

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Appellant,

v.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M.
HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON;
RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU;
JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A.
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN,

Respondents,

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Appellant,

v.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M.
HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON;
RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU;
JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A.
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN,

Respondents,

Electronically Filed
Supreme Court No. 80949 Oct 8 2020 01:53 p.m.
Elizabeth A. Brown
Clerk of Supreme Court
District Court No. A-17-756971-B

Consolidated with:

Supreme Court No. 80949

INDEX TO APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF APPENDIX

VOLUME IV OF IV

JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3861
James R. Christensen PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas NV 89101
(702) 272-0406 / (702) 272-0415 fax
jim@jchristensenlaw.com

SAMUEL T. REES, ESQ.
Admitted Pro Hac vice
26 Muirfield Place
New Orleans, LA 70131
(213) 220-9988
streesesq@earthlink.net

Attorneys for Appellant, DANIEL E. WOLFUS

Document	Page No.
Volume I:	
Complaint for Damages.....	AA001-135
First Amended Complaint for Damages.....	AA136-250
Volume II:	
First Amended Complaint for Damages.....	AA251-269
Acceptance of Service.....	AA270-271
Acceptance of Service.....	AA272-273
Acceptance of Service.....	AA274
Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Amended Complaint Without Prejudice.....	AA275-288
Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Amended Complaint Without Prejudice.....	AA289-305
Second Amended Complaint.....	AA306-451
D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint....	AA452-500
Volume III:	
D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint....	AA501-559
Kenneth A. Brunk’s Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint and Joinder in D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.....	AA560-577
Motion to Dismiss and Joinder to D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint.....	AA578-604

Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition
To Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.....AA605-651

Reply in Support of D&O Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint.....AA652-671

Kenneth A. Brunk's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint and Joinder in D&O Defendants' Reply in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint..... AA672-681

Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Joinder to D&O
Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second
Amended Complaint..... AA682-691

Recorder's Transcript of Hearing All Pending Motions May 9, 2018... AA692-733

Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint.....AA734-743

Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint.....AA744-750

Volume IV:

Notice of Entry of Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint AA751-756

Order Granting Petition for Writ of Prohibition.....AA757-783

Notice in Lieu of Remittitur.....AA784

Writ of Prohibition.....AA785-789

Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint.....AA790-801

Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint..... AA802-816

Notice of Appeal.....AA817-819

Judgment.....	AA820-821
Notice of Entry of Judgment.....	AA822-826
Amended Notice of Appeal.....	AA827-829
Notice of Appeal.....	AA830-832

1 would have sold their stock when Midway's stock price reached its peak on February 28, 2014.
2 See Compl. ¶¶ 106, 111, 114, 117, 124, 130, 131, 144-145.

3 **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW**

4 17. When a plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the Court
5 must dismiss the claim upon motion under NRCP 12(b)(5). "In considering a motion to dismiss
6 pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) the court accepts a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but the
7 allegations must be legally sufficient to constitute the elements of the claims asserted." *Sanchez*
8 *ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 818, 823, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009) (citation
9 omitted). "To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain some 'set of facts, which, if true, would
10 entitle the plaintiff to relief.'" *In re Amerco Derivative Litig.*, 127 Nev. 196, 211, 252 P.3d 681,
11 692 (2011) (citation omitted). "Dismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to
12 establish the elements of a claim for relief." *Stockmeier v. Nevada Dep't of Corr.*, 124 Nev. 313,
13 316, 183 P.3d 133, 135 (2008) (citations omitted).

14 18. Plaintiff's first cause of action is for Securities Fraud under the California
15 Corporate Securities Act. Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 provides: "It is unlawful for any person to
16 offer or sell a security in this state, or to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of
17 any written or oral communication that includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
18 state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
19 under which the statements were made, not misleading."

20 19. Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(a) provides: "Sale or sell includes every contract of sale
21 of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. Sale or sell
22 includes any exchange of securities and any change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
23 restrictions of or on outstanding securities."

24 20. Further, Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) provides: "Every sale or offer of a warrant or
25 right to purchase or subscribe to another security of the same or another issuer, as well as every
26 sale or offer of a security which gives the holder a present or future right or privilege to convert
27 the security into another security of the same or another issuer, includes an offer and sale of the
28

1 other security only at the time of the offer or sale of the warrant or right or convertible security;
2 but neither the exercise of the right to purchase or subscribe or to convert nor the issuance of
3 securities pursuant thereto is an offer or sale.”

4 21. After review of the plain language of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e), the Court
5 concludes that neither the exercise of the right to purchase shares nor the issuance of securities
6 pursuant thereto is an offer or sale. The sale or offer is deemed to occur at the time of the offer
7 or sale of the right to purchase the share.

8 22. Although Plaintiff contends this provision relates to stock warrants, stock warrants
9 are listed separately from rights to purchase and is separated by the word “or,” implying that the
10 provision applies to both warrants and rights to purchase shares.

11 23. Plaintiff claims the alleged misrepresentations, namely the 2013 and 2014 Material
12 Facts impose liability on Defendants under Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 for the alleged misleading
13 sale. However, the application of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) indicates that the sale occurred in
14 2009 when the stock options were issued, and there are no allegations that the sale in 2009 was
15 based upon any untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of the same. Accordingly, the
16 California Securities Fraud cause of action fails as a matter of law and is subject to dismissal with
17 prejudice as to all Defendants.

18 24. The Court further finds that the remaining causes of action Breach of Fiduciary
19 Duty, Aiding and Abetting a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, and Negligent Misrepresentation
20 are sufficiently pled in the Second Amended Complaint.

21 25. Defendants, with the exception of Frank Yu, have also moved for dismissal on the
22 basis of lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(2).

23 26. Rule 12(b)(2) of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (“NRCP”) allows a party to
24 seek dismissal of a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. NRCP 12(b)(2); *Trump v. District*
25 *Court*, 109 Nev. 687, 693, 857 P.2d 740, 744 (1993).

26 27. The Court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a defendant when the
27 defendant’s contacts with the State of Nevada are so “substantial” or “continuous and systematic”
28

1 such that hailing them into court would be reasonable as they may be deemed to be present within
2 this state. *Budget Rent-A-Car v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 108 Nev. 483, 485, 835 P.2d 17, 19
3 (1992).

4 28. Alternatively, the Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
5 defendant where: (1) purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting within the state or of
6 causing important consequences in the state; (2) the cause of action arises from defendant's
7 purposeful contacts with the forum state; and (3) those contacts with the forum state were
8 substantial enough to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. *Consipio*
9 *Holding, BV v. Carlberg*, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 43, 282 P.3d 751, 755 (2012).

10 29. The Court determined that Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' contention that
11 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID,
12 LLC. These Defendants are each Delaware LLCs with principal places of business in New York.
13 SAC ¶ 20.

