE was being molested by Frederick Harris, and her sister had previously been molester by Frederick Harris, and promising but failing to move the said TAHARE DUKE out of the home resulting in the continuing sexual abuse of TAHARE DUKE by Fredrick Harris.

STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001/565

BY

LISALLUZAICH

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Nevada Bar #5056

DA#13F03712X/jm/SVU LVMPD EV#1209271444 (TK1)

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| 1 | BETSY Allen, ESQ | | |
|----|--|--|--|
| 2 | Nevada Bar No. 6878 | | |
| 3 | P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 | | |
| 4 | (702) 386-9700 Fax (702) 386-4723 | | |
| 5 | betsyallenesq@yahoo.com | | |
| 6 | Attorney for Defendant FREDRICK HARRIS | | |
| 7 | DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | |
| 8 | | | |
| 9 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, Case No.: C-13-291374-1) Dept. No. XII | | |
| 10 | Plaintiff,) | | |
| 11 | vs. | | |
| 12 | FREDRICK HARRIS, | | |
| 13 | Defendant. | | |
| 14 | | | |
| 15 | DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND | | |
| 16 | SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL | | |
| 17 | COMES NOW the Defendant, FREDRICK HARRIS, by and through his attorney, | | |
| 18 | BETSY ALLEN, ESQ., and hereby files this Reply to State's Response to Motion for New | | |
| 19 | Trial and Supplements Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. | | |
| 20 | This Reply and Supplement is based upon the pleading and papers on files herein, | | |
| 21 | the following Points and Authorities all as incorporated herein. | | |
| 22 | DATED this _9th_ day of July, 2014 | | |
| 23 | 4 4 TO 4 A Maria | | |
| 24 | <u>/s/ Betsy Allen</u> Betsy Allen, Esq. | | |
| 25 | Nevada Bar No. 6878 | | |
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Factual Background

In the instant case, the Defendant, FREDRICK HARRIS, was convicted of 36 out of 45 counts of various charges, including: Sexual Assault on a Minor under Fourteen, Sexual Assault of a Minor under 16, and Lewdness with a Minor.

I. REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

NRS 176.515 provides in relevant part that:

1. The Court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required as a matter of law or on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

2. If trial was by the Court without a jury, the Court may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony on direct the entry of a new judgment.

3. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 176.0918, a motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only within 2 years after the verdict or finding of guilt.

4. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds must be made within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilt or within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7-day period.¹

A. The Court allowed portions of the statement of co-defendant Lealer Ann Cooks without a finding of reliability

During the trial, the State elicited statements from Lealer Cooks, ultimately choosing to admit them through a detective, not through Ms.Cooks.

Part of the State's argument that there is an indicia of reliability is that Lealer pled guilty to a count of Child Abuse and Neglect, pursuant to the <u>Alford decision</u>. The State glosses over the idea and thought process behind the <u>Alford decision</u>. This United State Supreme Court decision allows a defendant to plead guilty without admitting guilt, in order

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¹ Chief Deputy District Attorney Lisa Luzaich graciously granted the Defense until April 28, 2014 to file the aforementioned Motion.

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to avoid a harsher penalty.² This is not an admission of guilt, merely a way to avoid going to trial. In fact, as this Court is well aware, during a plea canvas, the Defendant is NOT asked to allocute but rather to agree that the State COULD prove the charges against him/her.

Therefore, Cooks "indicia" of reliability relied on by the State simply does not exist.

B. Harris should receive a new trial because his statement was altered incorrectly and the jury was precluded from hearing material facts.

During the course of the trial, the State opted to play Harris' statement to the jury.

However, there were parts of the statement that were which should have been played and were material to the defense.

Victoria made clear claims that Fred was the first person she had ever had sexual intercourse with. The State claims his statements that she had sex was somehow self-serving, without really explaining how it helped him somehow.

While making this statement, Fred was not under arrest, was in his own home and had just admitted to having sex with her. There was nothing self-serving about saying she had had sex previous to him.

The State claims that Defendant is trying to somehow circumvent rape shield, NRS 50.090. This could not be farther from the truth. Rape shield was meant to protect victims from a Defendant attacking based upon promiscuous conduct. However, when the alleged victim claims that she never had sexual intercourse before, the Defendant is permitted to rebuke that for very obvious reasons. Being able to relay specific actions related to sex requires some indicia of knowledge.

²² See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

Summit v. State, 101 Nev. 159, 697 P.2d 1374(1985) addressed this issue. In Summit the defense sought to introduce evidence that the victim had prior sexual experience, which would account for her knowledge of sex. The District Court denied the request. In analyzing the facts and NRS 50.090, the Court decidedly agreed with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Washington, which held that the trial court must undertake to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect and that the inquiry should particularly focus upon "potential prejudice to the truthfinding process itself," i.e., "whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or emotional basis." Summit at 1377, citing State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.2d 1, 59 P.2d 514(1983)

This Court did no such balancing. This was not an open and shut case, with confessions and undeniable evidence. There were hugely conflicting statements, a TON of prior inconsistent statements and witnesses presented by the Defense which CLEARLY contradicted the victims. The Court simply precluded this portion of the defendant's statement. Her claims of Harris taking her virginity were clearly rebuttable through his own statement to police. The purpose of bringing in the statements was not to attack her credibility but simply to show prior sexual knowledge, which would account for her rendition of the acts itself.

C. Victoria Duke made material misrepresentations of what she was doing in California.

The Defense became aware that Victoria was arrested shortly before the trial, two times, for soliciting prostitution. While she may have testified that she was in school and living with her "godmother" there was no coorboration for this information.

In the State's Response, they supplement the record by stating their investigator obtained information that she was in school and living with someone. However, this was not testified to during the trial and should not be considered by this Court.

In interviews with juror #8, Kathleen Smith, she indicated that information regarding arrests for prostitution would have made a difference in the verdict. (see attached affidavit, Exhibit A) Victoria Duke materially misrepresented her activities in California. Her mother testified that she was a prostitute during this trial and it was clear from Victoria's testimony that she was disgusted by this behavior. To find out that she was **DOING THE SAME THING**, and NOT because Fred was supposedly forcing to her do so, is a material issue that should have been presented to the jury.

II. SUPPLEMENT TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

NRS 176.515 provides in relevant part that:

1. The Court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required as a matter of law or on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

In the instant matter, it has been discovered that there was an extreme instance of juror misconduct. In an interview with Juror #8, Kathleen Smith, it was discovered that during deliberations, Juror #7, Yvonne Lewis, was not truthful during voir dire.

This was a forty-six(46) count sexual abuse/assault case. And jurors were asked if they were ever the victims of physical or sexual abuse during questioning during voir dire.

