TAB 28

TAB 28

Docket 78596 Document 2019-17165

		Electronically Filed 1/23/2019 11:28 AM Steven D. Grierson	
1	RIS	CLERK OF THE COURT	
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12	DISTRICT	COURT	
13	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA	
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Case No. A 15 719670 C	
15	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-15-718679-C Dept. No. XI	
16	vs.		
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S	
18	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE	MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; AND OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S	
	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	COUNTER-MOTION TO TRANSFER	
19	jointly and severally,	CASE BACK TO CHIEF JUDGE BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-	
20	Defendants.	VERDICT ISSUES	
21		Hearing Date: January 25, 2019	
22		Hearing Time: In Chambers	
23	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest") hereby files this Reply in Support of		
24	its Motion for Entry of Judgment, and hereby opposes Plaintiff Aaron M. Morgan's ("Mr. Morgan")		
25	Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues.		
26	///		
27	///		
28	///		
	T 4	2285	
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1	This Reply and Opposition to Counter-Motion is based on the following memorandum of points and		
2	authorities, the papers and pleadings on file, and any argument heard by the Court.		
3	DATED this 23rd day of January, 2019.		
4	BAILEY * KENNEDY		
5			
6	By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u>		
7	DENNIS L. KENNEDY SARAH E. HARMON		
8	JOSHUA P. GILMORE ANDREA M. CHAMPION		
9	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC		
10	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB ELC		
11			
12	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
13	I. INTRODUCTION		
14	Mr. Morgan pled one claim against Harvest in his Complaint — a claim for negligent		
15	entrustment. ¹ (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J. Vol. I, Ex. 1, at 3:19-4:12.) Mr.		
16	Morgan does not oppose Harvest's Motion for Entry of Judgment ("Motion") as to this claim for		
17	relief. Therefore, Harvest's Motion should be granted, this claim should be dismissed with		
18	prejudice, and Harvest's proposed judgment, attached as Exhibit A to its Motion, should be entered		
19	against Mr. Morgan.		
20	Despite Mr. Morgan's concession that judgment should be entered in favor of Harvest on his		
21	claim for negligent entrustment, Mr. Morgan still opposes Harvest's Motion — as to an unpled claim		
22	of vicarious liability — on several grounds which each fail as a matter of fact or law. First, Mr.		
23	Morgan contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Harvest's Motion, and that Harvest's		
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While Mr. Morgan may have captioned this claim for relief "Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior Against Defendant," the allegations of the claim clearly relate solely to the elements of a claim for negligent entrustment (i.e, Harvest "entrust[ed]" control of its vehicle to Mr. Lujan, who was an "incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver"; Harvest knew or should have known of Mr. Lujan's incompetence, inexperience, or recklessness; Mr. Morgan was injured as a proximate cause of Harvest's "negligent entrustment" of the vehicle; and Mr. Morgan suffered damages in excess of \$10,000 as a result of Harvest's "negligent entrustment"). (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., Vol.

28 I, Ex. 1, at 3:19-4:12.)

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ride Avenue Las Vegas, Nevuda 89148-1302 702.562.8820 Motion is procedurally improper, because he has attempted to appeal from this Court's November
28, 2018 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment and the December 17, 2018
Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict (which has not yet been entered by this Court). (Pl.'s Opp'n at 8:310:10.) However, Mr. Morgan's attempt to appeal is invalid because no final judgment has been
entered in this case. Therefore, concurrently with the filing of this Reply, Harvest has filed a motion
with the Nevada Supreme Court to dismiss this "improper" appeal. Because this Court retains
jurisdiction over this action, Harvest's Motion was properly filed.

8 Second, Mr. Morgan moved for this action to be transferred back to Chief Judge Bell for 9 determination because he believes she is more familiar with the events at the April 2018 trial and is 10 better able to decide this matter. (Id. at 10:11-11:17.) Essentially, Mr. Morgan is hoping to 11 improperly obtain reconsideration of this Court's determination on his Motion for Entry of 12 Judgment. If Chief Judge Bell's participation as the trial judge was a necessity to resolving these 13 "post-verdict issues," Mr. Morgan should have moved for a transfer prior to the hearing on his 14 Motion for Entry of Judgment. Alternatively, if Mr. Morgan believes this Court erred in denying his 15 Motion for Entry of Judgment, he should have filed a timely motion for reconsideration. He failed 16 to take either action, and he has failed to demonstrate that a transfer of the case at this late juncture is 17 necessary or proper. This Court has the entire record of this case, including all trial transcripts, 18 available for its review and is more than capable of deciding Harvest's Motion. Moreover, a transfer 19 of judges is not going to change the fact that Mr. Morgan failed to present any evidence against 20 Harvest at trial, failed to instruct the jury on any claim against Harvest, and failed to even present a 21 claim against Harvest to the jury for determination.

Third, Mr. Morgan asserts that Harvest's Motion fails because Harvest is judicially estopped from seeking entry of judgment pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). (*Id.* at 11:18-12:20.) However, Harvest's Motion is not based upon NRCP 49(a). Rather, Harvest has moved for entry of judgment because Mr. Morgan: (1) intentionally abandoned his claim; and/or (2) failed to prove the elements of his claim at trial. This has nothing to do with a post-trial resolution of an issue of fact that was mistakenly omitted from the jury's determination.

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1 Despite the fact that Mr. Morgan never pled a claim for vicarious liability, his last and final 2 argument in opposition to Harvest's Motion is that this claim was "tried by consent," and the jury 3 found Harvest liable because this unpled claim was "undisputed" at trial. (*Id.* at 5:3-4, 12:21-16:10.) 4 Mr. Morgan's assertions are completely unsupported by the record because: (1) Mr. Morgan never 5 provided notice that he intended to try a claim of vicarious liability to the jury; (2) Harvest never 6 impliedly or expressly consented to trial of an unpled, unnoticed claim for vicarious liability; (3) Mr. 7 Morgan bore the burden of proof on this unpled claim, and he failed to offer any evidence proving 8 that the accident occurred in the course and scope of Defendant David E. Lujan's ("Mr. Lujan") 9 employment with Harvest; (4) the evidence offered by the Defendants at trial demonstrated that Mr. 10 Lujan could not have been acting within the course and scope of his employment, because, at the 11 time of the accident, he was on his lunch break; (5) Mr. Morgan failed to refute the evidence that the 12 accident occurred during Mr. Lujan's lunch break; (6) no jury instructions addressed a claim for 13 vicarious liability, and no claim for vicarious liability was ever presented to the jury for 14 determination; and (7) this Court has already determined that the jury's verdict did not include any 15 claim for relief alleged against Harvest, and that it could not enter judgment against Harvest.

As a natural and logical consequence of this Court's denial of Mr. Morgan's Motion for
Entry of Judgment, Harvest now respectfully requests that this Court dismiss with prejudice any and
all claims which Mr. Morgan alleged (or could have alleged) in this case and enter judgment in favor
of Harvest on all such claims.

II. ARGUMENT

A. <u>Mr. Morgan Has Not Appealed From a Final Judgment; Therefore, This Court</u> <u>Retains Jurisdiction Over This Action.</u>

Mr. Morgan contends that this Court has been divested of jurisdiction to decide Harvest's
Motion because, on December 18, 2018, he appealed from this Court's Order denying his own
Motion for Entry of Judgment and the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict against Mr. Lujan. (*Id.* at 2:273:5, 7:4-6, 7:17-19, 8:3-10:10.) However, neither the Order denying Mr. Morgan's Motion for Entry
of Judgment nor the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict is a final judgment because the single claim
alleged against Harvest remains pending.

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"[A] final judgment is one that disposes of *all the issues* presented in the case, and *leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court*, except for post-judgment issues such as
attorney's fees and costs." *Lee v. GNLV Corp.*, 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000)
(emphasis added). The Court's ruling on Mr. Morgan's Motion for Entry of Judgment and the
Judgment Upon Jury Verdict against Mr. Lujan only dispose of Mr. Morgan's claims against Mr.
Lujan — they do not address Mr. Morgan's claim for relief against Harvest.

At the hearing on Mr. Morgan's Motion for Entry of Judgment, after the Court denied Mr.
Morgan's Motion, Harvest sought clarification that the judgment against Mr. Lujan would also
dismiss all claims alleged against Harvest, and this Court explicitly instructed Harvest that it would
need to file a motion seeking such relief. (Ex. 1,² at 9:18-10:8.) Therefore, it was clear that Mr.
Morgan's claim against Harvest had not been resolved as a result of the jury's verdict in the second
trial and had not yet been dismissed by the Court.

13 Mr. Morgan failed to move for certification of his Judgment against Mr. Lujan as a final judgment pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Rule 54(b) states that "[w]hen multiple 14 15 parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer 16 than all of the parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and 17 upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and 18 direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the parties" 19 20 (Emphasis added.)

Because the Court has not yet disposed of Mr. Morgan's claim against Harvest, his appeal is
premature. As such, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over this action, and Harvest has
concurrently filed a Motion to Dismiss in the Nevada Supreme Court. *See Rust v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist.*, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1381 (1988) ("Generally, a premature notice of appeal fails
to vest jurisdiction in [the Supreme Court].").³

²⁷ A true and correct copy of excerpts from the Transcript of Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment (Nov. 6, 2018) is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

²⁸ It is unclear how Mr. Morgan intends to demonstrate that he has appealed from a final judgment. His Opposition merely makes general, conclusory statements that this Court has already entered a final judgment. (Pl.'s 2289

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1 Moreover, because no final judgment has been entered in this action, Harvest's Motion is not 2 a procedurally improper motion seeking to "reopen, revisit, or supplement" a final judgment. (Pl.'s 3 Opp'n at 10:5-10.) Mr. Morgan mistakenly contends that "the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 4 Entry of Judgment involve[s] the exact same issue as the motion currently before the Court — 5 whether the jury's verdict supported a judgment against both Defendants." (Id. at 9:11-15.) However, Harvest successfully opposed Mr. Morgan's Motion for Entry of Judgment and has no 6 desire to "reopen" or "revisit" this Court's decision. Rather, as a logical and natural consequence of the Court's decision, Harvest's Motion only seeks to dispose of the sole remaining claim in this case and only relates to the dismissal with prejudice of Mr. Morgan's abandoned and/or unproven claim against Harvest.

B. <u>Transfer of This Action Back to Chief Judge Bell Is Unnecessary, Improper, and</u> <u>Would Only Serve to Promote Confusion.</u>

Mr. Morgan boldly requests that this action be transferred back to Chief Judge Bell because
if it were not for <u>her</u> "error," Mr. Morgan would not be in the position of defending against entry of
judgment in favor of Harvest.⁴ (*Id.* at 2:22-23, 10:13-19.) However, Mr. Morgan fails to explain
how Chief Judge Bell is responsible for:

- <u>*His*</u> failure to inform the jury that he had alleged claims against both Mr. Lujan and Harvest;
- <u>*His*</u> failure to mention Harvest, his claim against Harvest, or even corporate liability in voir dire;
 - <u>His</u> failure to reference Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his opening statement;
 - <u>*His*</u> failure to offer any evidence regarding Harvest's liability for his damages;

- ⁴ Despite Mr. Morgan's assertions, Chief Judge Bell committed no "error" with regard to the Special Verdict Form. Chief Judge Bell provided the Parties with a sample form from her most recent personal injury action which was "similar, sort of" to this case. (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., Vol. IV, Ex. 12, at 5:20-6:1; *see also id.* at Ex. 12, at 116:11-17 (stating that the sample verdict form provided by Chief Judge Bell "was just what [the Court] had laying around"). Chief Judge Bell requested that the parties revise the sample form as necessary including the caption page and Mr. Morgan chose only to revise the categories of damages included in the form as opposed to the substantive questions regarding the Defendants' liability. (*Id.* at Ex. 12, at 116:11-23, Ex. 14.)
 - substantive questions regarding the Defendants' liability. (Id. at Ex. 12, at 116:11-23, Ex. 14.)



Opp'n at 3:2.) Moreover, Mr. Morgan's Docketing Statement for his appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court was scheduled to be filed on January 16, 2019, but he requested an automatic two-week extension of time until January 30, 2019.

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- <u>*His*</u> failure to elicit any testimony from any witness that could have supported his claim against Harvest;
- <u>*His*</u> failure to mention Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his closing argument or his rebuttal closing argument;
- <u>His</u> failure to instruct the jury on the elements of his claim against Harvest; and
- <u>*His*</u> failure to include Harvest in the <u>*substance*</u> of the Special Verdict Form.

Mr. Morgan has provided no factual or legal basis for transferring this case back to Chief
Judge Bell — especially given the fact that Harvest's Motion and Mr. Morgan's Motion for
Attorney's Fees are the only issues remaining to be determined in this case. Just as the Supreme
Court must rely on the record in an appeal, this Court need look no further than the record to decide
Harvest's Motion.

12 Mr. Morgan erroneously relies on *Hornwood*, *Wolff*, *Winn*, and *Wittenberg* to support his 13 contention that the trial judge is in a better position to decide Harvest's Motion, (*Id.* at 10:23-11:13); 14 however, Harvest's Motion does not require this Court to weigh the credibility of any witnesses, to 15 weigh any conflicting evidence, to review a prior decision for abuse of discretion, or even to make 16 the ultimate determination on any issue of fact. See Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 17 Nev. 188, 191-92, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286-87 (1989) (reversing and remanding to district court for 18 assessment of consequential damages, as evidence still needed to be offered on this issue); Wolff v. 19 Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 1359, 929 P.2d 916, 918-19 (1996) (recognizing that deference should be 20 given to the trial judge's disposition of community property or an alimony award, because such 21 determinations are reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Winn v. Winn, 86 Nev. 18, 20, 467 P.2d 601. 22 602 (1970) (finding no reason to supplant their determination for that of the trial judge in the 23 absence of an abuse of discretion in the trial judge's equitable determination of alimony and 24 disposition of community property); Wittenberg v. Wittenberg, 56 Nev. 442, 55 P.2d 619 (1936) 25 (giving deference to the trial court's rulings where issues on appeal concerned the credibility of 26 witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony). Rather, Harvest's Motion merely seeks the 27 dismissal with prejudice of all claims Mr. Morgan alleged (or could have alleged) in this action as a /// 28

Mr. Morgan offered no evidence at trial demonstrating that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the car accident — so there is no evidence to weigh on this issue. Mr. Morgan offered no witness testimony on the issue of whether Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment — so there is no need for the court to assess the credibility of witnesses. No party has filed a motion for new trial, so there are no issues to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. In sum, there is no reason that this Court is incapable of or unprepared for deciding Harvest's Motion.

Finally, Judge Bell's tenure as Chief Judge began on July 1, 2018. The order reassigning this
action to this Court was issued on July 2, 2018. Therefore, Chief Judge Bell chose to reassign this
action despite knowledge that post-trial motions were possible. Clearly, Chief Judge Bell did not
believe that she needed to retain this action merely because she had been the presiding trial judge.

Mr. Morgan's Counter-Motion is nothing more than "judge-shopping" for what he hopes will
be an untimely reconsideration of his Motion to Entry of Judgment. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 3:7-12.) There
are no grounds for the transfer of this case; therefore, Harvest respectfully requests that Mr.
Morgan's Counter-Motion be denied.

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C. <u>Harvest Does Not Seek Entry of Judgment Pursuant to NRCP 49(a).</u>

19 Mr. Morgan asserts that Harvest is asking the court to reconsider its prior ruling on the 20 inapplicability of Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) and is judicially estopped from seeking 21 entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 49(a). (Id. at 3:10:11, 11:18-12:20.) However, Harvest has not moved for entry of judgment pursuant to NRCP 49(a). This Court has already determined: (i) that, 22 23 given the lack of jury instructions pertaining to claims against Harvest, Mr. Morgan's failure to 24 include Harvest in the Special Verdict form was not a clerical error; and (ii) that Mr. Morgan failed 25 to present his claim against Harvest to the jury for determination. (Ex. 1, at 9:8-20.) In light of this 26 Court's decision, Harvest respectfully requests that this Court now dismiss with prejudice Mr. 27 Morgan's abandoned claim against Harvest and that judgment be entered in favor of Harvest. Rule /// 28

49(a) is not relevant to the relief Harvest seeks, as the Court has the inherent power and discretion to
 grant such relief.

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D. <u>Nothing in the Record Supports Mr. Morgan's Claim for Vicarious Liability,</u> and Harvest Is Not Liable Merely Because Mr. Lujan Is an Employee Who Has <u>Been Found to Have Been Negligent.</u>

5 Mr. Morgan asserts that it would be a "mistake" to enter judgment in favor of Harvest Management, because "the jurors received significant evidence regarding the relationship between 6 7 the Defendants which established the facts necessary to prove vicarious liability." (Id. at 14:13-16.) 8 Notably, Mr. Morgan does not contend that sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to establish 9 the facts necessary to prove *negligent entrustment* — the only claim actually pled against Harvest in 10 Mr. Morgan's Complaint. Therefore, it is undisputed that Mr. Morgan either intentionally 11 abandoned his claim for negligent entrustment or failed to prove the elements of this claim at trial. 12 Thus, this claim must be dismissed with prejudice, and judgment should be entered in favor of 13 Harvest on this claim as well as any other claim he could have alleged in this case.

14 In apparent acknowledgement of the fact that he never pled a claim for vicarious 15 liability/respondeat superior, Mr. Morgan now asserts that this claim was "tried by consent." (Id. at 16 15:16-16:2.) However, in order for Harvest to expressly or impliedly consent to trial of an unpled 17 claim for vicarious liability, it must have been clear that Mr. Morgan was attempting to prove such a 18 claim at trial. See Sprouse v. Wentz, 105 Nev. 597, 602-03, 781 P.2d 1136, 1139 (1989) (holding 19 that an unpled issue cannot be tried by consent unless a party has taken some action to inform the 20 other parties that he is seeking such relief, and the district court has notified the parties that it intends 21 to consider the unpled issue). The record of the discovery for and trial of this action belies Mr. 22 Morgan's argument.

First, Mr. Morgan conducted no discovery relevant to a claim for vicarious liability. He
never deposed Mr. Lujan or a single employee, officer, or other representative of Harvest.
Moreover, Mr. Morgan never conducted any written discovery relating to whether Mr. Lujan was
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Rather, his
interrogatories focused on background checks that Harvest performed prior to hiring Mr. Lujan and
disciplinary actions Harvest had taken against Mr. Lujan in the five years preceding the accident —

information relevant to a claim for negligent entrustment, not vicarious liability. (App. of Exs. to
 Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., Vol. I, Ex. 4, at 6:25-7:2, 7:15-19.)

3 Second, Mr. Morgan failed to take any action at trial which would constitute notice of his intent to pursue a claim for vicarious liability. Specifically, his opening statement did not include 4 5 any references to his intent to prove: (i) that Harvest was vicariously liable for Mr. Morgan's damages; and/or (ii) that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and 6 7 scope of his employment with Harvest. (Id. at Vol. IV, at Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17.) He never 8 offered any evidence at trial regarding the issue of course and scope of employment. (Id. at Vol. I, 9 Ex. 3, at 164:21-177:17, Ex. 6, at 4:2-6:1, 9:23-12:6, 13:16-15:6.) Like his opening statement, his 10 closing argument failed to include any references to vicarious liability or the course and scope of 11 employment. (*Id.* at Vol. IV, at Ex. 12, at 121:5-136:19, 157:13-161:10.) There were no jury 12 instructions regarding the elements of a claim for vicarious liability or pertaining to the course and 13 scope of employment. (Id. at Ex. 13.) Finally, in the Special Verdict Form, the jury was not asked to find that Harvest was vicariously liable for Mr. Morgan's injuries. (Id. at Ex. 14.) In sum, Mr. 14 15 Morgan never provided Harvest, the Court, or the jury with notice that he intended to try a claim for 16 vicarious liability as opposed to, or in addition to, a claim for negligent entrustment. As such, 17 Harvest could not — and did not — expressly or impliedly consent to trial of a claim Mr. Morgan 18 failed to raise in his pleadings.

19 Finally, even if this Court finds that a claim for vicarious liability was pled in the Complaint 20 or tried by consent (which it was not), Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence at trial to prove this 21 claim. Mr. Morgan attempts to explain this lack of evidence by erroneously asserting that 22 "[v]icarious liability was not contested during trial." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 5:3-4.) First, the claim was 23 never pled — Harvest need not dispute an unpled claim for relief. Second, Harvest denied the one 24 and only allegation in Mr. Morgan's Complaint which referenced the phrase "course and scope of 25 employment" — despite the fact that this allegation actually concerned the negligent entrustment of a vehicle to Mr. Lujan and not Harvest's alleged vicarious liability.⁵ Moreover, it was Mr. Morgan 26

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1	— not Harvest — that bore the burden of proof regarding a claim of vicarious liability. Porter v. SW		
2	Christian Coll., 428 S.W. 3d 377, 381 (Tex. App. 2014) ("A plaintiff pleading respondeat superior		
3	bears the burden of establishing that the employee acted within the course and scope of his		
4	employment."); Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)		
5	("The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employee's tortious act was committed within		
6	the scope of his or her employment.").		
7	Mr. Morgan's assertion that he offered "sufficient evidence" to prove his claim for vicarious		
8	liability is based on the following:		
9	• "Harvest Management and its corporate representative were identified as Defendants		
10	during trial." (Pl.'s Opp'n at 13:1-2, 13:4-8). ⁶		
11	• However, the fact that Harvest is a defendant in this action is not admissible		
12	proof of any claim for relief, much less a claim for vicarious liability.		
13	• Harvest and Mr. Lujan "were represented by the same counsel at both trials." (Id. at		
14	13:2-3).		
15	• Given the lack of evidence regarding Mr. Lujan's history of incompetence,		
16	inexperience, and/or recklessness in driving motor vehicles, Harvest's and Mr.		
17	Lujan had aligned interests in defending against a claim for negligent		
18	entrustment of a vehicle. The fact of joint representation at trial is not		
19	admissible evidence offered to prove any element of a claim for vicarious		
20	liability.		
21	• Harvest's "NRCP 30(b)(6) representative, Erica Janssen, sat at counsel's table		
22	throughout the second trial." (Id. at 13:3-4).		
23	///		
24			
25	a negligent and careless manner so as to cause a collision with the vehicle occupied by Plaintiff'); <i>see also</i> Ex. 2, at 2:8-9 (denying this allegation).		
26	⁶ Harvest's corporate representative at the second trial, Erica Janssen, was <u><i>not</i></u> a named Defendant in this case.		
27	Because Mr. Morgan fails to cite to any evidence in support of his assertion that Harvest's <i>corporate representative</i> was identified as a <i>defendant</i> in this action, Harvest assumes Mr. Morgan is actually referring to the introductions of counsel		
28	and parties to the jury venire, when counsel for the Defendants stated: "my client, Erica, is right back here." (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., at Vol. III, at Ex. 10, at 17:15-18.)		

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1	• Mr. Morgan pled a claim for negligent entrustment against Harvest, and
2	Harvest's representative attended trial to defend against this claim. Her
3	presence at the trial is not admissible evidence offered to prove any element of
4	a claim for vicarious liability.
5	• Harvest's trial counsel informed the Court, during a bench conference, that Ms.
6	Janssen was a corporate representative. (Id. at 13:9-22.)
7	• The bench conference concerned the Court's confusion as to the identity of
8	Ms. Janssen and clarification that she was not the individual defendant, Mr.
9	Lujan — but, again, the fact that Harvest's corporate representative attended
10	trial to defend against a claim for negligent entrustment is not admissible
11	evidence offered to prove any element of a claim for vicarious liability.
12	• Both parties "discussed theories regarding corporate defendants during voir dire, with
13	the members of the jury venire answering three separate questions about liability for
14	corporate defendants, including one posed by Harvest" (Id. at 13:23-14:2 &
15	n.27 (citing Tr. of Jury Trial (Apr. 2, 2018), at 47, 213, and 232).)
16	• Mr. Morgan's contention is a complete mischaracterization of the record —
17	and, again, has no bearing on the evidence offered at trial to prove the
18	elements of a claim for vicarious liability. Questions posed to the jury venire
19	are not evidence, nor is the jury's response to such questions. Regardless, the
20	portions of the record cited by Mr. Morgan do not include any questions posed
21	by counsel for <i>Harvest</i> , and the questions asked by Mr. Morgan's counsel
22	were not even tangentially related to vicarious liability. ⁷
23	
24	On page 47 of the April 2, 2018 Transcript of Jury Trial, counsel for Mr. Morgan asked a member of the jury venire whether he or she was bothered by having responsibility for evaluating the Plaintiff's future medical needs,
25	whether he or she was bothered by the fact that the jury's decision may affect the Defendants, and whether he or she had ever had any setbacks in life which he or she handled differently than expected—there were no questions posed regarding vicarious liability. (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., Vol. III, Ex. 10, at 46:25-47:25.)
26	On page 213 of the same trial transcript, counsel for Mr. Morgan asked a member of the jury venire whether he or she felt more people abused the legal system versus using it for the way it was intended, whether he or she could
27 28	ignore worries about how the judgment was going to be paid, and whether thoughts of how the judgment would be paid by the defendant would influence his or her decision. This line of questioning came about because the member of the
	jury venire pondered how an individual defendant versus a large corporation could afford to pay a large judgment and 2296

• "During opening statements, both parties also addressed the fact that [Mr.] Lujan was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident." (*Id.* at 14:3-4 & n. 28 (citing counsel for Mr. Morgan stating that Mr. Lujan was driving a shuttlebus, worked for a retirement community, was having lunch at a park and got into an accident with Mr. Morgan after getting into his shuttlebus to get back to work; and that "the actions of our driver were not reckless").)

• Statements of counsel are not admissible evidence that can be offered to prove the elements of a claim for vicarious liability. Moreover, Harvest does not deny that Mr. Lujan is an employee of Harvest or that Harvest owned the shuttlebus involved in the accident. However, an employment relationship is *only one element* of a claim for vicarious liability, and these facts are just as relevant to a claim for *negligent entrustment* as they are to a claim of vicarious liability.

• Harvest's "NRCP 30(b)(6) representative also stated that she was testifying on behalf of Harvest [], was authorized to do so, and was aware of the fact that [Mr.] Lujan, the driver, was a Harvest [] employee." (*Id.* at 14:4-7.)

Harvest was a defendant in the action and appeared at trial to defend against a claim for negligent entrustment. The mere fact that Harvest's NRCP 30(b)(6) representative testified at trial in defense of this claim is not admissible evidence to prove the elements of a claim for vicarious liability. Moreover, Ms. Janssen's admission that Mr. Lujan was an employee of Harvest only proves *one element* of a claim for vicarious liability — and it is a fact that is equally relevant to a claim for negligent entrustment.

wondered whether the State pays such judgment (leading to increased taxes as a result). Mr. Morgan's counsel posed no questions regarding vicarious liability. (*Id.* at 212:25-214:3.)

Finally, on page 232 of the same trial transcript, counsel for Mr. Morgan asked a member of the jury venire to
explain his or her past experience with lawsuits and how this past experience affected his or her view of lawsuits in
general. This line of questioning came about after a juror disclosed that he had been deposed on behalf of Walgreens and
CVS as a "corporate spokesperson." Mr. Morgan's counsel posed no questions regarding vicarious liability. (*Id.* at
231:23-233:3.)

Mr. Morgan "also established the employee-employer relationship between the Defendants by reading [Mr.] Lujan's testimony from the first trial into the record." (*Id.* at 14:7-9 & n.30.)

Again, Harvest has never denied that Mr. Lujan was an employee of Harvest, but this fact alone does not prove a claim for vicarious liability. The testimony referenced by Mr. Morgan merely states that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Lujan was employed by Montara Meadows; that Harvest is the corporate office for Montara Meadows; that Mr. Lujan was employed as a bus driver; and that the accident happened after Mr. Lujan pulled out of the parking lot at Paradise Park during his lunch break. (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., at Vol. I, at Ex. 6, at 195:7-196:10, Ex. 3, at 168:6-20.) Rather than proving vicarious liability, such facts actually establish that Mr. Lujan was <u>mot</u> acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident because he was on his lunch break.

In their closing arguments, "both parties' [*sic*] referenced responsibility and agreed that [Mr.] Lujan, Harvest['s] employee, should not have pulled in front of [Mr.] Morgan when [Mr.] Morgan had the right of way." (*Id.* at 14:9-11 & n.31.)

The transcript cited by Mr. Morgan in footnote 31 does not include the closing arguments of the parties; thus, Harvest assumes that Mr. Morgan meant to cite to the trial transcript for April 9, 2018. While defense counsel admitted, during a discussion of comparative negligence, that Mr. Morgan had the right of way at the time of the accident, counsel for Harvest never admitted that Mr. Lujan was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

It is well recognized that vicarious liability is only imposed upon an employer when: "(1) the
actor at issue is an employee[;] <u>and</u> (2) *the action complained of occurred within the course and scope of the actor's employment*." (*Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites*, 112 Nev. 1217, 1223,
1225-26, 925 P.2d 1175, 1179, 1180-81 (1996) (holding that an employer is not liable if an

Page 14 of 17

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820 1 employee's tort is an "independent venture of his own" and was "not committed in the course of 2 the very task assigned to him") (quoting Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 86 Nev. 390, 391, 469 P.2d 3 399, 400 (1970)). While it is undisputed that Mr. Lujan was an employee of Harvest at the time of 4 the accident, and that he was driving a shuttle bus owned by Harvest when the accident occurred, 5 these facts, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to prove that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. This is particularly true in light of 6 7 the unrefuted evidence offered by the Defendants that Mr. Lujan was on his lunch break when the 8 accident occurred. Mr. Morgan failed to establish any evidence proving that Mr. Lujan was "on the 9 clock" during his lunch break; that Mr. Lujan had returned to work when the accident occurred; that 10 Mr. Lujan was transporting passengers or was on his way to pick up passengers when the accident 11 occurred; that Mr. Lujan had "clocked in" after his lunch break or had no requirement to "clock in" 12 and "clock out" as part of his employment with Harvest; that Harvest knew that Mr. Lujan was using 13 the company shuttle bus during his lunch breaks; and/or that Harvest authorized such use of the shuttlebus. 14

15 In Nevada, it is well settled that "[t]he tortious conduct of an employee *in transit to or from the place of employment* will *not* expose the employer to liability" *Molino v. Asher*, 96 Nev. 16 17 814, 817-18, 618 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1980). While the issue of whether an employee was acting 18 within the course and scope of his employment is generally an issue of fact, it may be resolved as a 19 matter of law "where undisputed evidence exists concerning the employee's status at the time of the 20 tortious act." Rockwell, 112 Nev. at 1225, 925 P.2d at 1180. Based on the unrefuted and 21 undisputed⁸ evidence that Mr. Lujan was at lunch at the time of the accident, and the lack of any 22 evidence that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the 23 accident, Mr. Morgan has not, as a matter of law, proven his alleged claim of vicarious liability 24 against Harvest. Mr. Lujan's negligence cannot be "imputed" to Harvest based on the mere 25 existence of an employer-employee relationship. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 16:6-8.) Therefore, this claim 26 should be dismissed with prejudice and a judgment should be entered in favor of Harvest.

In his opening statement, counsel for Mr. Morgan acknowledged that Mr. Lujan was at lunch when the accident occurred. (App. of Exs. to Harvest's Mot. for Entry of J., Vol. IV, Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17.)