14 30. This Court cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction over Defendants INV-
15 MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC, as Plaintiff has not alleged such jurisdiction
16 nor has he made any such showing supporting the exercise of such jurisdiction.

17 31. Defendants INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC have not
18 purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting within this State or causing any
19 important consequences within this State.

20 32. Plaintiff's causes of action do not arise from any of Defendants INV-MID, LLC,
21 EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC's purposeful contacts with this State.

22 33. It would be unreasonable to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
23 Defendants INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC under these
24 circumstances.

25 34. Accordingly, as there are no allegations nor showings that the Court has personal
26 jurisdiction over these Defendants, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to INV-MID,
27 LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID, LLC.

1 filings and Press Releases that predicate the Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Aiding and Abetting a
2 Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, and Negligent Misrepresentation causes of action, as follows:

3 1. Plaintiff is limited to four sets of ten interrogatories (i.e., Plaintiff may serve four
4 separate defendants with a set of ten interrogatories), and answers must be served within ten days
5 of service of the interrogatories.

6 2. Plaintiff is limited to four depositions lasting two hours each (i.e., Plaintiff may
7 take depositions of four defendants, each lasting up to two hours), which depositions may occur
8 upon not less than ten days' notice.

9 3. These discovery mechanisms are independent of the Nevada Rules of Civil
10 Procedure allowances for general discovery, yet shall be limited to the jurisdictional issues
11 enumerated herein.

12 4. The parties will initially have 90 days to complete jurisdictional discovery, with
13 jurisdictional discovery closing on August 19, 2018.

14 ///

15 ///

16 ///


1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Status Check is hereby set for July 26, 2018 at 11:00
2 a.m. to determine the status of jurisdictional discovery.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 DATED this 6th day of June 2018.

5 Nancy Alf
6 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

7 Respectfully submitted by:

8 

9 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)

10 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)

11 HOLLAND & HART LLP

12 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor

13 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

14 Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)

15 HOLLAND & HART LLP

16 555 17th Street, Suite 3200

17 Denver, CO 80202

18 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
19 *Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy Haddon,*
20 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
21 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
22 *Rodney D. Knutson*

23 11006715_4
24
25
26
27
28

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M.
HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON;
RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU;
JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A.
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
AND NATHANIEL KLEIN,
Petitioners,


vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
NANCY L. ALLF, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,
and
DANIEL E. WOLFUS,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 76052

FILED

OCT 11 2019

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY  DEPUTY CLERK

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging a district court denial of a motion to dismiss a corporations action.

Petitioners Kenneth Brunk, et al., (Directors) are former directors and officers of Midway Gold Corporation (Midway), a publicly traded Canadian company incorporated in British Columbia with principal offices in Colorado. Midway engaged in gold mining and mineral exploration operations in Nevada and elsewhere, and commissioned a feasibility study for a gold mine project to be located in White Pine County (the Pan project). Real party in interest Daniel Wolfus served as Midway's

Chairman and CEO at the time Midway commissioned the study. After his replacement as Midway's Chairman and CEO, Wolfus exercised various stock options to purchase shares of Midway stock, allegedly relying on favorable public statements and press releases concerning the Pan project. The Pan project was unsuccessful, however, and Midway ultimately went bankrupt. Thereafter, Wolfus filed suit in Nevada against the Directors, asserting claims based on California law. Wolfus alleged the Directors mismanaged the company, and the Pan project in particular, and despite knowing the Pan project was not going to succeed, breached a fiduciary duty of disclosure by issuing misleading press releases and public statements promoting the project's success. He alleged that he relied on these misleading statements in exercising his stock options, which were subsequently rendered worthless by Midway's bankruptcy.

The Directors moved to dismiss Wolfus's complaint, based in part on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Directors argued that because Midway was incorporated in British Columbia, Wolfus's claims are subject to the law of that jurisdiction, including various pre-suit requirements for shareholder derivative suits which Wolfus failed to satisfy. After initially agreeing with the Directors and dismissing Wolfus's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court permitted Wolfus to amend his complaint. Wolfus's second amended complaint included new citations to California and Delaware caselaw in support of his fiduciary duty and common law fraud claims, authorities he did not include in his original complaint or first amended complaint. The Directors moved once more to dismiss Wolfus's complaint, whereupon the district court reversed course, denying the Directors' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordering discovery on the issue of personal

jurisdiction as to certain of the Directors. The Directors now challenge the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss.

Having considered the petition, the record, and the points raised during oral argument, we conclude Wolfus's claims are derivative in nature, as they are necessarily dependent on injury directly inflicted upon Midway, injury from which harm indirectly affected Wolfus and other shareholders. Because Wolfus lacked standing to assert a derivative action on behalf of a bankrupt corporation incorporated under British Columbia law, we grant the Directors' writ petition and conclude the district court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Wolfus's complaint.

DISCUSSION

A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy, and "[t]he decision to entertain a petition for [writ relief] lies within this court's discretion." *Gen. Motors Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 122 Nev. 466, 469, 134 P.3d 111, 113-14 (2006). We exercise our discretion to entertain a writ petition only where there is "no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law or there are . . . important legal issues that need clarification." *Id.* at 469, 134 P.3d at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). Choice-of-law questions, such as the one presented here, may justify writ relief, particularly where the question implicates "an important issue of law recognizing the distinction between direct and derivative corporate shareholder claims." *Parametric Sound Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 133 Nev. 417, 421, 401 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2017); *Gen. Motors Corp.*, 122 Nev. at 469, 134 P.3d at 114. Because the instant petition raises important questions of law pertaining to choice-of-law issues and the distinction between direct and derivative shareholder claims, we exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition.

The distinction between derivative and direct shareholder claims

The critical distinction between derivative and direct shareholder claims is dispositive here. If Wolfus's claims against the Directors are derivative in nature, they trigger the internal affairs doctrine and are controlled by the law of British Columbia, which requires a shareholder to obtain leave of court and make a demand on the board of directors before filing a derivative action. See *Batchelder v. Kawamoto*, 147 F.3d 915, 920 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Under the 'internal affairs' doctrine, the rights of shareholders in a foreign company, including the right to sue derivatively, are determined by the law of the place where the company is incorporated."); see also *Rogers v. Bank of Montreal*, 1985 CarswellBC 176, para. 62 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL) ("[L]eave of court [is] a prerequisite to the commencement, conduct, discontinuance, settlement, or dismissal of any derivative action even if the shareholder meets the common law's stringent conditions.").

Additionally, if Wolfus's claims are derivative, he lacks standing as a result of Midway's bankruptcy, which rendered any such claims a part of the corporation's bankruptcy estate, over which the estate's trustee has exclusive standing to litigate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541; *Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court Case No. SPR 02211*, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate."); *Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres*, 785 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the bankruptcy estate of a corporate debtor includes any derivative right of action the corporation may have to recover damages for misconduct, mismanagement, or neglect of duty by a corporate officer or director).