Juror #7 did NOT disclose sexual abuse, only disclosing during deliberations, while crying, and calling for the conviction of the defendant. (see attached exhibit A).

This is on point with the facts in <u>Canada v. State</u>, 944 P.2d 781, 113 Nev. 938(1997). In <u>Canada</u>, the jury in this murder trial was tainted by a juror who failed to disclose during voir dire that his own father was murdered. Other jurors stated that he

would have voted to convict no matter what and kept referring to his own father's murder.

Fred Harris' case was a contentious sexual abuse case. The jurors were picked over meticulously and asked about abuse of all kinds. This particular juror talked about physical abuse from her mother, but failed to disclose sexual abuse of ANY KIND.

However, during jury deliberation, she broke down crying and referred to sexual abuse and knowing how it felt to be sexually abused. She also was pushing for Harris' conviction and need to be punished. (See attached affidavit of Harrison Mayo Jr., and notes from Kathleen Smith, including changes she asked for in original affidavit, attached as Exhibit A, B and C).

In <u>Lopez v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 68, 769 P.2d 1276(1989) the Supreme Court held that where a juror failed to reveal potentially prejudicial information during voir dire, the relevant inquiry is whether the juror is guilty of intentional concealment. <u>Id</u> at 89, 1290. <u>Lopez</u> states that is the trial court's discretion to determine this information.³ "A new trial must be granted unless it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no prejudice has resulted." <u>Lane v. State</u>, 110 Nev. 1156, 1164, 881 P.2d 1358, 1364 (1994). This Court must consider "whether the issue of guilt is close, the quantity and character of the error, and the gravity of the crime charged." <u>Rowbottom v. State</u>, 105 Nev. 472, 486, 779 P.2d 934, 943(1989)

In the instant case, Harris was charged with 46 felony counts, most of which were life sentence counts. There were days of jury deliberation, indicating people who were holding out on guilt and finally, a juror who, after lying about sexual abuse, was calling for

³ This court must remember the painstaking process both sides undertook to delve into this information. There was even a juror who reveal sexual abuse for the very first time EVER at the bench. Counsel has done numerous sexual abuse/trials and ALWAYS looks for people who previously have been victims for this exact reason.

| the punishment of Harris during deliberation. Harris is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|--|
| determine the facts and circumstances of this jurors misconduct. | | | | |
| <u>Conclusion</u> | | | | |
| Wherefore, The accused, FREDRICK HARRIS, is entitled to a hearing wherein Juror | | | | |
| # 7 and #8 must be called to testify regarding the information recently provided to Harris. | | | | |
| DATED _9th_ day of July, 2014 | | | | |
| BY: <u>/s/ Betsy Allen, Esq.</u> | | | | |
| BETSY ALLEN, ESQ Nevada Bar No. 6878 | | | | |
| P.O. Box 46991 Las Vegas, Nevada 89114 | | | | |
| (702) 386-9700 | | | | |
| | | | | |
| Certificate of Service | | | | |
| I hereby certify that I provided the Clark County District Attorney, specifically Lisa | | | | |
| Luzaich, a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion on the 1st day of July, 2014 via | | | | |
| email to: | | | | |
| lisa.luzaich@clarkcountyda.com | | | | |
| DATED this 9th day of July, 2014 | | | | |
| /s/Betsy Allen | | | | |
| Betsy Allen, Esq. | | | | |
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AFFIDAVIT OF HARRISON MAYO, JR.

| COUNTY OF CLARK |)) ss |
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| STATE OF NEVADA |) 55 |

- I, HARRISON MAYO, JR., being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
- 1. That I was appointed to work with Betsy Allen, Esq., on the case of Fredrick Harris, C291374-1 and the information contained herein is the truth to the best of my knowledge.
- 2. That I was asked by the attorney, Betsy Allen, to talk to a particular juror with regard to deliberations.
- 3. That I was asked to talk to this juror due to the fact that Dorothy Harris, Fredrick Harris' mother, was approached at Wal-Mart by this particular juror and discussed the case with her. Further, she apologized for the convictions.
- 4. That I came to find out that the this juror was named Kathleen Smith and she works in the Regional Justice Center at the Information booth on the first floor.
- 5. That Ms. Allen and I interviewed this juror, Ms. Smith, and she disclosed that during deliberations, another juror started talking about being sexually abused as a child. She described this juror as being juror number seven(7), Yvonne Lewis. Ms. Smith further said that Ms. Lewis became emotional during deliberations and began crying while she talked about her own experiences of sexual abuse.

III

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III

III

- 6. That after she said she had been sexually abused, she began talking about the defendant, Fred Harris, needing to be punished for what he did.
- 7. That after Ms. Allen made changes to the affidavit as requested by Ms. Smith, she now does not want to get involved.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Dated this 274 day of July, 2014.

HARRISON

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AFFIDAVIT OF KATHLEEN SMITH

COUNTY OF CLARK

STATE OF NEVADA

- I, KATHLEEN SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and states as follows:
- 1. That I was a sworn juror in the State of Nevada v. Fredrick Harris and the information contained herein is the truth to the best of my knowledge.
- 2. That I participated in deliberations which resulted in the conviction of Harris on multiple counts of sexual assault.
- 3. That I was pressured into voting to convict Fredrick Harris by other jurors. I, along with another juror, held out for two days.
 - 4. That I finally gave up because I did not want to be in deliberations forever.
- 5. That during deliberation, one juror became emotional and began crying. She then talked about her own experience with sexual abuse. This was juror #7, Yvonne Lewis. I recall she put strong emphasis on being sexually abused and physically abused as a child. She sympathized with the victims wholeheartedly and began crying when she spoke of this. I do not believe she separated her personal experience from this case. She was unable to make sound judgments on this case based upon the things she said about her own sexual abuse.

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#5-last line Thelieve sne Wasunable Z Wasunable Z MK Sourd Judgments on Judgments on 6. That after she said she had been sexually abused, she began talking about the defendant, Fred Harris, needing to be punished for what he did.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

Dated this _____ day of July, 2014.

KATHLEEN SMITH

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to me this _____ day of July, 2014.

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said County and State.