	1	III. CONCLUSION			
	2	For the foregoing reasons, Harvest respectfully requests that the Court deny Mr. Morgan's			
	3	Counter-Motion to transfer this case; dismiss any and all claims that Mr. Morgan has alleged or			
	4	could have alleged in this action; and enter judgment in favor of Harvest consistent with the			
	5	proposed Judgment attached as Exhibit A to Harvest's Motion.			
	6	DATED this 23rd day of January, 2019.			
	7	BAILEY KENNEDY			
	8				
	9	Dennis L. Kennedy Dennis L. Kennedy Sarah E. Harmon Joshua P. Gilmore			
	10				
	11				
	12	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC			
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		Page 16 of 17 2300			

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 23rd day of		
3	January, 2019, service of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT HARVEST		
4	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT; AND OPPOSITION		
5	TO PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE BACK TO CHIEF JUDGE		
6	BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-VERDICT ISSUES was made by mandatory electronic		
7	service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system and/or by depositing a		
8	true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and addressed to the following at		
9	their last known address:		
10	DOUGLAS J. GARDNEREmail: dgardner@rsglawfirm.comDOUGLAS R. RANDSdrands@rsgnvlaw.com		
11	RANDS , SOUTH & GARDNER 1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220 Attorneys for Defendant		
12	Henderson, Nevada 89014 DAVID E. LUJAN		
13	BENJAMIN P. CLOWARD Email: Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com		
14	BRYAN A. BOYACK Bryan@richardharrislaw.com RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM		
15	801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
16	and		
17	MICAH S. ECHOLS Email: Mechols@maclaw.com		
18	TOM W. STEWART Tstewart@maclaw.com MARQUIS AURBACH		
19	COFFING P.C.1001 Park Run DriveAttorneys for PlaintiffADDIMENTIAL		
20	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 AARON M. MORGAN		
21			
22	<u>/s/ Josephine Baltazar</u> Employee of BAILEY ♦ KENNEDY		
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
	Page 17 of 17 2301		

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EXHIBIT 1

 $\kappa^{(2)}$

EXHIBIT 1

Electronically Filed	
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Steven D. Grierson	
CLERK OF THE COURT	
Alenn S. Shing	¢.

TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

• • • • • •	• • • • • • • •	•	
I	Defendants	•	Transcript of Proceedings
DAVID LUJAN, e	et al.	•	DEPT. NO. XI
vs.		•	
:	Plaintiff		CASE NO. A-15-718679-C
AARON MORGAN		•	

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2018

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

BRYAN A. BOYACK, ESQ. THOMAS W. STEWART, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

DENNIS L. KENNEDY, ESQ. SARAH E. HARMON, ESQ. ANDREA M. CHAMPION, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINSFLORENCE HOYTDistrict CourtLas Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

employee, discusses the facts of the accident. Never does she 1 2 bring up on cross or direct examination he was on a break, we 3 aren't on the hook here, or any assertion of that. So this is 4 kind of after the fact them trying to escape the clear liability that was presented, although it wasn't stated on the 5 special verdict form, defendant Lujan, defendant Harvest 6 7 Management. It was the defendant. 8 THE COURT: Is there any instruction on either negligent entrustment or vicarious liability in the pack of 9 10 jury instructions? 11 MR. BOYACK: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. Thanks. The motion's denied. While there is a inconsistency 13 14 in the caption of the jury instructions and the special 15 verdict form, there does not appear to be any additional instructions that would lend credence to the fact that the 16 17 claims against defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC were 18 submitted to the jury. So if you would submit the judgment which only includes the one defendant, I will be happy to sign 19 20 it, and then you all can litigate the next step, if any, 21 related to the other defendant. 22 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 MR. BOYACK: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 MR. KENNEDY: And just for purposes of clarification, that judgment will say that the claims against 25

9

Harvest Management are dismissed? THE COURT: It will not, Mr. Kennedy. MR. KENNEDY: Okay. Well, I'll just have to file a motion. THE COURT: That's why I say we have to do something next. MR. KENNEDY: Okay. I'm happy to do that. THE COURT: I'm going one step at a time. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:13 A.M. * * * *

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Unexac M. Hoy

FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/17/19

DATE

Josephine Baltazar

From:efilingmail@tylerhost.netSent:Tuesday, January 22, 2019 4:14 PMTo:BKfederaldownloadsSubject:Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David
Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs - MAFC (CIV),
Envelope Number: 3736917

Notification of Service



Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3736917

This is a notification of service for the filing listed. Please click the link below to retrieve the submitted document.

	Filing Details			
Case Number	A-15-718679-C			
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)			
Date/Time Submitted	1/22/2019 4:13 PM PST			
Filing Type	Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs - MAFC (CIV)			
Filing Description	Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs			
Filed By	Peter Floyd			
	David E Lujan: Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (<u>jmeacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)			
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC: Sarah Harmon (sharmon@baileykennedy.com) Dennis Kennedy (dkennedy@baileykennedy.com) Joshua Gilmore (jgilmore@baileykennedy.com) Bailey Kennedy, LLP (bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com) Andrea Champion (achampion@baileykennedy.com) 2307			

Other Service Contacts not associated with a party on the case:
"Bryan A. Boyack, Esq." . (<u>bryan@richardharrislaw.com</u>)
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Kathleen Wilde (<u>kwilde@maclaw.com</u>)

Document Details		
Served Document	Download Document	
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TAB 29

TAB 29

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AARON M. MORGAN, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellant, vs.

DAVID E. LUJAN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC, A FOREIGN LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANY, Respondents. No. 77753

FILED

JAN 24 2019

ELIZABETH A

SETTLEMENT PROGRAM EARLY CASE ASSESSMENT REPORT

After conducting a premediation conference with counsel pursuant to NRAP 16(b), I make the following recommendation to the court regarding this appeal:



This case is appropriate for the program and a mediation session will be scheduled/has been scheduled for:

26/19 @ 10: W cm @ Kenned

This case is not appropriate for mediation and should be removed from the settlement program.

The premediation conference has not been conducted or is continued because:

Settlement Judge

cc: All Counsel

2309

19-03829

Reception

From:
Sent:
To:
Subject:

efiling@nvcourts.nv.gov Thursday, January 24, 2019 3:00 PM BKfederaldownloads Notification of Electronic Filing in MORGAN VS. LUJAN, No. 77753

Supreme Court of Nevada

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

Notice is given of the following activity:

Date and Time of Notice: Jan 24 2019 02:59 p.m.

Case Title: Docket Number: Case Category:	MORGAN VS. LUJAN 77753 Civil Appeal
Document Category:	Filed ECAR/Appropriate for Settlement Program. This case is appropriate for mediation and a settlement conference is scheduled for February 26, 2019, 10:00 am. (SC).
Submitted by:	Issued by Court
Official File Stamp:	Jan 24 2019 02:51 p.m.
Filing Status:	Accepted and Filed
Docket Text:	Filed ECAR/Appropriate for Settlement Program. This case is appropriate for mediation and a settlement conference is scheduled for February 26, 2019, 10:00 am. (SC).

The Clerk's Office has filed this document. It is now available on the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing website. Click <u>here</u> to log in to Eflex and view the document.

Electronic service of this document is complete at the time of transmission of this notice. The time to respond to the document, if required, is computed from the date and time of this notice. Refer to NEFR 9(f) for further details.

Clerk's Office has electronically mailed notice to:

Benjamin Cloward

Douglas Gardner Joshua Gilmore Bryan Boyack Thomas Stewart Andrea Champion Dennis Kennedy Micah Echols Sarah Harmon

No notice was electronically mailed to those listed below; counsel filing the document must serve a copy of the document on the following:

Ara Shirinian

This notice was automatically generated by the electronic filing system. If you have any questions, contact the Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 775-684-1600 or 702-486-9300.

TAB 30

TAB 30

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

AARON MORGAN, INDIVIDUALLY,

Appellant,

vs.

DAVID E. LUJAN, INDIVIDUALLY; AND HARVEST MANAGEMENT

SUB LLC, A FOREIGN LIMITED-

LIABILITY COMPANY.

No. 77753

Electronically Filed Jan 31 2019 09:12 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

DOCKETING STATEMENT CIVIL APPEALS

Respondents.

GENERAL INFORMATION

All appellants not in proper person must complete this docketing statement. NRAP 14(a). The purpose of the docketing statement is to assist the Court in screening jurisdiction, classifying cases for en banc, panel, or expedited treatment, compiling statistical information and identifying parties and their counsel.

WARNING

This statement must be completed fully, accurately and on time. NRAP 14(c). The Court may impose sanctions on counsel or appellant if it appears that the information provided is incomplete or inaccurate. *Id.* Failure to fill out the statement completely or to file it in a timely manner constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions, including a fine and/or dismissal of the appeal.

A complete list of the documents that must be attached appears as Question 26 on this docketing statement. Failure to attach all required documents will result in the delay of your appeal and may result in the imposition of sanctions.

This court has noted that when attorneys do not take seriously their obligations under NRAP 14 to complete the docketing statement properly and conscientiously, they waste the valuable judicial resources of this court, making the imposition of sanctions appropriate. *See* <u>KDI Sylvan</u> <u>Pools v. Workman</u>, 107 Nev. 340, 344, 810 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1991). Please use tab dividers to separate any attached documents.

 Judicial District <u>Eighth</u> Department <u>XI</u> County <u>Clark</u> Judge <u>Honorable Elizabeth Gonzalez</u> District Ct. Case No. <u>A-15-718679-C</u>

2. Attorney filing this docketing statement:

Attorney <u>Micah S. Echols, Esq. and Thomas W. Stewart, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-382-0711</u> Firm <u>Marquis Aurbach Coffing</u> Address 10001 Park Run Drive, Las Vegas, NV 89145

Attorney <u>Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. and Bryan A. Boyack, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-444-4444</u> Firm <u>Richard Harris Law Firm</u> Address <u>801 South Fourth Street, Las Vegas, NV 89101</u>

Client Aaron M. Morgan

3. Attorney(s) representing respondent(s):

Attorney <u>Douglas J. Gardner, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-940-2222</u> Firm <u>Rands, South & Gardner</u> Address <u>1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220, Henderson, NV 89014</u> Client <u>David E. Lujan</u>

Attorney <u>Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq.; Sarah E. Harmon, Esq.; Joshua P.</u> <u>Gilmore, Esq.; and Andrea M. Champion, Esq.</u> Telephone <u>702-562-8820</u> Firm <u>Bailey Kennedy</u> Address <u>8984 Spanish Ridge Ave., Las Vegas, NV 89148</u> Client <u>Harvest Management Sub LLC</u>

4. Nature of disposition below (check all that apply):

- Judgment after bench trial Dismissal X Judgment after jury verdict Lack of Jurisdiction Summary judgment Failure to state a claim Default judgment Failure to prosecute Grant/Denial of NRCP 60(b) relief Other (specify) Grant/Denial of injunction Divorce decree: Grant/Denial of declaratory relief Original Modification Review of agency determination \bigcirc Other disposition (specify)
 - November 28, 2018 Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment (**Exhibit 3**).
 - December 17, 2018 Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict (Exhibit 4).
- 5. Does this appeal raise issues concerning any of the following: N/A.
 - Child Custody
 - Venue
 - Termination of parental rights
- 6. **Pending and prior proceedings in this court.** List the case name and docket number of all appeals or original proceedings presently or previously pending before this court which are related to this appeal:

This case has not been the subject of a prior appeal or writ proceeding before this Court.

7. **Pending and prior proceedings in other courts.** List the case name, number and court of all pending and prior proceedings in other courts which are related to this appeal (*e.g.*, bankruptcy, consolidated or bifurcated proceedings) and their dates of disposition:

Morgan v. Lujan and Harvest Management Sub LLC (Eighth Judicial District Court Case No. A-15-718679-C)—the judgment upon the jury verdict was filed on December 17, 2018. This is the underlying case leading to this appeal.

8. **Nature of the action.** Briefly describe the nature of the action and the result below:

This case arises from an April 1, 2014 motor vehicle crash and the injuries sustained by Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan ("Morgan") in that crash. In his complaint, Morgan alleged three causes of action: (1) negligence against

Defendant, David E. Lujan ("Lujan"); (2) negligence per se against Lujan; and (3) vicarious liability/respondeat superior against Defendant, Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest Management"). (**Exhibit 1**). The Defendants jointly answered the complaint and were jointly represented by the same counsel through both trials.

The case initially proceeded to trial in November, 2017. However, on the third day of the initial trial, the District Court declared a mistrial based on Defendants' counsel's misconduct. Following the mistrial, the case proceeded to a second trial in April, 2018. Throughout the litigation, all parties were aware that claims for damages were being pursued against both Defendants. Morgan's claim for vicarious liability was not contested during trial. Harvest Management's NRCP 30(b)(6) witness contested primary liability, but never contested Harvest Management's vicarious liability.

On the final day of trial, the District Court (Judge Linda Bell) sua sponte created a special verdict form that inadvertently included Lujan as the only Defendant in the caption. The District Court informed the parties of this omission, and the Defendants agreed they had no objection. Jury instructions were provided to the jury with the proper caption. The jury used those instructions to fill out the improperly-captioned special verdict form and render judgment in favor of Plaintiff—the jury found Defendants to be negligent and 100% at fault for the accident. As a result, the jury awarded Plaintiff \$2,980,000.

Following trial, Morgan moved the District Court (Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez) to enter its proposed judgment against both Defendants or to make an explicit finding that the omission of Harvest Management from the special verdict was inadvertent and to render judgment in favor of Morgan against both Defendants, jointly and severally. (**Exhibit 2**). The District Court denied Morgan's motion, leaving the judgment only as to Lujan due to the improperly-captioned special verdict form. The order denying Morgan's motion was filed on November 28, 2018, and the judgment upon jury verdict was filed on December 17, 2018. (**Exhibits 3** and **4**).

Due to the District Court's interlocutory order on his motion for entry of judgment, Morgan has appealed from the judgment on jury verdict, but seeks review of the interlocutory order denying his motion for entry of judgment.

- 9. **Issues on appeal.** State concisely the principal issue(s) in this appeal (attach separate sheets as necessary):
 - (1) Whether Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez should have transferred the case back to Judge Linda Bell for purposes of determining what happened at trial.
 - (2) Whether the evidence presented at trial demonstrates that the jury's verdict is against both Lujan and Harvest Management.
 - (3) Whether the District Court should have, alternatively, made a finding that the jury's verdict is against both Lujan and Harvest Management.
- 10. **Pending proceedings in this court raising the same or similar issues.** If you are aware of any proceeding presently pending before this court which raises the same or similar issues raised in this appeal, list the case name and docket numbers and identify the same or similar issue raised:

Morgan is not aware of any pending case raising the same or similar issues.

- 11. **Constitutional issues.** If this appeal challenges the constitutionality of a statute, and the state, any state agency, or any officer or employee thereof is not a party to this appeal, have you notified the clerk of this court and the attorney general in accordance with NRAP 44 and NRS 30.130?
 - N/A
 - Yes
 - No

If not, explain:

- 12. Other issues. Does this appeal involve any of the following issues?
 - Reversal of well-settled Nevada precedent (identify the case(s))
 - An issue arising under the United States and/or Nevada Constitutions
 - \boxtimes A substantial issue of first impression
 - An issue of public policy
 - An issue where en banc consideration is necessary to maintain uniformity of this court's decisions
 - A ballot question

If so, explain: This case asks the Court to enforce the plain language of NRCP 49(a):

The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.

Morgan is not aware of any Nevada case law construing these provisions.

13. Assignment to the Supreme Court of Appeals or retention in the Supreme Court. Briefly set forth whether the matter is presumptively retained by the Supreme Court or assigned to the Court of Appeals under NRAP 17, and cite the subparagraph(s) of the Rule under which the matter falls. If appellant believes that the Supreme Court should retain the case despite its presumptive assignment to the Court of Appeals, identify the specific issue(s) or circumstance(s) that warrant retaining the case, and include an explanation of their importance or significance:

This case should be retained by the Supreme Court. The jury's verdict exceeds the 250,000 threshold in a tort case, as outlined by NRAP 17(b)(5). As outlined in response to Question 12, this case also presents at least one issue of first impression, which is also of statewide importance. Thus, NRAP 17(a)(10) and (11) also support the Supreme Court retaining this appeal.

14. Trial. If this action proceeded to trial, how many days did the trial last?

The initial trial in November 2017 lasted 3 days before being declared a mistrial. The second trial in April 2018 lasted 6 days.

Was it a bench or jury trial? Jury.

15. **Judicial Disqualification.** Do you intend to file a motion to disqualify or have a justice recuse him/herself from participation in this appeal? If so, which Justice?

N/A.

TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL

16. Date of entry of written judgment or order appealed from:

The Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment was filed on November 28, 2018. (Exhibit 3).

The Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict was filed on December 17, 2018. (Exhibit 4).

If no written judgment or order was filed in the district court, explain the basis for seeking appellate review:

17. Date written notice of entry of judgment or order was served:

The Notice of Entry of the Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment was filed on November 28, 2018. (Exhibit 3).

The Notice of Entry of the Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict was filed on January 2, 2018. (Exhibit 4).

Was service by:

Delivery

Mail/electronic/fax

18. If the time for filing the notice of appeal was tolled by a post-judgment motion (NRCP 50(b), 52(b), or 59)

N/A.

(a) Specify the type of motion, the date and method of service of the motion, and the date of filing.

NRCP 50(b)	Date of filing
\square NRCP 52(b)	Date of filing
NRCP 59	Date of filing

- NOTE: Motions made pursuant to NRCP 60 or motions for rehearing or reconsideration may toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. *See <u>AA Primo Builders v. Washington</u>, 126 Nev. ____, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010).*
 - (b) Date of entry of written order resolving tolling motion.

(c) Date written notice of entry of order resolving tolling motion was served.

Was service by:

Delivery

Mail


- 19. Date notice of appeal filed: December 18, 2018.
- 20. Specify statute or rule governing the time limit for filing the notice of appeal, *e.g.*, NRAP 4(a) or other

NRAP 4(a).

SUBSTANTIVE APPEALABILITY

21. Specify the statute or other authority granting this court jurisdiction to review the judgment or order appealed from:

(a)



(b) Explain how each authority provides a basis for appeal from the judgment or order:

NRAP 3A(b)(1) provides for an appeal of a final judgment.

- 22. List all parties involved in the action or consolidated actions in the district court:
 - (a) Parties:

Plaintiff: Aaron Morgan

Defendants: David E. Lujan and Harvest Management Sub LLC

(b) If all parties in the district court are not parties to this appeal, explain in detail why those parties are not involved in this appeal, e.g., formally dismissed, not served, or other:

N/A.

23. Give a brief description (3 to 5 words) of each party's separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims or third-party claims, and the date of formal disposition of each claim.

In his complaint, Morgan alleged three causes of action: (1) negligence against Defendant, David E. Lujan ("Lujan"); (2) negligence per se against Lujan; and (3) vicarious liability/respondeat superior against Defendant, Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest Management"). (Exhibit 1). Throughout the litigation, all parties were aware that claims for damages were being pursued against both Defendants. Morgan's claim for vicarious liability was not contested during trial. Harvest Management's NRCP 30(b)(6) witness contested primary liability, but never contested Harvest Management's vicarious liability.

On the final day of trial, the District Court (Judge Linda Bell) sua sponte created a special verdict form that inadvertently included Lujan as the only Defendant in the caption. The District Court informed the parties of this omission, and the Defendants agreed they had no objection. Jury instructions were provided to the jury with the proper caption. The jury used those instructions to fill out the improperly-captioned special verdict form and render judgment in favor of Plaintiff—the jury found Defendants to be negligent and 100% at fault for the accident. As a result, the jury awarded Plaintiff \$2,980,000.

Following trial, Morgan moved the District Court (Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez) to enter its proposed judgment against both Defendants or to make an explicit finding that the omission of Harvest Management from the special verdict was inadvertent and to render judgment in favor of Morgan against both Defendants, jointly and severally. (**Exhibit 2**). The District Court denied Morgan's motion, leaving the judgment only as to Lujan due to the improperly captioned special verdict form. The order denying Morgan's motion was filed on November 28, 2018, and the judgment upon jury verdict was filed on December 17, 2018. (**Exhibits 3** and **4**).

24. Did the judgment or order appealed from adjudicate ALL the claims alleged below and the rights and liabilities of ALL the parties to the action or consolidated actions below?

\ge	Yes
	No

25. If you answered "No" to question 24, complete the following:

- (a) Specify the claims remaining pending below:
- (b) Specify the parties remaining below:
- (c) Did the district court certify the judgment or order appealed from as a final judgment pursuant to NRCP 54(b)?

☐ Yes □ No

(d) Did the district court make an express determination, pursuant to NRCP 54(b), that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment?

☐ Yes ☐ No

26. If you answered "No" to any part of question 25, explain the basis for seeking appellate review (*e.g.*, order is independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)):

N/A.

27. Attach file-stamped copies of the following documents:

- The latest-filed complaint, counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims
- Any tolling motion(s) and order(s) resolving tolling motion(s)
- Orders of NRCP 41(a) dismissals formally resolving each claim, counterclaims, cross-claims and/or third-party claims asserted in the action or consolidated action below, even if not at issue on appeal
- Any other order challenged on appeal
- Notices of entry for each attached order

Exhibit	Document Description
1	Complaint (05/20/15)
2	Motion for Entry of Judgment Without Exhibits (filed 07/30/18)

Exhibit	Document Description
3	Notice of Entry with Order on Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Judgment (filed 11/28/18)
4	Notice of Entry with Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict (filed 01/02/19)

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that I have read this docketing statement, that the information provided in this docketing statement is true and complete to the best of my knowledge, information and belief, and that I have attached all required documents to this docketing statement.

Aaron Morgan

Name of appellant

Micah S. Echols, Esq.; Thomas W. Stewart, Esq.; Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq.; and Bryan A. Boyack, Esq.

Name of counsel of record

January 30, 2019

Date

/s/ Micah S. Echols Signature of counsel of record

Clark County, Nevada State and county where signed

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the <u>30th</u> day of January, 2018, I served a copy of this completed docketing statement upon all counsel of record:

 \boxtimes By electronic service according to the Master Service List:

Douglas Gardner Joshua Gilmore Andrea Champion Dennis Kennedy Sarah Harmon

 \boxtimes By mailing it by first class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address(es):

Ara H. Shirinian, Esq. 10651 Capesthorne Way Las Vegas, NV 89135 Settlement Judge

Dated this 30th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Leah Dell

Signature

Exhibit 1

DISTRICT O	OURT C	IVIL COV	ER SHEET A
------------	--------	----------	------------

County, Nevada VII Case No. (Assigned by Clork's Offices) 1. Party Information (provide both home and mailing addresses if different) Plaintiff(s) (name/address/phone); Defendant(s) (name/address/phone): Aaron M. Morgan David E. Lujan; Harvest Management Sub LLC. Attorney (name/address/phone); Attorney (name/address/phone): Adam W. Williams **Richard Harris Law Frim** 801 S. 4th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 II. Nature of Controversy (please select the one most applicable filing type below) **Civil Case Filing Types** Real Property Tarts Landlord/Tenant Negligence Other Torts Unlawfal Detainer Anto Product Liability Other Landlord/Tenant Premises Liability Intentional Misconduct Title to Property Other Negligence Employment Tort Jadicial Foreclosure Malpractice Insurance Tort Other Title to Property Medical/Dental Other Tori Other Real Property Legal Condemnation/Ensinent Domain Accounting Other Malpractice Other Real Property Probate **Construction Defect & Contract** Judicial Review/Appeal Prohate (select case (spe and estate value) **Construction Defect** Judicial Review Summary Administration Chapter 40 Foreclosure Mediation Case General Administration Other Construction Defect Petition to Seal Records Special Administration Contract Case Mental Competency Sei Aside Uniform Commercial Code Nevada State Agency Appeal Trust/Conservatorship Building and Construction Department of Motor Vehicle Other Probate Insurance Carner Worker's Compensation Estate Value Commercial Instrument Other Nevada State Agency Over \$200,000 Collection of Accounts Appeal Other Between \$100,000 and \$200,000. Employment Contract Appeal from Lower Court Under \$100,000 or Unknown Other Contract Other Judicial Review/Appeal Under \$2,500 Civil Writ Other Civil Filing Civil Writ Other Civil Filing Writ of Prohibition Writ of Habeas Corpus Compromise of Minor's Claim Writ of Mandamus Other Civil Writ Foreign Judgment Writ of Quo Warrant Other Civil Matters Business Court filings should be filed using the Business Court civil coversheet. 5/20/15

Date

Signature of initiating party or representative

See other side for family-related case filings.

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I 2 3 5 6 7 8	COMP ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13617 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Tel. (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-44455 Email <u>Adam.Williams@richardharrislaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiff	Alter b. Lower CLERK OF THE COURT
9	DISTRICT CO	DURT
10	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA
11	AARON M. MORGAN, individually	CASE NO.: A-15-718679-C
12 13	Plaintiff, vs.	DEPT. NO.: VII
14 15	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	COMPLAINT
16	jointly and severally,	
17 18	Defendants.	
19	COMES NOW, Plaintiff AARON M. MO	RGAN, individually, by and through his
20	attorney of record ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. of	the RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM, and
21	complains and alleges as follows:	
22	JURISDICT	ION
23	1. That at all times relevant herein, Plain	tiff AARON M. MORGAN (hereinafter

referred to as "Plaintiff") is, a resident of Clark County, Nevada. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant, DAVID E. LUJAN was, and is, a 2.

1

resident of Clark County, Nevada.

26 27

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25

RICHARD HARRIS

LAW FIRM

t 3. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant, HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB 2 LLC, was, and is, a foreign limited-liability Company licensed and actively 3 conducting business in Clark County, Nevada 4. 5 All the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the subject lawsuit occurred in Clark County, Nevada. 6 5. The identities of Defendant DOES 1 through 20, and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 7 through 20, are unknown at this time and are individuals, corporations, associations, 8 partnerships, subsidiaries, holding companies, owners, predecessor or successor 9 entities, joint venturers, parent corporations or related business entities of 10 Defendants, inclusive, who were acting on behalf of or in concert with, or at the 11 direction of Defendants and are responsible for the injurious activities of the other 12 Defendants. 13 6. Plaintiff alleges that each named and Doe and Roe Defendant negligently, willfully, 14 intentionally, recklessly, vicariously, or otherwise, caused, directed, allowed or set in 15 motion the injurious events set forth herein. 16 7. Each named and Doe and Roe Defendant is legally responsible for the events and 17 happenings stated in this Complaint, and thus proximately caused injury and 18 damages to Plaintiff. 19 8. Plaintiff requests leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to specify the Doe and 20 Roe Defendants when their identities become known. 21 9. On or about April 1, 2014, Defendants, were the owners, employers, family 22 members and/or operators of a motor vehicle, while in the course and scope of 23 employment and/or family purpose and/or other purpose, which was entrusted and/or 24 driven in such a negligent and careless manner so as to cause a collision with the 25 vehicle occupied by Plaintiff. 26 111 27 /// 28 111 2

RICHARD HARRIS

	1 2	<u>FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION</u> Negligence Against Employee Defendant, DAVID E. LUJAN
	3	10. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Complaint as though said
	5	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
	6	11. Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN owed Plaintiff a duty of care. Defendant DAVID E.
	7	LUJAN breached that duty of care.
	8	12. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Defendant, Plaintiff was
	9	seriously injured and caused to suffer great pain of body and mind, some of which
	10	conditions are permanent and disabling all to her general damage in an amount in
	п	excess of \$10,000.00.
ΣŴ	12	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
RRIS FIRM	13	Negligence Per Se Against Employee Defendant, DAVID E. LUJAN
RICHARD HARRIS	14	13. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 12 of the Complaint as though said
Γ ⁻	15	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
AR		14. The acts of Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN as described herein violated the traffic
Ð	16	laws of the State of Nevada and Clark County, constituting negligence per se, and
RI	17	Plaintiff has been damaged as a direct and proximate result thereof in an amount in
d E	18	excess of \$10,000.00.
	19	THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
	20	Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior Against Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
	21	
	22	15. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 14 of the Complaint as though said
	23	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
	24	Plaintiff is informed and believes that DAVID E. LUJAN was employed as a driver
	25	for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
	26	17. At all times mentioned herein, Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
	27	was the owner of, or had custody and control of, the Vehicle.
	28	18. That Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC. did entrust the Vehicle to
		the control of Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN.
		3

I	19.	That Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in
.2		the operation of the Vehicle.
3	20.	That Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC. actually knew, or by the
5		exercise of reasonable care should have known, that Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN
6		was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of motor vehicles.
7	21.	That Plaintiff was injured as a proximate consequence of the negligence and
8		incompetence of Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN, concurring with the negligent
9		entrustment of the Vehicle by Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC
10	22.	That as a direct and proximate cause of the negligent entrustment of the Vehicle by
11		Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC. to Defendant DAVID E,
12		LUJAN, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.
B		PRAYER FOR RELIEF
14	W	HEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment against Defendants as follows:
15	1.	General damages in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00;
16	2.	Special damages for medical and incidental expenses incurred and to be incurred;
17	3.	Special damages for lost earnings and earning capacity;
18	4.	Attorney's fees and costs off suit incurred herein; and
19	5.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
20		
21	DATED t	his <u>20</u> day of May, 2015. RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM
22		
23		ally and
24		ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13617
25		801 S. Fourth Street
26		Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff
20		
28		
		4

RICHARD HARRIS

LAW FIRM

	1 2 5 6 7 8 9	IAFD ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13617 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Tel. (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-4455 Email <u>Adam.Williams@richardharristaw.com</u> <i>Attorneys for Plaintiff</i> DISTRICT CO		
	10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
	11	AARON M. MORGAN, individually	CASENO	
s s	12	Plaintiff,	CASE NO.: DEPT. NO.:	
RRIS FIRM	13	VS,		
RICHARD HARRIS	14	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited-	INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCLOSURE	
AR	15	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive		
E	16	jointly and severally,		
B RU	17 18	Defendants.		
	19			
	20	Pursuant to NRS Chapter 19, as amended by	Senate Bill 106, filing fees are submitted for	
	21	parties appearing in the above entitled action as indicated below:		
	22	AARON M. MORGAN	\$270.00	
	23	TOTAL REMITTED:	\$270.00	
	24	DATED this <u>2</u> day of May, 2015.	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM	
	25			
	26			
	27		ADÀM W. WILLIAMS Nevada Bar No. 13617	
	28	I	301 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff	
		1		
			2331	

Exhibit 2

			Electronically Filed 7/30/2018 5:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	Richard Harris Law Firm Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq.		Atump. Shum
2	Nevada Bar No. 11087 Bryan A. Boyack, Esq.		
3	Nevada Bar No. 9980 801 South Fourth Street		
4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
5	Telephone: (702) 444-4444 Facsimile: (702) 444-4455	-	
6	Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
7	Marquis Aurbach Coffing Micah S. Echols, Esq.		
8	Nevada Bar No. 8437		
9	Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280		
10	10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145		
11	Telephone: (702) 382-0711 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816		
12	mechols@maclaw.com tstewart@maclaw.com		
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan		
14	DISTRICT	COURT	
15	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA	і
16	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,		
17	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	A-15-718679-C
18	vs.	Dept. No.:	XI
19	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST		
20	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE		
21	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally,		
22	Defendants.		
23			
24	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FO	R ENTRY OF	JUDGMENT
25	Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan, in this ma	tter, by and t	hrough his attorneys of record,
26	Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. and Bryan A. Boya	ck, Esq., of the	e Richard Harris Law Firm, and
27			- Aucharth Coffing handra film
	Micah S. Echols, Esq. and Tom W. Stewart, E	sq., or Marqui	s Aurbach Coming, nereby mes

Page 1 of 7

2333 MAC:15167-001 3457380_1

Case Number: A-15-718679-C

1	pleadings on file herein, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, and the oral
2	argument before the Court.
3	NOTICE OF MOTION
4	You and each of you, will please take notice that PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
5	ENTRY OF JUDGMENT will come on regularly for hearing on the
6	day of, 2018 at the hour of 9:00 A .m. or as soon thereafter as
7	counsel may be heard, in Department 11 in the above-referenced Court.
8	Dated this day of July, 2018.
9	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING
10	MARQUIS AURBACH COLLING
11	By
12	Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437
13	Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280
14	10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145
15	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan
16	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
17	I. INTRODUCTION
18	On April 9, 2018, a Clark County jury rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Aaron
19	Morgan ("Morgan"), and against Defendants, David Lujan ("Lujan") and Harvest Management
20	Sub LLC ("Harvest Management"), in the amount of \$2,980,980.00, plus pre- and post-judgment
21	interest.1 It was undisputed during trial that Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his
22	employment with Harvest Management at the time of the traffic accident at the center of the
23	case. All evidence and testimony indicated Morgan sought relief from, and that judgment would
24	be entered against, both Defendants. However, the special verdict form prepared by the Court
25	(the "special verdict form") inadvertently omitted Harvest Management from the caption, despite
26	Harvest Management being listed on the pleadings and jury instructions upon which the jury
27	
28	¹ See Special Verdict, attached as Exhibit 1.