If, on the other hand, Wolfus has properly asserted a direct claim, that is, a claim personal to him, then he alleges an individual cause

of action on his own behalf for which he would have standing to sue. *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 423, 401 P.3d at 1105 (2017) (“[S]hareholders have standing to bring suit for direct injuries they have suffered and that are separate from any injury the corporation may have suffered without making a demand on the board of directors.”).

Wolfus, unsurprisingly, argues his claims are direct, rather than derivative, in that they are personal to him as a shareholder and arise from a breach of duty Midway’s Directors owed to him personally, rather than a duty owed to the corporation. As discussed herein, we conclude the gravamen of Wolfus’s claims allege mismanagement by the Directors, causing Midway’s ultimate demise, stemming from the failed Pan project, which incidentally harmed Wolfus and other shareholders in the form of diminution in the value of their corporate shares. Wolfus has thus failed to allege an injury that is independent of the harm Midway suffered as a corporation allegedly mismanaged by the Directors. As such, Wolfus’s claims are derivative in nature.

Controlling standard for distinguishing direct and derivative claims

“The question whether a suit is derivative by nature or may be brought by a shareholder in his own right is governed by the law of the state of incorporation” *Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs.*, 348 F.3d 584, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2003); *see also Kepley v. Lanz*, 715 F.3d 969, 972-73 (6th Cir. 2013). The test British Columbian courts apply when evaluating whether a claim is direct or derivative is whether “the gravamen of the cause of action alleged [arises] as a result of wrongs done to the company If the damage that flows is a direct result of the wrongs done to the company, then those damages can only be claimed by the company.” *Robak Indus. Ltd. v. Gardner*, 2006 CarswellBC 2533, para. 5 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL). In making this determination, the courts in that jurisdiction examine “the nature of

the damages suffered as alleged in the pleadings.” *Id.* at para. 13; *see also* *Luft v. Ball*, 2013 CarswellBC 820, para. 34 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL) (“In order for a complaining shareholder to maintain a personal action for breach of duties owed to the company, that shareholder must show that he or she has suffered damage or loss in a manner distinct from other shareholders.”).

The test in British Columbia closely resembles that which California courts have adopted, as articulated in *Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.*: “[T]he action is derivative . . . if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock or property without any severance or distribution among individual holders . . .”. 460 P.2d 464, 470 (Cal. 1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). British Columbia’s approach is also similar to the approach the Supreme Court of Delaware follows: “[T]o bring a direct action, the stockholder must allege something other than an injury resulting from a wrong to the corporation.” *Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette*, 845 A.2d 1031, 1038 (Del. 2004). “[A] court should look to the nature of the wrong and to whom the relief should go. The stockholder’s claimed direct injury must be independent of any alleged injury to the corporation.” *Id.* at 1039. We have adopted Delaware’s approach for determining whether a claim is direct or derivative. *Parametric Sound Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 133 Nev. 417, 427, 401 P.3d 1100, 1108 (2017).

The tests controlling the direct/derivative distinction in California, British Columbia, and Nevada are essentially the same, and require us to evaluate the nature of the injury Wolfus alleges in his second amended complaint. We apply this analysis to the entirety of Wolfus’s complaint, dealing first with the nature of his fiduciary duty claims.

Wolfus's claims for breach of fiduciary duty

Wolfus alleges the Directors breached a duty of disclosure by failing to communicate material information about Midway and the Pan project in public filings and press releases. In particular, he alleges that the Directors' non-disclosure of facts pertaining to Midway's mismanagement constituted a breach of fiduciary duty to disclose, and that the duty was owed to him personally. Any duty to disclose the alleged mismanagement, however, stems from duties which the Directors owed to Midway, not to Wolfus. As the Supreme Court of Delaware has explained: "The duty of directors to observe proper disclosure requirements derives from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith." *Malone v. Brincat*, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998). Thus, Wolfus's allegation of a breach of a duty to disclose does not automatically implicate an individual cause of action. Rather, "[the] violation may result in a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action for damages," depending on the "classic 'direct v. derivative'" analysis. *Id.* at 14 & n.45.

We recently adopted Delaware's "direct harm" test for distinguishing between derivative and direct shareholder claims in *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 427, 401 P.3d at 1108. In order to determine whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative, the court must consider: "(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?" *Id.* (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1033). The purpose of *Tooley's* two-part "direct harm" test is to serve as a means for "determining whether stockholders can bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty directly, or whether a particular fiduciary duty claim must be brought derivatively

on the corporation's behalf." *Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Inv. P'ship*, 140 A.3d 1125, 1139 (Del. 2016).

Pursuant to the direct harm test, the relevant inquiry in addressing who suffered the alleged harm is: "Looking at the body of the complaint and considering the nature of the wrong alleged and the relief requested, has the plaintiff demonstrated that he or she can prevail without showing an injury to the corporation?" *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 426, 401 P.3d at 1107-08 (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1036). Applying the direct harm test as set forth in *Parametric Sound*, we conclude Wolfus's fiduciary duty claims are derivative because he has not demonstrated a harm that is independent of the injury to Midway as a corporation.

Reviewing the entirety of Wolfus's complaint, it is clear the nature of Wolfus's claims are wholly dependent on alleged injuries primarily inflicted upon Midway, which resulted indirectly in harm to Wolfus and to other Midway stockholders in the form of a diminution in stock value. The gravamen of his complaint is the Directors' mismanagement of Midway, specifically, mismanagement in the form of failing to secure sufficient capital for the Pan project, deciding not to sell assets to create necessary capital, and allowing a Director (Martin Hale) to "tak[e] effective control of Midway and the Pan project even though Hale *lacked the ability to manage the Pan project*." (Emphasis added.) Wolfus also alleges the Directors failed to appropriately employ supervisory staff for the Pan project, which delayed production. Further, Wolfus alleges the Pan project failed because the Directors, rather than cut costs to purchase necessary equipment, "decided not to purchase this necessary equipment" and instead purchased equipment for which the company had not secured the appropriate permits. These alleged acts of mismanagement and

imprudent investment decisions impaired or prevented what Wolfus describes in his complaint as the "two major events" required for the Pan project to succeed: Midway securing necessary permits and securing necessary financing for the project.

Wolfus's breach of fiduciary duty claims depend on alleged misrepresentations involving the purported mismanagement of the company by the Directors, mismanagement which caused the failure of the Pan project and presumably the failure and bankruptcy of the company. He contends the Directors breached a fiduciary duty to disclose material information about their mismanagement of the company by omitting the information from public filings and public press releases in order to encourage investors to retain and purchase Midway's stock. Thus, Wolfus's allegations explicitly set forth, first and foremost, a direct harm to the company caused by the Director's purported mismanagement, and implicate primarily a breach of duty the Directors owed to the corporation.