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| 2 | NINAU | CLERK OF THE COURT | | |
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| 4 | DISTRICT COURT | | | |
| 5 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | | |
| 6 | | | | |
| 7 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, | | | |
| 8 | Plaintiff, | CASE NO. C291374-1 | | |
| 9 | vs. |) DEST VII | | |
| 0 | FREDERICK HAROLD HARRIS, JR., | DEPT. XII | | |
| 11 | aka FREDRICK HAROLD HARRIS JR., | | | |
| 12 | Defendant. | | | |
| 13 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE | | | |
| 14 | | | | |
| 15 | TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2015 | | | |
| 16 | | | | |
| 17 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE: SENTENCING | | | |
| 18 | APPEARANCES: | | | |
| 19 | For the State: | ELISSA LUZAICH, ESQ. | | |
| 20 | For the State. | Chief Deputy District Attorney | | |
| 21 22 | | KRISTINA A. RHOADES, ESQ. Deputy District Attorney | | |
| 23 | For the Defendant: | BETSY ALLEN, ESQ. | | |
| 24 | | | | |
| 25 | Recorded by: KRISTINE CORNELIUS, COURT RECORDER | | | |
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2015; 10:39 A.M.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Harris today is the date and time set for entry of judgment and imposition of sentencing. Is there any legal cause or reason why judgment should not be pronounced against you at this time?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: By virtue of the verdicts returned in this case, I hereby adjudicate you guilty of:

2, 3, 6, 8 through 11, sexual assault with a minor under 14; 13, 14, 21, 22, I guess those are the same.

Lewdness with a child under the age of 14, Counts 4, 5, 7, 12 and 20.

And 16, child abuse, neglect or endangerment;

First degree kidnapping, 19, 25, 28 and 37;

23, coercion sexually motivated;

24, administration of a drug to aid in the commission of a crime;

26, 29 and 31, sexual assault with a minor under 16 years of age;

33 through 35, sexual assault with a minor under 16 years of age;

36, 39 through 41, sexual assault;

38, battery with intent to commit sexual assault;

42, pandering;

44, living from the earnings of a prostitute.

Does the State wish to address the Court?

MS. LUZAICH: I do. And before I start arguing the PSI is incorrect when it comes to what the potential sentences are for some of the offense. The Court, I am sure is well aware, that in many of the legislatures the penalties changed. And P

and P's PSI did not take into account the legislature changing the penalties, so very briefly regarding the sexual assault with a minor under 14 counts –

THE COURT: That's 35 to life now, right?

MS. LUZAICH: It is now, so counts 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14, the penalty is correct, it's 35 to life.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: However, counts 21 and 22 that pertain to Victoria Duke, those are the counts that were on or between December, 2004 and May of 2005, during that timeframe sexual assault under 14 was punishable by 20 to life not 35.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: And then the sexual assault under 16 counts, Counts 26 and 29 –

THE COURT: Let me turn the page.

MS. LUZAICH: -- I think P and P has them as 25 to life, in fact -

THE COURT: Okay. 26 and 29 they have 25 to life, that's true.

MS. LUZAICH: Right. In fact it was 20 to life. Counts 26 and 29 were on or between August 1, 2007 and August 31 of 2007.

THE COURT: So those two should be 20 to life?

MS. LUZAICH: Wait, I'm sorry.

MS. ALLEN: 31, 33, 34 and 35.

MS. LUZAICH: And then counts – yes, 20 to life for 26 and 29. And then for Counts 31, 33, 34 and 35, I was explaining to Ms. Allen earlier, when I pled all the way through this case, Victoria's counts spanned a whole significant amount of her life. And the – there's sexual assault under 14, under 16 and just sexual assaults. So I was pleading according to her age and I didn't take into account the changing

of the - legislature changing the penalties.

And in Counts 31, 33, 34 and 35, I pled those between September 1, '07 and July 30, '08, because of her date of birth, her age.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: In October 1st of 2007, the legislature changed the sexual assault under 16 from 20 to life to 25 to life, but because of the way I pled it, it also encompasses the 20 to life timeframe. I think that the Supreme Court would say that the Defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt –

THE COURT: Twenty to life.

MS. LUZAICH: And I would ask the Court on those counts to also sentence him 20 to life. So all of it that say under 16; 26, 29, 31, 33, 34 and 35, I would ask the Court to sentence 20 to life. And I just think that that's intellectually honest of me to do that.

MS. ALLEN: And I appreciate that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: And then, finally, Count 20, the lewdness with a minor.

During a short period of time lewdness with a minor was punishable by both 10 to life or 2 to 20; so Count 20 is December, 2004 through May of 2005. During that timeframe, the Court had the option of either 10 to life or 2 to 20. So I at least want the Court to be aware of that.

THE COURT: Had the option of 10 to life or what?

MS. LUZAICH: Two to 20 years in prison. No probation, but 10 to life or 2 to 20 and that's only for Count 20. The lewdness with a minor counts, 4, 5, 7 and 12 are appropriate 10 to life.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything you want to add?

MS. LUZAICH: Okay. So that being said the Court heard the trial. The Court heard evidentiary hearing. The Court heard a bunch of motions; so I'm not going to reiterate all of the facts, just basically what the testimony at trial was the Defendant had all of these individuals; Tina, the mom and her five children in his life. That during different timeframes while they either lived with him in the house or he was helping take care of them, he and his girlfriend, he abused all five of the – well, according to the jury's verdict, three of the children and Tina Duke.

I would not lose any sleep if the Court ran every single count concurrent or consecutive, sorry; I'm not going to do that. I recommend – I recognize that P and P has said to run pretty much everything concurrent. And I think that based on what happened in this case that that's absolutely inappropriate.

What I would ask the Court to do, Taharah was a young child. She had been abused. She was afraid to report it when she was asked about it and, therefore, was abused again. However, the Defendant had had contact with the police. And, even after having contact with the police, abused Taharah afterwards. So I would ask the Court to run two of Taharah's counts consecutive to each other.

THE COURT: Which one are they?

MS. LUZAICH: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Which ones are they?

MS. LUZAICH: Counts 1 through -

MS. ALLEN: One was a not guilty.

MS. LUZAICH: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No, 1 -

MS. LUZAICH: Oh, sorry, 2 -

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. LUZAICH: I'm just – I was just – the time frame of – well, I guess it's all – I would ask the Court to run a lewdness and a sexual assault consecutive to each other. The Defendant abused Victoria over – and I'm sorry, Taharah's counts are 2 through 14. So I would ask the count – the Court to run counts – Count 4 consecutive to Count 2. And then the other Taharah counts concurrent to each other.

Victoria was abused literally over the course of pretty much her entire adult life by the Defendant. If the Court remembers before they went to Utah he touched her. She wasn't believed by her family. I would ask the Court to run that count – one of those counts consecutive to the others for a 10 to life.

When she got back things -

THE COURT: Which one are they? Which one of the counts involving Victoria?

MS. LUZAICH: Count 20.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: Then they went to Utah. When they got back he abused her continuously for an extended period of time. And I would ask the Court to run one of those counts consecutive to 20 and 4 and 2, if the Court chooses anyone of those 29 – and that would be a 20 to life not a 35.