Page 2 of 7

relied when reaching the verdict itself. The Court acknowledged this omission, and Defendants conceded they had no objection to it. Accordingly, Morgan respectfully requests this Court enter judgment against both Defendants, in accordance with the jury instructions, pleadings, testimony, and evidence, either by (a) simply entering the proposed judgment attached hereto or, (b) by making an explicit finding that the judgment was rendered against both Defendants 5 pursuant to NRCP 49(a) and then entering judgment accordingly.²

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MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

(702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816

Vegas, Nevada 89145

0001 Park Run Drive

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND П.

On April 1, 2014, Morgan was driving his Ford Mustang north on McLeod Drive in the right lane. Morgan approached the intersection with Tompkins Avenue. At that time, Lujan, who was driving a shuttle bus owned by Harvest Management, entered the intersection driving east from the Paradise Park driveway, and attempted to cross McLeod Drive heading east on Tompkins Avenue. The front of Morgan's car struck the side of Defendants' bus in a major collision resulting in total loss of Morgan's vehicle and serious bodily injuries. Morgan was transported from the scene of the accident to Sunrise Hospital. The emergency room physicians focused on potential head trauma and injuries to the cervical spine and to Morgan's wrists. Morgan was eventually discharged with instructions to follow up with a primary care physician. A week later, Morgan sought treatment for pain in his neck, lower-back, and both wrists.

Over the next two years, Morgan underwent a series of treatments and procedures for his injuries-including bilateral medial branch block injections to his thoracic spine; injections to ease the pain from his bilateral triangular fibrocartilage tears; left wrist arthroscope and triangular fibrocartilage tendon repair with debridement, incurring approximately nearly \$264,281.00 in medical expenses.

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2015, Morgan filed a complaint for negligence and negligence per se against 24 Lujan and vicarious liability against Harvest Management. In jointly answering the complaint, 25 both Defendants were represented by the same counsel and both named in the caption. 26

27

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See proposed Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict, attached as Exhibit 2.

Page 3 of 7

1	After a lengthy discovery period, the case initially proceeded to trial in early November,
2	2017. During the initial trial, Lujan testified that he was employed by Montara Meadows, a local
3	entity under the purview of Harvest Management:
4	[Morgan's counsel]: All right. Mr. Lujan, at the time of the accident in April of 2014, were you employed with Montara Meadows?
5	[Lujan]: Yes.
6	[Morgan's counsel]: And what was your employment?
7	[Lujan]: I was the bus driver.
8	[Morgan's counsel]: Okay. And what is your understanding of the relationship
9	of Montara Meadows to Harvest Management?
10	[Lujan]: Harvest Management was our corporate office.
11	[Morgan's counsel]: Okay.
12	[Lujan]: Montara Meadows is just the local
13	[Morgan's counsel]: Okay. All right. And this accident happened April 1, 2014, correct?
14 15	[Lujan]: Yes, sir. ³
16	However, on the third day of the initial trial, the Court declared a mistrial based on
17	Defendants' counsel's misconduct.4
18	Following the mistrial, the case proceeded to a second trial the following April.
19	Vicarious liability was not contested during trial. Instead, Harvest Management's
20	NRCP 30(b)(6) representative contested primary liabilitythe representative claimed that either
21	Morgan or an unknown third party was primarily responsible for the accident-but did not
22	contest Harvest Management's own vicarious liability.5

- ³ Transcript of Jury Trial, November 8, 2017, attached as **Exhibit 3**, at 109 (direct examination of Lujan).
- ⁴ See Exhibit 3 at 166 (the Court granting Plaintiff's motion for mistrial); see also Court Minutes, November 8, 2017, attached as Exhibit 4.
- ⁵ See Transcript of Jury Trial, April 5, 2018, attached as Exhibit 5, at 165–78 (testimony of Erica Janssen, NRCP 30(b)(6) witness for Harvest Management); Transcript of Jury Trial, April 6, 2018, attached as Exhibit 6, at 4–15 (same).

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IV.

On the final day of trial, the Court *sua sponte* created a special verdict form that inadvertently included Lujan as the only Defendant in the caption. The Court informed the parties of this omission, and the Defendants explicitly agreed they had no objection:

THE COURT: Take a look and see if -- will you guys look at that verdict form? I know it doesn't have the right caption. I know it's just the one we used the last trial. See if that looks sort of okay.

[Defendants' counsel]: Yeah. That looks fine.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

THE COURT: I don't know if it's right with what you're asking for for damages, but it's just what we used in the last trial which was similar sort of.

At the end of the six-day jury trial, jury instructions were provided to the jury with the proper caption.⁶ The jury used those instructions to fill-out the improperly-captioned special verdict form and render judgment in favor of Plaintiff—the jury found Defendants to be negligent and 100% at fault for the accident.⁷ As a result, the jury awarded Plaintiff \$2,980,000.⁸

This Court should enter the proposed Judgment on the Jury Verdict attached as **Exhibit 2**—it provides that judgment was rendered against both Lujan and Harvest Management because such a result conforms to the pleadings, evidence, and jury instructions upon which the jury relied in reaching the special verdict.

In the alternative, the Court should make an explicit finding pursuant to NRCP 49(a) that
the special verdict was rendered against both Defendants and then enter judgment accordingly.
NRCP 49(a) provides, in certain circumstances, the Court may make a finding on an issue not
raised before a special verdict was rendered. Indeed, when a special verdict is used, "the court
may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief
answer... which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence." NRCP 49(a).
Further, "[t]he court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter

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- ⁶ See Jury Instructions cover page, attached as Exhibit 7, at 1.
- ⁷ See Exhibit 1.

Id.

thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue." Id. However, "[i]f in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the 2 evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the 3 jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such 4 demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a 5 finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." Id. (emphasis added). 6

Here, the record plainly supports judgment being rendered against both Defendants. However, should the Court wish to clarify the issue for the record, the Court should make an explicit finding that the omission of Harvest Management from the special verdict was inadvertent and, as a result, that judgment was rendered in favor of Morgan and both against Defendants, jointly and severally.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Aaron Morgan respectfully requests this Court enter the proposed Judgment on the Jury Verdict attached as Exhibit 2. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests this Court to make an explicit finding that judgment in this matter was rendered against both Defendants and then enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 30th day of July, 2018.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

By /s/ Micah S. Echols Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan

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
27

	CEDTIFICATE OF SEDVICE			
1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	I hereby certify that the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF			
3	JUDGMENT was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial			
4	District Court on the 30th day of July, 2018. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall			
5	be made in accordance with the E-Service List as follows:9			
6	Andrea M. Champion achampion@baileykennedy.com Joshua P. Gilmore jgilmore@baileykennedy.com			
7	Sarah E. Harmon sharmon@baileykennedy.com Dennis L. Kennedy dkennedy@baileykennedy.com			
8	Bailey Kennedy, LLP bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub, LLC			
9				
10	Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. bryan@richardharrislaw.com Benjamin Cloward Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com			
11	Olivia Bivens olivia@richardharrislaw.com Shannon Truscello Shannon@richardharrislaw.com			
12	Tina Jarchow tina@richardharrislaw.com Nicole M. Griffin ngriffin@richardharrislaw.com			
13	E-file ZDOC zdocteam@richardharrislaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan			
13	Doug Gardner, Esq. dgardner@rsglawfirm.com			
	Douglas R. Rands drands@rsgnvlaw.com Melanie Lewis mlewis@rsglawfirm.com			
15	Pauline Batts pbatts@rsgnvlaw.com			
16	Jennifer Meacham jmeacham@rsglawfirm.com Lisa Richardson lrichardson@rsglawfirm.com			
17	Attorneys for Defendant David E. Lujan			
18	I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy			
19	thereof, postage prepaid, addressed to:			
20	N/A			
21				
22	/s/ Leah Dell			
23	Leah Dell, an employee of Marquis Aurbach Coffing			
24				
25				
26				
27	⁹ Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who submits an E-Filed document through the E-Filing			
28	System consents to electronic service in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).			
20	Page 7 of 7 2339 MAC:15167-001 3457380_1			
	MAC:15107-001 3457380_1			

Exhibit 3

1	1	11/28	ronically Filed /2018 2:46 PM
1	NEOJ	CLEF	n D. Grierson K OF THE COURT
	DENNIS L. KENNEDY	\mathcal{C}	times. Arun
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462 SARAH E. HARMON		
3	Nevada Bar No. 8106 JOSHUA P. GILMORE		
4	Nevada Bar No. 11576		
5	ANDREA M. CHAMPION Nevada Bar No. 13461		
6	BAILEY * KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue		
	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302		
7	Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821		
8	DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com		
9	JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com		
10	AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com		
11	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC		
12	DISTRICT	COURT	
13	CLARK COUNT	TY, NEVADA	
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	C N A 15 719(70.)	, I
15	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-15-718679-0 Dept. No. XI	
16	vs.		
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST		
18	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE		
19	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally,		
20	Defendants.		
21			
22	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF O		
23	MOTION FOR ENTR	Y OF JUDGMENT	
24	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order on I	Plaintiff's Motion for Entry	of Judgment was
25	entered on November 28, 2018.		
26	///		
27	///		
28	///		
			2341
	Page 1	of 3	
	•		

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820



BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevuoa 89148-1302 702.562.8920

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE				
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 28th day of				
3	November, 2018, service of the foregoing NOT	ICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S			
4	MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT wa	as made by mandatory electronic service through the			
5	Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing	system and/or by depositing a true and correct copy			
6	in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and	addressed to the following at their last known			
7	address:				
8	BENJAMIN P. CLOWARD BRYAN A. BOYACK	Email: Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com Bryan@richardharrislaw.com			
9 10	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	Bryan@rienardnarrisiaw.com			
11	and				
12	MICAH S. ECHOLS	Email: Mechols@maclaw.com			
13					
14	COFFING P.C. 1001 Park Run Drive	Attorneys for Plaintiff			
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	AARON M. MORGAN			
16	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER	Email: dgardner@rsglawfirm.com			
17	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER 1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220 Henderson, Nevada 89014	Attorney for Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN			
18	Tionaologi, Perada opor P				
19					
20	<u>/s/</u> Em	<i>Josephine Baltazar</i> poloyee of BAILEY * KENNEDY			
21					
22					
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24					
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	Pag	ge 3 of 3 2343			

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

an e		Electronically Filed 11/28/2018 11:31 AM
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	ORDR DENNIS L. KENNEDY Nevada Bar No. 1462 SARAH E. HARMON Nevada Bar No. 8106 JOSHUA P. GILMORE Nevada Bar No. 11576 ANDREA M. CHAMPION Nevada Bar No. 13461 BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com	11/28/2018 11:31 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
10	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
12	DISTRICT	
13	CLARK COUNT	Case No. A-15-718679-C
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Case No. A-15-718679-C
15	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. $4-15-718079-C$
16	vs.	
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited-	ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
18	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	LIVINI OF CODUMENT
19	jointly and severally,	Date of Hearing: November 6, 2018 Time of Hearing: 9:00 A.M.
20	Defendants.	
. 21		
22	On November 6, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., the Mot	ion for Entry of Judgment came before the
23	Court. Tom W. Stewart of Marquis Aurbach Coffin	g P.C. and Bryan A. Boyack of Richard Harris
24	Law Firm appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Aaron Mo	rgan and Dennis L. Kennedy, Sarah E. Harmon,
25	and Andrea M. Champion of Bailey �Kennedy appe	eared on behalf of Defendant Harvest
. 26	Management Sub LLC.	
27	///	
28	11-25-18АТО:41 КСУО Раде 1 -	of 2 2344

1 The Court, having examined the briefs of the parties, the records and documents on file, and 2 having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, 3 HEREBY ORDERS that the Motion for Entry of Judgment shall be, and hereby is, 4 DENIED. DATED this 26 day of November , 2018. 5 6 7 RT JUDGE 8 9 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: 10 BAILEY *****KENNEDY, LLP MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C. 11 By: By 12 MICAH S. ECHOLS Dí INIS L. KENNEDY SARAH E. HARMON TOM W. STEWART 13 JOSHUA P. GILMORE 1001 Park Run Drive ANDREA M. CHAMPION Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 14 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Attorneys for Plaintiff Aaron Morgan Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 15 Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2345

Exhibit 4

1 2 3 4 5 6	Marquis Aurbach Coffing Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com tstewart@maclaw.com	Electronically Filed 1/2/2019 11:13 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
7 8 9 10	Richard Harris Law Firm Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11087 Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
11 12	Telephone: (702) 444-4444 Facsimile: (702) 444-4455 Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com	
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan	
14	DISTRICT	COURT
15	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA
16	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	
17	Plaintiff,	Case No.: A-15-718679-C Dept. No.: XI
18	vs.	Dept. No.: XI
19 20	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
21	jointly and severally,	
22	Defendants.	
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		2347 MAC:15167-001 3612459_1
	Case Number: A-15-71867	'9-C

1	Please take notice that the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict was filed in the above-captioned			
2	matter on December 17, 2018. A copy of the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict is attached hereto as			
3	Exhibit 1.			
4	Dated this 2nd day of January, 2019.			
5	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING			
6	MARQUIS AURBACH COTTING			
7	By /s/ Micah S. Echols			
8	Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437			
9	Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280			
10	10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145			
11	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan			
12				
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15 16				
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	Page 1 of 2 2348 MAC:15167-001 3612459_1			

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE			
2	I hereby certify that the foregoing NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was			
3	submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court on the			
4	<u>2nd</u> day of January, 2019. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall be made in			
5	accordance with the E-Service List as follows:1			
6	Andrea M. Champion achampion@baileykennedy.com			
7	Joshua P. Gilmore jgilmore@baileykennedy.com Sarah E. Harmon sharmon@baileykennedy.com			
8	Dennis L. Kennedy Bailey Kennedy, LLP Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub, LLC			
9				
10	Doug Gardner, Esq.dgardner@rsglawfirm.comDouglas R. Randsdrands@rsgnvlaw.com			
11	Melanie Lewis mlewis@rsglawfirm.com Pauline Batts pbatts@rsgnvlaw.com Jennifer Meacham imeacham@rsglawfirm.com			
12	Jennifer Meacham jmeacham@rsglawfirm.com Lisa Richardson lrichardson@rsglawfirm.com Attorneys for Defendant David E. Lujan			
13	Allorneys for Defendunt David E. Lujan			
14				
15	/s/ Leah Dell			
16	Leah Dell, an employee of Marquis Aurbach Coffing			
17				
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25				
26				
27	¹ Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who submits an E-Filed document through the E-Filing System			
28	consents to electronic service in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).			
	Page 2 of 2 2349 MAC:15167-001 3612459_1			

Exhibit 1

		1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1	
ن م ا			Electronically Filed 12/17/2018 10:00 AM Steven D. Grierson	
	1	JGJV Richard Harris Law Firm	CLERK OF THE COURT	~
	2	Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11087	aller	
	3	Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980		
	4	801 South Fourth Street		
	5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 444-4444		
	6	Facsimile: (702) 444-4455 Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
	7	Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
	8	Marquis Aurbach Coffing Micah S. Echols, Esq.		
	9	Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq.		
	10	Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive		
	11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711		
M IS	12	Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com		
RRIS FIRM	13	tstewart@maclaw.com		
H.A A W	14	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan		
RICHARD HARRIS	15	DISTRICT	COURT	
CHA	16	CLARK COUN		
RIC	17	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	CASE NO.: A-15-718679-C	
	18	Plaintiff,	Dept. No.: XI	
	18		:	
		VS.		
	20	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited-	JUDGMENT UPON THE JURY VERDICT	
	21	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive		
	22	jointly and severally,		
	23	Defendants.		
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		12-13-18P01:10 RCVD	2351	
		12-15-10101110 1010		

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•	1	JUDGMENT	UPON THE JURY VE	RDICT
	2	This action came on for trial before the Court and the jury, the Honorable Linda Marie		
	3	Bell, District Court Judge, presiding, ¹ a	und the issues having bee	en duly tried and the jury having
	4	duly rendered its verdict.2		
	5	IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUE	OGED that PLAINTIFF,	AARON M. MORGAN, have a
	6	recovery against DEFENDANT, DAVID E. LUJAN, for the following sums:		
	7	Past Medical Expenses		\$208,480.00
	8	Future Medical Expenses		+\$1,156,500.00
	9	Past Pain and Suffering		+\$116,000.00
	10	Future Pain and Suffering		+\$1,500,000.00
	11	Total Damages \$2,980,980.00		\$2,980,980.00
RRIS FIRM	12	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that AARON M. MORGAN's past		
	13	damages of \$324,480 shall bear Pre-Judgment interest in accordance with Lee v. Ball, 121 Nev.		
D HA Law	14	391, 116 P.3d 64 (2005) and NRS 17.130 at the rate of 5.00% per annum plus 2% from the date		
IAR	15	of service of the Summons and Complaint on May 28, 2015, through the entry of the Special		
ICH	16	Verdict on April 9, 2018:		
Ĕ	17	PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON PAST DAMAGES:		
	18	05/28/15 through 04/09/18 = \$65,402.72		
	19	[(1,051 days) at (prime rate (5.0	0%) plus 2 percent = 7.0	0%) on \$324,480 past damages]
	20	[Pre-Judgment Interest is approximately \$62.23 per day]		
	21	PLAINTIFF'S TOTAL JUDG	MENT	
	22	Plaintiff's total judgment is as fo	ollows:	
	23	Total Damages:	\$2,980,980.00	
	24	Prejudgment Interest:	\$65,402.72	
	25	TOTAL JUDGMENT	\$3,046,382.72	
	26	¹ This case was reassigned to the Honorable	Elizabeth Gonzalez Distr	ict Court Judge in July 2018
	27	² See Special Verdict filed on April 9, 2018		in contrange, moury work
	28	200 aprenii - eraret inea on ripin 2, 2010	,	2250

RICHARD HARRIS

Now, THEREFORE, Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict in favor of the Plaintiff is as 1 2 follows: PLAINTIFF, AARON M. MORGAN, is hereby awarded \$3,046,382.72 against 3 DEFENDANT, DAVID E. LUJAN, which shall bear post-judgment interest at the adjustable 4 legal rate from the date of the entry of judgment until fully satisfied. Post-judgment interest at 5 the current 7.00% rate accrues interest at the rate of \$584.24 per day. 6 Dated this β day of $\beta 2018$. 7 8 9 ZALEZ H GO ELIZAB COURT UDGE 10 TRIC MENT 11 11 LAW FIRM 12 13 Respectfully Submitted by: Dated this 127th of December, 2018. 14 15 MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 16 17 Вý Micah S. Echols, Esq. 18 Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. 19 Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive 20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan 21 22 [CASE NO. A-15-718679-C—JUDGMENT UPON THE JURY VERDICT] 23 24 25 26 27 28 2353 Page 2 of 2

RICHARD HARRIS

Exhibit 1

		1		
		1 1		FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT
	1	DISTRICT CO	OURT	APR - 9 2018
-	2	CLARK COUNTY,	NEVADA	ALAM BL
	3	CLARR COUNTI,	NEVADA	UM BROWN, DELLA
	4		CASE NO	: A-15-718679-C
	5		DEPT. NO): VII
	6 AARON MORGAN	N',		
	7 Plaint	iff,		
	⁸ vs.			
	9 DAVID LUJAN,			
	0	1		,
	Defen	l dant		
	-			
. 1		SPECIAL VER	RDICT	
		ry in the above-entitled action,		lowing special verdict on the
	6 questions submittee			
		: Was Defendant negligent?		
	8 ANSWER:	Yes N	ło	
		ered no, stop here. Please sign and	d return this v	erdict.
2	If you another	ered yes, please answer question n	o. 2.	
2	1			
2	2 QUESTION NO.2	: Was Plaintiff negligent?		/
2	3 ANSWER:	Yes	No	
2	4 If you answ	ered yes, please answer question n	o. 3.	
2	5 If you answ	ered no, please skip to question no	. 4.	A 15_319875_C
2	6 ///			A – 16 – 718679 – C SJV Special Jury Verdict 4738215
2	7	1		
2	8	• · · ·		
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1	QUESTION NO. 3: What percentage of fault do you assign to each party?
2	Defendant: 100
3	Plaintiff: O
4	Total: 100%
5	Please answer question 4 without regard to you answer to question 3.
6	QUESTION NO. 4: What amount do you assess as the total amount of Plaintiff's damages?
7	(Please do not reduce damages based on your answer to question 3, if you answered question 3.
8	The Court will perform this task.)
9	208 480 00
10	Past Medical Expenses <u>\$ 208, 780</u> .
п	Past Medical Expenses $\underline{308, 480.}$ $\underline{90.}$ Future Medical Expenses $\underline{1, 156, 500.}$ $\underline{90.}$ Past Pain and Suffering $\underline{116, 000, 00.}$ $\underline{90.}$ Future Pain and Suffering $\underline{1, 500, 000, 00.}$ $\underline{90.}$ TOTAL $\underline{2, 980, 980.}$ $\underline{00.}$
12	Past Pain and Suffering \$6,000, 00
13	Future Pain and Suffering \$ <u>1,500,000</u> ,
14	TOTAL \$ 2, 980, 980.
15	
16	DATED this <u>9</u> th day of April, 2018.
17.	
18 19	Cilth I. Faurent
20	FOREPERSON
21	ARTHUR J. ST. LANRENT
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Josephine Baltazar

From: Sent: To: Subject: efiling@nvcourts.nv.gov Thursday, January 31, 2019 9:15 AM BKfederaldownloads Notification of Electronic Filing in MORGAN VS. LUJAN, No. 77753

Supreme Court of Nevada

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

Notice is given of the following activity:

Date and Time of Notice: Jan 31 2019 09:14 a.m.

Case Title:	MORGAN VS. LUJAN
Docket Number:	77753
Case Category:	Civil Appeal

Document Category:	Docketing Statement
Submitted by:	Micah S. Echols
Official File Stamp:	Jan 31 2019 09:12 a.m.
Filing Status:	Accepted and Filed

Docket Text: Filed Docketing Statement Docketing Statement

The Clerk's Office has filed this document. It is now available on the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing website. Click <u>here</u> to log in to Eflex and view the document.

Electronic service of this document is complete at the time of transmission of this notice. The time to respond to the document, if required, is computed from the date and time of this notice. Refer to NEFR 9(f) for further details.

Clerk's Office has electronically mailed notice to:

Benjamin Cloward Douglas Gardner Joshua Gilmore Kathleen Wilde Bryan Boyack Dennis Kennedy Andrea Champion Micah Echols Sarah Harmon

No notice was electronically mailed to those listed below; counsel filing the document must serve a copy of the document on the following:

Ara Shirinian

This notice was automatically generated by the electronic filing system. If you have any questions, contact the Nevada Supreme Court Clerk's Office at 775-684-1600 or 702-486-9300.

TAB 31

TAB 31

			Electronically Filed 2/7/2019 3:55 PM Steven D. Grierson
1	Marquis Aurbach Coffing		CLERK OF THE COURT
2	Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437		Atump. Atum
3	Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 12522		
4	10001 Park Run Drive		
5	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711		
6	Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com		
7	kwilde@maclaw.com		
	Richard Harris Law Firm		
8	Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11087		
9	Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980		
10	801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
11	Telephone: (702) 444-4444		
12	Facsimile: (702) 444-4455 Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
13	Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan		
15	DISTRICT	COURT	
16	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA	L
17	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Case No.: Dept. No.:	A-15-718679-C XI
18	Plaintiff,		
19	VS.		
20	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited-		
21	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive		
22	jointly and severally,		
23	Defendants.		
24			
25	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION		
26	CHIEF JUDGE BELL FOR RESOLU		
27	///		
28	///		
	Page 1	of 3	2359 MAC:15167-001 3647828 1
			WIAC.15107-001 3047828_1

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE BACK TO <u>CHIEF JUDGE BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-VERDICT ISSUES</u>

Please take notice that an Order Regarding Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues was entered in the abovecaptioned matter on the 7th day of February, 2019. A copy of the Order is attached hereto. Dated this The day of February, 2019.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 12522 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 *Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan*

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-07111 FAX: (702) 382-5816 1

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Page 2 of 3



CERTIFICA	ATE OF SERVICE	
I hereby certify that the foregoing \underline{N}	OTICE OF ENTRY O	F ORDER REGARDING
PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION TO	TRANSFER CASE BA	ACK TO CHIEF JUDGE
BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-VI	ERDICT ISSUES was s	submitted electronically for
iling and/or service with the Eighth Judicia	al District Court on the	7th day of February, 2019.
Electronic service of the foregoing document	nt shall be made in acco	ordance with the E-Service
List as follows: ¹		
Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Benjamin Cloward Olivia Bivens Shannon Truscello Tina Jarchow Nicole M. Griffin E-file ZDOC <i>Attorneys for Plaintiff</i> ,	bryan@richardha Benjamin@richardha olivia@richardha Shannon@richard tina@richardharri ngriffin@richardl zdocteam@richar	rdharrislaw.com rrislaw.com dharrislaw.com islaw.com harrislaw.com
Andrea M. Champion Joshua P. Gilmore Sarah E. Harmon Dennis L. Kennedy Bailey Kennedy, LLP Attorneys for Defendar	achampion@baile jgilmore@baileyl sharmon@baileyl dkennedy@bailey bkfederaldownloa nt Harvest Management S	kennedy.com kennedy.com ykennedy.com ads@baileykennedy.com
Doug Gardner, Esq. Douglas R. Rands Melanie Lewis Pauline Batts Jennifer Meacham Lisa Richardson	dgardner@rsglaw drands@rsgnvlav mlewis@rsglawfi pbatts@rsgnvlaw jmeacham@rsgla lrichardson@rsgl	v.com irm.com y.com wfirm.com
Attorneys for Defenda	Kim'Dean, an employ Marquis Aurbach Co	
¹ Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who sul consents to electronic service in accordance with		t through the E-Filing System
Pa	age 3 of 3	2361 MAC:15167-001 3647828_1

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816

2/7/2019 9:43 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COUR 1 **Marquis Aurbach Coffing** Micah S. Echols, Esq. 2 Nevada Bar No. 8437 Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq. 3 Nevada Bar No. 12522 10001 Park Run Drive 4 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711 5 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com 6 kwilde@maclaw.com 7 **Richard Harris Law Firm** 8 Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11087 9 Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980 10 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 11 Telephone: (702) 444-4444 Facsimile: (702) 444-4455 12 Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com 13 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan 14 DISTRICT COURT 15 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 16 AARON M. MORGAN, individually, 17 Case No.: A-15-718679-C 18 Plaintiff, Dept. No.: XI 19 **ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S** vs. **COUNTER-MOTION TO TRANSFER** 20 DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST CASE BACK TO CHIEF JUDGE BELL MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited-FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-VERDICT 21 Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE ISSUES **BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive** 22 jointly and severally, 23 Defendants. 24 Plaintiff Aaron M. Morgan's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell 25 for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues came before this Court during its Chambers' Calendar on 26 27 January 25, 2019. The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file and for good cause appearing, hereby makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 28 2362 Page 1 of 5 02-05-19P01:40 RCVD MAC: 19:02.01 Proposed Order Re Counter-Motion to Transfer to Bell

MAROUIS AURBACH COFFING

Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX. (702) 382-5816

0001 Park Run Drive

Electronically Filed

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I. FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On April 1, 2014, Plaintiff was injured after his vehicle collided with a Montara Meadows shuttle bus at the intersection of McLeod Drive and Tompkins Avenue.

2. On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the driver of the shuttle bus, David Lujan, and Mr. Lujan's employer, Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest Management") in which he asserted three causes of action.

3. The case was randomly assigned to the Honorable Judge Bell, who presides in Department VII.

4. The case proceeded to a trial in November 2017, though Judge Bell declared a mistrial on day three.

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5. A second trial took place in April 2018.

6. The parties disagree as to the events surrounding the special verdict form. According to Plaintiff, Judge Bell *sua sponte* prepared a special verdict form on the last day of trial which listed only Mr. Lujan in the caption and used the singular word "Defendant" throughout. In a discussion regarding the special verdict form, Judge Bell noted "I know it doesn't have the right caption," before asking counsel if the form "look[ed] sort of okay." Counsel for the parties voiced no concerns. The form was then inadvertently given to the jury without updating the language to list both Defendants.

7. By contrast, Harvest Management contends that Judge Bell provided the Parties with a sample special verdict form that she had recently used in a another trial involving similar issues, informing the Parties that it was "just what we had laying around" and that "it's just what we used in the last trial which was similar sort of." The only revision that Mr. Morgan requested be made to the special verdict form was for past and future medical expenses and past and future pain and suffering to be separated as different categories of damages. Mr. Morgan did not request any revisions to the caption or the other substantive provisions of the special verdict form that referred to a singular defendant or the sole claim of negligence.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816 8. Regardless of how the special verdict form was prepared, the jury ultimately completed the special verdict form to read that "Defendant" (written in the singular) was 100% at fault and Plaintiff was entitled to \$2,980,980.00 for his damages.

9. On July 2, 2018, the case was reassigned to Department XI after Judge Bell assumed the role of Chief Judge for the Eighth Judicial District Court.

10. On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment in which he urged this Court to enter a written judgment against both Defendants or, in the alternative, make an explicit finding in accordance with NRCP 49(a).

11. After Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment was fully briefed and argued, this Court denied Plaintiff's Motion and entered a Judgment on the Jury Verdict against only Defendant Lujan which totaled \$3,046,382.72.

12. On December 21, 2018, Defendant Harvest Management filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment in which it argued that Plaintiff abandoned his claims against Harvest Management or, at the very least, failed to produce evidence at trial sufficient to prove a claim for vicarious liability / respondent superior.

13. Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a counter-motion in which he argued that Judge Bell is better equipped to rule upon the request for entry of judgment because Judge Bell presided over the earlier case proceedings, including the jury trial. In addition, Plaintiff argued that transferring the case back to Judge Bell is consistent with precedent which recognizes the special knowledge which presiding judges have regarding trials.

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14. Defendant Lujan did not file a response to Plaintiff's counter-motion.

15. On January 23, 2019, Defendant Harvest Management filed a reply in support of
its motion and an opposition to Plaintiff's counter-motion. With respect to the counter-motion,
Harvest Management argued that Plaintiff was effectively seeking reconsideration because it was
unhappy regarding this Court's previous decision. Further, Harvest Management argued that the
transfer was not necessary because this Court has the entire record of the case and is capable of
making a fully informed decision.

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16. This Court elected to consider the motion and counter-motion during its January 25, 2019, Chambers' Calendar.

17. On January 29, 2019, this Court issued a Minute Order detailing its decision to transfer Harvest Management's Motion for Entry of Judgment to Chief Judge Bell for resolution.

II.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

18. In addressing Plaintiff's counter-motion, the Court finds persuasive the Supreme Court of Nevada's decision in Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188, 191, 772 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1989). There, the Supreme Court explained that the District Court that presides over a trial was in the best position to re-assess evidence and award consequential damages.

19. Hornwood is thus similar to a number of other Supreme Court decisions which recognize the unique insights and knowledge available to the judge who presides over a trial. See, e.g., Winn v. Winn, 86 Nev. 18, 20, 467 P.2d 601, 602 (1970) ("The trial judge's perspective is much better than ours for we are confined to a cold, printed record."); Wittenberg v. Wittenberg, 56 Nev. 442, 55 P.2d 619, 623 (1936) ("[M]uch must be left to the wisdom and experience of the presiding judge, who sees and hears the parties and their witnesses, scrutinizes their testimony and studies their demeanor.").

19 20. As relevant here, these precedent decisions support Plaintiff's argument that 20 Judge Bell is in best position to address Defendant Harvest Management's Motion for Entry of 21 Judgment because Judge Bell presided over all aspects of this case, including both trials.