We are persuaded, based on the body of his complaint and the nature of his claims, that Wolfus's breach of fiduciary duty claims describe a derivative action based on the Directors' alleged mismanagement of Midway. His complaint merely reflects an unavailing attempt to characterize the derivative claim as a direct claim personal to him. Such an effort does not alter the nature of his claims. *See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc.*, 546 A.2d 348, 352-53 (Del. 1988) (holding that where the gravamen of a stockholder's complaint is director mismanagement, the cause of action is derivative in nature). Notwithstanding his attempt to characterize his claims as direct, the essence of Wolfus's claims allege direct harm to Midway from which injury resulted indirectly to Midway's shareholders. Wolfus cannot sidestep the gravamen of his allegations,

which is harm to Midway, simply by framing his fiduciary duty claims in terms of misrepresentation about the alleged mismanagement. Accordingly, in this instance, Wolfus's fiduciary duty claims are derivative. See *In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.*, 916 F.2d 874, 882-83 (3rd Cir. 1990) (concluding shareholders' purported direct claim was derivative where they alleged corporate "advertisements, press releases, periodic reports and other publicly disseminated materials," were misleading as to the company's financial condition and omitted information about the company's mismanagement, because the shareholders' "asserted injury emanated from mismanagement, not fraud" (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also *Rivers v. Wachovia Corp.*, 665 F.3d 610, 614-18 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding a shareholder asserted a derivative claim after alleging that directors misrepresented the company's financial health, causing the shareholder to retain company stock until they lost nearly all value, and that the attempt to "differentiate between mismanagement which injured the corporation and misrepresentations which injured [the shareholder] individually . . . is a distinction without a difference").

Wolfus invokes *Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Investment Partnership*, 140 A.3d 1125, 1126-27 (Del. 2016) to assert that his claims are direct claims because they belong to him personally. For several reasons, however, *Citigroup* is distinguishable from the instant case and does not support Wolfus's argument that his claims against the Directors are direct and personal to him. First, the shareholders in *Citigroup* were not pursuing claims for breach of fiduciary duty, as Wolfus is here, and the court in *Citigroup* did not apply the direct harm test as set forth in *Tooley* and adopted by this court in *Parametric Sound*. See *Citigroup*, 140 A.3d at 1126-27, 1134 ("Because the holder claims at issue here belong to the holding

stockholders under the state laws that govern the claims, *and are not fiduciary duty claims* or claims otherwise belonging to the corporation, *Tooley* does not affect our answer to this certified question.”)). Wolfus’s explicit allegations of claims for breach of fiduciary distinguish his claims from those which the *Citigroup* court considered.

Second, the *Citigroup* court explicitly noted that if the shareholders there had asserted the type of claims Wolfus asserts here—claims arising from a failure to make timely and accurate public disclosures—the *Citigroup* shareholders’ cause of action would implicate the internal affairs doctrine and would be subject to the laws of the state in which the company (Citigroup) was incorporated. *Id.* at 1134-36. The court articulated several concerns related to this point, explaining that:

When a public corporation . . . has shares in the market, it will have investors . . . in virtually every state in our nation. For investors to be able to sue not only under federal law, but purport to sue under their own state’s bespoke laws, subjects corporations to potential inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and unfairness.

Id. at 1136. We identify the same concerns with Wolfus’s attempt to subject Midway, a British Columbian corporation headquartered in Colorado, to claims brought under California law in a Nevada court.

Finally, *Citigroup* is unavailing for Wolfus because, unlike the parties in *Citigroup*, the parties here disagree as to the law that should govern Wolfus’s claims. The *Citigroup* court was asked to interpret New York and Florida state law in response to a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the parties agreed the law of either New York or Florida controlled the claims at issue. *Id.* at 1132-34. The *Citigroup* court explained that because both New York and Florida would recognize so-called “holder” claims as belonging to the

individual shareholder, and because the parties agreed that either Florida or New York law applied, the court's answer was based on the law of those states:

For the purpose of answering this certified question what matters is that the [shareholders'] [h]older [c]laims are governed by either New York or Florida law—a fact about which the parties, and as important, our referring courts, agree—and . . . courts in those states have suggested that their highest courts would recognize holder claims and would conclude, consistent with their very name, that . . . they belong to the holder

Id. at 1137 (footnotes omitted).

While *Citigroup* does not assist Wolfus in his effort to color his derivative claims as direct claims, our conclusion here does align with the *Citigroup* court's rationale insofar as Wolfus asserts breach-of-fiduciary duty claims involving the Directors' alleged failure to make timely and accurate public disclosures. To the extent the *Citigroup* court concluded that such claims implicate the internal affairs doctrine and are subject to the law of the state of incorporation, *id.* at 1134-35, we agree and conclude Wolfus's claims are subject to British Columbia law.

We are also guided by the *Citigroup* court's explanation that non-fiduciary duty claims are not subject to the *Tooley* "direct harm" test which we adopted in *Parametric Sound*. Determining whether non-fiduciary duty claims are direct or derivative requires, as discussed in *Citigroup*, *id.* at 1138-40, an analysis of the nature of the harm the shareholder alleges. Having applied the direct harm test to Wolfus's fiduciary duty claims, we next analyze the nature of Wolfus's common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and conclude that they, too, are derivative in nature.

Wolfus's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation

Wolfus argues that California common law, as set forth in *Small v. Fritz Cos.*, 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003), permits him to assert claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation directly. Regardless of how Wolfus purports to characterize these claims, however, he has simply repackaged his fiduciary duty claims under different labels. "[T]he duty of the court," however, "is to look at the nature of the wrong alleged, not merely at the form of the words used in the complaint." *Schuster v. Gardner*, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 468, 476 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting *In re Syncor Int'l Corp. Shareholders Litig.*, 857 A.2d 994, 997 (Del. Ch. 2004)); see also *Arent v. Distribution Scis., Inc.*, 975 F.2d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he fact that plaintiffs framed the harm as a direct fraud [does] not permit them to go forward on a claim that [i]s, at its core, derivative."). Here, Wolfus attempts to frame his cause of action as one for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, but the claims are based on what the Directors purportedly should have disclosed about their mismanagement of Midway. The underlying nature of Wolfus's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are derivative insofar as they are dependent on alleged injuries to Midway.