And then Tina was also abused by the Defendant. I would ask – she has a 1 to 5 and a 1 to 4 for the last two counts. I would ask the Court to run one of those, either Count 43 – or 44 or Count 42, consecutive to the others. And I would submit it.

THE COURT: Do you want to say anything, Mr. Harris?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: You sure?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I mean I know the Court heard this trial. This was – this was one of those trials that sort of changes, I think you as an attorney, because we had so many people that we were bringing in, you know, obviously during the course of the trial that talked – I mean these were upstanding people. These were teachers.

Good citizens. People who in the community are respected that testified that, you know, this kind of stuff wasn't going on. That any of these girls hadn't disclosed it. It was very difficult. Ultimately, the jury did come back finding Mr. Harris guilty and he maintains his innocence and he absolutely has the right to do so.

Most horrifying part of this trial in my opinion is that if in fact any of this was true is that the mother was allowed to walk off the stand and she wasn't arrested. Because someone like that should never be allowed to have their children back, if in fact she was even remotely being honest when she testified.

The facts that he is getting a sentence in this case of 35 to life, I just want to put that in perspective for the Court. He's – according to the PSI, he's currently close to 50 years old. That would put him at close to 90 years old before he even steps out of prison and that's if the Court runs everything concurrent. If he just gets one 35 to life and nothing else, he – it's 90 years old or close to that.

I'm requesting – and P and P saw, I guess, something in this to run everything concurrent; that's their recommendation. I guess at some point it becomes sort of ridiculous to give someone, you know, consecutive sentences when they are so many counts, when he's facing so much time just from one count alone.

I'm requesting the Court run everything concurrent like P and P recommended. That, again, puts him at close to 90 years old before he even is up for parole. This – again, this was a very difficult case. I understand the Court's concern but it's not as if he's getting probation. It's not as if he's walking out of this courtroom or anywhere anytime soon. I would submit it with that. And there were 979 days credit.

THE COURT: In accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada, this Court does now sentence you as follows: In addition, \$25 administrative assessment, \$150 DNA fee, order that you submit to genetic marker testing. Impose a \$3 DNA collection fee.

As to Count 2, the Court is going to sentence you to 35 years to life in the Nevada Department of Corrections.

As to Count 3, 35 to life.

Count 6, 35 to life.

Count 8, 35 to life.

Count 9, 35 to life.

Ten, 35 to life.

Count 11, 35 to life.

Count 13, 35 to life.

Count 14, 35 to life.

Count 21, 20 years to life.

Count 22, 20 years to life to run consecutive to number 21, to Count 21.

Okay. The lewdness with the child charges, Count 4, 10 to life.

Count 5, 10 to life.

Count 7, 10 to life.

MS. ALLEN: You went so fast.

MS. LUZAICH: Oh, no, the aggregate total –

| - 13 | | | | |
|------|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | THE COURT: Oh, that's right. I have to figure out what the aggregate total is | | | |
| 2 | MS. LUZAICH: Thirty-five, 55 – | | | |
| 3 | THE COURT: Where did my notes go? | | | |
| 4 | MS. LUZAICH: Sixty-five, oh and it's months too, shit. | | | |
| 5 | [Court and counsel calculating time] | | | |
| 6 | MS. ALLEN: I think it's 76. | | | |
| 7 | MS. LUZAICH: No, it's got to be months. | | | |
| 8 | MS. ALLEN: Oh. | | | |
| 9 | MS. LUZAICH: [Calculating and conferring with co-counsel]. | | | |
| 10 | Nine hundred and eighteen months, yeah. And, again, I went to law | | | |
| 11 | school 'cause I can't add. | | | |
| 12 | MS. ALLEN: Yes, yes. Thirty-six – is that right? | | | |
| 13 | MS. LUZAICH: I got 75 years, which is – but it's got to be in months – | | | |
| 14 | MS. ALLEN: Right. No, no, 1 know – | | | |
| 15 | MS. LUZAICH: which is 900 months - | | | |
| 16 | MS. ALLEN: Right. | | | |
| 17 | MS. LUZAICH: Seventy-five years is 900 plus she ran 18 to 48 consec, so. | | | |
| 18 | MS. ALLEN: Okay. | | | |
| 19 | MS. LUZAICH: So 918. | | | |
| 20 | MS. ALLEN: Well, I had that as 12, but okay, maybe that's why I had it | | | |
| 21 | wrong. | | | |
| 22 | MS. LUZAICH: Judge, on Count 44 was it 18 to 48? | | | |
| 23 | THE COURT: Yes, it was. | | | |
| 24 | MS. LUZAICH: So I have 918 months to life. Anybody disagree? | | | |
| 25 | CORRECTIONS OFFICER: Seventy-six point five years. | | | |

| 1 | THE COURT: Well, what is the aggregate? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MS. ALLEN: Seventy-six point five years. |
| 3 | MS. LUZAICH: Yeah, but they do it in months. Seventy-six point five years. |
| 4 | THE COURT: What's the aggregate? |
| 5 | THE COURT CLERK: Seventy-six point five. |
| 6 | MS. LUZAICH: Seventy-six point five years or 918 months. When we did |
| 7 | the prison math class, we learned that they calculate it in months. |
| 8 | MS. ALLEN: 1 don't – |
| 9 | MS. LUZAICH: So either way 76.5 years or 918 months. |
| 10 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 11 | MS. LUZAICH: And, I'm sorry, how many credit, Ms. Allen? |
| 12 | MS. ALLEN: Nine seventy-nine. |
| 13 | MS. LUZAICH: Nine-seven-nine. |
| 14 | MS. ALLEN: Um-huh. |
| 15 | THE COURT: Yeah. |
| 16 | MS. LUZAICH: Thank you. |
| 17 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 18 | [Proceedings concluded at 10:57 a.m.] |
| 19 | * * * * * * |
| 20 | ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/video |
| 21 | proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. |
| 22 | Debra Kinn |
| 23 | DEBRA WINN, Court Transcriber |

| | | Alun & Chum | | | |
|----|---|---|--|--|--|
| 1 | RTRAN | CLERK OF THE COURT | | | |
| 2 | | | | | |
| 3 | | | | | |
| 4 | DISTRICT COURT | | | | |
| 5 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | | | |
| 6 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, |) CASE NO. C291374 | | | |
| 7 | Plaintiff, |) DEPT. XII | | | |
| 8 | vs. | | | | |
| 9 | FREDERICK HAROLD HARRIS, JR., |) | | | |
| 10 | Defendant. |) | | | |
| 11 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE | | | | |
| 12 | | BRUARY 17, 2015 | | | |
| 13 | | | | | |
| 14 | | TRANSCRIPT RE: ARY HEARING | | | |
| 15 | DEFENDANT'S MOT | TION FOR A NEW TRIAL | | | |
| 16 | | | | | |
| 17 | APPEARANCES: | | | | |
| 18 | For the State: | ELISSA LUZAICH, ESQ. Chief Deputy District Attorney | | | |
| 19 | For the Defendant | • | | | |
| 20 | For the Defendant: | BETSY ALLEN, ESQ. | | | |
| 21 | | | | | |
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| 25 | RECORDED BY: KRISTINE CORNELIL | JS, COURT RECORDER | | | |
| 25 | RECORDED BY: KRISTINE CORNELIL | JS, COURT RECORDER | | | |

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2015; 9:05 A.M.