22 21. Further, this Court finds that transfer of the pending motion to Judge Bell is both 23 efficient and in the interest of justice.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 26 27 DECREED that Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues is GRANTED IN PART. 28

> Page 4 of 5 MAC: 19.02.01 Proposed Order Re Counter-Motion to Transfer to Bell

2365

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Harvest Management's Motion for Entry 1 of Judgment shall be referred to Judge Bell for further proceedings and a decision. 2 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's remaining request(s) for relief are 3 DENIED, and all other pending motions in this action and the remainder of this case continue to 4 5 be assigned to Department XI. IT IS SO ORDERED this _____ day of February 2019. 6 7 8 9 10 Respectfully submitted by: 11 MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 12 By: Kattellen Wille 13 Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 14 Kathleen A. Wilde, Esq. 15 Nevada Bar No. 12522 10001 Park Run Drive 16 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan 17 18 Approved as to form and content this 15th day of Februan 2019. 19 **BAILEY KENNEDY** 20 21 By: Dennis L. Kennedy, Esq. 22 Nevada Bar No. 1462 Sarah E. Harmon, Esq. 23 Nevada Bar No. 8106 24 Andrea M. Champion, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13461 25 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 26 Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC 27 28 Page 5 of 5 2366 MAC: 19.02.01 Proposed Order Re Counter-Motion to Transfer to Bell

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Josephine Baltazar

From:efilingmail@tylerhost.netSent:Thursday, February 07, 2019 3:56 PMTo:BKfederaldownloadsSubject:Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David
Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Notice of Entry of Order - NEOJ (CIV), Envelope Number:
3820648

Notification of Service



Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3820648

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Filing Details		
Case Number	A-15-718679-C	
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)	
Date/Time Submitted	2/7/2019 3:55 PM PST	
Filing Type	Notice of Entry of Order - NEOJ (CIV)	
Filing Description	Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues	
Filed By	Peter Floyd	
	David E Lujan: Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (<u>imeacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)	
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC:	
	Sarah Harmon (<u>sharmon@baileykennedy.com</u>)	
	Dennis Kennedy (<u>dkennedy@baileykennedy.com</u>)	
	Joshua Gilmore (jgilmore@baileykennedy.com)	
	Bailey Kennedy, LLP (<u>bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.cem</u>)	

1

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Andrea Champion (achampion@baileykennedy.com)
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Benjamin Cloward . (Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com)
Douglas R. Rands . (<u>drands@rsgnvlaw.com</u>)
Melanie Lewis . (<u>mlewis@rsglawfirm.com</u>)
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TAB 32

TAB 32

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1	NOTC Dennis L. Kennedy	Alenne A. a Summer
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462	
3	SARAH E. HARMON Nevada Bar No. 8106	
4	ANDREA M. CHAMPION Nevada Bar No. 13461	
5	BAILEY & KENNED Y	
	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302	
6	Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821	
7	DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
8	SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com	
9	Attorneys for Defendant	
10	HARVÉST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
	DISTRICT	COURT
11	CLARK COUNT	TY, NEVADA
12	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	
13		Case No. A-15-718679-C
14	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. XI Dept. No. VII
15	vs.	
16	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	DEFENDANT HARVEST MANACEMENT SUB LLC2S NOTICE
	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S NOTICE OF OBJECTION AND RESERVATION
17	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally,	OF RIGHTS TO ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION TO
18	Defendants.	TRANSFER CASE BACK TO CHIEF JUDGE BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF
19	Detendants.	POST-VERDICT ISSUES
20		
21		
22	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC h	ereby files this Notice of Objection and
23	Reservation of Rights to the February 7, 2019 Order	
23	Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resoluti	
25	transferred to Department XI on July 2, 2018, and the	is Court is more than capable of resolving any
26	///	
27	///	
28	///	0000
	Page 1	of 3 2369

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

1	and all motions and issues before it. No legal basis or need was demonstrated for the transfer of one
2	pending motion in this action to another judge for determination.
3	DATED this 7th day of February, 2019.
4	BAILEY * KENNEDY
5	
6	By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u> Dennis L. Kennedy
7	Sarah E. Harmon
8	ANDREA M. CHAMPION
9	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC
10 11	
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	Page 2 of 3 2370

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 7th day of		
3	February, 2019, service of the foregoing DEFENDANT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB		
4	LLC'S NOTICE OF OBJECTION AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS TO ORDER		
5	REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-MOTION TO TRANSFER CASE BACK TO		
6	CHIEF JUDGE BELL FOR RESOLUTION OF POST-VERDICT ISSUES was made by		
7	mandatory electronic service through the Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing system		
8	and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and		
9	addressed to the following at their last known address:		
10	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER Email: dgardner@rsglawfirm.com DOUGLAS R. RANDS drands@rsgnvlaw.com		
11	BRETT K. SOUTH bsouth@rsgnvlaw.com		
12	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220Attorneys for DefendantHenderson, Nevada 89014DAVID E. LUJAN		
13			
14	BENJAMIN P. CLOWARDEmail: Benjamin@richardharrislaw.comBRYAN A. BOYACKBryan@richardharrislaw.com		
15	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street		
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
17	and		
18	MICAH S. ECHOLS Email: Mechols@maclaw.com KATHLEEN A. WILDE Kwilde@maclaw.com		
19	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C.		
20	1001 Park Run DriveAttorneys for PlaintiffLas Vegas, Nevada 89145AARON M. MORGAN		
21			
22	/s/ Iosenhine Baltazar		
23	<u>_/s/ Josephine Baltazar</u> Employee of BAILEY ∜ KENNEDY		
24			
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Josephine Baltazar

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efilingmail@tylerhost.net Thursday, February 07, 2019 1:36 PM BKfederaldownloads Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Notice - NOTC (CIV), Envelope Number: 3818942

Notification of Service

Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3818942

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Filing Details		
Case Number	A-15-718679-C	
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)	
Date/Time Submitted	2/7/2019 1:34 PM PST	
Filing Type	Notice - NOTC (CIV)	
Filing Description	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC's Notice of Objection and Reservation of Rights to Order Regarding Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdic Issues	
Filed By	Josephine Baltazar	
	David E Lujan: Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (<u>imeacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)	
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC:	
	Sarah Harmon (sharmon@baileykennedy.com)	
	Dennis Kennedy (<u>dkennedy@baileykennedy.com</u>)	
	Joshua Gilmore (jgilmore@baileykennedy.com)	
	Bailey Kennedy, LLP (<u>bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.gen</u>)	

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
TAB 33

TAB 33

1	Dennis L. Kennedy Nevada Bar No. 1462	
2	SARAH E. HARMON Nevada Bar No. 8106	
Z	JOSHUA P. GILMORE Nevada Bar No. 11576	Electronically Filed
3	ANDREA M. CHAMPION Nevada Bar No. 13461	Feb 11 2019 03:09 p.m. Elizabeth A. Brown
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7	Attorneys for Respondent	
8	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLO	C
9	IN THE SUPREME COURT (OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
10	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Supreme Court No. 77753
	Appellant,	District Court No. A-15-718679-C
11	vs.	
12	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; and HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB	RESPONDENT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S
13	LLC, a foreign limited-liability company,	RESPONSE TO DOCKETING STATEMENT
14	Respondents.	
15		
16	Pursuant to Nevada Rule of Appe	ellate Procedure 14(f), Respondent
17	Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harve	st") hereby responds to Appellant
	Раде	1 of 3 2374
	T uge	1 of 3 2374

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Docket 77753 Document 2019-06396



1	CERTIFICATE	OF SERVICE
2	I certify that I am an employee of	BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the
2	11th day of February, 2019, service of the	ne foregoing RESPONDENT
3	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LI	C'S RESPONSE TO DOCKETING
4	STATEMENT was made by electronic	service through Nevada Supreme
5	Court's electronic filing system and/or b	y depositing a true and correct copy in
5	the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid	l, and addressed to the following at
6	their last known address:	
7	MICAH S. ECHOLS Tom W. Stewart MARQUIS AURBACH	Email: mechols@maclaw.com tstewart@maclaw.com
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9	Benjamin P. Cloward	Email:
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12	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER DOUGLAS R. RANDS	Email: dgardner@rsglawfirm.com
13	BRETT SOUTH RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER	drands@rsgnvlaw.com bsouth@rsgnvlaw.com
14	1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220	Attorneys for Respondent DAVID E. LUJAN
15	Henderson, Nevada 89014	
	ARA H. SHIRINIAN 10651 Capesthorne Way	Email: arashirinian@cox.net
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	Settlement Program Mediator
17		<i>∕ Susan Russo</i> nployee of BAILEY
	Page	3 of 3 2376

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EXHIBIT A

EXHIBIT A

RESPONDENT'S RESPONSE TO DOCKETING STATEMENT

A. <u>Statement of the Case:</u> Morgan abandoned any and all claims against Harvest during trial. He failed to prove any claim against Harvest, and he failed to present any claim against Harvest to the jury for determination.

Morgan did not allege a claim for vicarious liability against Harvest. He pled a claim for negligent entrustment. No claim for vicarious liability was tried to the jury. No evidence was offered at trial to prove a claim for vicarious liability — particularly as to the essential element of the employee acting within the course and scope of his employment. Moreover, the undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that the employee was at lunch at the time of the accident. Thus, under the coming and going rule, Harvest cannot be vicariously liable.

The jury's verdict is not the result of an alleged "clerical error" in the caption of the special verdict form. The jury did not render a verdict against Harvest because Morgan failed to present a claim against Harvest to the jury for determination. Morgan made a voluntary and intentional decision to exclude any claim against Harvest from the jury's determination, as demonstrated by the lack of evidence offered against Harvest at trial, the lack of jury instructions pertaining to any claim against Harvest, and Morgan's explanation of the verdict form to the jury in closing arguments. Thus, the district court denied Morgan's Motion for Entry of Judgment against Harvest.

B. <u>Issues on Appeal:</u> Morgan never requested that Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez transfer the case back to Judge Linda Bell for determination of any of the post-trial issues on appeal. Therefore, the issue of whether or not Judge Gonzalez should have granted such relief is not a proper issue on appeal.

Josephine Baltazar

From: Sent: To: Subject: efiling@nvcourts.nv.gov Monday, February 11, 2019 3:12 PM BKfederaldownloads Notification of Electronic Filing in MORGAN VS. LUJAN, No. 77753

Supreme Court of Nevada

NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

Notice is given of the following activity:

Date and Time of Notice: Feb 11 2019 03:11 p.m.

Case Title:	MORGAN VS. LUJAN
Docket Number:	77753
Case Category:	Civil Appeal

Document Category:	Response to Docketing Statement
Submitted by:	Dennis L Kennedy
Official File Stamp:	Feb 11 2019 03:09 p.m.
Filing Status:	Accepted and Filed

Docket Text:Filed Response to Docketing Statement Respondent Harvest Management Sub
LLC's Response to Docketing Statement

The Clerk's Office has filed this document. It is now available on the Nevada Supreme Court's E-Filing website. Click <u>here</u> to log in to Eflex and view the document.

Electronic service of this document is complete at the time of transmission of this notice. The time to respond to the document, if required, is computed from the date and time of this notice. Refer to NEFR 9(f) for further details.

Clerk's Office has electronically mailed notice to:

Benjamin Cloward Douglas Gardner Joshua Gilmore Kathleen Wilde Bryan Boyack Dennis Kennedy Andrea Champion Micah Echols Sarah Harmon

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Ara Shirinian

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	Case	No.	
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC, Apr 18 2019 01:47 p.m. Petitioner,

Electronically Filed Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

VS.

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, THE HONORABLE LINDA MARIE BELL, DISTRICT COURT CHIEF JUDGE.

Respondent,

- and -

AARON M. MORGAN and DAVID E. LUJAN, **Real Parties in Interest.**

District Court Case No. A-15-718679-C, Department VII

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT RELIEF VOLUME 13 OF 14

DENNIS L. KENNEDY, Nevada Bar No. 1462 SARAH E. HARMON, Nevada Bar No. 8106 ANDREA M. CHAMPION, Nevada Bar No. 13461 **BAILEY KENNED Y** 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com Attorneys for Petitioner HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC April 18, 2019

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT RELIEF VOLUME 13 OF 14

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No.	Document Title	Page Nos.
27	Respondent Harvest Management Sub LLC's Motion	2172-2284
	to Dismiss Appeal as Premature (January 23, 2019)	
28	Reply in Support of Defendant Harvest Management	2285-2308
	Sub LLC's Motion for Entry of Judgment; and	
	Opposition to Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer	
	Case Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-	
	Verdict Issues (January 23, 2019)	
29	Settlement Program Early Case Assessment Report	2309-2311
	(January 24, 2019)	
30	Docketing Statement Civil Appeals (January 31, 2019)	2312-2358
31	Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Plaintiff's	2359-2368
	Counter-Motion to Transfer Case Back to Chief Judge	
	Bell for Resolution of Post-Verdict Issues (February 7,	
	2019)	
32	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC's Notice of	2369-2373
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	Regarding Plaintiff's Counter-Motion to Transfer Case	
	Back to Chief Judge Bell for Resolution of Post-	
	Verdict Issues (February 7, 2019)	
33	Respondent Harvest Management Sub LLC's	2374-2380
	Response to Docketing Statement (February 11, 2019)	

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TAB 27

TAB 27

1	Dennis L. Kennedy Nevada Bar No. 1462	
	SARAH E. HARMON Nevada Bar No. 8106	
2	JOSHUA P. GILMORE	
3	Nevada Bar No. 11576 ANDREA M. CHAMPION	Electronically Filed Jan 23 2019 03:08 p.m.
3	Nevada Bar No. 13461 BAILEY * KENNEDY	Elizabeth A. Brown
4	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue	Clerk of Supreme Court
_	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820	
5	Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
6	SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com	
	AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com	
7	Attorneys for Respondent	
8	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
	IN THE SUPPEME COURT (OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
9		
10	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Supreme Court No. 77753
1.1	Appellant,	District Court No. A-15-718679-C
11	VS.	
12	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; and	RESPONDENT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S
	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC, a foreign limited-liability	MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS PREMATURE
13	company,	
14	Respondents.	
15		
16		
17		
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		1

RESPONDENT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL AS PREMATURE

2 Respondent Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest"), by and through its attorneys, the law firm of Bailey Kennedy, hereby moves to dismiss the 3 Notice of Appeal filed by Appellant Aaron M. Morgan ("Mr. Morgan") on 4 December 18, 2018. Mr. Morgan's Notice of Appeal is premature, as the 5 district court has not yet entered a final judgment in the underlying action. 6 Specifically, Mr. Morgan's claim against Harvest remains pending, subject to 7 the district court's resolution of Harvest's Motion for Entry of Judgment, 8 9 which is scheduled to be heard in chambers on January 25, 2019. Moreover, Mr. Morgan did not seek Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification 10 for the order or judgment appealed from. As such, this Court lacks jurisdiction 11 12 over the appeal. DATED this 23rd day of January, 2019. 13 **BAILEY KENNEDY** 14 By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u> **DENNIS L. KENNEDY** 15 SARAH E. HARMON JOSHUA P. GILMORE 16 ANDREA M. CHAMPION Attorneys for Respondent 17 HARVÉST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC Page 2 of 9 2173

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 8948-1302 702.562.8820

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On May 20, 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a Complaint against Harvest and 3 Respondent David E. Lujan ("Mr. Lujan"). (Ex. 1.¹) Mr. Morgan alleged 4 claims for negligence and negligence per se against Mr. Lujan, and a claim for 5 negligent entrustment against Harvest.² (Ex. 1, at 3:1-4:12.) In April 2018, 6 7 this underlying case was tried to a jury, and the only claims presented to the jury for determination were the claims of negligence and negligence per se 8 alleged against Mr. Lujan. $(Ex. 2.^3)$ 9 On July 30, 2018, Mr. Morgan filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment 10 seeking to have the district court enter the jury's verdict against Harvest, 11 despite the fact that no claim for relief against Harvest was proven at trial or 12 presented 13 /// 14

- ¹ A true and correct copy of the Complaint (May 20, 2015), filed in the underlying action, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
 - ² The claim against Harvest is erroneously titled "vicarious liability/respondeat superior," but it is clearly a claim for negligent entrustment.
- 17 ³ A true and correct copy of the Special Verdict (Apr. 9, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

	1	to the jury for determination. (Ex. 3^4 ; Ex. 4^5) On November 28, 2018, the
	2	district court denied Mr. Morgan's Motion, holding that the failure to include
	3	the claim against Harvest in the Special Verdict form was not a "clerical error,"
	4	that no claim against Harvest had been presented to the jury for determination,
	5	and that a judgment could not be entered against Harvest based on the jury's
	6	verdict. (Ex. 5^6 ; Ex. 6^7 , at 9:8-20.) Further, when Harvest sought clarification
۲ 2	7	whether the judgment against Mr. Lujan would also dismiss all claims alleged
ENNEDY DGE AVENUE DA 89148-1302 8820	8	against Harvest, the district court explicitly instructed Harvest that it would
LEY & K Spanish Ru 762as, Neva 702.562.8	9	have to file a motion seeking such relief. (Ex. 6, at 9:18-10:8.)
$\operatorname{BAII}_{8984}^{8984}$	10	On December 17, 2018, Mr. Morgan filed a Judgment Upon the Jury
	11	Verdict against Mr. Lujan. (Ex. $7.^8$) This judgment has not yet been entered
	12	by the district court.
	13	⁴ A true and correct copy of Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment (July 30, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached hereto as Exhibit 3. The exhibits to this motion have been omitted in the interest
	14	 of judicial economy and efficiency. A true and correct copy of Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC's Opposition to Plaintiff's
	15	Motion for Entry of Judgment (Aug. 16, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached hereto as Exhibit 4. The exhibits to this motion have been omitted in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency.
	1.0	⁶ A true and correct copy of the Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment (Nov. 28, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
	16	⁷ A true and correct copy of excerpts from the Transcript of the Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry
	17	of Judgment (Jan. 18, 2019), is attached as Exhibit 6.

⁸ A true and correct copy of the Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict (Dec. 17, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached as Exhibit 7.

On December 18, 2018, Mr. Morgan filed a Notice of Appeal from the
 November 28, 2018 Notice of Entry of Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
 Entry of Judgment and from the December 17, 2018 Judgment Upon the Jury
 Verdict. (Ex. 8.⁹)

On December 21, 2018, Harvest filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment
against Mr. Morgan as to the claim for relief that it seemingly abandoned
and/or failed to prove at trial. (Ex. 9.¹⁰) This motion is fully briefed and
scheduled to be heard, in chambers, on January 25, 2019.

9 Mr. Morgan has not yet filed a Docketing Statement establishing this
10 court's jurisdiction for the appeal. The Docketing Statement was originally
11 scheduled to be filed on January 16, 2019, but Mr. Morgan requested and was
12 granted an extension until January 30, 2019.

13 ///

14 ///

- 16 ⁹ A true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal (Dec. 18, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached as Exhibit 8.
- 17 A true and correct copy of Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC's Motion for Entry of Judgment (Dec. 21, 2018), filed in the underlying action, is attached as Exhibit 9. The exhibits to the motion have been omitted in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency.

II. ARGUMENT

Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 3A sets forth the judgments and 2 orders from which a party may appeal. An order denying entry of judgment is 3 not an appealable order under the Rules, and only final judgments (or 4 interlocutory judgments in certain real property actions) are appealable. NRAP 5 3A(b)(1). 6 7 It is well-settled that "when multiple parties are involved in an action, a judgment is not final unless the rights and liabilities of all parties are 8 adjudicated." Rae v. All Am. Life & Cas. Co., 95 Nev. 920, 922, 605 P.2d 196, 9 197 (1979); see also Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 10 417 (2000) ("[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all issues presented in 11 the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for 12 post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs."). When a judgment 13 disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties, a party must 14 15 seek certification of the judgment as final pursuant to Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) before it can file an appeal from the judgment. "In the 16 absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of 17

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SPANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820

1	decision, however designated, which adjudicates the rights and liabilities of
2	fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the parties
3	" NRCP 54(b) (emphasis added).
4	Here, neither the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of
5	Judgment ("Order") nor the Judgment Upon Jury Verdict ("Judgment"),
6	individually or considered together, constitutes a final judgment. Neither the
7	Order nor the Judgment disposes of all of the claims in the case. Mr. Morgan's
8	claim against Harvest remains unresolved and is the subject of a pending
9	Motion for Entry of Judgment in the district court. The district court clearly
10	informed the Parties in November 2018, before Mr. Morgan filed his Notice of
11	Appeal, that his claim against Harvest remained unresolved by the jury's
12	verdict and that additional motions were necessary for its resolution. Mr.
13	Morgan failed to seek Rule 54(b) certification for either the Order or the
14	Judgment prior to filing his Notice of Appeal. Therefore, Mr. Morgan's appeal
15	is premature and this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
16	///


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1	CERTIFICAT	E OF SERVICE
2	I certify that I am an employee o	f BAILEY KENNEDY and that on the
-	23rd day of January, 2019, service of th	ne foregoing RESPONDENT
3	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB L	LC'S MOTION TO DISMISS AS
4	PREMATURE was made by electroni	c service through Nevada Supreme
5	Court's electronic filing system and/or	by depositing a true and correct copy in
U	the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepai	d, and addressed to the following at
6	their last known address:	
7	MICAH S. ECHOLS Tom W. Stewart MARQUIS AURBACH	Email: <u>mechols@maclaw.com</u> <u>tstewart@maclaw.com</u>
8	COFFING 1001 Park Run Drive	Attorneys for Appellant AARON M. MORGAN
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	
10	Benjamin P. Cloward Bryan A. Boyack RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM	Email: <u>Bbenjamin@richardharrislaw.com</u> <u>bryan@richardharrislaw.com</u>
11	801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	Attorneys for Appellant AARON M. MORGAN
12	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER DOUGLAS R. RANDS	Email: <u>dgardner@rsglawfirm.com</u>
13	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER	drands@rsgnvlaw.com
14	1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220 Henderson, Nevada 89014	Attorneys for Respondent DAVID E. LUJAN
15	ARA H. SHIRINIAN 10651 Capesthorne Way	Email: arashirinian@cox.net
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89135	Settlement Program Mediator
17		<i>(s/ Josephine Baltazar</i> Employee of BAILEY ∻ KENNEDY
	Page	2180 e 9 of 9

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820

EXHIBIT 1

EXHIBIT 1

DISTRICT COURT CIVIL COVER SHEET

A-15-718679-C

 County, Nevada

	Assigned by Clark's	Officei	
Party Information (provide both he	me and mailing addresses if different)		A 2 CONTRACTOR OF THE STATE
laintiff(s) (name/address/phone):		:	s) (name/address/plione):
Aaron M. M	organ	David	E. Lujan; Harvest Management Sub LLC.
tioney (name/address/phone):		Å Borney (n	ame/address/phone);
Adam W. W	illiams	and not to	and the second products
Richard Harris			
801 S. 4th S	Street		
Las Vegas, Neva			
L. Nature of Controversy (please s	elect the one most applicable filing type	nelaw)	
Civil Case Filing Types Reat Property	1	~~~~~~	Torts
Landlord/Tenant	Negligence		Other Torts
Unlawful Detainer	Auto		Product Liability
Other Landlord/Tenant	Premises Liability		Intentional Misconduct
Title to Property	Other Negligence		Employment Tori
Indicial Foreclosure	Malpractice		Insurance Tort
Other Title to Property	Medical/Dental		Other Tori
Other Real Property	Legal		
Condemnation/Eminent Domain	Accounting		
Other Real Property	Other Malpractice		
Probate	Construction Defect & Cont	net	Judicial Review/Appeal
Probate (select case (spo and ostate value)	Construction Defect		Judicial Review
Summary Administration	Chapter 40		Foreclosure Mediation Case
General Administration	Other Construction Defect		Detition to Seal Records
Special Administration	Contract Case		Mental Competency
Set Aside	Uniform Commercial Code		Nevada State Agency Appeal
Trust/Conservatorship	Building and Construction		Department of Motor Vehicle
Other Probate	Insurance Carrier		Worker's Compensation
Estate Value	Commercial Instrument		Other Nevada State Agency
Over \$200,000	Collection of Accounts		Appeal Other
Between \$100,000 and \$200,000	Employment Contract		Appeal from Lower Court Other Judicial Review/Appeal
Under \$100,000 or Unknown	Other Contract		Comer Sudicial Review/Appeal
[] (Juder \$2,300	20 TXX.14		Other Civil Filing
	<u>a Writ</u>		
Civil Writ	main principalities		Other Civil Filing
Writ of Habeas Corpus	Writ of Prohibition Other Civil Writ		Foreign Judgment
Writ of Mandainus Writ of Quo Warrant	Think rain wan		Other Civil Matters
		1	Lund section of the conductor

Date

Signature of initiating party or representative

See other side for family-related case fillings.

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			•			
	1	COMP	Alun J. Chim			
		ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13617	CLERK OF THE COURT			
,	3	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM				
	5	801 South Fourth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101				
	6	Tel. (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-4455				
	7	Email Adam.Williams@richardharrislaw.com				
	8	Attorneys for Plaintiff				
	9	DISTRICT CO				
	10	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA				
	11	AARON M. MORGAN, individually	CASE NO.: A-15-718679-C			
SΣ	12	Plaintiff,	DEPT. NO.: VII			
RRIS FIRM	13	vs.				
HAI	14	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	COMPLAINT			
Ľ Ă	15	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE				
IAF	16	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally,				
RICHARD HARRIS	17					
	18	Defendants.				
و مستندر	19					
	20	COMES NOW, Plaintiff AARON M. MOI				
	21	attorney of record ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. of	INE KICHAKD HAKKIS LAW FIKM, and			
	22	complains and alleges as follows:	ION			
	23	JURISDICT				
	23		ntiff AARON M. MORGAN (hereinafter			
	24 25	referred to as "Plaintiff") is, a resident of (
	25 26		ndant, DAVID E. LUJAN was, and is, a			
		resident of Clark County, Nevada.				
	27					
	28					
		1				
			2183			
		1				

- 3. That at all times relevant herein, Defendant, HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC, was, and is, a foreign limited-liability Company licensed and actively conducting business in Clark County, Nevada
- All the facts and circumstances that gave rise to the subject lawsuit occurred in Clark 4. County, Nevada.
- 5. The identities of Defendant DOES 1 through 20, and ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, are unknown at this time and are individuals, corporations, associations, partnerships, subsidiaries, holding companies, owners, predecessor or successor entities, joint venturers, parent corporations or related business entities of Defendants, inclusive, who were acting on behalf of or in concert with, or at the direction of Defendants and are responsible for the injurious activities of the other Defendants.
- 6. Plaintiff alleges that each named and Doe and Roe Defendant negligently, willfully, intentionally, recklessly, vicariously, or otherwise, caused, directed, allowed or set in motion the injurious events set forth herein.
- 7. Each named and Doe and Roe Defendant is legally responsible for the events and happenings stated in this Complaint, and thus proximately caused injury and damages to Plaintiff.
- Plaintiff requests leave of the Court to amend this Complaint to specify the Doe and 8. Roe Defendants when their identities become known.
- 9. On or about April 1, 2014, Defendants, were the owners, employers, family members and/or operators of a motor vehicle, while in the course and scope of employment and/or family purpose and/or other purpose, which was entrusted and/or driven in such a negligent and careless manner so as to cause a collision with the vehicle occupied by Plaintiff.

A W FIRM **RICHARD HARRIS**

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	<u>FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION</u> Negligence Against Employee Defendant, DAVID E. LUJAN
10.	Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 9 of the Complaint as though said
10.	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
11.	
	LUJAN breached that duty of care.
12.	•
12.	seriously injured and caused to suffer great pain of body and mind, some of which
	conditions are permanent and disabling all to her general damage in an amount in
	excess of \$10,000.00.
	SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
	Negligence Per Se Against Employee Defendant, DAVID E. LUJAN
13.	Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 12 of the Complaint as though said
	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
14.	
	laws of the State of Nevada and Clark County, constituting negligence per se, and
	Plaintiff has been damaged as a direct and proximate result thereof in an amount in
	excess of \$10,000.00.
	THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
	Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior Against Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
15.	Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 14 of the Complaint as though said
	paragraphs were fully set forth herein.
16.	Plaintiff is informed and believes that DAVID E. LUJAN was employed as a driver
	for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
17.	At all times mentioned herein, Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC.
	was the owner of, or had custody and control of, the Vehicle.
18.	That Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC. did entrust the Vehicle to
	the control of Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN.
	3

RICHARD HARRIS

	Ĵ	19. That Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in						
	.2	*****	the operation of the Vehicle.					
	3	20.		NAGEMENT SUB LLC. actually knew, or by the				
	5		exercise of reasonable care shoul	d have known, that Defendant DAVID E. LUJAN				
	6	was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of motor vehicles.						
	7	2,1.		ximate consequence of the negligence and				
	8			VID E. LUJAN, concurring with the negligent				
	9	9 entrustment of the Vehicle by Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT						
	ŧQ	22.		use of the negligent entrustment of the Vehicle by				
	11	Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC. to Defendant DAVID E,						
X	12		LUJAN, Plaintiff has been damaged in an amount in excess of \$10,000.00.					
21 II II II	13	PRAYER FOR RELIEF						
W, W	14	WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment against Defendants as follows:						
t	15	1.						
	16	2. Special damages for medical and incidental expenses incurred and to be incurred;						
	17	3.						
	18	4.	Attorney's fees and costs off suit incurred herein; and					
	19	5.	For such other and further relief a	s the Court may deem just and proper.				
	20	DATED +	his <u>20</u> day of May, 2015.	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM				
	21	i ver i juli 4	1113 <u>. 2012</u> .	AND DECKAND RECEENED LICK II GLENGIE				
	22			1970 and 19				
	23			ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ.				
	24	***		Nevada Bar No. 13617				
	25			801 S. Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101				
	26			Attorneys for Plaintiff				
	27							
	28							
				4				
				2186				

RUCHARD HARRIS

] 3. 5 6 7 8	IAFD ADAM W. WILLIAMS, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13617 RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth St. Las Vegas, NV 89101 Tel. (702) 444-4444 Fax (702) 444-44455 Email <u>Adam.Williams@richardharrislaw.com</u> Attorneys for Plaintiff DISTRICT CO	DURT		
	9	CLARK COUNTY			
RICHARD HARRIS	10. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	AARON M. MORGAN, individually Plaintiff, vs, DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally, Defendants.	CASE-NO.: DEPT. NO.: INITIAL APPEARANCE FEE DISCLOSURE		
	19	Pursuant to NRS Chapter 19, as amended by a	Senate Bill 106, filing fees are submitted for		
	20	parties appearing in the above entitled action as indicated below:			
	21 22	AARON M. MORGAN	\$270.00		
	23	TOTAL REMITTED:	\$270.00		
	24	DATED this 🔔 day of May, 2015. I	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM		
	25				
	26		ADAM W. WILLIAMS		
	27 28	8 I	Nevada Bar No. 13617 301 S. Fourth Street Jas Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiff		
		1			
			2187		

EXHIBIT 2

EXHIBIT 2

			FILED IN OPEN COURT STEVEN D. GRIERSON CLERK OF THE COURT DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT COURT
	1		DISTRICT COURT N APR
~	2		DISTRICT COURT APR -9 2018
	3		CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
	4		CASE NO: A-15-718679-C
	5		DEPT. NO: VII
	6	AARON MORGAN	
	7	Plaintif	f,
	8	vs.	
	9	DAVID LUJAN,	
	10		
	11		
	12	Defenda	int.
	13	1	
	14		SPECIAL VERDICT
	15		in the above-entitled action, find the following special verdict on the
	16	questions submitted t	
	17	ANSWER:	Was Defendant negligent? Yes No
	18		ed no, stop here. Please sign and return this verdict.
	19		ed yes, please answer question no. 2.
	20		eu yes, pieuse unswer question no. 2.
	21 22	QUESTION NO.2:	Was Plaintiff negligent?
	22	ANSWER:	Yes No
	23	If you answer	ed yes, please answer question no. 3.
	25	If you answer	ed no, please skip to question no. 4.
	26	111	A – 15 – 718679 – C SJV
	27	:	Special Jury Verdict 4738215
	28		
		(2189
			H000815 2

QUESTION NO. 3: What percentage of fault do you assign to each party? 1 10 Ô Defendant: 2 Plaintiff: 3 100% Total: 4 Please answer question 4 without regard to you answer to question 3. 5 QUESTION NO. 4: What amount do you assess as the total amount of Plaintiff's damages? 6 (Please do not reduce damages based on your answer to question 3, if you answered question 3. 7 The Court will perform this task.) 8 s<u>808,480</u> s<u>1,156,500</u> s<u>1,56,500</u> <u>s</u><u>1,500,000</u> <u>s</u>2,980,980 <u>eo</u> 9 Past Medical Expenses 10 Future Medical Expenses 11 Past Pain and Suffering 12 13 Future Pain and Suffering 14 TOTAL 15 16 DATED this $\underline{9^{\#}}$ day of April, 2018. 17. Celth J.J. Jauren T FOREPERSON ARTHUR J. ST. LANRENT 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2190 H000816

EXHIBIT 3

EXHIBIT 3

Electronically Filed 7/30/2018 5:13 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Richard Harris Law Firm Steven D. Ghelson Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 11087 Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Telephone: (702) 444-44455 Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com Marquis Aurbach Coffing Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive Lored Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive
10 11 12	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711 Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com tstewart@maclaw.com
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan
14	DISTRICT COURT
15	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA
16	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,
17	Plaintiff, Case No.: A-15-718679-C Dept. No.: XI
18	VS.
19	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited-
20	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive
21	jointly and severally,
22	Defendants.
23	
24	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
25	Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan, in this matter, by and through his attorneys of record,
26	Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq. and Bryan A. Boyack, Esq., of the Richard Harris Law Firm, and
27	Micah S. Echols, Esq. and Tom W. Stewart, Esq., of Marquis Aurbach Coffing, hereby files
28	Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment. This motion is made and based on the papers and

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Page 1 of 7

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816

pleadings on file herein, the attached memorandum of points and authorities, and the oral 1 2 argument before the Court. NOTICE OF MOTION 3 You and each of you, will please take notice that **PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR** 4 regularly for hearing will come on on the 5 ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 04 9:00 A .m. or as soon thereafter as Sept. 2018 at the hour of day of 6 counsel may be heard, in Department 11 in the above-referenced Court. 7 8 Dated this ____ day of July, 2018. 9 MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10 11 By Micah S. Echols, Esq. 12 Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. 13 Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive 14 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan 15 16 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES** INTRODUCTION 17 I. On April 9, 2018, a Clark County jury rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Aaron 18 Morgan ("Morgan"), and against Defendants, David Lujan ("Lujan") and Harvest Management 19 Sub LLC ("Harvest Management"), in the amount of \$2,980,980.00, plus pre- and post-judgment 20 interest.¹ It was undisputed during trial that Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his 21 employment with Harvest Management at the time of the traffic accident at the center of the 22 case. All evidence and testimony indicated Morgan sought relief from, and that judgment would 23 be entered against, both Defendants. However, the special verdict form prepared by the Court 24 (the "special verdict form") inadvertently omitted Harvest Management from the caption, despite 25 Harvest Management being listed on the pleadings and jury instructions upon which the jury 26 27 See Special Verdict, attached as Exhibit 1. 28 Page 2 of 7 MAC:1261-93457380_1

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relied when reaching the verdict itself. The Court acknowledged this omission, and Defendants
conceded they had no objection to it. Accordingly, Morgan respectfully requests this Court enter
judgment against both Defendants, in accordance with the jury instructions, pleadings,
testimony, and evidence, either by (a) simply entering the proposed judgment attached hereto or,
(b) by making an explicit finding that the judgment was rendered against both Defendants
pursuant to NRCP 49(a) and then entering judgment accordingly.²

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 1, 2014, Morgan was driving his Ford Mustang north on McLeod Drive in the right lane. Morgan approached the intersection with Tompkins Avenue. At that time, Lujan, who was driving a shuttle bus owned by Harvest Management, entered the intersection driving east from the Paradise Park driveway, and attempted to cross McLeod Drive heading east on Tompkins Avenue. The front of Morgan's car struck the side of Defendants' bus in a major collision resulting in total loss of Morgan's vehicle and serious bodily injuries. Morgan was transported from the scene of the accident to Sunrise Hospital. The emergency room physicians focused on potential head trauma and injuries to the cervical spine and to Morgan's wrists. Morgan was eventually discharged with instructions to follow up with a primary care physician. A week later, Morgan sought treatment for pain in his neck, lower-back, and both wrists.