To be sure, Wolfus attempts to circumvent the fact that his claims arise from corporate mismanagement by carefully alleging that the Directors owed a duty directly to him, and breached that duty when, in their capacity as Directors, they failed to make true and complete public statements regarding the Pan project. Wolfus's second amended complaint explicitly states he does not assert any claim belonging to Midway and does not assert any claim for mismanagement of Midway, while alleging the Directors are liable for withholding facts they knew would be material to any reasonable investor in Midway, including Wolfus, and knew that none

of those facts had been disclosed. But generally alleging that a duty is owed individually to a shareholder, without more, is unavailing. See *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 422 n.10, 401 P.3d at 1105 n.10 (“Without more, general language concerning fiduciary duty owed to shareholders by directors does not support a direct action.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

No matter how he characterizes them, the nature of Wolfus’s fraud and misrepresentation claims, as the *Citigroup* court explained, are claims for breach of fiduciary duty that would be governed by the law of the state of incorporation:

[A]ny argument . . . that an issuer of stock owes special duties to the holder of its stock is just another way of arguing that the investors of a corporation are owed fiduciary duties by those who manage it. In other words, it is a way of saying that because of the relationship between the governed and the governors of a corporation, a special cause of action ought to exist. That kind of claim is governed by the laws of the state of incorporation exclusively under the internal affairs doctrine.

Citigroup, 140 A.3d at 1134-35. Like his fiduciary duty claims, the basis of Wolfus’s fraud claim is that Midway’s Directors mismanaged the Pan project, failed to disclose various aspects of their mismanagement, and as a result of the non-disclosure, Wolfus exercised stock options he otherwise would not have. Wolfus’s fraud claim is slightly distinct from his fiduciary duty claims to the extent it emphasizes that his cause of action stems from the diminution in Midway’s share value. His second amended complaint alleges that, had he known of the purportedly undisclosed facts the Directors withheld, Wolfus “would have sold all of his Midway shares . . . in February 2014 *when Midway’s stock price began to fall* from its peak.” (Emphasis added.) The nature of the harm alleged here cannot be understood apart from the decline in Midway’s stock value which ostensibly

resulted from the Directors' mismanagement. The decline in Midway's stock value did not result from any misrepresentation or omission, but from the Directors' alleged failure to successfully manage the Pan project. Generally, such an allegation will sustain a derivative action, not an action for direct injury to the shareholder. "The reasoning behind this rule is said to be that a diminution in the value of corporate stock resulting from some depreciation or injury to corporate assets is a direct injury only to the corporation; it is merely an indirect or incidental injury to an individual shareholder." 12B *Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations* § 5913 (Sept. 2018 Update). In other words, a shareholder's allegation of harm in the form of diminished value in stock is derivative when it results from alleged injury to the corporation, as Wolfus has alleged here. The overwhelming weight of authority clearly supports the proposition that shareholder suits alleging harm based on diminution in stock value are derivative when the decline results from harm directly inflicted on the corporation. See, e.g., *Rivers v. Wachovia Corp.*, 665 F.3d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2011) ("The well-established general rule is that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their stock." (internal quotation marks omitted); *Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.*, 407 F.3d 381, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding a shareholder's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were derivative because alleged corporate misrepresentations that "caus[e] a decline in the company's share price when the truth is revealed," injure the corporation directly and the shareholders only indirectly.); *Pareto v. FDIC*, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding a shareholder's allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and corporate mismanagement "describe[d] a direct

injury to the bank, not the individual stockholders,” and allegations of “depreciation of stock value [were] an indirect result of the injury to [the bank] which resulted in its closure”); *NBD Bank, N.A. v. Fulner*, 109 F.3d 299, 301 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A shareholder’s rights are merely derivative unless he can show a violation of a duty owed directly to him. Depreciation in value of a shareholder’s corporate stock is generally not the type of direct personal injury necessary to sustain a direct cause of action.”).

Even if we were to entertain Wolfus’s argument that his claims for fraud and misrepresentation allege direct harm personal to him, his pleading would be inadequate pursuant to the very authority upon which he relies, specifically, the decision in *Small v. Fritz Cos.*, 65 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Cal. 2003). There, the California Supreme Court explained:

“[I]n view of the danger of nonmeritorious suits . . . conclusory language does not satisfy the specificity requirement. In a holder’s action a plaintiff must allege specific reliance on the defendants’ representations: for example, that if the plaintiff had read a truthful account of the corporation’s financial status the plaintiff would have sold the stock, how many shares the plaintiff would have sold, and when the sale would have taken place. The plaintiff must allege actions, as distinguished from unspoken and unrecorded thoughts and decisions, that would indicate that the plaintiff actually relied on the misrepresentations.”

Id.

Wolfus’s allegations regarding his reliance on the Directors’ alleged misrepresentations are far from specific. He broadly asserts that he would have sold “all” of his Midway shares when they “peaked” in February 2014, while failing to explain how he could have known the stock price had reached a peak at that time. In effect, he has resorted to little more than

alleging the type of “unspoken and unrecorded thoughts and decisions” which the California Supreme Court rejected in *Small*. *Id.* For example, according to his second amended complaint, “Wolfus was primarily concerned with the status of the Pan project and the *likelihood* that this project would begin profitably mining gold and be revenue positive. *Wolfus determined* from those public statements and the absence of the 2013 [u]ndisclosed [f]acts that profitable mining operations would result in a *substantial increase in the value* of their combined Midway shares.” (Emphasis added.) Wolfus’s generic assertions that he subjectively “determined” through speculation based on public statements that Midway shares would “likely” be profitable, and that had he learned of the alleged omissions about the Directors’ mismanagement, he would have sold all his Midway shares when the stock price “peaked” in February 2014, are merely conclusory and lack the level of specificity the California Supreme Court held is required under California law.¹ Thus, even if we were to apply California law to Wolfus’s fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, they would fail.

¹Wolfus’s generic and speculative allegations also stand in stark contrast to the shareholders’ allegations in *Citigroup*, upon which Wolfus relies for support. The shareholders there apparently had developed a specific plan for selling their Citigroup shares at a specific price, at a specific time, in collaboration with their financial advisors, *before* the Citigroup stock price declined. *Citigroup*, 140 A.3d at 1128. They evidently supported their allegation by showing that they partly carried out their plan to sell their Citigroup shares, but delayed selling the remainder of their shares for twenty-two months in reliance on misrepresentations made to them about the corporation’s financial health. *Id.* Wolfus, here, fails to identify anything remotely similar, beyond generic references to what he would have done with the benefit of hindsight.

In short, the gravamen of Wolfus's complaint is the Directors' mismanagement of Midway, and the Pan project in particular, which harmed the corporation and contributed to its demise. Wolfus attempts to isolate the injury to him at the point at which he exercised stock options, and essentially seeks to obtain a refund of the purchase price he paid for his Midway shares, as well as the market value of the shares he purportedly would have sold, had the Directors' alleged mismanagement been disclosed to him and to the public. To recognize such a claim as a direct claim would be to ignore the entirety of Wolfus's complaint in disregard of the primary harm inflicted directly on the now-bankrupt corporation, an injury from which harm to Wolfus and other Midway shareholders necessarily derived. *Wolfus's claims are governed by the law of the state of incorporation*

Having determined that Wolfus's claims against the Directors are derivative in nature, as allegations of mismanagement which harmed Midway directly, we conclude the law of British Columbia, where Midway was incorporated, controls Wolfus's claims. *Vaughn v. LJ Int'l, Inc.*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 175 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Under the internal affairs doctrine, the rights of shareholders in a foreign company, including the right to sue derivatively, are determined by the law of the place where the company is incorporated." (internal quotation marks omitted)). British Columbia law requires a corporate shareholder to apply for leave of the court of that jurisdiction before filing a derivative action, and requires the shareholder to provide notice of such application to the company and demand that the directors take remedial action prior to commencement of the suit. Business Corporations Act, R.S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 §§ 232(2)(a) & 233(1)(a)-(b). The failure to obtain leave of court is fatal under British Columbia common law.