* * * * *

THE COURT: State of Nevada versus Frederick Harris, C291374. He's present. He's in custody.

MS. ALLEN: Yes, Your Honor. This matter was set at 10:30. I had issued subpoenas to Facebook based upon the discussions that we had last time —

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. ALLEN: – we were in court. I provided the letter that I received from Facebook to Ms. Luzaich. I apologize. I meant to forward it to the Court. However, basically Facebook told me no, didn't have jurisdiction, the court order, none of it. Yeah. Anyhow and there was federal statute cited. What they did tell me I needed to do was subpoena with court orders to the actual Facebook users.

THE COURT: Oh.

MS. ALLEN: So I'm here to advise the Court that I – the only way for me to do it is actually go through the two individuals, the two individuals we previously named.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. ALLEN: They'd be the same two individuals. I was going to submit orders to the Court indicating that they were to produce that information.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: That's the only way I can do it according to Facebook. And I did give that letter to her.

THE COURT: What if they don't have it? What if they've deleted it?

MS. ALLEN: I was given detailed instructions on how they are to – they can retrieve it. Nothing ever gets erased from Facebook. That is the lovely part about

Facebook. It never goes away. That's why I don't have [indiscernible].

MS. LUZAICH: My only issue with that is: the if they don't have it thing. If the Court issues an order to them to, you know, provide whatever they have, you know, that's fine.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUZAICH: But I don't know that the Court technically has authority to order them to go out and retrieve things.

MS. ALLEN: Well, it's on their computer and so the – I'll provide them detailed instructions on how to retrieve it. They don't have to go through some huge process through Facebook. It's all basically what you would do on your computer and I would – I respectfully disagree with Ms. Luzaich. I believe the Court does have jurisdiction. They were jurors in this case. There's implications of misconduct.

MS. LUZAICH: Well, I mean I don't know what the instructions are, but if it's just like click three buttons on your computer –

MS. ALLEN: Yeah.

MS. LUZAICH: - I don't have a problem with that.

THE COURT: I have to assume it's got to be easy like that; that it can't be, you know – that you don't need a PhD in computer programming to do it.

MS. ALLEN: No. I think the instructions were in the letter or in the email that I forwarded to you.

MS. LUZAICH: Oh, were they? I don't know.

MS. ALLEN: Yeah. The instructions were included.

THE COURT: Okay. How much time do you want?

MS. ALLEN: What do we do? Just another 30 days is fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

| 1 | MS. ALLEN: And I'll get those orders over to you today or tomorrow. | | |
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| 2 | THE COURT: Okay, thank you. | | |
| 3 | They'll be thrilled, I guess, when they get those. | | |
| 4 | MS. ALLEN: Uh-huh. | | |
| 5 | [Colloquy between the Court and clerk] | | |
| 6 | THE CLERK: That will be March 23, 8:30. | | |
| 7 | MS. ALLEN: Thank you. | | |
| 8 | And then I have one other matter. | | |
| 9 | MS. LUZAICH: Thank you. | | |
| 10 | THE CLERK: I'm sorry. I gave the wrong date, March 26th, 8:30. | | |
| 11 | MS. LUZAICH: March 26 th ? | | |
| 12 | THE COURT: Uh-huh. | | |
| 13 | THE CLERK: Yes. I'm sorry. | | |
| 14 | [Proceedings concluded at 9:08 a.m.] | | |
| 15 | **** | | |
| 16 | ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. | | |
| 17 | Kristine Cornelius | | |
| 18 | KRISTINE CORNELIUS Court Recorder | | |
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| 1 | RTRAN | CLERK OF THE COURT | | |
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| 4 | DISTRICT COURT | | | |
| 5 | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA | | | |
| 6 | THE STATE OF NEVADA, |) CASE NO. C291374 | | |
| 7 | Plaintiff, |) DEPT. XII | | |
| 8 | vs. | ý | | |
| 9 | FREDERICK HAROLD HARRIS, JR., |) | | |
| 10 | Defendant. |)) | | |
| 11 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 2015 | | | |
| 12 | | | | |
| 13 | RECORDER'S | TRANSCRIPT RE: | | |
| 14 | EVIDENTIA | ARY HEARING ION FOR A NEW TRIAL | | |
| 15 | DEI ENDANT 3 MOT | ION I ON A NEW TRIAL | | |
| 16 | | | | |
| 17 | APPEARANCES: For the State: | ELISSA LUZAICH, ESQ. | | |
| 18 19 | T GT GT STATE | Chief Deputy District Attorney | | |
| 20 | | KRISTINA A. RHOADES, ESQ. | | |
| 21 | | Deputy District Attorney | | |
| 22 | For the Defendant: | BETSY ALLEN, ESQ. | | |
| 23 | | | | |
| 24 | | | | |
| 25 | RECORDED BY: KRISTINE CORNELIL | IS, COURT RECORDER | | |

MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 2015; 10:37 A.M.

* * * * *

THE COURT: State versus Harris, C291374. Mr. Harris is present and he's in custody.

Good morning.

MS. ALLEN: Good morning, Your Honor. We were back here today for the continued hearing on this matter. After we left last time, if you recall, Mr. Bell testified about posting that picture on Facebook. Yeah. And I went back and I pulled up his Facebook account. It's not private and I did print out the – what I found on Facebook. I provided a copy to the State.

I had at that time sent Ms. Luzaich an email, and I think your law clerk was cc'd on it. We had talked about, you know, the different dates that we wanted to move it to, and I had asked Ms. Luzaich could you make sure those two jurors come back, because after I read this I realized that not only was he posting on Facebook about this but the Yvonne Lewis, she posted the same picture of herself on Facebook with the juror badge. And you can see that in one of the comments that's on his Facebook account. It's like the very first comment from a Clay Heximer. And so I wanted – I had gone to Yvonne's Facebook account and I couldn't find it. It's either private or she deleted it.