Over the next two years, Morgan underwent a series of treatments and procedures for his injuries—including bilateral medial branch block injections to his thoracic spine; injections to ease the pain from his bilateral triangular fibrocartilage tears; left wrist arthroscope and triangular fibrocartilage tendon repair with debridement, incurring approximately nearly \$264.281.00 in medical expenses.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 5, 2015, Morgan filed a complaint for negligence and negligence per se against
Lujan and vicarious liability against Harvest Management. In jointly answering the complaint,
both Defendants were represented by the same counsel and both named in the caption.

 2 See proposed Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict, attached as **Exhibit 2**.

Page 3 of 7

After a lengthy discovery period, the case initially proceeded to trial in early November. 1 2017. During the initial trial, Lujan testified that he was employed by Montara Meadows, a local 2 entity under the purview of Harvest Management: 3 [Morgan's counsel]: All right, Mr. Lujan, at the time of the accident in April of 4 2014, were you employed with Montara Meadows? 5 Yes. [Lujan]: 6 [Morgan's counsel]: And what was your employment? 7 I was the bus driver. [Lujan]: 8 [Morgan's counsel]: Okay. And what is your understanding of the relationship 9 of Montara Meadows to Harvest Management? 10 [Lujan]: Harvest Management was our corporate office. [Morgan's counsel]: Okay. 11 Montara Meadows is just the local --12 [Lujan]: Okay. All right. And this accident happened April 1, [Morgan's counsel]: 13 2014, correct? 14 Yes. sir.³ [Lujan]: 15 However, on the third day of the initial trial, the Court declared a mistrial based on 16 17 Defendants' counsel's misconduct.⁴ Following the mistrial, the case proceeded to a second trial the following April. 18 Vicarious liability was not contested during trial. Instead, Harvest Management's 19 NRCP 30(b)(6) representative contested primary liability-the representative claimed that either 20 Morgan or an unknown third party was primarily responsible for the accident-but did not 21 contest Harvest Management's own vicarious liability.⁵ 22 23 Transcript of Jury Trial, November 8, 2017, attached as Exhibit 3, at 109 (direct examination 24 of Luian). 25 See Exhibit 3 at 166 (the Court granting Plaintiff's motion for mistrial); see also Court Minutes, November 8, 2017, attached as Exhibit 4. 26 See Transcript of Jury Trial, April 5, 2018, attached as Exhibit 5, at 165-78 (testimony of 27 Erica Janssen, NRCP 30(b)(6) witness for Harvest Management); Transcript of Jury Trial. April 6, 2018, attached as Exhibit 6, at 4-15 (same). 28 Page 4 of 7 MAC: 10 67 00 3457380 1

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1 On the final day of trial, the Court *sua sponte* created a special verdict form that 2 inadvertently included Lujan as the only Defendant in the caption. The Court informed the 3 parties of this omission, and the Defendants explicitly agreed they had no objection:

THE COURT: Take a look and see if -- will you guys look at that verdict form? I know it doesn't have the right caption. I know it's just the one we used the last trial. See if that looks sort of okay.

[Defendants' counsel]: Yeah. That looks fine.

THE COURT: I don't know if it's right with what you're asking for for damages, but it's just what we used in the last trial which was similar sort of.

At the end of the six-day jury trial, jury instructions were provided to the jury with the proper caption.⁶ The jury used those instructions to fill-out the improperly-captioned special verdict form and render judgment in favor of Plaintiff—the jury found Defendants to be negligent and 100% at fault for the accident.⁷ As a result, the jury awarded Plaintiff \$2,980,000.⁸

IV. <u>LEGAL ARGUMENT</u>

This Court should enter the proposed Judgment on the Jury Verdict attached as **Exhibit 2**—it provides that judgment was rendered against both Lujan and Harvest Management because such a result conforms to the pleadings, evidence, and jury instructions upon which the jury relied in reaching the special verdict.

In the alternative, the Court should make an explicit finding pursuant to NRCP 49(a) that the special verdict was rendered against both Defendants and then enter judgment accordingly. NRCP 49(a) provides, in certain circumstances, the Court may make a finding on an issue not raised before a special verdict was rendered. Indeed, when a special verdict is used, "the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer . . . which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence." NRCP 49(a). Further, "[t]he court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter

- ⁶ See Jury Instructions cover page, attached as Exhibit 7, at 1.
- ⁷ See Exhibit 1.

Id.

27 28

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thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue." *Id.* However, "[i]f in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires the party demands its submission to the jury. *As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding*; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Here, the record plainly supports judgment being rendered against both Defendants. However, should the Court wish to clarify the issue for the record, the Court should make an explicit finding that the omission of Harvest Management from the special verdict was inadvertent and, as a result, that judgment was rendered in favor of Morgan and both against Defendants, jointly and severally.

V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Aaron Morgan respectfully requests this Court enter the proposed Judgment on the Jury Verdict attached as **Exhibit 2**. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests this Court to make an explicit finding that judgment in this matter was rendered against both Defendants and then enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this <u>30th</u> day of July, 2018.

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING

By <u>/s/ Micah S. Echols</u> Micah S. Echols, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan

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	1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE	
	2	I hereby certify that the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF	
	3	JUDGMENT was submitted electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial	
	4	District Court on the 30th day of July, 2018. Electronic service of the foregoing document shall	
	5	be made in accordance with the E-Service List as follows: ⁹	
	6	Andrea M. Champion achampion@baileykennedy.com Joshua P. Gilmore jgilmore@baileykennedy.com	
	7	Sarah E. Harmon sharmon@baileykennedy.com Dennis L. Kennedy dkennedy@baileykennedy.com	
	8	Bailey Kennedy, LLP bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub, LLC	
	9	Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. bryan@richardharrislaw.com	
	10	Benjamin Cloward Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com Olivia Bivens olivia@richardharrislaw.com	
7 B	11	Shannon TruscelloShannon@richardharrislaw.comTina Jarchowtina@richardharrislaw.com	
NIE	12	Nicole M. Griffin ngriffin@richardharrislaw.com E-file ZDOC zdocteam@richardharrislaw.com	
COFI	13	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan	
CH C Drive a 89146 702) 38	14	Doug Gardner, Esq.dgardner@rsglawfirm.comDouglas R. Randsdrands@rsgnvlaw.com	
RBA wk Run Nevad	15	Melanie Lewismlewis@rsglawfirm.comPauline Battspbatts@rsgnvlaw.com	
QUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816	16	Jennifer Meacham jmeacham@rsglawfirm.com Lisa Richardson lrichardson@rsglawfirm.com	-
001S	17	Attorneys for Defendant David E. Lujan	
ARC	18	I further certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy	
M	19	thereof, postage prepaid, addressed to:	
	20	N/A	
	21		
	22	/s/ Leah Dell Leah Dell, an employee of	
	23	Marquis Aurbach Coffing	
	24		
	25 26		
	26 27		
	27	⁹ Pursuant to EDCR 8.05(a), each party who submits an E-Filed document through the E-Filing System consents to electronic service in accordance with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).	
	20	Page 7 of 7	
		MAC: 21470983457380_1	

EXHIBIT 4

EXHIBIT 4

1	l	Electronically Filed 8/16/2018 1:02 PM
1	oppo	Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	OPPS Dennis L. Kennedy	Atump. Atumon
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462 Sarah E. Harmon	
3	Nevada Bar No. 8106	
4	JOSHUA P. GILMORE Nevada Bar No. 11576	
	ANDREA M. CHAMPION	
5	Nevada Bar No. 13461 BAILEY * KENNEDY	
6	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue	
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820	
8	Facsimile: 702.562.8821 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
9	SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com	
	JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com	
10	Attorneys for Defendant	
11	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
12	DISTRICT	COURT
13	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Case No. A-15-718679-C
15	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. XI
16	vs.	DEFENDANT HARVEST
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S
18	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE	OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
19	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	
	jointly and severally,	Hearing Date: September 14, 2018 Hearing Time: In Chambers
20	Defendants.	
21		1
22		
23	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC ('	'Harvest"), hereby opposes the Motion for Entry
24	of Judgment (the "Motion") filed by Plaintiff Aaron	M. Morgan ("Mr. Morgan") on July 30, 2018.
25	///	
26	///	
27	111	
28	///	
	Page 1	of 26 2200

Case Number: A-15-718679-C

BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ruge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 8944-1302 702.562.8820

1	This Opposition is made and based on the following memorandum of points and authorities, the
2	papers and pleadings on file, and any oral argument the Court may allow. ¹
3	DATED this 16 th day of August, 2018.
4	BAILEY * KENNEDY
5	
6	By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u> Dennis L. Kennedy
7	Sarah E. Harmon Joshua P. Gilmore
8	ANDREA M. CHAMPION
9	Attorneys for Defendants HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC
10	
11	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
12	I. INTRODUCTION
13	In the recent trial of this matter, Plaintiff Mr. Morgan wholly failed to pursue — and in fact
14	appeared to have abandoned — the single claim (for negligent entrustment) that he asserted against
15	Harvest, the former employer of the individual defendant, David E. Lujan ("Mr. Lujan"). In
16	particular, Mr. Morgan failed to do any of the following at trial:
17	• He did not reference Harvest in his introductory remarks to the jury regarding the
18	identity of the Parties and expected witnesses, (Ex. 10, ² 17:2-24, 25:7-26:3);
19	• He did not mention Harvest or his claim against Harvest during jury voir dire, (id. at
20	33:2-93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex. 11, ³ at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22);
21	• He did not reference Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his opening statement,
22	(Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17);
23	• He offered no evidence regarding any liability of Harvest for his damages;
24	
25	¹ The Motion is currently scheduled to be heard in chambers by the Court on September 14, 2018. Harvest respectfully requests that, if the Court finds it appropriate, the Motion be set for hearing so that the parties can be heard
26	on this important issue. ² Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 2, 2018) are attached as Exhibit 10, at Vol. III of App.
27	at H000384-H000619.
28	³ Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 3, 2018) are attached as Exhibit 11, at Vol. IV of App. at H000620-H000748.
	Page 2 of 26 2201

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- He did not elicit any testimony from any witness that could have supported his claim against Harvest;
- He did not reference Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his closing argument or rebuttal closing argument, (Ex. 12,⁴ at 121:4-136:19, 157:13-161:10);
- He did not include his claim against Harvest in the jury instructions, (Ex. 13⁵); and
- He did not include Harvest in the Special Verdict Form, never asked the jury to assess liability against Harvest, and, in fact, gave the jury no option to find Harvest liable for anything, (Mot. at Ex. 1).

9 Now, having obtained a verdict in excess of \$3 million (when interest is considered) against 10 Mr. Lujan, and perhaps regretting his trial strategy, Mr. Morgan asks the Court to "fix" the jury's 11 verdict and enter judgment against Harvest. Mr. Morgan attempts to classify the verdict form as 12 merely an inadvertent clerical error that easily can be corrected by this Court. To the contrary, assessing liability against Harvest would require that this Court ignore the record and impose 13 14 liability where none has been proven to exist, supplanting the jury's verdict with its own 15 determination. Essentially, Mr. Morgan requests that the Court engage in reversible error by determining the ultimate liability of a party — rather than an issue of fact, as contemplated by 16 17 Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). Thus, Mr. Morgan's Motion must be denied. 18 Alarmingly, Mr. Morgan's Motion is based on multiple half-truths and blatant misrepresentations. For example, Mr. Morgan asserts — without a single citation to supporting 19 20 evidence in the record (because there is none) — that (1) the issue of whether Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident was "undisputed," (Mot. 21 22 at 2:21-23); (2) the issue of vicarious liability was uncontested by Harvest, (id. at 4:21-22); and (3)

- 23 "the record plainly supports" a judgment against both Mr. Lujan and Harvest, (*id.* at 6:7). The
- 24 record, however, demonstrates the complete opposite.
- 25 ///
- 26

A true and correct copy of the Jury Instructions (Apr. 9, 2018) are attached as Exhibit 13, at Vol. IV of App. at H000775-H000814.

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Page 3 of 26



Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 9, 2018) are attached hereto as Exhibit 12, at Vol. IV of App. at H000749-H000774.

First, in his Complaint, Mr. Morgan pled a claim for negligent entrustment, not vicarious 1 liability, and Harvest denied these allegations in its Answer. (Ex. 1,⁶ at ¶¶ 15-22; Ex. 2,⁷ at 2:8-9, 2 3 3:9-10.) Far from being undisputed or uncontested, *Harvest squarely denied liability*. Thereafter, Mr. Morgan took no steps at trial to satisfy his burden of proof as to either negligent entrustment or 4 vicarious liability. He developed no testimony and offered no evidence even suggesting that Mr. 5 Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Harvest at the time of the 6 7 accident. Nor did he develop any testimony or offer any evidence suggesting that Mr. Lujan was an inexperienced, incompetent, or reckless driver prior to the accident, or that Harvest knew or should 8 9 have known of such (alleged) driving history. More importantly, Mr. Morgan failed to rebut the evidence offered by Mr. Lujan and Harvest which proved that Harvest could not be liable for either 10 vicarious liability or negligent entrustment — specifically, Mr. Lujan's testimony that he was on a 11 12 lunch break when the accident occurred and that he had never been in an accident before.

13 Given the lack of *any* evidence offered at trial against Harvest, there is no legal basis for 14 entry of judgment against Harvest. Mr. Morgan's Motion — characterizing the verdict as a simple 15 mistake — borders on dishonesty. Therefore, Harvest respectfully requests that Mr. Morgan's Motion be denied in its entirety and that a judgment be entered consistent with the jury's verdict — 16 17 solely against Mr. Lujan.

18

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II. **RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

A. The Pleadings.

On May 20, 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a Complaint against Mr. Lujan and Harvest. (See 20 generally Ex. 1.) The only claim alleged against Harvest in the Complaint is captioned "Vicarious 21 22 Liability/Respondeat Superior," but the allegations of the claim are more akin to a claim for 23 negligent entrustment. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-22 (alleging that Harvest negligently entrusted the vehicle to Mr. Lujan despite the fact that it knew or should have known that Mr. Lujan was an incompetent. 24 25 inexperienced, or reckless driver).)

- 26
- 6 A true and correct copy of the Complaint (May 20, 2015) is attached as Exhibit 1, at Vol. I of App. at H000001-H000006. 27
- A true and correct copy of Defs.'Answer to Pl.'s Compl. (June 16, 2015) is attached as Exhibit 2, at Vol. I of 28 App. at H000007-H000013.

1 Despite the title of the claim, the third cause of action fails to allege that Mr. Lujan was 2 acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. (Id.) Rather, the 3 only reference to "course and scope" in the entire Complaint is as follows: 4 On or about April 1, 2014, Defendants, [sic] were the owners, employers, family members[,] and/or operators of a motor vehicle. 5 while in the *course and scope of employment* and/or family purpose and/or other purpose, which was *entrusted* and/or driven in such a 6 negligent and careless manner so as to cause a collision with the vehicle occupied by Plaintiff. 7 (*Id.* at \P 9 (emphasis added).) 8 9 On June 16, 2015, Mr. Lujan and Harvest filed Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.⁸ (See generally Ex. 2.) The Defendants denied Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, including 10 its implied allegation that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at 11 the time of the accident. (Ex. 1, at ¶ 9; Ex. 2, at 2:8-9.) Harvest admitted that it employed Mr. Lujan 12 as a driver, that it owned the vehicle involved in the accident, and that it had entrusted control of the 13 vehicle to Mr. Lujan. (Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 16-18; Ex. 2, at 3:7-8.) However, Harvest denied that: (i) Mr. 14 15 Lujan was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of the vehicle; (ii) it knew or 16 should have known that he was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of motor vehicles; (iii) Mr. Morgan was injured as a proximate consequence of Harvest's alleged negligent 17 entrustment of the vehicle to Mr. Lujan; and (iv) Mr. Morgan suffered damages as a direct and 18 proximate result of Harvest's alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Mr. Lujan. (Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 19 19-22; Ex. 2, at 3:9-10.) Harvest's and Mr. Lujan's Answer also included an affirmative defense of 20 comparative liability. (Ex. 2, at 3:16-21.)⁹ 21 22 /// 23 111 24 111 25 Mr. Morgan's Motion emphasizes that Mr. Lujan and Harvest were represented by the same counsel. (Mot. at 3:25-26.) This fact is irrelevant. Liability cannot be imputed to Harvest simply because it shared counsel with its 26 employee. Mr. Morgan still bore the burden of proving his claims against both defendants.

Harvest's and Mr. Lujan's Answer was admitted into evidence during the second trial, as Exhibit 26. (Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 5, 2018), attached hereto as Exhibit 3, at Vol. I of App. at H000014-H000029, at 169:25-170:17.)

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1	B. <u>Discovery.</u>
2	On April 14, 2016, Mr. Morgan propounded interrogatories on Harvest. ¹⁰ (See generally Ex.
3	4. ¹¹) The interrogatories included a request regarding the background checks Harvest performed
4	prior to hiring Mr. Lujan, (<i>id.</i> at 6:25-7:2), and a request regarding any disciplinary actions Harvest
5	had taken against Mr. Lujan in the five years preceding the accident which related to Mr. Lujan's
6	operation of a Harvest vehicle, (id. at 7:15-19). There were no interrogatories propounded upon
7	Harvest which concerned whether Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his
8	employment at the time of the accident. (See generally Ex. 4.)
9	On October 12, 2016, Harvest served its Responses to Mr. Morgan's Interrogatories. (See
10	generally Ex. 5. ¹²) Harvest answered Interrogatory No. 5, regarding the pre-hiring background
11	checks relating to Mr. Lujan, as follows:
12	Mr. Lujan was hired in 2009. As part of the qualification process, a
13	pre-employment DOT drug test was conducted as well as a criminal background screen and a motor vehicle record. Also, since he held a
14	CDL, an inquiry with past/current employers within three years of the date of application was conducted and were satisfactory. A DOT
15	physical medical certification was obtained and monitored for renewal as required. MVR was ordered yearly to monitor activity of personal
16	<i>driving history</i> and <i>always came back clear</i> . Required Drug and Alcohol Training was also completed at the time of hire and included
17	the effects of alcohol use and controlled substances use on an individual's health, safety, work environment and personal life, signs
18	of a problem with these and available methods of intervention.
19	(Id. at 3:2-19 (emphasis added).) Further, in response to Interrogatory No. 8, regarding past
20	disciplinary actions taken against Mr. Lujan, Harvest's response was "None." (Id. at 4:17-23
21	(emphasis added).) ¹³
22	///
23	¹⁰ Mr. Morgan also propounded interrogatories on Mr. Luign, but Mr. Luign failed to some one morgan Mr.
24	¹⁰ Mr. Morgan also propounded interrogatories on Mr. Lujan, but Mr. Lujan failed to serve any responses. Mr. Morgan never moved to compel Mr. Lujan to answer the interrogatories and never deposed Mr. Lujan.
25	¹¹ A true and correct copy of Pl.'s First Set of Interrogs. to Def. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC (Apr. 14, 2016) is attached as Exhibit 4, at Vol. 1 of App. at H000030-H000038.
26	¹² A true and correct copy of Def. Harvest Mgmt. Sub, LLC's Resps. to Pl.'s First Set of Interrogs. (Oct. 12, 2016) is attached as Exhibit 5, at Vol. I of App. at H000039-H000046.
27	¹³ Portions of Harvest's Responses to Mr. Morgan's Interrogatories were read to the jury during the second trial,
28	(Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 6, 2018), attached hereto as Exhibit 6, at Vol. I of App. at H000047-H000068, at 10:22-13:12).

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No other discovery regarding Harvest's alleged liability for negligent entrustment and/or
 respondeat superior was conducted by Mr. Morgan. In fact, Mr. Morgan never even deposed an
 officer, director, employee, or other representative of Harvest as a fact witness or a Nevada Rule of
 Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness.

C. <u>The First Trial.</u>

5

This case was first tried to a jury on November 6, 2017 through November 8, 2017. (See 6 generally Ex. 7¹⁴; Ex. 8.¹⁵) At the start of the first trial, when the Court asked the prospective jurors 7 if they knew any of the Parties or their counsel, the Court asked about Mr. Morgan. Plaintiff's 8 counsel, Mr. Lujan, and defense counsel. (Ex. 7, at 36:24-37:25.) No mention was made of Harvest, 9 10 and no objection was raised by Mr. Morgan. (Id.) Further, when the Court asked counsel to name their witnesses to determine if the prospective jurors were familiar with any witnesses, no officer. 11 director, employee, or other representative of Harvest was named as a potential witness. (Id. at 41:1-12 21.) 13

Mr. Morgan also never referenced Harvest, his express claim for negligent entrustment, or
his attempted claim for vicarious liability during voir dire or his opening statement. (*Id.* at 45:25121:20, 124:13-316:24; Ex. 9,¹⁶ at 6:4-29:1.) In fact, Harvest was not mentioned until the third day
of the first trial, while Mr. Lujan was on the witness stand. Mr. Lujan's relevant testimony is as
follows:

19	BY MR. BOYACK:	
20 Q: All right. Mr. Lujan, at the time of the accident in April of 2014, were you employed with Montara Meadows?	were you employed with Montara Meadows?	
21	A: Yes. Q. And what was your employment? A: I was the bus driver.	
22	Q: Okay. And what is your understanding of the relationship of Montara Meadows to Harvest Management?	
23	A: Harvest Management was our corporate office.	
24	Q: Okay. A: Montara Meadows is just the local	
25	(Ex. 8, at 108:23-109:8.)	
26		
~	¹⁴ Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 6, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 7, at Vol. II of App. at H000069-H000344.	
27	¹⁵ Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 8, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 8, at Vol. III of App. at H000345-H000357.	
28	¹⁶ Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 7, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 9, at Vol. III of App. at H000358-H000383.	

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1	Mr. Lujan also provided the only evidence during trial which was relevant to claims of either				
2	negligent entrustment or vicarious liability:				
3	Q: Okay. And isn't it true that you said to [Mr. Morgan's] mother you				
4	were sorry for this accident? A: Yes.				
5	Q: And that you were actually pretty worked up and crying after the accident?				
6	A: I don't know that I was crying. I was more concerned than I was crying				
7	Q: Okay. A: because I never been in an accident like that.				
8	(<i>Id.</i> at 111:16-24 (emphasis added).)				
9	Q: Okay. So this was a big accident?				
10	A: Well, it was for me <i>because I've never been in one in a bus</i> , so it was for me.				
11	(Id. at 112:8-10 (emphasis added).)				
12	After counsel for Mr. Morgan completed his examination of Mr. Lujan, the court permitted				
13	the jury to submit its own questions. A juror — not Mr. Morgan — asked Mr. Lujan:				
14	THE COURT: Where were you going at the time of the accident?				
15	THE WITNESS: I was coming back from lunch. I had just ended my lunch break.				
16	THE COURT: Any follow up? Okay. Sorry. Any follow up? MR. BOYACK: No, Your Honor.				
17	(Id. at 131:21-24, 132:18, 132:22-133:2 (emphasis added).)				
18	Later that day, the first trial ended prematurely as a result of a mistrial, when defense counsel				
19	inquired about a pending DUI charge against Mr. Morgan. (Id. at 150:15-152:14, 166:12-18.)				
20	D. <u>The Second Trial.</u>				
21	1. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest in His Introductory Remarks to				
22	the Jury.				
23	The second trial of this action commenced on April 2, 2018. (See generally Ex. 10.) The				
24	second trial was very similar to the first trial regarding the lack of reference to and the lack of				
25	evidence offered regarding Harvest. First, Harvest was not officially identified as a party when the				
26	court requested that counsel identify themselves and the Parties for the jury. In fact, counsel for the				
27	defense merely stated as follows:				
28	///				
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1 2 3	MR. GARDNER: Hello everyone. What a way to start a Monday, right? In my firm we've got myself, Doug Gardner and then Brett South, who is not here, but this is Doug Rands, and then my client, Erica ¹⁷ is right back here. Let's see, I think that's it for me.
4	(Id. at 17:15-18.) Mr. Morgan did not object or inform the prospective jurors that the case also
5	involved Harvest, or a corporate defendant, or even the employer of Mr. Lujan. (Id. at 17:19-24.)
6	When the Court asked the prospective jurors whether they knew any of the Parties or their
7	counsel, there was no mention of Harvest — only Mr. Lujan was named as a defendant:
8	THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Did you raise your hand, sir? No. Anyone else? Does anyone
9	know the plaintiff in this case, Aaron Morgan? And there's no response to that question. Does anyone know the plaintiff's attorney
10	in this case, Mr. Cloward? Any of the people he introduced? Any people on [<i>sic</i>] his firm? No response to that question.
11	Do any of you know the defendant in this case, David Lujan? There's no response to that question. Do any of you know Mr.
12	Gardner or any of the people he introduced, Mr. Rands? No response to that question.
13	
14	(Id. at 25:6-14 (emphasis added).) Again, consistent with his approach in the first trial and
15	throughout the remainder of this second trial, Mr. Morgan did not object or clarify that the case also
16	involved a claim against Mr. Lujan's employer, Harvest. (Id. at 25:15-22.)
17	Finally, when the Court asked the Parties to identify the witnesses they planned to call during
18	trial, no mention was made of any officer, director, employee, or other representative of Harvest —
19	not even the representative, Erica Janssen, who was attending trial. (Id. at 25:15-26:3.)
20	2. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest or His Claim for Negligent Entrustment/Vicarious Liability in Voir Dire or His Opening Statement.
21	Entrustment/ vicarious Liabinty in von Dire of tils Opening Statement.
22	Just as with the first trial, Mr. Morgan failed to reference Harvest or his claim for negligent
23	entrustment/vicarious liability during voir dire. (Id. at 33:2-93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex.
24	11, at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22.) Moreover, during Mr. Morgan's opening statement, Plaintiff's
25	counsel never made a single reference to Harvest, a corporate defendant, vicarious liability,
26	///
27	17 In the arrest trial Ma I wise share watth attend Ma Conduct's interdention and many I Tria. I
28	¹⁷ In the second trial, Mr. Lujan chose not to attend. Mr. Gardner's introduction referenced Erica Janssen, a representative of Harvest.
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1	negligent entrustment, or even the fact that there were two defendants in the action. (Ex. 11, at
2	126:7-145:17.) Plaintiff's counsel merely stated:
3	[MR. CLOWARD:] Let me tell you about what happened in this case. And this case starts off with the actions of Mr. Lujan, who's not here.
4 5	He's driving a shuttlebus. He worked for a retirement [indiscernible], shuttling elderly people. He's having lunch at Paradise Park, a park
6	here in town Mr. Lujan gets in his shuttlebus and it's time for him to get back to work. So he starts off. Bang. Collision takes place. He doesn't stop at the stop sign. He doesn't look left. He doesn't look
7	right.
8	(Id. at 126:15-25.) Plaintiff's counsel made no reference to any evidence to be presented during the
9	trial which would demonstrate that Mr. Lujan was acting in the course and scope of his employment
10	at the time of the accident or that Harvest negligently entrusted the vehicle to Mr. Lujan. (Id. at
11	126:7-145:17.)
12	3. The Only Evidence Offered and Testimony Elicited Demonstrated That
13	Harvest Was Not Liable for Mr. Morgan's Injuries.
14	On the fourth day of the second trial, Mr. Morgan called Erica Janssen, the Rule 30(b)(6)
15	representative of Harvest, as a witness during his case in chief. (Ex. 3, at 164:13-23.) Ms. Janssen
16	confirmed that it was Harvest's understanding that Mr. Lujan had been at a park in a shuttlebus
17	having lunch and that the accident occurred as he exited the park:
18 19	[MR. CLOWARD:] Q: And have you had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Lujan about what he claims happened?
20	[MS. JANSSEN:]
20	A: Yes. Q: So you are aware that he was parked in a park in his shuttle bus having lunch, correct?
22	A: <i>That's my understanding, yes.</i> Q: You're understanding that he proceeded to exit the park and head
22	east on Tompkins? A: Yes.
24	(<i>Id.</i> at 168:15-23 (emphasis added).)
25	Mr. Morgan never asked Ms. Janssen where she was employed, her title, whether Harvest
26	employed Mr. Lujan, what Mr. Lujan's duties were, or any other questions that might have elicited
27	evidence to support a claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Id. at 164:21-177:17;
28	///

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Ex. 6, at 4:2-6:1.) In fact, it wasn't until redirect examination that Mr. Morgan even referenced the 1 2 fact that Ms. Janssen was in risk management for Harvest: 3 [MR. CLOWARD:] Q: So where it says, on interrogatory number 14, and you can follow 4 along with me: 5 "Please provide the full name of the person answering the interrogatories on behalf of the Defendant, Harvest 6 Management Sub, LLC, and state in what capacity your [sic] are authorized to respond on behalf of said 7 Defendant. "A. Erica Janssen, Holiday Retirement, Risk 8 Management." 9 A: Yes. 10 (Ex. 6, at 11:18-25.) Other than this acknowledgement that Ms. Janssen executed interrogatory responses on behalf of Harvest, Mr. Morgan, again, failed to elicit any evidence on redirect 11 12 examination to support a claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Id. at 9:23-12:6, 13 13:16-15:6.) On the fifth day of the second trial, Mr. Morgan rested his case (id. at 55:6-7), again, with no 14 15 evidence presented to support a claim for vicarious liability or negligent entrustment - i.e., 16 evidence of Mr. Lujan's driving history; Harvest's knowledge of Mr. Lujan's driving history; disciplinary actions Harvest took against Mr. Lujan prior to the accident; background checks Harvest 17 performed on Mr. Lujan; alcohol and drug testing Harvest performed on Mr. Lujan; Mr. Lujan's job 18 duties; Harvest's policy regarding the use of company vehicles to drive to and from lunch; whether 19 20 Mr. Lujan was required to clock-in and clock-out during his shifts; or whether any residents of the 21 retirement home were passengers on the bus at the time of the accident, among other facts.¹⁸ 22 During the defense's case in chief - not Mr. Morgan's - defense counsel read portions of Mr. Lujan's testimony from the first trial into the record. (Id. at 195:7-203:12.) As referenced 23 above, this testimony included that: (1) Mr. Lujan worked as a bus driver for Montara Meadows at 24 25 the time of the accident; (2) Harvest was the "corporate office" for Montara Meadows; (3) the 26 18 It should be noted that despite the lack of evidence on these issues, Plaintiff's counsel stated, during his closing 27 argument, that there were no passengers on the bus at the time of the accident. (Ex. 12, at 124:15-17) ("That this

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company transporting our elderly members of the community is going to follow the rules of the road. Aren't we lucky

that there weren't other people on the bus? Aren't we lucky?") (emphasis added)).