Bruneau v. Irwin Indus. (1978) Ltd., 2002 CarswellBC 1107, para. 19 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL) (“[W]here an action [is] in fact a derivative action but commenced without leave, the appropriate remedy [is] to strike it as disclosing no reasonable claim.”).

For his part, Wolfus concedes that if his claims are derivative, they are also subject to an effective pre-suit demand requirement which he failed to satisfy. Failure to comply with such a requirement is equally fatal to his complaint. *Vaughn*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171-72 (holding a pre-suit demand requirement imposed by the British Virgin Islands Business Companies Act of 2004 imposed a substantive requirement determining whether a shareholder had standing to sue). Wolfus also appears to acknowledge that he is barred from asserting a derivative claim as a result of Midway’s bankruptcy.


Having rejected Wolfus’s main contention that his claims are direct, rather than derivative, we agree with the district court’s initial determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Wolfus’s claims, because Wolfus lacked standing to assert them. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court was correct to initially dismiss Wolfus’s claims against the Directors on a jurisdictional basis, and the court’s subsequent reversal in permitting Wolfus’s claims to move forward was error. In light of the foregoing, we


ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION instructing the


district court to vacate its order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting petitioners' motion to dismiss.²

, C.J.
Gibbons

, J.
Hardesty

, J.
Parraguirre

, J.
Stiglich

, J.
Cadish

²Because we conclude that petitioners are entitled to a writ of prohibition in light of the district court's erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, NRS 34.320; *Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 131 Nev. 30, 35, 342 P.3d 997, 1001 (2015), we need not address petitioners' alternate request for mandamus relief.

cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, Chief Judge
Hon. Nancy L. Allf, District Judge
Greenberg Traurig, LLP/Las Vegas
Holland & Hart LLP/Las Vegas
Holland & Hart, LLP/Denver
Moye White LLP
Santoro Whitmire
James R. Christensen
BleauFox
Eighth District Court Clerk

SILVER, J., with whom PICKERING, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the district court should have dismissed the first three causes of action in California-resident Wolfus's second amended complaint, since those claims are derivative in nature and are for the corporation to assert or decline, not Wolfus. However, the same cannot be said for Wolfus's fourth and fifth causes of action, which are grounded in common law fraud and misrepresentation. Further, as pleaded, these are direct, *not derivative*, claims under California law as espoused by *Small v. Fritz Companies*, 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003). Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

Midway's Pan Gold Project (Pan) involved the company's intent to mine for gold at the northern end of the Pancake Mountains located in White Pine County, Nevada. In order to complete the project, Midway needed to secure permits from both the Bureau of Land Management and the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection. In May of 2010, Midway hired petitioner Brunk as its President and Chief Operating Officer, and by May of 2012, he ascended to become Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer—ousting Wolfus. Wolfus alleged in his second amended complaint that Brunk, along with other named defendants (petitioners here), through the company, issued various press releases and SEC filings over the next two years that described in significant detail the method and manner by which Midway intended to mine gold in the Pancake Mountains. According to Wolfus, these releases and filings misrepresented that Midway had made significant progress in permitting and financing the project moving forward.

In fact, Wolfus distinctly pleaded that in a January 15, 2014, SEC press release, Midway reported that the Pan project was “*fully permitted and construction is underway with completion estimated for Q3 2014.*” (Emphasis added). As a result, Wolfus exercised his stock option—purchasing 200,000 shares for \$112,000 Canadian dollars, which was the equivalent of \$100,636 U.S. dollars. Again, in March 12, 2014, Midway issued another press release stating that the Pan project was *fully permitted and that construction was underway*. Additionally, days later Midway issued another press release naming its mining contractor for the Pan project.

Wolfus alleged that on September 19, 2014, he again relied upon petitioners’ continued misrepresentations through press releases and SEC filings and purchased another 1,000,000 shares of Midway stock—exercising his stock options for \$860,000 Canadian dollars, which was then equivalent to \$783,778 U.S. dollars. Finally, only six months later, by June of 2015, Midway announced that it had begun Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Soon after, the bankruptcy was converted from Chapter 11 reorganization to Chapter 7 liquidation.

Wolfus alleged fraud and negligent misrepresentation by petitioners in his second amended complaint, highlighting that but for petitioners’ fraud and or negligent misrepresentations regarding the Pan project’s permits and financing (neither of which actually occurred), Wolfus would not have held onto his stock and would have sold it, and, moreover, he would not have exercised stock options in *purchasing* stock. Specifically, Wolfus alleged that he would have sold his existing stock around February 14, 2014, when Midway shares peaked at \$1.39.

This court disfavors granting writ petitions that challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss. *Buckwalter v. Dist. Court*, 126 Nev. 200, 201, 234 P.3d 920, 921 (2010); *State v. Thompson*, 99 Nev. 358, 361-62, 662 P.2d 1338, 1340 (1983). We review de novo the decision to dismiss a complaint under NRCP 12(b)(1), resolving factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, supported by competent evidence. *Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court*, 130 Nev. 368, 374, 328 P.3d 1152, 1156 (2014).

Midway and its representatives (petitioners) were responsible for Midway's press releases and SEC filings. The releases and filings publically claimed that Midway was fully permitted to mine for gold and that the company successfully obtained financing in moving forward with the Pan project. Midway cannot sue itself for its own fraud and misrepresentation. Fraud and misrepresentation as pleaded by Wolfus reflect a direct claim pursuant to common law.

In *Small*, the California Supreme Court held that California law authorizes a direct, as opposed to derivative, claim to a shareholder who alleges that they were wrongfully induced to hold stock instead of selling it. 65 P.3d at 1260, 1266. Therefore, a shareholder may properly bring a common law action for fraud or misrepresentation if that shareholder makes a bona fide showing of actual reliance upon the misrepresentations. *See id.* at 1266.