And so I really needed – I need to make a record with these two jurors about what they were doing on Facebook with regard to posting pictures, commenting on each other's Facebook pages, because she commented on his Facebook post, as well on his picture. So I asked Ms. Luzaich if she would make sure that those two jurors were back. Ms. Luzaich agreed. Because I said I can subpoena them. I don't mind subpoenaing them. And she said: No, that's fine. I'll

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make sure they're here. I texted her last week about whether or not they were coming, and I didn't really get a response specifically with regard to them. And then last night late I did get a text message where she said I'm – basically I'm not going to do that. I want an offer of proof.

So I would've had them subpoenaed for today. I certainly would've sent my PI out there. I don't care.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: That doesn't bother me in the least. But I was under the impression that Ms. Luzaich was doing that. She did agree to do it and then, I guess, at the last minute decided not to. I, obviously, would've appreciated knowing and I could've had them here, because this seems like a big waste for us to come in and discuss this without having them here. Regardless of what happened between Ms. Luzaich and I, these two individuals clearly defied the Court's order repeatedly. I mean this Court repeatedly says things about not posting on Facebook or social media. It turns out Yvonne Lewis was doing it as well because her page was made private. I—

THE COURT: Why does it say Kerrigan?

MS. ALLEN: That's the name she has on her Facebook account.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: But it is her. And I apologize. I would've printed it out so you could see the picture. It is her though.

THE COURT: I can see her. It looks like her.

MS. ALLEN: And she says she's sitting right across from Robert, so it's clearly her. There's also another post at the very bottom of the page, [indiscernible]. It says: Two people I know on one trial. I would've robbed a bank if I had known. I

mean, so there's clearly a – there's clearly interconnectivity here. I think that this was a surprise to me, obviously, Mr. Bell saying about the picture and then posting it on Facebook. I didn't know any of this until the – you know when we were here last. I think everybody was surprised.

But either way, again, this – I really do think this needs to be fleshed out. And while my investigator could come in and say that he printed this off, off Mr. Bell's Facebook page, I think that Mr. Bell's the one who really does need to authenticate it in order to have it admitted as an exhibit. And I think it – for purposes of appeal in this case, if it goes that direction, this really does need to be made part of the record. And we also – I also need to get Ms. Kerrigan slash Lewis's Facebook information, because she clearly posted the same picture of herself with the same badge.

THE COURT: Well, you have the right to make whatever you want part of the record. I agree with that.

MS. ALLEN: Right. And but I – you know, again, I need – I do need to verify some of that, which is why I needed them back. And Ms. Lewis, when I printed this out – it was only when I printed it out after the last hearing that I realized that Ms. Lewis was doing the same thing, which is clearly a concern to me.

THE COURT: Her Facebook is private.

MS. ALLEN: Well, you can – I'm not on Facebook, so I don't know any of that stuff, but it's –

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: You can't pull up her pictures. So she's either deleted it, she was smart and deleted it, or she made it private and no one has access to it.

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: Sure.

wanted her investigator to testify.

THE COURT: Right. I thought -

MS. LUZAICH: Can I respond first?

last time because of the funeral. THE COURT: Right.

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Can I approach?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUZAICH: I'll stipulate that it come into evidence.

see. I agree that it was Ms. Lewis. And I will offer it into - I'll stipulate.

THE COURT: That's what I wondered if we could -

MS. ALLEN: Either way - and I was talking about this earlier. Even if she did

MS. LUZAICH: First, the reason we're here today is because Ms. Allen

MS. LUZAICH: We continued it to today specifically because he was not here

MS. LUZAICH: I certainly wouldn't have objected to coming back another day

for him to testify because of the funeral. I get all that. Second, I have a copy of -a

better copy than Ms. Allen's - of Mr. Bell's Facebook posts. It's in color. You can

MS. LUZAICH: Because they did nothing wrong. I pulled the transcript. That was – if you look at the Facebook posts, that is from March 27th of 2014.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: The transcript from March 26th, the day before, on the very last page, day two, rough draft, page 240, you tell the jurors that they have been impaneled and you say: Before you leave I want to give you some instructions. You can't talk about this case with anyone, including your fellow jurors. You can tell your family members and friends that you're a juror in a criminal trial, but you can't tell them anything else. Wear the blue badges all the time when you're in the courthouse, so you can identify yourself as a juror in Department 12, so anybody associated knows they can't talk to you. Well, if you look at that photograph, it's a picture of him in his juror badge that just says: a cup of coffee in the morning duty. It says nothing about the case.

And then after the jury is impaneled the Court gives them a juror book – THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. LUZAICH: – and reads them an admonishment every single time they leave the courtroom, and what the admonishment says is: You can't talk with yourself or anyone else about the trial or read anything about the trial. You say: You are further admonished you may not communicate with anyone, including your fellow jurors about this case –

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MS. LUZAICH: – on your cell phone, BlackBerry, Facebook, blah, blah, blah. You never tell jurors that they can't go on Facebook. These jurors did nothing wrong. They didn't talk about the case. All they did was say I'm in a trial and posted a picture. There's nothing inappropriate about that, nothing.

And I would ask that these be made part of the record. The trial transcript hasn't been officially transcribed. Ms. Allen has a copy. It's the rough draft. It's page 240 from day two. And this I got from your JEA. It's just the admonishment that you read, but I would ask that it be made part of the record.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUZAICH: And these could be marked as State's exhibits.

THE COURT: Do you want to accept the stipulation of – is it Mr. Bell's Facebook page?

MS. ALLEN: Well, that's – Your Honor, I didn't actually see that copy, so I don't know if it – does it contain all the posts?

MS, LUZAICH: Yes.

MS. ALLEN: Okay. If it contains all the posts, then I'm fine.

MS. LUZAICH: And they're in color.

MS. ALLEN: Which is fine. Which is fine with regard to Mr. Bell if they want to –

MS. LUZAICH: I'm giving her an extra copy.

MS. ALLEN: If they want to stipulate to it that's fine. I have no issue with that. But we're still in a position where Yvonne posted the same photo and apparently – I mean there's obviously – well, I'm assuming there's comments on her page as well and we don't have those. And, again, this is kind of why I had asked that these jurors be brought back, because once I saw that this Yvonne Lewis was doing the same thing, again, I think that needs to be made part of the record.

And, again, Your Honor, I didn't – I wasn't intentionally trying to waste the Court's time. I would've had her subpoenaed to come back. That's – I have no problem with that, but I was under the impression from the emails that we

exchanged that Ms. Luzaich was going to do that. Had she informed me earlier, I would've certainly subpoenaed Ms. Lewis and brought her in and I wouldn't have had a problem with that.