This testimony, coupled with Ms. Janssen's testimony that Mr. Lujan was on his lunch break
at the time of the accident, is the complete universe of evidence offered at the second trial that even
tangentially concerns Harvest.

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4. There Are No Jury Instructions Pertaining to the Claim Against Harvest.

As Mr. Morgan points out in his Motion, the jury instructions provided to the jury included
the correct caption for this action and listed both Mr. Lujan and Harvest as defendants. (Ex. 13, at
1:6-12.) However, Mr. Morgan fails to disclose in his Motion that neither party submitted any jury
instructions *pertaining to vicarious liability, actions within the course and scope of employment, negligent entrustment, or corporate liability.* (See generally Ex. 13.)

Again, this is entirely consistent with Mr. Morgan's trial strategy. He all but ignored Harvest throughout the trial process.

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14 15 5. Mr. Morgan Failed to Include Harvest in the Special Verdict Form. 16 On the last day of trial, before commencing testimony for that day, the Court provided the 17 Parties with a sample jury form that the Court had used in its last car accident trial. 18 THE COURT: Take a look and see if – will you guys look at that verdict form? I know it doesn't have the right caption. I know it's just 19 the one we used the last trial. See if that looks sort of okay. MR. RANDS: Yeah. That looks fine. 20 THE COURT: I don't know if it's right with what you're asking for for damages, but it's just what we used in the last trial which was similar 21 sort of. 22 (Ex. 12, at 5:20-6:1 (emphasis added).) Later that same day, after the defense rested its case, 23 Plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that it only wanted to make one change to the special verdict 24 form that the Court had proposed: 25 MR. BOYACK: On the verdict form we just would like the past and future medical expenses and pain and suffering to be differentiated. 26 THE COURT: Yeah. Let me see. MR. BOYACK: Just instead of the general. 27 THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine. MR. BOYACK: Yeah. That's the only change. 28 THE COURT: That was just what we had laying around, so.

1 2	MR. BOYACK: Yeah. THE COURT: So you want – got it. Yeah. That looks great. I actually prefer that as well.	
	MR. BOYACK: Yeah. <i>That was the only modification</i> . THE COURT: That's better if we have some sort of issue.	
3	MR. BOYACK: Right.	
4		
5	(<i>Id.</i> at 116:11-23 (emphasis added).) The Special Verdict Form approved by Mr. Morgan — after	
6	his edits were accepted and incorporated by the Court — makes no mention of Harvest (which is	
7	entirely consistent with Mr. Morgan's trial strategy).	
8	Mr. Morgan asserts that the Special Verdict form simply "inadvertently omitted Harvest	
9	Management from the caption." (Mot. at 2:24-25.) This is disingenuous. Not only does the caption	
10	list Mr. Lujan as the sole defendant, (id. at Ex. 1, at 1:6-12), but:	
11	• The Special Verdict form only asked the jury to determine whether the "Defendant" was	
12	negligent, (<i>id.</i> at 1:17 (emphasis added));	
13	• The Special Verdict form did not ask the jury to find Harvest liable for anything, (<i>id</i> .);	
14	• The Special Verdict form directed the jury to apportion fault only between "Defendant" and	
15	Plaintiff, with the percentage of fault totaling 100 percent, (id. at 2:1-4 (emphasis added));	
16	and	
17	• Mr. Morgan never objected to the failure to apportion fault between Plaintiff and the <i>two</i>	
18	defendants, as is required by NRS 41.141, (id.).	
19	6. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest or His Claim Against Harvest in	
20	His Closing Arguments.	
21	Finally, in closing arguments, Plaintiff's counsel never even mentioned Harvest or Mr.	
22	Morgan's claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Ex. 12, at 121:5-136:19.)	
23	Plaintiff's counsel merely made references to the testimony of Erica Janssen and the fact that she: (1)	
24	contested liability; (2) blamed Mr. Morgan for the accident; (3) blamed an unknown third party for	
25	the accident; and (4) was unaware that Mr. Lujan had previously testified that Mr. Morgan had done	
26	nothing wrong and was not to blame for the accident. (Id. at 122:10-123:5.)	
27	///	
28	///	
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1 Further, and perhaps the clearest example of the impropriety of Mr. Morgan's Motion, 2 Plaintiff's counsel explained to the jury, in closing, how to fill out the Special Verdict form. His 3 remarks on liability were *limited exclusively to Mr. Lujan*: 4 So when you are asked to fill out the special verdict form there are a couple of things that you are going to fill out. This is what the form 5 will look like. Basically, the first thing that you will fill out is was the Defendant negligent. Clear answer is yes. Mr. Lujan, in his 6 testimony that was read from the stand, said that [Mr. Morgan] had the right of way, said that [Mr. Morgan] didn't do anything wrong. That's 7 what the testimony is. Dr. Baker didn't say that it was [Mr. Morgan's] fault. You didn't hear from any police officer that came in to say that 8 it was [Mr. Morgan's] fault. The only people in this case, the only people in this case that are blaming [Mr. Morgan] are the corporate 9 folks. They're the ones that are blaming [Mr. Morgan]. So was Plaintiff negligent? That's [Mr. Morgan]. No. And then from there 10 you fill out this other section. What percentage of fault do you assign each party? Defendant, 100 percent, Plaintiff, 0 percent. 11 BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 SFANISH RIDGE AVENUE LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89148-1302 702.562.8820 (Id. at 124:20-125:6 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff's counsel also failed to mention Harvest or the 12 13 claim alleged against Harvest in his rebuttal closing argument. (Id. at 157:13-161:10.) 14 III. LEGAL ARGUMENT 15 A. A Judgment Cannot Be Entered Against Harvest Because It Would Be Contrary to the Pleadings, Evidence, and Jury Instructions in This Case. 16 17 Mr. Morgan's primary argument in bringing this Motion is that the Court should enter judgment against Harvest "because such a result conforms to the pleadings, evidence, and jury 18 19 instructions upon which the jury relied in reaching the special verdict." (Mot. at 5:14-17; see also Id. at 2:23-24, 6:7.) However, Mr. Morgan fails to cite to a single piece of evidence or even a jury 20 21 instruction that would demonstrate that the jury intended to find Harvest liable for the claim alleged 22 in the Complaint. Rather, Mr. Morgan makes unsupported assertions that the claim of vicarious 23 liability was not contested at trial, (*id.* at 4:21-22), and that it was undisputed that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment with Harvest at the time of the accident, (id. at 24 25 2:21-23). 26 The record establishes that Mr. Morgan failed to meet his burden of proof as to any claim he 27 alleged (or attempted to allege) against Harvest. The record further establishes that Harvest cannot be liable for vicarious liability or negligent entrustment, as a matter of law, because Mr. Lujan was at 28 Page 14 of 26 2213

lunch when the accident occurred and he has no prior history of reckless or negligent driving.
 Finally, the record establishes that Mr. Morgan — whether through carelessness, a strategic trial
 decision, or acceptance of the futility of his claim — completely ignored Harvest and Harvest's
 alleged liability at trial and chose to focus solely on Mr. Lujan's liability and the amount of his
 damages. Thus, there is no factual basis for entry of judgment against Harvest.

6 7

28

1. Mr. Morgan Failed to Prove That Harvest Was Vicariously Liable for Mr. Lujan Injuries or Liable for Negligent Entrustment.

8 Mr. Morgan asserts that the issue of vicarious liability was not contested. (Mot. at 4:21-22.) 9 This is not true. Harvest contested liability for the only claim pled in the Complaint --- negligent 10 entrustment — and for the attempted claim of vicarious liability, by denying these allegations in its 11 Answer. (Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 9, 19-22; Ex. 2, at 2:8-9, 3:9-10.) Thus, as the plaintiff, Mr. Morgan bore the 12 burden of proving his claims against Harvest at trial. Porter v. Sw. Christian Coll., 428 S.W.3d 377, 13 381 (Tex. App. 2014) ("A plaintiff pleading respondeat superior bears the burden of establishing that 14 the employee acted within the course and scope of his employment."); Montague v. AMN 15 Healthcare, Inc., 168 Cal. Reptr. 3d 123, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) ("The plaintiff bears the burden 16 of proving that the employee's tortious act was committed within the scope of his or her 17 employment."); Willis v. Manning, 850 So. 2d 983, 987 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that the 18 plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a claim for negligent entrustment); Dukes v. McGimsev, 500 19 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) ("The plaintiff has the burden of proving negligent 20 entrustment of an automobile.") 21 Not only did Mr. Morgan fail to prove his claim, but the evidence adduced at trial actually 22 demonstrated that Harvest could not be liable for either vicarious liability or negligent entrustment. 23 Specifically, the undisputed evidence offered at trial proved that Mr. Lujan was at lunch at the time 24 of the accident and had never been in an accident before. (Ex. 3, at 168:15-23; Ex. 6, at 196:19-24, 25 197:8-10.) Such evidence prevents the imposition of a judgment against Harvest. J&C Drilling Co. v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1993), is instructive on this issue: 26 27 We reject appellees' contention that the issue of course and scope was not contested. Appellants' answer contained a

general denial, which put in issue all of the allegations of

appellees' petition, including the allegation that Gonzalez was acting in the course and scope of his employment with J&C. Because appellees had the burden of proof on this issue, it was not necessary for appellants to present evidence negating course and scope in order to contest the issue. In any event, as is discussed below, evidence was presented that Gonzalez was on a personal errand at the time of the accident, refuting the allegation that he was acting in the course and scope of his employment.

6 (*Id.* at 635).

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a. <u>Mr. Morgan Did Not Prove a Claim for Vicarious Liability, and Based</u> on the Sole Evidence Offered at Trial Which Relates to This Claim, No Judgment Can Be Entered Against Harvest.

While Mr. Morgan's Complaint states one claim for relief against Harvest entitled "Vicarious 9 Liability/Respondeat Superior," the allegations contained therein do not actually reflect a theory of 10 respondeat superior — i.e., that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment 11 with Harvest at the time of the accident. (See Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 15-22.) Rather, his claim was akin to a 12 claim for negligent entrustment, alleging that: (1) Mr. Lujan was employed as a driver for Harvest; 13 (2) Harvest entrusted him with the vehicle; (3) Mr. Lujan was an incompetent, inexperienced, and/or 14 reckless driver; and (4) Harvest actually knew, or should have known, of Mr. Lujan's inexperience 15 or incompetence. (See id.) 16

It is anticipated that Mr. Morgan will argue that one general allegation in his Complaint 17 which references the course and scope of employment was sufficient to state a claim for respondeat 18 superior. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Even assuming arguendo that Mr. Morgan alleged a claim for vicarious 19 liability, he failed to prove this claim at trial. Vicarious liability and/or respondeat superior applies 20 to an employer only when: "(1) the actor at issue was an employee[;] and (2) the action complained 21 of occurred within the course and scope of the actor's employment." Rockwell v. Sun Harbor 22 Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 1217, 1223, 1225-26, 925 P.2d 1175, 1179, 1180-81 (1996) (holding that an 23 employer is not liable if an employee's tort is an "independent venture of his own" and was "not 24 committed in the course of the very task assigned to him"") (quoting Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 25 86 Nev. 390, 391, 469 P.2d 399, 400 (1970)). 26

Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence as to Mr. Lujan's status at the time of the accident.
The *only* facts adduced at trial that are related to Mr. Lujan's employment were: (1) that Mr. Lujan

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was an employee of Montara Meadows (a bus driver); (2) that Mr. Lujan drove the bus to Paradise
 Park for a lunch break; (3) that the accident occurred as Mr. Lujan was exiting the park; and (3) that
 Harvest is the "corporate office" of Montara Meadows. (See Ex. 3, at 168:15-23; Ex. 6, at 195:8-17,
 195:25-196:10.)

Mr. Morgan failed to establish whether Mr. Lujan was "on the clock" during his lunch break,
whether Mr. Lujan had returned to work and was transporting passengers at the time of the accident,
whether Mr. Lujan had to "clock in" after his lunch break, whether Mr. Lujan was permitted to use a
company vehicle while on his lunch break, or whether Harvest Management even knew that Mr.
Lujan was using a company vehicle during his lunch breaks. Without developing these facts, there is
insufficient evidence, under Nevada law, to conclude that Mr. Lujan was acting in the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

12 Moreover, the evidence offered by Mr. Lujan and Harvest demonstrates that Harvest is not 13 vicariously liable for Mr. Morgan's injuries. Nevada has adopted the "going and coming rule." Under this rule, "[t]he tortious conduct of an employee in transit to or from the place of employment 14 15 will not expose the employer to liability, unless there is a special errand which requires driving." Molino v. Asher, 96 Nev. 814, 817-18, 618 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1980); see also Nat'l Convenience 16 Stores, Inc. v. Fantauzzi, 94 Nev. 655, 658, 584 P.2d 689, 691 (1978). The rule is premised upon the 17 idea that the "employment relationship is "suspended" from the time the employee leaves until he 18 19 returns, or that in commuting, he is not rendering service to his employer." Tryer v. Ojai Valley 20 Sch., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 471 P.2d 988, 990-91 (Cal. 1970)). 21

While the Nevada Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether an employer is
vicariously liable for an employee's actions during a lunch break, the express language of and policy
behind the "going and coming rule" suggests that an employee is not acting within the course and
scope of his employment when he commutes to and from lunch during a break from his
employment. Moreover, other jurisdictions have routinely determined that employers *are not liable for an employee's negligence during a lunch break*. See e.g., Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc.,
935 S.W. 2d 202, 212 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that an employer was not liable under respondeat

1 superior when its employee rear-ended the plaintiff while driving back from his lunch break in a 2 company vehicle because the test is not whether the employee is returning from his personal undertaking to "possibly engage in work" but rather whether the employee has "returned to the zone 3 4 of his employment" and engaged in the employer's business); *Richardson v. Glass*, 835 P.2d 835, 838 (N.M. 1992) (finding the employer was not vicariously liable for the employee's accident during 5 his lunch break because there was no evidence of the employer's control over the employee at the 6 7 time of the accident); Gordon v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 411 So. 2d 1094, 1098 8 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("Ordinarily, an employee who leaves his employer's premises and takes his 9 noon hour meal at home or some other place of his own choosing is outside the course of his 10 employment from the time he leaves the work premises until he returns.").

Because Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence proving that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident — and the only evidence regarding Mr. Lujan's actions at the time of the accident demonstrate that he was on a lunch break — as a matter of law, judgment cannot be entered against Harvest on a claim of vicarious liability.

b. <u>Mr. Morgan Also Failed to Prove to the Jury That Harvest Is Liable for</u> <u>Negligent Entrustment.</u>

While Mr. Morgan does not address the claim of negligent entrustment in his Motion, it bears
noting that he likewise failed to prove that Harvest was liable for the *sole claim actually alleged against it in the Complaint*. In Nevada, "a person who knowingly entrusts a vehicle to an
inexperienced or incompetent person" may be found liable for damages resulting therefrom. *Zugel by Zugel v. Miller*, 100 Nev. 525, 527, 688 P.2d 310, 312 (1984). To establish negligent
entrustment, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that an entrustment actually occurred; and (2) that the
entrustment was negligent. *Id.* at 528, 688 P.2d at 313.

It is true that Harvest conceded that Mr. Lujan was its employee and that it entrusted him with a vehicle — satisfying the first element of a negligent entrustment claim; however, the second element was contested and never proven to a jury. (Ex. 2, at 3:9-10.) Mr. Morgan offered no evidence of Harvest's negligence in entrusting Mr. Lujan with a company vehicle. He adduced no evidence that Mr. Lujan was an inexperienced or incompetent driver. In fact, the only evidence in

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the record relating to Mr. Lujan's driving history demonstrates that he has never been in an accident
 before. (See Ex. 6, at 196:19-24; 197:8-10).

Mr. Morgan also failed to offer any evidence regarding Harvest's knowledge of Mr. Lujan's
driving history. This is likely because Harvest's interrogatory responses demonstrated early in the
case that it thoroughly checked Mr. Lujan's background prior to hiring him, and Harvest's annual
check of Mr. Lujan's motor vehicle record "always came back clear." (Ex. 5, at 3:2-19.)

Because Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence at trial that Mr. Morgan was an
inexperienced or incompetent driver and that Harvest knew or should have known of his
inexperience or incompetence, the record fails to support entry of a judgment against Harvest for
negligent entrustment. In fact, the undisputed evidence offered by Mr. Lujan demonstrating that he
has never been in an accident before precludes entry of judgment against Harvest for negligent
entrustment.

2. The Record Belies Mr. Morgan's Contention That He Proceeded to Verdict Against Harvest.

15 Further undermining his current position, the record conclusively establishes that Mr. 16 Morgan made a conscious choice and/or strategic decision to abandon his claim against Harvest at 17 trial. Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest during the introductory remarks to the jury in which the 18 Parties and expected witnesses were introduced to the jury. (Ex. 10, at 17:2-24, 25:7-26:3.) Mr. 19 Morgan never mentioned Harvest to the jury during voir dire or examined prospective jurors about their feelings regarding corporate liability, negligent entrustment, or vicarious liability. (Id. at 33:2-20 93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex. 11, at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22.) Mr. Morgan never mentioned 21 22 Harvest, vicarious liability, negligent entrustment, or even corporate liability in his opening 23 statement. (Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17.) Mr. Morgan never offered a single piece of evidence or elicited any testimony from any witness which would prove the elements of either vicarious liability 24 or negligent entrustment. Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest, vicarious liability, negligent 25 26 entrustment, or corporate liability in his closing argument or rebuttal closing argument. (Ex. 12, at 27 121:4-136:19, 157:13-161:10.) Mr. Morgan failed to include questions relating to Harvest's liability or the apportionment of fault to Harvest in the Special Verdict form, despite requesting revisions to 28

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the damages question in the sample Special Verdict form proposed by the Court.¹⁹ (Ex. 12, at
 116:11-23; *see also* Mot. at Ex. 1.) Finally, Mr. Morgan failed to include a single jury instruction
 relating to vicarious liability, negligent entrustment, or corporate liability. (Ex. 13.)

For Mr. Morgan to claim that the omission of Harvest from the Special Verdict form was a 4 5 mere oversight or clerical error to be corrected by the Court is completely disingenuous. Mr. Morgan employed the same strategy for litigating his claims in the first trial — he chose to focus 6 7 solely on Mr. Lujan's liability for negligence. Harvest was not mentioned in the introductory remarks to the jurors, in voir dire, in opening statements, or in the examination of any witness. (Ex. 8 9 7, at 29:4-17, 36:24-37:25, 41:1-21, 45:25-121:20, 124:13-316:24; Ex. 9, at 6:4-29:1.) Thus, the 10 record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Morgan abandoned his claim against Harvest --- likely due to a lack of evidence. 11

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B. <u>Mr. Morgan's Alternative Request That Judgment Be Entered Against Harvest</u> <u>Pursuant to N.R.C.P. 49(a) Is Contrary to the Law and Must Be Denied.</u>

14 In the alternative, Mr. Morgan asks this Court to make an explicit finding, under Nevada 15 Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), that Harvest is jointly and severally liable for the jury's verdict 16 against Mr. Lujan. (See Mot. at 5:18-6:11.) N.R.C.P. 49(a) permits a court to submit a special 17 verdict form, or special interrogatories, to the jury. If a special verdict form is submitted to the jury and a particular "issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence" is omitted from the special 18 verdict form, "each party waives the right to a trial by jury of the issue omitted unless, before the 19 jury retires[,] the party demands its written submission to the jury." N.R.C.P. 49(a). If there are any 20 21 omitted issues for which a demand was not made by a party, "the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special 22 23 verdict." Id. Thus, the Court is permitted to make findings on omitted factual issues in order to avoid "the hazard of the verdict remaining incomplete and indecisive where the jury did not decide 24

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Mr. Morgan attempts to shift the blame to the Court for the Special Verdict form's omission of Harvest. (Mot. at 5:1-8.) While the Court did provide the Parties with a sample special verdict form that it had used in its most recent car accident case (completely unrelated to this action), the Court clearly expected counsel to apply the correct caption and make any other changes they wanted. (Ex. 12, at 5:20-6:1.) It is Mr. Morgan — not the Court — that is responsible for a special verdict form that pertains solely to Mr. Lujan.

every element of recovery or defense." 33 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 44:326, Omitted Issue—Substitute
 Finding By Court (June 2018).²⁰ However, N.R.C.P 49(a) does not permit the Court to decide the
 ultimate issue of liability or to enter judgment where there is a complete lack of evidence to support
 a judgment.

This Court need not look any further than *Kinnel v. Mid-Atlantic Mausoleums, Inc.*, 850 F.2d
958 (3rd Cir. 1988), to determine that Mr. Morgan's request is beyond the power of this Court and
completely contrary to clearly established case law. In *Kinnel*, the plaintiff brought claims against
two defendants — a corporate entity (Mid-Atlantic Mausoleum, Inc.) and an individual (Kennan) —
on the same claims for relief. *Id.* at 959. The court bifurcated the trial as to liability and damages. *Id.* During the trial on liability, the court submitted written interrogatories to the jury. *Id.* However,

11 the written interrogatories failed to include any questions regarding Kennan's individual liability.

12 *Id.* Thus, when the jury returned its verdict, it only found liability as to Mid-Atlantic Mausoleum.

Id. Nonetheless, the district court entered judgment against both defendants in its order and the jury
later determined damages against both defendants. *Id.* at 959-60.

15 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in entering

16 judgment against Kennan even though the claims against the defendants were indistinguishable and

17 *the jury subsequently determined damages against both defendants. Id.* at 960. In reversing the trial

18 court's entry of liability against Kennan, the Third Circuit drew a distinction between a court

19 supplying an omitted subsidiary finding (as intended by the rule) and a court supplanting the jury to

20 determine the ultimate liability of a party (which was never intended by the rule):

Rule 49(a) as we understand it, was designed to have the court supply an omitted subsidiary finding which would complete the jury's determination or verdict. For example, although we recognize that in this case no individual elements of a misrepresentation cause of action were specifically framed for the jury to answer, nevertheless, the district court could 'fill in' those subsidiary elements when the jury returned a verdict finding that Mid-Atlantic had misrepresented commission rates to Kinnel. Subsumed within that ultimate jury findings were the five elements of misrepresentation, i.e., materiality,

As the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure are closely based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Nevada courts consider federal cases interpreting the rules as strong persuasive authority. *Exec. Mgmt., Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.*, 118 Nev. 46, 53, 38 P.2d 872, 876 (2002); *Las Vegas Novelty, Inc. v. Fernandez*, 106 Nev. 113, 119, 787 P.2d 772, 776 (1990).

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deception, intent, reasonable reliance and damages, each of which could be deemed to have been supplied by the court in accordance with the jury's judgment once the jury's ultimate verdict was known.

That procedure of supplying a finding subsidiary to the ultimate verdict is a far cry, however, from a procedure whereby the court in the absence of a jury verdict, determines the ultimate liability of a party, as it did here. We have been directed to no authority which would permit the district court to act as it did here in depriving Kennan of his right to a jury verdict.

7 *Id.* at 965-66 (emphasis added). In refusing to make a finding as to the ultimate liability to the individual defendant, the Court declined to "enter the minds of the jurors to answer a question 8 9 F.2d 488, 490 (3rd Cir. 1975)).²¹ 10

Despite the fact that Rule 49(a) only applies to factual findings, and ultimate liability cannot be entered by a court under Rule 49(a),²² Mr. Morgan now invites reversible error by asking this

14 21 Stradley addressed a somewhat similar issue of an "omitted verdict." In Stradley, the complaint named two individual defendants, Frederick Cortez, Sr. and Frederick Cortez, Jr. 518 F.2d at 489. When the deputy clerk asked the 15 jury foreman about the verdict, the clerk only inquired if the jury found the *defendant* liable, and the clerk announced that the jury had found Cortez, Jr. liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 489-90. The jury foreman confirmed this 16 verdict. Id. at 490. Four years after the judgment was entered, the plaintiff moved to change the docket and enter judgment against both defendants, claiming that the deputy clerk's examination of the jury foreman was the only reason 17 the judgment was not entered against both defendants. Id. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, refusing to treat the judgment as a "clerical error." Id. The Third Circuit upheld that decision. Id. The Court held: 18 We believe that the jury/clerk colloquy, the verdict, and the entry of judgment set out in Stradley's motion, if anything, supports the defendant's position rather than 19 Stradley's. We cannot at this late stage overturn what appears to be a verdict consistent with the evidence presented on plaintiff's mere allegation that the jury 20 intended to do other than it did when it returned a verdict solely against Cortez, Jr. Stradley's claim that the jury never exonerated Senior and never indicated that its 21 findings of liability should relate only to Junior are not borne out by the verdict, the judgment, or the record at trial. 22 We have reviewed the record of the 1970 trial and have found no evidence that, at 23 the time of the accident, Cortez, Jr. was acting as the agent of or under the control of his father. While the defendants were not present or represented at trial, their 24 answer, specifically denying agency, was still of record. It was incumbent upon plaintiff to offer some evidence to prove the alleged agency relationship. 25 Id. at 495 (emphasis added). 26 22 See Williams v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 90-5394, 1992 WL 230148 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 8, 1992) (refusing to determine individual recovery by each plaintiff, under Rule 49(a), because the three plaintiffs were treated 27 jointly, and interchangeably, as the "plaintiff" throughout the case); Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 56 (2002) (holding that Rule 49(a) does not apply where "the jury is required to make determinations not only of issues of fact but 28 of ultimate liability").

Page 22 of 26

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Court to do exactly what *Kinnel* held it cannot: to enter judgment against Harvest. The jury never
 rendered such a verdict and the record fails to support entry of such a verdict.

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C.

<u>Mr. Morgan's Failure to Request Apportionment of Damages Between the</u> <u>Defendants Dooms His Current Request that Judgment Be Entered Against</u> <u>Harvest.</u>

5 Finally, even assuming *arguendo* Mr. Morgan had proved a claim of negligent entrustment or vicarious liability against Harvest (which he did not), and the Court had the power to add Harvest to 6 7 the jury's verdict under Rule 49(a) (which it does not), it still would be impossible to enter judgment 8 against Harvest in this case because Mr. Morgan failed to have the jury determine how to apportion 9 liability between the defendants. Specifically, Mr. Morgan asks this Court to find that Harvest is 10 jointly and severally liable for Mr. Lujan's conduct, (see Mot. at 6:7-11), despite the fact that 11 Nevada abolished joint and several liability in cases against multiple, negligent tortfeasors over 12 thirty years ago. See Warmbrodt v. Blanchard, 100 Nev. 703, 707-08, 692 P.2d 1282, 1285-86 13 (1984) (explaining that NRS 41.141 "eliminat[ed]" and "abolished" two common-law doctrines: (1) 14 a plaintiff's contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery; and (2) joint and several liability 15 against negligent defendants), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Countrywide 16 *Home Loans v. Thitchener*, 124 Nev. 725, 740-43 & n.39, 192 P.3d 243, 253-55 & n.39 (2008). 17 The law requires that "[i]n any action to recover damages for death or injury ... in which 18 comparative negligence is asserted as a defense [and] the jury determines the plaintiff is entitled to recover [damages], [the jury] shall return . . . [a] special verdict indicating the percentage of 19 negligence attributable to each party remaining in the action."²³ NRS 41.141(1), (2)(b)(2). If a 2021 plaintiff is entitled to recover against more than one defendant, then "*each defendant is severally* 22 liable to the plaintiff only for that portion of the judgment which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to that defendant."²⁴ NRS 41.141(4) (emphasis added). By way of 23 24

28 the Senate Judiciary Comm., 57th Leg. (Nev. April 6, 1973)).

The jury does not need to find that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent to trigger the application of NRS
 41.141; it is enough that a comparative negligence defense is asserted. See Piroozi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 100, 363 P.3d 1168, 1171 (2015). In this case, Mr. Lujan and Harvest collectively asserted a comparative negligence defense. (Ex. 2, at 3:16-21.)

 ²⁴ "[B]y abandoning joint and several liability against negligent defendants, the Legislature sought to ensure that a negligent defendant's liability would be limited to an amount proportionate with his or her fault." *Café Moda, LLC v. Palma,* 128 Nev. 78, 82, 272 P.3d 137, 140 (2012) (citing 1973 Nev. Stat., ch. 787, at 1722; Hearing on S.B. 524 Before

4 Here, Harvest and Mr. Lujan jointly asserted an affirmative defense of comparative 5 negligence. (Ex. 2, at 3:16-21.) Despite the fact that Mr. Morgan had alleged negligence-based claims against two defendants, he failed to ask the jury to apportion damages between Mr. Lujan and 6 7 Harvest as required by NRS 41.141. (See generally Mot. at Ex. 1.) Mr. Morgan has not (and 8 cannot) cite to any authority that allows the Court to now determine how to apportion liability 9 between the defendants (assuming there was a factual basis for entry of judgment against Harvest). Indeed, it would be completely contrary to N.R.C.P. 49(a) and *Kinnel* for the Court to find that any 10 portion of the jury's \$3 million verdict could be applied to Harvest because that would be a 11 determination of ultimate liability ---not a factual finding. 12

IV. CONCLUSION²⁵

Now, dissatisfied with his trial strategy, Mr. Morgan asks this Court to do what it cannot: to
enter liability against Harvest despite the complete lack of evidence to prove his claim for either
vicarious liability or negligent entrustment. Mr. Morgan's request is not only contrary to the record
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28 advanced in his Motion.