My review of the 47 pages of the second amended complaint in this case reveals that Wolfus sufficiently alleged a personal holder claim, which is a direct claim under California law. More importantly, Wolfus additionally alleged that because of petitioners' fraud or negligent misrepresentations in claiming the Pan project was "fully permitted" and

financed, he *purchased* almost a \$1,000,000 US stock—when in actuality, Midway was never fully permitted, nor was it financed, which ultimately resulted in Midway’s bankruptcy. Most certainly, Wolfus’s “purchaser claims” are direct claims that are personal to him. In my view, the majority broadly and in a conclusory fashion opines that the “gravamen” of Wolfus’s second amended complaint is derivative in nature. Not only does the majority fail to properly analyze the specifically pleaded holder claims involving *affirmative* acts of alleged fraud and misrepresentation, but it completely ignores specifically pleaded purchaser claims. These purchaser claims are clearly personal to Wolfus, not to all shareholders. How can the allegation that Wolfus purchased 1,000,000 shares of Midway Stock for \$860,000 Canadian dollars, equivalent to \$783,778 U.S. dollars, on September 19, 2014, based on fraud and misrepresentations by the petitioners regarding the project being fully permitted, be derivative in nature—as opposed to personal to Wolfus? This is *not*, as the majority claims, a cause of action for general mismanagement leading to the demise of the corporation for which all shareholders seek redress.

I do not disagree with those critical of “holder” claims who underscore that Wolfus has a long row to hoe to prove fraud and negligent misrepresentation, as “holder” claims may be quite speculative in nature and involve very complex questions of proof and damages. But that is not our concern. Here, this court is tasked with entertaining a writ petition involving a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). In *Citigroup Inc. v. AHW Investment Partnership*, 140 A.3d 1125 (Del. 2016), the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that difficulties proving a holder claim do not affect its status as a direct claim, and further noted that purchaser claims are direct as well:

Finally, whatever analytical problems are involved in recognizing the Holder Claims as a species of common law fraud claim or negligent misrepresentation claim do not turn those Holder Claims into claims belonging to the issuer who is the primary defendant, or into claims governed by the internal affairs doctrine. As discussed above, *holder claims are analytically indistinct from seller and purchaser claims, which are direct claims that are personal to the holder.* Purchaser, seller, and holder claims all involve very difficult questions of proof and damages, and holder claims just entail proving the additional requirement of inducement. This admittedly can be said to compound, not just marginally add to, those complex questions of proof and damages. That is, a holder claim plaintiff must prove that she would have sold her securities in some particular time period had she had certain information at that time. Because securities holders may decide whether to hold or sell stock for various reasons, proving inducement is difficult. *The speculation arguably inherent in this added element has led states to be rightly cautious about creating broad causes of action for securities holders, as opposed to sellers or purchasers, a caution our state law has shared. That issue, however, does not transmogrify a common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim belonging to the security holder under state law into one belonging to the issuer.*

Id. at 1140-41 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, I would deny petitioners' writ. In my view, the district court properly denied petitioners' motion to dismiss Wolfus's second amended complaint regarding counts 4 and 5, alleging

fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Both causes of action are direct claims, personal to Wolfus, and he pleaded them with enough specificity to survive a motion to dismiss.

Silver J.
Silver

I concur:

Pickering J.
Pickering

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D. MORITZ;
BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR; TIMOTHY
HADDON; MARTIN M. HALE, JR.; TREY
ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK
YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A.
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON; AND
NATHANIEL KLEIN,

Petitioners,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE
HONORABLE NANCY L. ALLF, DISTRICT
JUDGE,

Respondents,

and

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Real Party in Interest.

Supreme Court No. 76052

District Court Case No. A756971

NOTICE IN LIEU OF REMITTITUR

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES:

The decision and Order of the court in this matter having been entered on October 11th, 2019, and the period for the filing of a petition for rehearing having expired and no petition having been filed, notice is hereby given that the Order and decision entered herein has, pursuant to the rules of this court, become effective.

DATE: November 05, 2019

Elizabeth A. Brown, Clerk of Court

By: Rory Wunsch
Deputy Clerk

cc: Hon. Nancy L. Alf, District Judge
Eighth Judicial District Court, Chief Judge
Santoro Whitmire
Moye White LLP
Holland & Hart LLP/Las Vegas
Greenberg Traurig, LLP/Las Vegas
James R. Christensen
BleauFox
Steven D. Grierson, Eighth District Court Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D. MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR; TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M. HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A. NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON; AND NATHANIEL KLEIN,
Petitioners,

vs.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE NANCY L. ALLF, DISTRICT JUDGE,
Respondents,

and

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,
Real Party in Interest.

No. 76052

FILED

NOV 08 2019

ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
BY S. Young
DEPUTY CLERK

WRIT OF PROHIBITION

TO: The Honorable Nancy L. Allf, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court:

WHEREAS, this Court having made and filed its written decision that a writ of prohibition issue,

NOW, THEREFORE, you are instructed to vacate your order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting petitioners' motion to dismiss, in the case entitled Daniel E. Wolfus, v. Kenneth A. Brunk; Richard D. Moritz; Bradley J. Blacketor; Timothy Haddon; Marin M. Hale, Jr.; Trey Anderson; Richard Sawchak; Frank Yu; John W. Sheridan; Roger A. Newell; Rodney D. Knutson; Nathaniel Klein; INV-MID, LLC, 2019 Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-MID II, LLC, a

Deleware Limited Liability Company; and HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, case no. A756971.

WITNESS The Honorables Mark Gibbons, Chief Justice, James W. Hardesty, Ron Parraguirre, Lidia Stiglich, and Elissa Cadish, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, and attested by my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 2019.

Harriet .
Summers

Chief Assistant Clerk



IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M.
HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON;
RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU;
JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN,

Petitioners,

v.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK; AND THE HONORABLE
NANCY L. ALLF, DISTRICT JUDGE,
DEPT. 27,

Respondents,

And


DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Real Parties in Interest.

Supreme Court No. 76052

District Court Case No.
A-17-756971-B

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



HOLLAND & HART LLP

Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Tel: (702) 669-4600
Fax: (702) 669-4650
bcassity@hollandhart.com
dfreeman@hollandhart.com

Holly Stein Sollod, Esq.
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 295-8085
Fax: (303) 295-8261
hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

*Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,
Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy Haddon,
Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,
Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and Rodney
D. Knutson*

GREENBERG TRAUIG, LLP

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq.
Christopher Miltenberger, Esq.
3773 Howard Hughes Pkwy Ste. 400
Las Vegas, NV 89169
Tel: (702) 792-3773
ferrariom@gtlaw.com
miltenbergerc@gtlaw.com

*Attorneys for Martin M. Hale, Jr. Trey
Anderson and Nathaniel Klein*

SANTORO WHITMIRE

Jason D. Smith, Esq.
10100 W. Charleston Blvd., Suite 250
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
Tel: (702) 948-8771
jsmith@santoronevada.com

MOYE WHITE LLP

Eric B. Liebman, Esq.
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
Rebecca DeCook, Esq.
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
16 Market Square, 6th Floor
1400 16th Street
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 292-7944
Fax: (303) 292-4510
eric.liebman@moyewhite.com