So I appreciate that she says well, they haven't done anything wrong, but in reality we really don't know what Ms. Lewis has on her Facebook page, first of all. Second of all, this was wrong. They're not supposed to go on social media and discuss this, and there's clearly a discussion going on with his friends about, you know, not guilty, hang him high, things like that. It was clearly inappropriate and it was clearly juror misconduct and I – and while that may be the admonition that you read the day before, I'm fairly certain the Court said before that at some point that you're not really supposed to do this. You're not supposed to post on social media what you're doing. It's okay to tell friends and family that you're in a trial, but this is, you know – both of them were doing it. Then they're commenting back and forth apparently on their pictures, their friends are.

THE COURT: I tell them -

MS. LUZAICH: The jurors aren't commenting back and forth, and they posted one picture and other people made comments. It's nothing about the case. And this Court never told them you can't go on Facebook. It says you cannot talk about this case, and they haven't talked about the case. There's nothing wrong with what they did. They're telling their friends that they're jurors – that's it – which is exactly what you told them they can do. You can tell your friends and family that you're jurors in a criminal case. They didn't even say in a criminal case. They just said that they're jurors.

MS. ALLEN: Well, actually, Your Honor, we don't know what Ms. Kerrigan – THE COURT: Well, it looks like I need to be more specific from now on.

MS. ALLEN: We didn't – we don't – I don't know what Ms. Lewis did.

THE COURT: Because this is exactly what I'm trying to avoid.

MS. ALLEN: Well, I don't know what Ms. Lewis did on her Facebook page, Your Honor. That's the problem.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you want to accept this stipulation and I can mark this and make it part of the record?

MS. ALLEN: Please.

THE COURT: And the other documents can be marked and admitted as well.

But I guess what you're asking is a continuance to bring in Ms. Lewis?

MS. ALLEN: Yes, Your Honor, and I would actually ask – I'm not sure if I need one at this point, but I would request in advance a court order for Facebook to be able to get her, her – the – whatever picture it is, like that – I'm assuming it's like the 26th, 27th, 28th of March, in that period, because whoever makes the comment, this Clay Heximer says on the 27th, essentially, my friend Yvonne posted the exact same photo. So I want to get that thread.

THE COURT: On the 26th?

MS. ALLEN: I don't know if it was the 26^{th} , 27^{th} or 20 - 1 like I'm not sure exactly when it was.

MS. LUZAICH: Well, it would have to be before the 27th -

THE COURT: Right.

MS. LUZAICH: - if he posted that on the 27th.

THE COURT: It would have to be.

MS. ALLEN: So it – yeah, so I need a court order. Well, I don't know if I need a court order, but if I do, I'm requesting now at this point in time the Court give me a court order to get her Facebook posts with regard to this picture and that thread and

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what comments were made on that.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MS. LUZAICH: I don't have any objection to getting her Facebook posts for that picture or Mr. Bell's picture for the 25th or 6th or 7th.

THE COURT: Okay. And when was the jury impaneled?

MS. ALLEN: Well, he's -

MS. LUZAICH: The 26th.

THE COURT: The 20 -

MS. LUZAICH: It was the 25th and 6th.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: And at the end of the day they were impaneled on the 26th.

What I read to you was from the 26th.

THE COURT: Okay. All right -

MS. ALLEN: Okay.

THE COURT: - so you can have it.

MS. ALLEN: Okay.

THE COURT: But then it's probably going to take you a while.

MS. ALLEN: I assume, yeah. I – my intent is to contact Facebook. Again, Your Honor, I would've done all this sooner, but I thought she was going to be here, and we would've alleviated a lot of that I think if she was here. But I – it's – I will contact Facebook today and figure out what exactly they need. I may not need a court order, and if I don't, I won't even submit the paperwork. Obviously, I'll just – a lot of them just have a subpoena compliance and I can just submit a subpoena.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. ALLEN: But if I do, I usually email it to your law clerk -

 THE COURT: Sure.

MS. ALLEN: - if that's okay.

THE COURT: Sure, and she might give it to you.

MS. ALLEN: She won't. That's part of the reason why I asked Ms. Luzaich. She was very unhappy that we contacted her. Apparently, she doesn't like the idea that the defense attorney contact – excuse me – contacted her, which is why I asked her to – Ms. Luzaich to see if she would bring her, so that I didn't have to bother this woman with the idea that we knew where she lived and, you know, subpoena her. My private investigator is that – just that. He's an investigator. Like he – he is tasked with finding someone and he usually does. He's quite good at his job. There's nothing untoward about it. It's just what he does for a living. However, Ms. Lewis was uncomfortable with that, which is why I tried to go through the State. So that's where we are.

THE COURT: Well, we know her address. We sent her a jury summons.

MS. ALLEN: I understand that. I mean I just – what I'm saying is, like, I tried to make this as noncaustic for her as possible, you know, and go through Ms. Luzaich. That clearly didn't work out, so I will make sure I subpoena her myself.

THE COURT: Okay. So you think 45 days is enough time?

MS. ALLEN: Forty-five days, and if there's an issue – I'll contact Facebook if there's an issue. I'll immediately email Ms. Luzaich and your law clerk and let you know if we need to move it. He's been great about moving –

THE COURT: But the investigator is not going to testify?

MS. ALLEN: No. I originally was going to have him testify, because I said you need to figure – we need to figure this out, but I think it's – Mr. Bell is the one who probably needs to – if I'm going to have – but now with the stipulation, I'm not

l it.

sure that I need to have him come back.

THE COURT: So just Ms. Lewis?

MS. ALLEN: I believe it's just going to be Ms. Lewis. And if there's any change at all I will let everybody know.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. LUZAICH: The State still objects to recalling Ms. Lewis. You know jurors are here not because they choose to be here ever. She sat here for three-and-a-half weeks as a juror. She was extremely distraught when she was asked to come back last time and have to talk about it. So the fact that she has to come back yet again, when I still believe that it is unnecessary, just for the record the State objects.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I'm not sure whether it's necessary or not, because I don't have what she posted is what I'm being told, correct?

MS. ALLEN: And I don't have it, Your Honor. I wasn't -

THE COURT: I think she posted something, but we don't know what it is.

MS. ALLEN: Right. And, clearly, it alludes to that in the comments under Mr. Bell's Facebook page. I wasn't able to access that.

MS. LUZAICH: I assume she's private, which means the public can't access

THE COURT: Okay. So we'll continue it for 45 days and you can – I guess if you want to bring Ms. Lewis in you can. If you don't need to bring her in – maybe you'll get her Facebook and you don't need to bring her in.