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^{26 &}lt;sup>25</sup> Given the brevity of Mr. Morgan's Motion, his lack of citations to the record, and his failure to truly analyze the evidence and procedure of this case, Harvest is concerned that Mr. Morgan may intend to file a lengthy reply that raises new arguments for the first time. Any attempt to do so would be entirely improper. But, out of an abundance of caution, should Mr. Morgan do so, Harvest reserves the right to request a surreply to address any arguments or evidence not

	1	in this action, but also to the purpose of Rule 49(a). Thus, it must be denied. Mr. Morgan of	hose to
	2	proceed against only Mr. Lujan at trial and he must now bear the burden of that choice.	
	3	DATED this 16 th day of August, 2018.	
	4	BAILEY * KENNEDY	
	5		
	6	By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u> Dennis L. Kennedy	
	7	Sarah E. Harmon Joshua P. Gilmore	
	8	ANDREA M. CHAMPION	
	9	Attorneys for Defendants HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB 1	LLC
	10		
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		Page 25 of 26 222) /

1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 16 th day of August,		
3	2018, service of the foregoing DEFENDANT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S		
4	OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION	FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT wa	is made by
5	mandatory electronic service through the Eighth	Judicial District Court's electronic f	iling system
6	and/or by depositing a true and correct copy in t	he U.S. Mail, first class postage prep	aid, and
7	addressed to the following at their last known ac	ldress:	
8	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER	Email:	
9 10	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER 1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220 Henderson, Nevada 89014	<i>Attorney for Defendant</i> DAVID E. LUJAN	
10	BENJAMIN P. CLOWARD	Email: Benjamin@richardharrislav	w.com
11	BRYAN A. BOYACK RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM	Bryan@richardharrislaw.co	om
12	801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
13	and		
15	MICAH S. ECHOLS Tom W. Stewart	Email: Mechols@maclaw.com Tstewart@maclaw.com	
16	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C.	Tstewart(a)maciaw.com	
17	1001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	Attorneys for Plaintiff AARON M. MORGAN	
18	Las Vegas, Nevada 67145		
19			
20	<u>/s/</u> En	<i>Josephine Baltazar</i> ployee of BAILEY ∜ KENNEDY	
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Josephine Baltazar

From: Sent: To: Subject: efilingmail@tylerhost.net Thursday, August 16, 2018 2:40 PM Josephine Baltazar Courtesy Notification for Case: A-15-718679-C; Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s); Envelope Number: 3011415

Courtesy Notification

Envelope Number: 3011415 Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)

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
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Case Number	A-15-718679-C
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)
Date/Time Submitted	8/16/2018 1:02 PM PST
Filing Type	EFileAndServe
Filing Description	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment
Activity Requested	Opposition - OPPS (CIV)
Filed By	Josephine Baltazar
Filing Attorney	Dennis Kennedy

Document Details		
Lead Document	18.08.16 Opp to Mot for Entry of Judgment.pdf	
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EXHIBIT 5

EXHIBIT 5

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	2	Dennis L. Kennedy Nevada Bar No. 1462	(A	terms, Arman			
		SARAH E. HARMON					
	3	Nevada Bar No. 8106 JOSHUA P. GILMORE					
	4	Nevada Bar No. 11576					
	5	ANDREA M. CHAMPION Nevada Bar No. 13461					
	-	BAILEY *KENNEDY					
	6	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302					
	7	Telephone: 702.562.8820					
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	9	JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com					
	10						
	11	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC					
EDY snue 8-1302	12	DISTRICT COURT					
JENN DGE AVI DGE AVI 8820 8820	13	CLARK COUNT	'Y, NEVADA				
Y ↔ K MISH RU S, NEVA 702.562.	14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,					
BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820	15	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-15-718679-C Dept. No. XI				
m ,	16	vs.					
	17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST					
	18	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE					
		BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive					
	19	jointly and severally,					
	20	Defendants.					
	21						
	22	NOTICE OF ENTRY OF O	RDER ON PLAINTIFF'S				
	23	MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT					
	23	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order on F	laintiff's Motion for Entry of	f Iudoment was			
	25	PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment was entered on November 28, 2018.					
	25 26	///					
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	28	///					
		Page 1	of 3	2228			



1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 28th day of		
3	November, 2018, service of the foregoing NOT	ICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER ON PLAINTIFF	'S
4	MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT wa	s made by mandatory electronic service through the	ne
5	Eighth Judicial District Court's electronic filing	system and/or by depositing a true and correct cop	,y
6	in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, and	addressed to the following at their last known	
7	address:		Í
8	BENJAMIN P. CLOWARD	Email: Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com	
9 10	BRYAN A. BOYACK RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	Bryan@richardharrislaw.com	
11	and		
12	MICAH S. ECHOLS	Email: Mechols@maclaw.com	
13	TOM W. STEWART MARQUIS AURBACH	Tstewart@maclaw.com	
14	COFFING P.C. 1001 Park Run Drive	Attorneys for Plaintiff	
15	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	AAROŃ M. MORGĂN	
16	DOUGLAS J. GARDNER	Email: dgardner@rsglawfirm.com	
17	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER 1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220	Attorney for Defendant	
18	Henderson, Nevada 89014	DAVID É. LUĴAN	
19			
20	<u>/s/</u> En	<i>Josephine Baltazar</i> pployee of BAILEY ∜ KENNEDY	
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Electronically Filed 11/28/2018 11:31 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT 1 ORDR **DENNIS L. KENNEDY** 2 Nevada Bar No. 1462 SARAH E. HARMON 3 Nevada Bar No. 8106 JOSHUA P. GILMORE 4 Nevada Bar No. 11576 ANDREA M. CHAMPION 5 Nevada Bar No. 13461 **BAILEY KENNEDY** 6 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 7 Telephone: 702.562.8820 Facsimile: 702.562.8821 8 DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com 9 JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com 10 Attorneys for Defendant 11 HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC 12 DISTRICT COURT 13 CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 14 AARON M. MORGAN, individually, Case No. A-15-718679-C 15 Dept. No. 🏼 🛪 Plaintiff, 16 VS. 17 DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST **ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR** MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited-**ENTRY OF JUDGMENT** 18 Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE **BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive** 19 jointly and severally, Date of Hearing: November 6, 2018 Time of Hearing: 9:00 A.M. 20 Defendants. 21 On November 6, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., the Motion for Entry of Judgment came before the 22 Court. Tom W. Stewart of Marquis Aurbach Coffing P.C. and Bryan A. Boyack of Richard Harris 23 Law Firm appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Aaron Morgan and Dennis L. Kennedy, Sarah E. Harmon, 24 25 and Andrea M. Champion of Bailey Kennedy appeared on behalf of Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC. 26 /// 27 28 11-26-18A10:41 RCVD 2231 Page 1 of 2

The Court, having examined the briefs of the parties, the records and documents on file, and 1 2 having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, HEREBY ORDERS that the Motion for Entry of Judgment shall be, and hereby is, 3 DENIED. 4 DATED this 26 day of November 5 , 2018. 6 7 DIS RT JUDGE 8 9 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: 10 BAILEY *****KENNEDY, LLP MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C. 11 By: By: 12 MICAH S. ECHOLS Dí INIS L. KENNEDY SARAH E. HARMON TOM W. STEWART 13 1001 Park Run Drive JOSHUA P. GILMORE ANDREA M. CHAMPION Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 14 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Attorneys for Plaintiff Aaron Morgan Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 15 Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2232 Page 2 of 2

Josephine Baltazar

From:	efilingmail@tylerhost.net
Sent:	Wednesday, November 28, 2018 2:48 PM
То:	BKfederaldownloads
Subject:	Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Notice of Entry of Order - NEOJ (CIV), Envelope Number:
	3496877

Notification of Service



Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3496877

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	Filing Details
Case Number	A-15-718679-C
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)
Date/Time Submitted	11/28/2018 2:46 PM PST
Filing Type	Notice of Entry of Order - NEOJ (CIV)
Filing Description	Notice of Entry of Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment
Filed By	Josephine Baltazar
	Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (j <u>meacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC: Sarah Harmon (<u>sharmon@baileykennedy.com</u>) Dennis Kennedy (<u>dkennedy@baileykennedy.com</u>) Joshua Gilmore (jgilmore@baileykennedy.com) Bailey Kennedy, LLP (<u>bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com</u>)
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Michelle Monkarsh (<u>mmonkarsh@maclaw.com</u>)

Document Details					
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EXHIBIT 6

EXHIBIT 6

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TRAN

DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA * * * * *

AARON MORGAN

I	Plaintiff		CASE NO.	A-15-718679-C
VS.		•		
v.ə.•		•	DEPT. NO. XI	
DAVID LUJAN, e	et al.	•		
_		•	Transcrip	
L	Defendants	•	Proceedir	ngs

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH GONZALEZ, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

HEARING ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 2018

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

BRYAN A. BOYACK, ESQ. Thomas W. Stewart, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

DENNIS L. KENNEDY, ESQ. SARAH E. HARMON, ESQ. ANDREA M. CHAMPION, ESQ.

COURT RECORDER:

TRANSCRIPTION BY:

JILL HAWKINSFLORENCE HOYTDistrict CourtLas Vegas, Nevada 89146

Proceedings recorded by audio-visual recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

1 employee, discusses the facts of the accident. Never does she bring up on cross or direct examination he was on a break, we 2 3 aren't on the hook here, or any assertion of that. So this is 4 kind of after the fact them trying to escape the clear 5 liability that was presented, although it wasn't stated on the special verdict form, defendant Lujan, defendant Harvest 6 7 Management. It was the defendant. 8 THE COURT: Is there any instruction on either 9 negligent entrustment or vicarious liability in the pack of 10 jury instructions? MR. BOYACK: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. Thanks. 13 The motion's denied. While there is a inconsistency 14 in the caption of the jury instructions and the special 15 verdict form, there does not appear to be any additional 16 instructions that would lend credence to the fact that the 17 claims against defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC were 18 submitted to the jury. So if you would submit the judgment 19 which only includes the one defendant, I will be happy to sign it, and then you all can litigate the next step, if any, 20 21 related to the other defendant. 22 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. STEWART: 23 MR. BOYACK: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 MR. KENNEDY: And just for purposes of 25 clarification, that judgment will say that the claims against

9

Harvest Management are dismissed? THE COURT: It will not, Mr. Kennedy. MR. KENNEDY: Okay. Well, I'll just have to file a motion. THE COURT: That's why I say we have to do something next. MR. KENNEDY: Okay. I'm happy to do that. THE COURT: I'm going one step at a time. THE PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 9:13 A.M. * * * * *

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT FROM THE AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER.

AFFIRMATION

I AFFIRM THAT THIS TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT CONTAIN THE SOCIAL SECURITY OR TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER OF ANY PERSON OR ENTITY.

FLORENCE HOYT Las Vegas, Nevada 89146

Unexce M. Hoy


FLORENCE M. HOYT, TRANSCRIBER

1/17/19

DATE

EXHIBIT 7

EXHIBIT 7



Case Number: A-15-718679-C

•			, <u>,</u>				
	1	JUDGMENT UPON THE JURY VERDICT					
	2	This action came on for trial before the Court and the jury, the Honorable Linda Marie					
	3	Bell, District Court Judge, presiding, ¹ and the issues having been duly tried and the jury having					
	4	duly rendered its verdict. ²					
LAW FIRM	5	IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that PLAINTIFF, AARON M. MORGAN, have a					
	6	recovery against DEFENDANT, DAVID E. LUJAN, for the following sums:					
	7	Past Medical Expenses	senses \$208,480.00				
	8	Future Medical Expenses		+\$1,156,500.00			
	.9	Past Pain and Suffering		+\$116,000.00			
	10	Future Pain and Suffering		+\$1,500,000.00			
	11	Total Damages		\$2,980,980.00			
	12	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that AARON M. MORGAN's past					
	13	damages of \$324,480 shall bear Pre-Judgment interest in accordance with Lee v. Ball, 121 Nev.					
	14	391, 116 P.3d 64 (2005) and NRS 17.130 at the rate of 5.00% per annum plus 2% from the date					
	15	of service of the Summons and Complaint on May 28, 2015, through the entry of the Special					
	16	Verdict on April 9, 2018:					
Ì	17	PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON PAST DAMAGES:					
•	18	05/28/15 through 04/09/18 = \$65,402.72					
	19	[(1,051 days) at (prime rate (5.00%) plus 2 percent = 7.00%) on \$324,480 past damages]					
	20	[Pre-Judgment Interest is approximately \$62.23 per day]					
	21	PLAINTIFF'S TOTAL JUDGMENT					
	22	Plaintiff's total judgment is as follows:					
	23	Total Damages:	\$2,980,980.00				
	24	Prejudgment Interest:	\$65,402.72				
	25	TOTAL JUDGMENT	\$3,046,382.72				
	26	¹ This case was reassigned to the Honora	ble Elizabeth Gonzalez, Distric	t Court Judge, in July 2018.			
	27	² See Special Verdict filed on April 9, 2018, attached as Exhibit 1.					
	28						
			Page 1 of 2	00.40			

RICHARD HARRIS

Page 1 of 2

Now, THEREFORE, Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict in favor of the Plaintiff is as 1 2 follows: PLAINTIFF, AARON M. MORGAN, is hereby awarded \$3,046,382.72 against 3 DEFENDANT, DAVID E. LUJAN, which shall bear post-judgment interest at the adjustable 4 legal rate from the date of the entry of judgment until fully satisfied. Post-judgment interest at 5 the current 7.00% rate accrues interest at the rate of \$584.24 per day. 6 Dated this $(\mathcal{L} day of) \mathcal{QC}$, 2018. 7 8 9 H GONZALEZ COURT JUDGE 10 TRIC D **AENT 11** 11 **MRICHARD HARRIS** LAW FIRM 12 13 Respectfully Submitted by: Dated this 27th day of December, 2018. 14 15 MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 16 17 Bý Micah S. Echols, Esq. 18 Nevada Bar No. 8437 Tom W. Stewart, Esq. 19 Nevada Bar No. 14280 10001 Park Run Drive 20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan 21 22 [CASE NO. A-15-718679-C-JUDGMENT UPON THE JURY VERDICT] 23. 24 25 26 27 28 Page 2 of 2 2243

Exhibit 1

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· ·	DISTRICT	COURT	APR-9	2010 2010
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1	CLARK COUNT	I, NEVADA	T'M. BROWN, E	UU
		CASE NO	: A-15-718679-C	TUTY
		DEPT, NO): VII	
AARON MORGAN',				
Plaintiff	f,			
vs.				
DAVID LUJAN,				u.
1			,	
l Defenda	nt			
Defenda	nt.			
Defenda				
(SPECIAL V	•	lowing special ve	erdict
(SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio	•	llowing special ve	erdict
We, the jury questions submitted to	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio	•	llowing special ve	erdict
We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1:	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us:	•	lowing special ve	erdict
We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1: ANSWER:	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us: Was Defendant negligent?	n, find the fol		erdict
We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1: ANSWER: If you answere	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us: Was Defendant negligent? Yes	n, find the fol No		erdict
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We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1: ANSWER: If you answere QUESTION NO.2: ANSWER: If you answere If you answere If you answere	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us: Was Defendant negligent? Yes ed no, stop here. Please sign a ed yes, please answer question Was Plaintiff negligent? Yes ed yes, please answer question	n, find the fol No and return this v n no. 2. No n no. 3.	Perdict.	
We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1: ANSWER: If you answere QUESTION NO.2: ANSWER: If you answere If you answere If you answere	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us: Was Defendant negligent? Yes ed no, stop here. Please sign a ed yes, please answer question Was Plaintiff negligent? Yes ed yes, please answer question	n, find the fol No and return this v n no. 2. No n no. 3.	A-15-718679-C	
We, the jury questions submitted to QUESTION NO. 1: ANSWER: If you answere QUESTION NO.2: ANSWER: If you answere If you answere If you answere	SPECIAL V in the above-entitled actio o us: Was Defendant negligent? Yes ed no, stop here. Please sign a ed yes, please answer question Was Plaintiff negligent? Yes ed yes, please answer question	n, find the fol No and return this v n no. 2. No n no. 3.	Verdiçt. A – 15 – 718679 – C SJV Special Jury Verdict 4738215	erdict

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1	QUESTION NO. 3: What p	~	u assign to each party?
2	Defendant:	<u> </u>	
3	Plaintiff:	1008/	
4		100%	
5	Please answer question 4 with		· ·
6	•		as the total amount of Plaintiff's damages?
7	-		r to question 3, if you answered question 3.
8	The Court will perform this ta	(SK.)	-
9	Past Medical E	Expenses	\$ 208, 480.
10 11	Future Medica	l Expenses	\$ 1, 156, 500.00
11	Past Pain and S		s <u>208, 480</u> . s <u>1, 156, 500</u> . <u>s</u> <u>116,000</u> , <u>ee</u> <u>s</u> <u>1, 500,000</u> . <u>s</u> <u>2, 980, 980</u> . <u>eo</u>
13	Future Pain and		\$ 1.500.000.
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15	TOTAL		<u>s 2, 980, 180 .</u>
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18	· ·		$ \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} \mathcal{A} $
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Reception

From:efilingmail@tylerhost.netSent:Monday, December 17, 2018 10:02 AMTo:BKfederaldownloadsSubject:Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David
Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Judgment on Jury Verdict - JGJV (CIV), Envelope Number:
3581119

Notification of Service



Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3581119

This is a notification of service for the filing listed. Please click the link below to retrieve the submitted document.

	Filing Details
Case Number	A-15-718679-C
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)
Date/Time Submitted	12/17/2018 10:00 AM PST
Filing Type	Judgment on Jury Verdict - JGJV (CIV)
Filing Description	Judgment Upon the Jury Verdict
Filed By	Peter Floyd
	Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (<u>imeacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC: Sarah Harmon (<u>sharmon@baileykennedy.com</u>) Dennis Kennedy (<u>dkennedy@baileykennedy.com</u>) Joshua Gilmore (<u>jgilmore@baileykennedy.com</u>) Bailey Kennedy, LLP (<u>bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com</u>)
	Andrea Champion (achampion@baileykennedy.com)

Other Service Contacts not associated with a party on the case:
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Michelle Monkarsh (<u>mmonkarsh@maclaw.com</u>)

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
EXHIBIT 8

EXHIBIT 8


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4	Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 Telephone: (702) 382-0711		
5	Facsimile: (702) 382-5816 mechols@maclaw.com		
6	tstewart@maclaw.com		
7	Richard Harris Law Firm Benjamin P. Cloward, Esq.		
8	Nevada Bar No. 11087		
9	Bryan A. Boyack, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9980		
10	801 South Fourth Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
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12	Benjamin@RichardHarrisLaw.com Bryan@RichardHarrisLaw.com		
13	Attorneys for Plaintiff, Aaron Morgan		
14	DISTRICT	COURT	
15	CLARK COUN	TY, NEVADA	L
16	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,		
17	Plaintiff,	Case No.:	A-15-718679-C XI
18	vs.	Dept. No.:	AI
19	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST		
20	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE		
21	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive jointly and severally,		
22	Defendants.	-	
23			
24	NOTICE OI	F APPEAL	
25	Plaintiff, Aaron M. Morgan, by and thro	ugh his attorn	eys of record, Marquis Aurbach
26	Coffing and the Richard Harris Law Firm, hereby	appeals to the	Supreme Court of Nevada from:
27	(1) the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion fo	r Entry of J	udgment, which was filed on
28			
	Page 1	of 3	MAC:1 262-50 604743_1
	Case Number: A-15-71867	'9-C	

MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING 10001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 (702) 382-0711 FAX: (702) 382-5816



MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING



MAROUIS AURBACH COFFING

Exhibit 1

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		Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT
1	ORDR	
T	Dennis L. Kennedy	Atump, Dour
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462	
_	SARAH E. HARMON	
3	Nevada Bar No. 8106	
	Joshua P. Gilmore	
4	Nevada Bar No. 11576	
	Andrea M. Champion	
5	Nevada Bar No. 13461	
	BAILEY KENNEDY	
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9	SHarmon@BaileyKennedy.com	
9	JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com	
10	Achampion@DancyRennedy.com	
	Attorneys for Defendant	
11	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
12	DISTRICT	COURT
10		
13	CLARK COUN	ry, nevada
14	A ADONING MODICANI in dissidually	CPT OF NO.
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	Case No. A-15-718679-C
15	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. $473-718079-C$
10	1 101110111,	
16	vs.	· ·
	•	
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
10	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited-	ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
18	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE	
10	BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	
19	jointly and severally,	Date of Hearing: November 6, 2018
20	Defendents	Time of Hearing: 9:00 A.M.
20	Defendants.	
21		
21		
22	On November 6, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., the Mot	ion for Entry of Judgment came before the
23	Court. Tom W. Stewart of Marquis Aurbach Coffir	ng P.C. and Bryan A. Boyack of Richard Harris
24	Law Firm appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Aaron Mo	rgan and Dennis L. Kennedy, Sarah E. Harmon,
0.5	and Andrea M. Champion of Delland Konneder and	
25	and Andrea M. Champion of Bailey Kennedy app	eared on benall of Defendant Harvest
26	Management Sub LLC.	
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	11-26-18AT0:47 RCV9 Page 1	of 2 2254
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The Court, having examined the briefs of the parties, the records and documents on file, and 1 2 having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, 3 HEREBY ORDERS that the Motion for Entry of Judgment shall be, and hereby is, DENIED. 4 DATED this 26 day of November ,2018. 5 6 7 CONRT JUDGE DISTRICT 8 9 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: 10 MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C. BAILEY *****KENNEDY, LLP 11 By: By: 12 MICAH S. ECHOLS D KENNEDY NNIS L SARAH E. HARMON TOM W. STEWART 13 JOSHUA P. GILMORE 1001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 ANDREA M. CHAMPION 14 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Attorneys for Plaintiff Aaron Morgan Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 15 Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2255 Page 2 of 2

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Exhibit 2

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		Steven D. Grierson
1		CLERK OF THE COURT
1	ORDR Dennis L. Kennedy	Atump. Anno
2	Nevada Bar No. 1462	
	SARAH E. HARMON	
3	Nevada Bar No. 8106	
4	JOSHUA P. GILMORE	
	Nevada Bar No. 11576 Andrea M. Champion	
5	Nevada Bar No. 13461	
	BAILEY *KENNEDY	
6	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue	
7	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 Telephone: 702.562.8820	
,	Facsimile: 702.562.8821	
8	DKennedy@BaileyKennedy.com	
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9	JGilmore@BaileyKennedy.com AChampion@BaileyKennedy.com	
10	A champion@Dancyiteimedy.com	
	Attorneys for Defendant	
11	HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC	
12	DISTRICT	COURT
13	CLARK COUN	ΓY, NEVADA
14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,	APT CLNON
		Case No. A-15-718679-C
15	Plaintiff,	Dept. No. 🆛 🔨
16	~~~	
10	VS.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
10	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited-	ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
18	Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	· .
19	jointly and severally,	Date of Hearing: November 6, 2018
		Time of Hearing: 9:00 A.M.
20	Defendants.	•
21		
<i>L</i> , 1		
22	On November 6, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., the Mot	ion for Entry of Judgment came before the
22	Court. Tom W. Stewart of Marquis Aurbach Coffir	a P C and Bryan A Boyack of Richard Harris
. 23.	Court. Tom w. Stewart of Marquis Auroach Corm	ig i .e. and Diyan A. Doyack of Kichard Hairis
24	Law Firm appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Aaron Mc	rgan and Dennis L. Kennedy, Sarah E. Harmon,
0.5	and Andrea M. Chammion of Dailant Variation	aread on hoholf of Defendant Harrist
25	and Andrea M. Champion of Bailey �Kennedy app	caled off benan of Defendant Harvest
26	Management Sub LLC.	
27		
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	11-25-18AT0:47 RCVD Page 1	of 2 2257

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The Court, having examined the briefs of the parties, the records and documents on file, and 1 2 having heard argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing, HEREBY ORDERS that the Motion for Entry of Judgment shall be, and hereby is, 3 4 DENIED. DATED this 26 day of November , 2018. 5 6 7 RT JUDGE DISTF 8 9 Respectfully submitted by: Approved as to form and content by: 10 BAILEY * KENNEDY, LLP MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C. 11 By: By: 12 D MICAH S. ECHOLS NIS L. KENNEDY SARAH E. HARMON TOM W. STEWART 13 1001 Park Run Drive JOSHUA P. GILMORE Las Vegas, Nevada 89145 ANDREA M. CHAMPION 14 Attorneys for Plaintiff Aaron Morgan 8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 15 Attorneys for Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2258 Page 2 of 2

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Josephine Baltazar

From:	efilingmail@tylerhost.net
Sent:	Tuesday, December 18, 2018 4:59 PM
То:	BKfederaldownloads
Subject:	Notification of Service for Case: A-15-718679-C, Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) for filing Notice of Appeal - NOAS (CIV), Envelope Number: 3593124

Notification of Service



Case Number: A-15-718679-C Case Style: Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s) Envelope Number: 3593124

This is a notification of service for the filing listed. Please click the link below to retrieve the submitted document.

	Filing Details
Case Number	A-15-718679-C
Case Style	Aaron Morgan, Plaintiff(s)vs.David Lujan, Defendant(s)
Date/Time Submitted	12/18/2018 4:58 PM PST
Filing Type	Notice of Appeal - NOAS (CIV)
Filing Description	Notice of Appeal
Filed By	Peter Floyd
	Lisa Richardson (<u>Irichardson@rsglawfirm.com</u>) Jennifer Meacham (<u>jmeacham@rsglawfirm.com</u>)
Service Contacts	Harvest Management Sub LLC: Sarah Harmon (<u>sharmon@baileykennedy.com</u>) Dennis Kennedy (<u>dkennedy@baileykennedy.com</u>) Joshua Gilmore (<u>jgilmore@baileykennedy.com</u>) Bailey Kennedy, LLP (<u>bkfederaldownloads@baileykennedy.com</u>)
	Andrea Champion (achampion@baileykennedy.com)


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
EXHIBIT 9

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	2	Nevada Bar No. 1462 Sarah E. Harmon		
	3	Nevada Bar No. 8106		
	4			
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	6	8984 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302		
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	10			
EDY NUE -1302	11	Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC		
	12	DISTRICT COURT		
CENNEDY DGE AVENUE ND 89148-1302 8820	13	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA		
Y V KEN NISH RIDGE / NEVADA 8 702.562.8820	14	AARON M. MORGAN, individually,		
BAILEY & KENNEDY 8984 Spanish Rudeb Avenue 148 Vegas, Nevada 89148-1302 702.562.8820	15	Plaintiff,	Case No. A-15-718679-C Dept. No. XI	
₩ ~+	16	vs.		
	17	DAVID E. LUJAN, individually; HARVEST	DEFENDANT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC'S MOTIO	N
	18	MANAGEMENT SUB LLC; a Foreign-Limited- Liability Company; DOES 1 through 20; ROE	FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT	
		BUSINESS ENTITIES 1 through 20, inclusive	Hearing Date:	
	19	jointly and severally,	Hearing Time:	
	20	Defendants.		
	21			
	22	Defendant Harvest Management Sub LLC ("Harvest"), hereby requests that the Court enter		
	23	judgment in favor of Harvest on any and all claims for relief alleged by Plaintiff Aaron Morgan		
	24	("Mr. Morgan") in this action. (A proposed Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) Mr. Morgan		
	25	failed to present any evidence in support of his claims, failed to refute the defendants' evidence		
	26	offered in defense of these claims, failed to submit these claims to the jury for determination, and		
	27	has ostensibly chosen to abandon his claims against Harvest.		
	28			
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			2202	



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1	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES		
2	I. INTRODUCTION		
3	Although there is some confusion as to what cause of action Mr. Morgan asserted against		
4	Harvest in this action — negligent entrustment or vicarious liability — there is no dispute that at the		
5	recent trial of this matter, Mr. Morgan wholly failed to pursue — and in fact appears to have		
6	abandoned — his claim for relief against Harvest. Specifically:		
7	• He did not reference Harvest in his introductory remarks to the jury regarding the		
8	identity of the Parties and expected witnesses, (Ex. 10, ¹ at 17:2-24, 25:7-26:3);		
9	• He did not mention Harvest or his claim against Harvest during jury voir dire, (id. at		
10	33:2-93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex. 11, ² at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22);		
11	• He did not reference Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his opening statement,		
12	(Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17);		
13	• He offered no evidence regarding Harvest's liability for his damages;		
14	• He did not elicit any testimony from any witness that could have supported his claim		
15	against Harvest;		
16	• He did not reference Harvest or his claim against Harvest in his closing argument or		
17	rebuttal closing argument, (Ex. 12, ³ at 121:4-136:19, 157:13-161:10);		
18	• He did not include his claim against Harvest in the jury instructions, (Ex. 13 ⁴); and		
19	• He did not include Harvest in the Special Verdict Form, never asked the jury to assess		
20	liability against Harvest, and, in fact, gave the jury no option to find Harvest liable for		
21	anything, (Ex. 14 ⁵).		
22			
23	¹ Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 2, 2018) are attached as Exhibit 10, at Vol. III of App. at H384-H619.		
24	² Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 3, 2018) are attached as Exhibit 11, at Vol. IV of App. at H620-H748.		
25	³ Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 9, 2018) are attached hereto as Exhibit 12, at Vol. IV		
26	of App. at H749-H774. A true and correct copy of the Jury Instructions (Apr. 9, 2018) is attached as Exhibit 13, at Vol. IV of App. at		
27	H775-H814.		
28	A true and correct copy of the Special Verdict (Apr. 9, 2018) is attached as Exhibit 14, at Vol. IV of App. at H815-816.		
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In addition to abandoning his claims against Harvest, Mr. Morgan also failed to refute the
 evidence offered by the defendants at trial which established that Harvest could not, as a matter of
 law, be liable for either negligent entrustment or vicarious liability — specifically, (1) David Lujan's
 ("Mr. Lujan") testimony that he was on a lunch break when the accident occurred; and (2) Mr.
 Lujan's testimony that he had never been in an accident before.

Given the lack of *any* evidence offered at trial against Harvest, Mr. Morgan's claims against
Harvest should be dismissed with prejudice and judgment should be entered in favor of Harvest as to
Mr. Morgan's express claim for negligent entrustment and his implied claim for vicarious liability.

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II. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. <u>The Pleadings.</u>

11 On May 20, 2015, Mr. Morgan filed a Complaint against Mr. Lujan and Harvest. (See generally Ex. 1⁶.) The only claim alleged against Harvest in the Complaint is captioned "Vicarious 12 13 Liability/Respondent Superior," but the allegations of the claim are more akin to a claim for 14 negligent entrustment. (Id. at ¶ 15-22 (alleging that Harvest negligently entrusted the vehicle to 15 Mr. Lujan despite the fact that it knew or should have known that Mr. Lujan was an incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless driver).) Further, the cause of action fails to allege that Mr. Lujan was 16 acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. (Id.) Rather, the 17 only reference to "course and scope" in the entire Complaint is as follows: 18 19 On or about April 1, 2014, Defendants, [sic] were the owners,

employers, family members[,] and/or operators of a motor vehicle, while in the *course and scope of employment* and/or family purpose and/or other purpose, which was *entrusted* and/or driven in such a negligent and careless manner so as to cause a collision with the vehicle occupied by Plaintiff.

23 (Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).)

24 On June 16, 2015, Mr. Lujan and Harvest filed Defendants' Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.

25 (See generally Ex. 2.⁷) The Defendants denied Paragraph 9 of the Complaint, including the

A true and correct copy of Defs.'Answer to Pl.'s Compl. (June 16, 2015) is attached as Exhibit 2, at Vol. I of App. at H007-H013.

A true and correct copy of the Complaint (May 20, 2015) is attached as Exhibit 1, at Vol. I of App. at H001 H006.

1 purported allegation that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the 2 time of the accident. (Ex. 1, at \P 9; Ex. 2, at 2:8-9.) Harvest admitted that it employed Mr. Lujan as 3 a driver, that it owned the vehicle involved in the accident, and that it had entrusted control of the vehicle to Mr. Lujan. (Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 16-18; Ex. 2, at 3:7-8.) However, Harvest denied that: (i) Mr. 4 Lujan was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of the vehicle; (ii) it knew or 5 should have known that he was incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless in the operation of motor 6 7 vehicles; (iii) Mr. Morgan was injured as a proximate consequence of Harvest's alleged negligent 8 entrustment of the vehicle to Mr. Lujan; and (iv) Mr. Morgan suffered damages as a direct and proximate result of Harvest's alleged negligent entrustment of the vehicle to Mr. Lujan. (Ex. 1, at ¶¶ 9 19-22; Ex. 2, at 3:9-10.)⁸ 10

B. <u>Discovery.</u>

12 On April 14, 2016, Mr. Morgan propounded interrogatories on Harvest. (See generally Ex. 13 4.⁹) The interrogatories included a request regarding the background checks Harvest performed 14 prior to hiring Mr. Lujan, (id. at 6:25-7:2), and a request regarding any disciplinary actions Harvest 15 had taken against Mr. Lujan in the five years preceding the accident which related to Mr. Lujan's operation of a Harvest vehicle, (*id.* at 7:15-19). There were no interrogatories propounded upon 16 17 Harvest which concerned whether Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. (See generally Ex. 4.) 18 On October 12, 2016, Harvest served its Responses to Mr. Morgan's Interrogatories. (See 19 generally Ex. 5.¹⁰) Harvest answered Interrogatory No. 5, regarding the pre-hiring background 20

21 checks relating to Mr. Lujan, as follows:

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Mr. Lujan was hired in 2009. As part of the qualification process, *a* pre-employment DOT drug test was conducted as well as a criminal background screen and a motor vehicle record. Also, since he held a

A true and correct copy of Pl.'s First Set of Interrogs. to Def. Harvest Mgmt. Sub LLC (Apr. 14, 2016) is attached as Exhibit 4, at Vol. 1 of App. at H030-H038.