MS. ALLEN: Very well may be the case, Your Honor.

MS. LUZAICH: I would ask that we try to do it that way; that we -

THE COURT: That's what I think would be -

MS. LUZIACH: - get the Facebook and after the Facebook comes then the

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Court can decide whether or not Ms. Lewis needs to actually come.

MS. ALLEN: Well, certainly if I get it and the State stipulates to its admission and, you know, and all those things, then there may not be a cause to bring her back.

MS. LUZAICH: Well, of course if it's hers -

THE COURT: I'm sure they're going to stipulate.

MS. LUZAICH: - I'm going to stipulate to its admission, just like I did with this.

THE COURT: Right. You know, is there any chance she'll give it to us without doing this whole subpoena?

MS. ALLEN: My concern is you can go in and delete posts, so I'd actually prefer at this point to get it from Facebook

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine.

MS. LUZAICH: Just for the record, you need to do a preservation letter for Facebook. If there's a preservation – oh, well, that's what the police do. They do a preservation letter, so that Facebook causes it not to be able to be deleted. I don't know if I said that right. Causes it – well –

THE COURT: Okay. It sounds -

MS. ALLEN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It sounds right.

Okay, so 45 days.

THE CLERK: February 17, 10:30, Tuesday.

MS. ALLEN: A Tuesday?

THE CLERK: Yes.

MS. ALLEN: Thank you.

THE COURT: Is that okay with -

| 1 | MS. ALLEN: Yeah. | | | |
|----|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | THE COURT: both sides? Okay. | | | |
| 3 | MS. LUZAICH: Yes. | | | |
| 4 | THE COURT: Thank you. | | | |
| 5 | [Proceedings concluded at 10:53 a.m.] | | | |
| 6 | **** | | | |
| 7 | ATTEST: I hereby certify that I have truly and correctly transcribed the audio/visual proceedings in the above-entitled case to the best of my ability. | | | |
| 8 | Kristine Cornelius | | | |
| 9 | KRISTINE CORNELIUS Court Recorder | | | |
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 1 2 FREDERICK HARRIS, S.C. CASE NO. 69093 3 **Electronically Filed** Appellant, 4 Jun 16 2016 04:51 p.m. Tracie K. Lindeman VS. 5 Clerk of Supreme Court THE STATE OF NEVADA, 6 Respondent. 7 8 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION 9 (JURY TRIAL) EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT THE HONORABLE JUDGE MICHELLE LEAVITT, PRESIDING 10 11 12 APPELLANT'S APPENDIX TO THE OPENING BRIEF **VOLUME VIII** 13 14 15 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ. STEVE WOLFSON District Attorney Attorney at Law 16 Nevada Bar No. 001565 Nevada Bar No. 004349 520 S. Fourth Street, 2nd Floor 200 Lewis Avenue 17 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 384-5563 18 ADAM PAUL LAXALT 19 Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar No. 0003926 20 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

| | 1 | 8 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE: EVIDENTIARY HEARING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL FEBRUARY 17, 2015 | |
|---|---------------------------------|-----|--|------------------------|
| | 2 | | (FILED 12/30/2015) | 995-998 |
| | 3 | 8 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE: EVIDENTIARY HEARING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL JANUARY 5, 2015 | |
| | 5 | | (FILED 12/30/2015) | 999-1012 |
| | 6 | 9 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 1 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1013-1197 |
| | 7 8 | 10 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 2 MARCH 26, 2014 | |
| | 9 | | (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1198-1445 |
| | 10 11 | 11 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 3 MARCH 27, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1446-1621 |
| AM, LTD. SECOND FLOOR A 89101 702.974-0623 | 12 | 12 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 4 MARCH 31, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1622-1768 |
| CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, LTD. 20 SOUTH 4 TH STREET! SECOND FLOO LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 TEL. 702.384-5563 FAX. 702.974-0623 | 13 14 | 13 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 5 APRIL 1, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1769-1936 |
| PHER t th Str EGAS, I P-5563 | 15 | 1.4 | | 1709-1930 |
| CHRISTOPHER R. OR 0 SOUTH 4 TH STREET I LAS VEGAS, NEVAD EL. 702.384-5563 FAX. | 16 17 | 14 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 6 APRIL 2, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 1937-2138 |
| 520 TB | 18 | 15 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 7 APRIL 3, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 2139-2321 |
| | 19 | 16 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | |
| | 2021 | | JURY TRIAL DAY 8 APRIL 4, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 2322-2575 |
| | 22 | 17 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 9 APRIL 7, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 2576-2766 |
| | 23 | 18 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | |
| | 2425 | | JURY TRIAL DAY 10 APRIL 9, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 2767-2943 |
| | 26 | 19 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 11 APRIL 10, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 2944-3123 |
| | 27 | 20 | (FILED 12/30/2015) PECOPDED'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS | 49 44 -3143 |
| | 28 | 20 | RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS JURY TRIAL DAY 12 APRIL 11, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) | 3124-3255 |
| | | | | |

21 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 1 JURY TRIAL DAY 12 APRIL 15, 2014 (FILED 12/30/2015) 3266-3268 2 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT RE: EVIDENTIARY 22 3 HEARING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL (12/30/2015)3269-3289 4 23 RECORDER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS RE: 5 EVIDENTIARY HEARING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 6 (12/30/2015)3290-3349 7 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF BINDOVER (FILED 08/08/2013) 787-815 8 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF EXCERPT OF PROCEEDINGS 22-31 9 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 32-79 10 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 11 JUNE 20, 2013 80-93 520 SOUTH 4TH STREET | SECOND FLOOR 702.384-5563 | FAX. 702.974-0623 12 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING APRIL 29, 2013 CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, LTD. 108-366 13 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 14 MAY 7, 2013 367-542 15 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING JUNE 13, 2013 16 (FILED 07/31/2013) 543-653 TEL. 17 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY HEARING 6 JUNE 11, 2013 18 (FILED 07/31/2013) 654-786 19 SECOND AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT (FILED 07/19/2013) 94-107 20 STATE'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 21 A NEW TRIAL (FILED 06/13/2014) 954-967 22 VERDICT 23 (FILED 04/15/2014) 936-946 24 25 26 27 28

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, LTD. 520 SOUTH 4TH STREET! SECOND FLOOR LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89101 TEL. 702.384-5563 | FAx. 702.974-0623

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court 17th day of June, 2016. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

ADAM PAUL LAXALT
 Nevada Attorney General
 STEVE OWENS
 Chief Deputy District Attorney

CHRISTOPHER R. ORAM, ESQ.

BY:

/s/ Jessie Folkestad
An Employee of Christopher R. Oram, Esq.