²² 23

Harvest's and Mr. Lujan's Answer was admitted into evidence during the second trial, as Exhibit 26. (Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 5, 2018), attached hereto as Exhibit 3, at Vol. I of App. at H014-H029, at 169:25-170:17.)

A true and correct copy of Def. Harvest Mgmt. Sub, LLC's Resps. to Pl.'s First Set of Interrogs. (Oct. 12, 2016)
 is attached as Exhibit 5, at Vol. I of App. at H039-H046.

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CDL, an *inquiry with past/current employers within three years of the date of application was conducted and was satisfactory*. A DOT *physical medical certification was obtained and monitored for renewal* as required. *MVR was ordered yearly to monitor activity of personal driving history* and *always came back clear*. Required Drug and Alcohol Training was also completed at the time of hire and included the effects of alcohol use and controlled substances use on an individual's health, safety, work environment and personal life, signs of a problem with these and available methods of intervention.

6 (*Id.* at 3:2-19 (emphasis added).) Further, in response to Interrogatory No. 8, regarding past
7 disciplinary actions taken against Mr. Lujan, Harvest's response was "*None*." (*Id.* at 4:17-23
8 (emphasis added).)¹¹

No other discovery regarding Harvest's alleged liability for negligent entrustment and/or
respondeat superior was conducted by Mr. Morgan. In fact, Mr. Morgan never even deposed an
officer, director, employee, or other representative of Harvest as a fact witness or a Nevada Rule of
Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) witness.

C. <u>The First Trial.</u>

This case was first tried to a jury on November 6, 2017 through November 8, 2017. (See 14 generally Ex. 7¹²; Ex. 8.¹³) At the start of the first trial, when the Court asked the prospective jurors 15 if they knew any of the Parties or their counsel, the Court asked about Mr. Morgan, Plaintiff's 16 counsel, Mr. Lujan, and defense counsel. (Ex. 7, at 36:24-37:25.) No mention was made of Harvest, 17 and no objection was raised by Mr. Morgan. (Id.) Further, when the Court asked counsel to name 18 their witnesses to determine if the prospective jurors were familiar with any witnesses, no officer, 19 director, employee, or other representative of Harvest was named as a potential witness. (Id. at 41:1-20 21.) 21 Mr. Morgan also never referenced Harvest, his express claim for negligent entrustment, or 22 his attempted claim for vicarious liability during voir dire or his opening statement. (Id. at 45:25-23 24 25 11 Portions of Harvest's Responses to Mr. Morgan's Interrogatories were read to the jury during the second trial, 26 (Excerpts of Recorder's Tr. of Hrg. Civil Jury Trial (Apr. 6, 2018), attached hereto as Exhibit 6, at Vol. I of App. at H047-H068, at 10:22-13:12). 27 12 Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 6, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 7, at Vol. II of App. at H069-H344. 13 28 Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 8, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 8, at Vol. III of App. at H345-H357.

121:20, 124:13-316:24; Ex. 9,¹⁴ at 6:4-29:1.) In fact, Harvest was not mentioned until the third day 1 of the first trial, while Mr. Lujan was on the witness stand. Mr. Lujan's relevant testimony is as 2 3 follows: 4 BY MR. BOYACK: Q: All right. Mr. Lujan, at the time of the accident in April of 2014, 5 were you employed with Montara Meadows? A: Yes. 6 Q. And what was your employment? A: I was the bus driver. 7 O: Okay. And what is your understanding of the relationship of Montara Meadows to Harvest Management? 8 A: Harvest Management was our corporate office. O: Okav. 9 A: Montara Meadows is just the local--10 (Ex. 8, at 108:23-109:8.) 11 Mr. Lujan also provided the only evidence during trial which was relevant to claims of either 12 negligent entrustment or vicarious liability: 13 Q: Okay. And isn't it true that you said to [Mr. Morgan's] mother you were sorry for this accident? 14 A: Yes. Q: And that you were actually pretty worked up and crying after the 15 accident? A: I don't know that I was crying. I was more concerned than I was 16 crying ---Q: Okay. 17 A: -- because I never been in an accident like that. 18 (Id. at 111:16-24 (emphasis added).) 19 Q: Okay. So this was a big accident? A: Well, it was for me because I've never been in one in a bus, so it 20 was for me. 21 (*Id.* at 112:8-10 (emphasis added).) 22 After counsel for Mr. Morgan completed his examination of Mr. Lujan, the court permitted 23 the jury to submit its own questions. A juror — not Mr. Morgan — asked Mr. Lujan: 24 THE COURT: Where were you going at the time of the accident? THE WITNESS: I was coming back from lunch. I had just ended 25 mv lunch break. THE COURT: Any follow up? Okay. Sorry. Any follow up? 26MR. BOYACK: No, Your Honor. 27 28 14 Excerpts of Tr. of Jury Trial (Nov. 7, 2017) are attached as Exhibit 9, at Vol. III of App. at H358-H383. Page 8 of 21 2269

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	$(1d \text{ at } 131 \cdot 21 \cdot 24)$	132:18, 132:22-133:2	(emphasis added))
*	(10. at 131.21 21,	102.10, 102.22 100.2	(emphasis added).)

Later that day, the first trial ended prematurely as a result of a mistrial, when defense counsel
inquired about a pending DUI charge against Mr. Morgan. (*Id.* at 150:15-152:14, 166:12-18.)

- D. <u>The Second Trial.</u>
 - 1. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest in His Introductory Remarks to the Jury.

The second trial of this action commenced on April 2, 2018. (See generally Ex. 10.) The

8 second trial was very similar to the first trial regarding the lack of reference to and the lack of

9 evidence offered regarding Harvest. First, Harvest was not officially identified as a party when the

10 court requested that counsel identify themselves and the Parties for the jury. In fact, counsel for the

11 defense merely stated as follows:

MR. GARDNER: Hello everyone. What a way to start a Monday, right? In my firm we've got myself, Doug Gardner and then Brett South, who is not here, but this is Doug Rands, and then my client, Erica¹⁵ is right back here. Let's see, I think that's it for me.

15 (*Id.* at 17:15-18.) Mr. Morgan did not object or inform the prospective jurors that the case also

16 involved Harvest, or a corporate defendant, or even the employer of Mr. Lujan. (*Id.* at 17:19-24.)

17 When the Court asked the prospective jurors whether they knew any of the Parties or their

18 counsel, there was no mention of Harvest — only Mr. Lujan was named as a defendant:

19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Did you raise your hand, sir? No. Anyone else? Does anyone 20 know the plaintiff in this case, Aaron Morgan? And there's no response to that question. Does anyone know the plaintiff's attorney 21 in this case, Mr. Cloward? Any of the people he introduced? Any people on [sic] his firm? No response to that question. 22 Do any of you know the defendant in this case, David Lujan? There's no response to that question. Do any of you know Mr. 23 Gardner or any of the people he introduced, Mr. Rands? No response to that question. 24 25 111 26 /// 27 15 In the second trial, Mr. Lujan chose not to attend. Mr. Gardner's introduction referenced Erica Janssen, a 28 representative of Harvest.

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(Id. at 25:6-14 (emphasis added).) Again, consistent with his approach in the first trial and 1 2 throughout the remainder of this second trial, Mr. Morgan did not object or clarify that the case also 3 involved a claim against Mr. Lujan's employer, Harvest. (Id. at 25:15-22.) Finally, when the Court asked the Parties to identify the witnesses they planned to call during 4 trial, no mention was made of any officer, director, employee, or other representative of Harvest — 5 not even the representative, Erica Janssen, who was attending trial. (Id. at 25:15-26:3.) 6 7 2. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest or His Claim for Negligent Entrustment/Vicarious Liability in Voir Dire or His Opening Statement. 8 9 Just as with the first trial, Mr. Morgan failed to reference Harvest or his claim for negligent 10 entrustment/vicarious liability during voir dire. (Id. at 33:2-93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex. 11, at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22.) Moreover, during Mr. Morgan's opening statement, Plaintiff's 11 counsel never made a single reference to Harvest, a corporate defendant, vicarious liability, 12 negligent entrustment, or even the fact that there were two defendants in the action. (Ex. 11, at 13 126:7-145:17.) Plaintiff's counsel merely stated: 14 15 [MR. CLOWARD:] Let me tell you about what happened in this case. And this case starts off with the actions of Mr. Lujan, who's not here. 16 He's driving a shuttlebus. He worked for a retirement [indiscernible], shuttling elderly people. He's having lunch at Paradise Park, a park 17 here in town.... Mr. Lujan gets in his shuttlebus and it's time for him to get 18 back to work. So he starts off. Bang. Collision takes place. He doesn't stop at the stop sign. He doesn't look left. He doesn't look 19 right. (Id. at 126:15-25 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff's counsel made no reference to any evidence to be 2021 presented during the trial which would demonstrate that Mr. Lujan was acting in the course and 22 scope of his employment at the time of the accident or that Harvest negligently entrusted the vehicle to Mr. Lujan — rather, he acknowledged that Mr. Lujan was at lunch at the time of the accident. (Id. 23 24 at 126:7-145:17.) 25 3. The Only Evidence Offered and Testimony Elicited Demonstrated That Harvest Was Not Liable for Mr. Morgan's Injuries. 26 On the fourth day of the second trial, Mr. Morgan called Erica Janssen, the Rule 30(b)(6) 27 representative of Harvest, as a witness during his case in chief. (Ex. 3, at 164:13-23.) Ms. Janssen 28 Page 10 of 21 2271

confirmed that it was Harvest's understanding that Mr. Lujan had been at a park in a shuttlebus 1 2 having lunch and that the accident occurred as he exited the park: 3 [MR. CLOWARD:] Q: And have you had an opportunity to speak with Mr. Lujan about 4 what he claims happened? [MS. JANSSEN:] 5 A: Yes. Q: So you are aware that he was parked in a park in his shuttle bus 6 having lunch, correct? A: That's my understanding, ves. 7 O: You're understanding that he proceeded to exit the park and head east on Tompkins? 8 A: Yes. 9 (Id. at 168:15-23 (emphasis added).) 10 Mr. Morgan never asked Ms. Janssen where she was employed, her title, whether Harvest 11 employed Mr. Lujan, what Mr. Lujan's duties were, or any other questions that might have elicited evidence to support a claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Id. at 164:21-177:17; 12 Ex. 6, at 4:2-6:1.) In fact, it wasn't until redirect examination that Mr. Morgan even referenced the 13 14 fact that Ms. Janssen was in risk management for Harvest: 15 [MR. CLOWARD:] Q: So where it says, on interrogatory number 14, and you can follow 16 along with me: 17 "Please provide the full name of the person answering the interrogatories on behalf of the Defendant, Harvest 18 Management Sub, LLC, and state in what capacity your [sic] are authorized to respond on behalf of said 19 Defendant. "A. Erica Janssen, Holiday Retirement, Risk 20 Management." 21 A: Yes. (Ex. 6, at 11:18-25.) Other than this acknowledgement that Ms. Janssen executed interrogatory 22 23 responses on behalf of Harvest, Mr. Morgan, again, failed to elicit any evidence on redirect 24 examination to support a claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Id. at 9:23-12:6, 25 13:16-15:6.) On the fifth day of the second trial, Mr. Morgan rested his case (id. at 55:6-7), again, with no 26 27 evidence presented to support a claim for vicarious liability or negligent entrustment — i.e., 28 evidence of Mr. Lujan's driving history; Harvest's knowledge of Mr. Lujan's driving history;

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disciplinary actions Harvest took against Mr. Lujan prior to the accident; background checks Harvest
performed on Mr. Lujan; alcohol and drug testing Harvest performed on Mr. Lujan; Mr. Lujan's job
duties; Harvest's policy regarding the use of company vehicles to drive to and from lunch; whether
Mr. Lujan was required to clock-in and clock-out during his shifts; or whether any residents of the
retirement home were passengers on the bus at the time of the accident, among other facts.¹⁶

During the defense's case in chief — not Mr. Morgan's — defense counsel read portions of
Mr. Lujan's testimony from the first trial into the record. (*Id.* at 195:7-203:12.) As referenced
above, this testimony included the following facts: (1) Mr. Lujan worked as a bus driver for Montara
Meadows at the time of the accident; (2) Harvest was the "corporate office" for Montara Meadows;
(3) the accident occurred when Mr. Lujan was leaving Paradise Park; and (4) Mr. Lujan had never
been in an "accident like that" or an accident in a bus before. (*Id.* at 195:8-17, 195:25-196:10,
196:19-24, 197:8-10.)

This testimony, coupled with Ms. Janssen's testimony that Mr. Lujan was on his lunch break
at the time of the accident, is the complete universe of evidence offered at the second trial that even
tangentially concerns Harvest.

4. There Are No Jury Instructions Pertaining to the Claim Against Harvest.
 Mr. Morgan never submitted any jury instructions pertaining to vicarious liability, actions
 within the course and scope of employment, negligent entrustment, or corporate liability. (See
 generally Ex. 13.) Again, this is entirely consistent with Mr. Morgan's trial strategy. He all but
 ignored Harvest throughout the trial process.

5. Mr. Morgan Failed to Include Harvest in the Special Verdict Form.
 On the last day of trial, before commencing testimony for that day, the Court provided the
 Parties with a sample jury form that the Court had used in its last car accident trial.

THE COURT: Take a look and see if – will you guys look at that verdict form? *I know it doesn't have the right caption*. *I know it's just the one we used the last trial*. See if that looks sort of okay.

It should be noted that despite the lack of evidence on these issues, Plaintiff's counsel stated, during his closing argument, that there were no passengers on the bus at the time of the accident. (Ex. 12, at 124:15-17) ("That this company transporting our elderly members of the community is going to follow the rules of the road. Aren't we lucky that there weren't other people on the bus? Aren't we lucky?") (emphasis added)).

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1	MR. RANDS: Yeah. That looks fine.		
2	THE COURT: I don't know if it's right with what you're asking for for damages, but <i>it's just what we used in the last trial which was similar</i>		
3	sort of.		
4	(Ex. 12, at 5:20-6:1 (emphasis added).) Later that same day, after the defense rested its case,		
5	Plaintiff's counsel informed the Court that it only wanted to make one change to the special verdict		
6	form that the Court had proposed:		
7	MR. BOYACK: On the verdict form we just would like the past and		
8	future medical expenses and pain and suffering to be differentiated. THE COURT: Yeah. Let me see.		
9	MR. BOYACK: Just instead of the general. THE COURT: That's fine. That's fine.		
10	MR. BOYACK: Yeah. <i>That's the only change</i> . THE COURT: <i>That was just what we had laying around, so</i> .		
11	MR. BOYACK: Yeah. THE COURT: So you want – got it. Yeah. That looks great. I		
12	actually prefer that as well. MR. BOYACK: Yeah. <i>That was the only modification</i> .		
13	THE COURT: That's better if we have some sort of issue. MR. BOYACK: Right.		
14	(Id. at 116:11-23 (emphasis added).) The Special Verdict Form approved by Mr. Morgan — after		
15	his edits were accepted and incorporated by the Court — makes no mention of Harvest (which is		
16	entirely consistent with Mr. Morgan's trial strategy):		
17	• The Special Verdict form only asked the jury to determine whether the "Defendant" was		
18	negligent, (Ex. 14, at 1:17 (emphasis added));		
19	• The Special Verdict form did not ask the jury to find Harvest liable for anything, (<i>id.</i>); and		
20	• The Special Verdict form directed the jury to apportion fault only between " <i>Defendant</i> " and		
21	Plaintiff, with the percentage of fault totaling 100 percent, (id. at 2:1-4 (emphasis added)).		
22	Thus, Mr. Morgan chose not to present any claim against Harvest to the jury for determination.		
23	6. Mr. Morgan Never Mentioned Harvest or His Claim Against Harvest in		
24	His Closing Arguments.		
25	Finally, in closing arguments, Plaintiff's counsel never even mentioned Harvest or Mr.		
26	Morgan's claim for negligent entrustment or vicarious liability. (Ex. 12, at 121:5-136:19.) Further,		
27	and perhaps the clearest example of Mr. Morgan's decision to abandon his claims against Harvest,		
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Plaintiff's counsel *explained to the jury, in closing, how to fill out the Special Verdict form*. His remarks on liability were *limited exclusively to Mr. Lujan*: So when you are asked to fill out the special verdict form there are a couple of

things that you are going to fill out. This is what the form will look like. Basically, the first thing that you will fill out is was the Defendant negligent. Clear answer is yes. Mr. Lujan, in his testimony that was read from the stand, said that [Mr. Morgan] had the right of way, said that [Mr. Morgan] didn't do anything wrong. That's what the testimony is. Dr. Bak er didn't say that it was [Mr. Morgan's] fault. You didn't hear from any police officer that came in to say that it was [Mr. Morgan's] fault. The only people in this case, the only people in this case that are blaming [Mr. Morgan] are the corporate folks. They're the ones that are blaming [Mr. Morgan]. So was Plaintiff negligent? That's [Mr. Morgan]. No. And then from there you fill out this other section. What percentage of fault do you assign each party? Defendant, 100 percent, Plaintiff, 0 percent.

11 (Id. at 124:20-125:6 (emphasis added).) Plaintiff's counsel also failed to mention Harvest or the

12 claim alleged against Harvest in his rebuttal closing argument. (*Id.* at 157:13-161:10.)

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E. <u>Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment Against Harvest Was Denied By This</u> <u>Court.</u>

On July 30, 2018, Mr. Morgan filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment seeking to apply the
jury's verdict against Mr. Lujan against Harvest. On November 28, 2018, this Court entered an
Order denying Mr. Morgan's Motion, finding that no claims against Harvest were ever presented to
the jury for determination.

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III. LEGAL ARGUMENT

A. <u>Mr. Morgan Voluntarily Abandoned His Claim Against Harvest and Chose Note</u> to Present Any Claim Against Harvest to the Jury for Determination.

The record in this case conclusively establishes that Mr. Morgan made a conscious choice and/or strategic decision to abandon his claim against Harvest at trial. Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest during the introductory remarks to the jury in which the Parties and expected witnesses were introduced to the jury. (Ex. 10, at 17:2-24, 25:7-26:3.) Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest to the jury during voir dire or examined prospective jurors about their feelings regarding corporate liability, negligent entrustment, or vicarious liability. (*Id.* at 33:2-93:22, 97:6-188:21, 191:7-268:12; Ex. 11, at 3:24-65:7, 67:4-110:22.) Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest, vicarious liability, negligent

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entrustment, or even corporate liability in his opening statement. (Ex. 11, at 126:7-145:17.) Mr. 1 2 Morgan never offered a single piece of evidence or elicited any testimony from any witness which 3 would prove the elements of either vicarious liability or negligent entrustment. Mr. Morgan never mentioned Harvest, vicarious liability, negligent entrustment, or corporate liability in his closing 4 argument or rebuttal closing argument. (Ex. 12, at 121:4-136:19, 157:13-161:10.) Mr. Morgan 5 6 failed to include questions relating to Harvest's liability or the apportionment of fault to Harvest in the Special Verdict form, despite requesting revisions to the damages question in the sample Special 7 8 Verdict form proposed by the Court. (Ex. 12, at 116:11-23; see also Ex. 14.) Finally, Mr. Morgan failed to include a single jury instruction relating to vicarious liability, negligent entrustment, or 9 corporate liability. (Ex. 13.) 10

Mr. Morgan employed the same strategy for litigating his claims in the first trial — he chose
to focus solely on Mr. Lujan's liability for negligence. Harvest was not mentioned in the
introductory remarks to the jurors, in voir dire, in opening statements, or in the examination of any
witness. (Ex. 7, at 29:4-17, 36:24-37:25, 41:1-21, 45:25-121:20, 124:13-316:24; Ex. 9, at 6:4-29:1.)
Thus, the record clearly demonstrates that Mr. Morgan abandoned his claim against Harvest —
likely due to a lack of evidence.

Typically, when a party chooses to abandon his or her claims at trial, the claims are 17 18 dismissed with prejudice by stipulation either before or after the trial. It is rare that a party fails to 19 litigate his or her alleged claims against a party yet refuses to dismiss the claims and insists that the 20 abandoned claims should be resolved in his or her favor. Because Mr. Morgan has not sought the 21 voluntary dismissal of his claims, Harvest respectfully requests that this Court enter judgment in 22 favor of Harvest and against Mr. Morgan on both the express claim for negligent entrustment and the 23 implicitly alleged claim for vicarious liability. Mr. Morgan had the opportunity for the jury to render 24 a decision on these claims and voluntarily and intentionally chose not to present them to the jury for 25 determination; therefore, Mr. Morgan should not be given another bite at the apple.

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1 2 **B**.

<u>Based on the Evidence Presented at Trial, Harvest Is Entitled to Judgment in Its</u> Favor as to Mr. Morgan's Claim for Either Negligent Entrustment or Vicarious Liability.

As the plaintiff, Mr. Morgan bore the burden of proving his claims against Harvest at trial. 3 Porter v. Sw. Christian Coll., 428 S.W.3d 377, 381 (Tex. App. 2014) ("A plaintiff pleading 4 respondeat superior bears the burden of establishing that the employee acted within the course and 5 scope of his employment."); Montague v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 126 (Cal. 6 Ct. App. 2014) ("The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the employee's tortious act was 7 committed within the scope of his or her employment."); Willis v. Manning, 850 So. 2d 983, 987 8 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (recognizing that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on a claim for negligent 9 entrustment); Dukes v. McGimsey, 500 S.W.2d 448, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) ("The plaintiff has 10 the burden of proving negligent entrustment of an automobile.") However, Mr. Morgan failed to 11 offer any evidence in support of these claims - primarily, evidence that Mr. Lujan was acting in the 12 course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, or evidence that Harvest knew or 13 reasonably should of known that Mr. Lujan was an inexperienced, incompetent, and/or reckless 14 driver. 15

Not only did Mr. Morgan fail to prove his claim, but the evidence adduced at trial actually
demonstrated that Harvest could not, as a matter of law, be liable for either vicarious liability or
negligent entrustment. Specifically, the *undisputed evidence* offered at trial proved that Mr. Lujan
was at lunch at the time of the accident and had never been in an accident before. (Ex. 3, at 168:1523; Ex. 6, at 196:19-24, 197:8-10.) Based on such unrefuted evidence, judgment should be entered
in favor of Harvest.

J&C Drilling Co. v. Salaiz, 866 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1993), is instructive on this issue:

We reject appellees' contention that the issue of course and scope was not contested. Appellants' answer contained a general denial, which put in issue all of the allegations of appellees' petition, including the allegation that Gonzalez was acting in the course and scope of his employment with J&C. Because appellees had the burden of proof on this issue, it was not necessary for appellants to present evidence negating course and scope in order to contest the issue. In any event, as is discussed below, evidence was presented that Gonzalez was

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3 (*Id.* at 635).

employment.

1. Mr. Morgan Did Not Prove a Claim for Vicarious Liability, and Based on the Sole Evidence Offered at Trial Relating to This Claim, Judgment Should Be Entered in Favor of Harvest.

While Mr. Morgan's Complaint states one claim for relief against Harvest entitled "Vicarious 6 Liability/Respondent Superior," the allegations contained therein do not actually reflect a theory of 7 respondeat superior — i.e., that Mr. Lujan was acting within the course and scope of his employment 8 with Harvest at the time of the accident. (See Ex. 1 at ¶¶ 15-22.) Rather, his claim was akin to a 9 claim for negligent entrustment, alleging that: (1) Mr. Lujan was employed as a driver for Harvest; 10 (2) Harvest entrusted him with the vehicle; (3) Mr. Lujan was an incompetent, inexperienced, and/or 11 reckless driver; and (4) Harvest actually knew, or should have known, of Mr. Lujan's inexperience 12 or incompetence. (See id.) 13

on a personal errand at the time of the accident, refuting the allegation that he was acting in the course and scope of his

Even assuming *arguendo* that Mr. Morgan alleged a claim for vicarious liability, he failed to 14 prove this claim at trial. Vicarious liability and/or respondent superior applies to an employer only 15 when: "(1) the actor at issue was an employee[;] and (2) the action complained of occurred within 16 the course and scope of the actor's employment." Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 17 1217, 1223, 1225-26, 925 P.2d 1175, 1179, 1180-81 (1996) (holding that an employer is not liable if 18 an employee's tort is an "independent venture of his own" and was "not committed in the course 19 of the very task assigned to him") (quoting Prell Hotel Corp. v. Antonacci, 86 Nev. 390, 391, 469 20 P.2d 399, 400 (1970)). 21

Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence as to Mr. Lujan's status at the time of the accident.
The *only* facts adduced at trial that are related to Mr. Lujan's employment were: (1) that Mr. Lujan
was an employee of Montara Meadows (a bus driver); (2) that Mr. Lujan drove the bus to Paradise
Park for a lunch break; (3) that the accident occurred as Mr. Lujan was exiting the park; and (3) that
Harvest is the "corporate office" of Montara Meadows. (*See* Ex. 3, at 168:15-23; Ex. 6, at 195:8-17,
195:25-196:10.)

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Mr. Morgan failed to establish whether Mr. Lujan was "on the clock" during his lunch break,
 whether Mr. Lujan had returned to work and was transporting passengers at the time of the accident,
 whether Mr. Lujan had to "clock in" after his lunch break, whether Mr. Lujan was permitted to use a
 company vehicle while on his lunch break, or whether Harvest Management even knew that Mr.
 Lujan was using a company vehicle during his lunch breaks. Without developing these facts, there is
 insufficient evidence, under Nevada law, to conclude that Mr. Lujan was acting in the course and
 scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

8 Moreover, the evidence offered by Mr. Lujan and Harvest demonstrates that Harvest is not 9 vicariously liable for Mr. Morgan's injuries. Nevada has adopted the "going and coming rule." 10 Under this rule, "[t]he tortious conduct of an employee in transit to or from the place of employment 11 will not expose the employer to liability, unless there is a special errand which requires driving." Molino v. Asher, 96 Nev. 814, 817-18, 618 P.2d 878, 879-80 (1980); see also Nat'l Convenience 12 Stores, Inc. v. Fantauzzi, 94 Nev. 655, 658, 584 P.2d 689, 691 (1978). The rule is premised upon the 13 idea that the "employment relationship is "suspended" from the time the employee leaves until he 14 returns, or that in commuting, he is not rendering service to his employer." Tryer v. Ojai Valley 15 Sch., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 16 471 P.2d 988, 990-91 (Cal. 1970)). 17

18 While the Nevada Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether an employer is 19 vicariously liable for an employee's actions during a lunch break, the express language of and policy behind the "going and coming rule" suggests that an employee is not acting within the course and 20 21 scope of his employment when he commutes to and from lunch during a break from his 22 employment. Moreover, other jurisdictions have routinely determined that employers are not liable 23 for an employee's negligence during a lunch break. See e.g., Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W. 2d 202, 212 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that an employer was not liable under respondeat 24 25 superior when its employee rear-ended the plaintiff while driving back from his lunch break in a 26 company vehicle because the test is not whether the employee is returning from his personal 27 undertaking to "possibly engage in work" but rather whether the employee has "returned to the zone 28 of his employment" and engaged in the employer's business); Richardson v. Glass, 835 P.2d 835,

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838 (N.M. 1992) (finding the employer was not vicariously liable for the employee's accident during
his lunch break because there was no evidence of the employer's control over the employee at the
time of the accident); *Gordon v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.*, 411 So. 2d 1094, 1098
(La. Ct. App. 1982) ("Ordinarily, an employee who leaves his employer's premises and takes his
noon hour meal at home or some other place of his own choosing is outside the course of his
employment from the time he leaves the work premises until he returns.").

Because Mr. Morgan failed to offer any evidence proving that Mr. Lujan was acting within
the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident — and the only evidence
regarding Mr. Lujan's actions at the time of the accident demonstrate that he was on a lunch break
— as a matter of law, Mr. Morgan's implicit claim for vicarious liability should be dismissed with
prejudice and judgment should be entered in favor of Harvest.

2. Mr. Morgan Also Failed to Prove to the Jury That Harvest Is Liable for Negligent Entrustment.

In Nevada, "a person who knowingly entrusts a vehicle to an inexperienced or incompetent
person" may be found liable for damages resulting therefrom. *Zugel by Zugel v. Miller*, 100 Nev.
525, 527, 688 P.2d 310, 312 (1984). To establish negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that an entrustment actually occurred; and (2) that the entrustment was negligent. *Id.* at 528, 688 P.2d at 313.

Harvest conceded that Mr. Lujan was its employee and that it entrusted him with a vehicle —
satisfying the first element of a negligent entrustment claim; however, the second element was
contested and never proven to a jury. (Ex. 2, at 3:9-10.) Mr. Morgan offered no evidence of
Harvest's negligence in entrusting Mr. Lujan with a company vehicle. He adduced no evidence that
Mr. Lujan was an inexperienced or incompetent driver. In fact, the only evidence in the record
relating to Mr. Lujan's driving history demonstrates that *he has never been in an accident before*.
(See Ex. 6, at 196:19-24; 197:8-10).

26 Mr. Morgan also failed to offer any evidence regarding Harvest's knowledge of Mr. Lujan's
27 driving history. This is likely because Harvest's interrogatory responses demonstrated early in the
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case that it thoroughly checked Mr. Lujan's background prior to hiring him, and Harvest's annual
 check of Mr. Lujan's motor vehicle record "always came back clear." (Ex. 5, at 3:2-19.)

Based on the failure of evidence offered by Mr. Morgan, and Mr. Lujan's undisputed
testimony regarding his lack of prior car accidents, as a matter of law, Mr. Morgan's express claim
for negligent entrustment should be dismissed with prejudice and judgment should be entered in
favor of Harvest.

IV. CONCLUSION

8 For the foregoing reasons, Harvest requests that the Court enter judgment in its favor as to
9 Mr. Morgan's claim for negligent entrustment (or vicarious liability). A proposed Judgment is
10 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

DATED this 21st day of December, 2018.

BAILEY KENNEDY

By: <u>/s/ Dennis L. Kennedy</u> Dennis L. Kennedy Sarah E. Harmon Joshua P. Gilmore Andrea M. Champion

Attorneys for Defendant HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB LLC

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1	CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE		
2	I certify that I am an employee of BAILEY * KENNEDY and that on the 21st day of		
3	December, 2018, service of the foregoing DEFENDANT HARVEST MANAGEMENT SUB		
4	LLC'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT was made by mandatory electronic service		
5	through the Eighth Judicial District Court's elec	tronic filing system to the following:	
6	Douglas J. Gardner Douglas R. Rands	Email: dgardner@rsglawfirm.com drands@rsgnvlaw.com	
7	RANDS, SOUTH & GARDNER 1055 Whitney Ranch Drive, Suite 220	Attorney for Defendant	
8	Henderson, Nevada 89014	DAVID E. LUJAN	
9	Benjamin P. Cloward Bryan A. Boyack	Email: Benjamin@richardharrislaw.com Bryan@richardharrislaw.com	
10	RICHARD HARRIS LAW FIRM 801 South Fourth Street	Di yanarionarananisiaw.com	
11	Las Vegas, Nevada 89101		
12	and		
13	MICAH S. ECHOLS TOM W. STEWART	Email: Mechols@maclaw.com Tstewart@maclaw.com	
14	MARQUIS AURBACH COFFING P.C.		
15	1001 Park Run Drive Las Vegas, Nevada 89145	Attorneys for Plaintiff AARON M. MORGAN	
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18	En En	′ <i>Josephine Baltazar</i> pployee of BAILEY ∻ KENNEDY	
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Supreme Court of Nevada

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Date and Time of Notice: Jan 23 2019 03:09 p.m.

Case Title:	MORGAN VS. LUJAN
Docket Number:	77753
Case Category:	Civil Appeal

Document Category:	Motion to Dismiss Appeal
Submitted by:	Dennis L Kennedy
Official File Stamp:	Jan 23 2019 03:08 p.m.
Filing Status:	Accepted and Filed

Docket Text:Filed Motion to Dismiss Appeal Respondent Harvest Management Sub LLC's
Motion to Dismiss Appeal as Premature

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Ara Shirinian

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