Attorneys for Kenneth A. Brunk

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE


Pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 25(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Holland & Hart; that on this date I caused to be hand delivered the following documents: **ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION and WRIT OF PROHIBITION** as follows:

Honorable Judge Nancy L. Allf
Department 27
Eighth Judicial District Court
200 Lewis Avenue
Las Vegas, 89155

November 5, 2019

/s/ Julie Linton
An Employee of HOLLAND & HART LLP

13788626_v1



1 **ORDG**

2 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
3 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
4 HOLLAND & HART LLP
5 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
7 Tel: (702) 669-4600
8 Fax: (702) 669-4650
9 bcassity@hollandhart.com
10 dfreeman@hollandhart.com

11 Holly Stein Sollod, Esq. (Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*)
12 HOLLAND & HART LLP
13 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
14 Denver, CO 80202
15 Tel: (303) 295-8085
16 Fax: (303) 295-8261
17 hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

18 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
19 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
20 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
21 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
22 *Rodney D. Knutson.*

23 **DISTRICT COURT**

24 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

25 DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

26 Plaintiff,

27 v.

28 KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO. : A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT**

Electronic Filing Case

1 On March 16, 2018, Defendants Richard D. Moritz, Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy
2 Haddon, Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and Rodney D.
3 Knutson (collectively, the “D&O Defendants”) filed D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
4 Second Amended Complaint (the “Motion”), Defendants Martin M. Hale, Jr., Trey Anderson,
5 Nathaniel Klein, INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC (collectively, the
6 “Hale Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss and Joinder thereto (the “Hale Joinder”) and Defendant
7 Kenneth A. Brunk (“Brunk”) Motion to Dismiss and Joinder thereto (the “Brunk Joinder”)
8 (collectively, the Motion, Brunk Joinder, and Hale Joinder will be referred to as “Defendants’
9 Motions”), wherein the D&O Defendants, Hale Defendants and Brunk (collectively, the
10 “Defendants”) moved the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for Damages filed
11 by Plaintiff Daniel E. Wolfus (“Wolfus” or “Plaintiff”) on February 5, 2018 (the “Second
12 Amended Complaint” or “SAC”).

13 The Defendants’ Motions came before this Court for hearing on May 9, 2018 at 10:30
14 a.m. Robert J. Cassity, Esq. and David J. Freeman, Esq., of the law firm HOLLAND & HART
15 LLP, appeared on behalf of the D&O Defendants. Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. and Christopher R.
16 Miltenberger, Esq., of the law firm GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, appeared on behalf of the
17 Hale Defendants. Eric B. Liebman, Esq., of the law firm MOYE WHITE LLP, and Jason D.
18 Smith, Esq., of the law firm SANTORO WHITMIRE, appeared on behalf of Brunk. James R.
19 Christensen, Esq., of the law firm JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN PC, and Samuel T. Rees, Esq.
20 appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

21 On June 6, 2018, the Court entered an Order Regarding Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
22 On June 12, 2018, Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively,
23 Mandamus (the “Writ Petition”) with the Nevada Supreme Court, which was assigned Case No.
24 76052. In the Writ Petition, Defendants challenged the Court’s Order Regarding Defendants’
25 Motions to Dismiss. On July 26, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order Directing an
26 Answer to the Writ Petition. On September 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Answer to the Writ
27 Petition. On October 29, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the Writ Petition. On
28 April 2, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court, sitting *en banc*, held oral argument on Defendants’

1 Writ Petition. On October 11, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order Granting
2 Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and the Supreme Court issued a Writ of Prohibition, instructing
3 this Court to vacate its Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and to enter an order
4 granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. A Notice of Lieu of Remittitur was issued on
5 November 5, 2019.

6 The Court having carefully considered the D&O Defendants' Motion, Hale Joinder, Brunk
7 Joinder, Plaintiff's Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
8 Motions to Dismiss, the Defendants' respective reply briefs filed in support of the Motion,
9 together with all declarations filed in support of and opposition to the Motion and Joinders,
10 including the exhibits to the declarations, the oral argument of counsel presented at the hearing
11 on this matter, and having reviewed the Nevada Supreme Court's Order Granting Petition for
12 Writ of Prohibition, having been served with the Writ of Prohibition, and in accordance with the
13 requirements of the Writ of Prohibition, issues the following Order Granting Defendants' Motions
14 to Dismiss:

15 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

16 1. Midway Gold Corp. ("Midway") was a publicly traded Canadian Corporation
17 incorporated under the Company Act of British Columbia, with its principal executive offices
18 located in Englewood, Colorado. *See* Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 23.

19 2. Midway was engaged in the business of exploring and mining gold, primarily from
20 mines located in Nevada and Washington (*see id.* ¶¶ 24, 30), including the Pan Mine located at
21 the northern end of the Pancake mountain range in Western Pine County, Nevada (*see id.* ¶ 32).

22 3. Defendants are alleged to be former directors, officers and/or controlling persons
23 of Midway. SAC ¶¶ 8-20.

24 4. Defendants INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID, LLC are each
25 Delaware limited liability corporations with their principal places of business in New York. SAC
26 ¶ 20.

1 5. Plaintiff, a California resident, became an outside director of Midway in
2 November 2008 and began purchasing Midway common stock in the open market in February
3 2008. *Id.* ¶¶ 7, 26 and 29.

4 6. In 2009, Plaintiff became Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer
5 of Midway, serving in both capacities until May 18, 2012 when he was replaced by Brunk. *Id.* ¶
6 27.

7 7. Plaintiff also received stock option grants pursuant to Midway's qualified
8 employee stock option plan on January 7, 2009 and September 10, 2009. *See* Mot. Exs. H, I.

9 8. At the time Plaintiff became Chairman of the Board and CEO, Midway had
10 properties in the exploratory stage where gold mineralization had been identified (*see* SAC ¶ 30),
11 including the Pan Mine (*see id.* ¶ 32).

12 9. Prior to May 2010, Midway made the decision to convert from a purely exploration
13 company into a gold mining production company using the Pan Mine as its initial production
14 mine. *Id.* ¶ 35.

15 10. In late 2011, when Plaintiff was still Midway's Chairman and CEO, an
16 independent contractor, Gustavson Associates, completed a feasibility study on the Pan Mine,
17 which predicted over 1 million ounces of gold existed at the mine, and could be commercially
18 mined (the "2011 Pan Mine Study"). *Id.* ¶ 44; *Id.* Ex. 1 at 9.

19 11. Midway disclosed the study to the public in December 2011 (*see id.* ¶ 45), and
20 stated it was converting to a production company to bring the Pan Mine online as a profitable
21 revenue stream.

22 12. Plaintiff alleges that, by either mid or late 2013, Midway's management and its
23 board (including the D&O Defendants) knew the Pan Mine was being built and operated in ways
24 that were materially different from those assumed in the 2011 Pan Mine Study, but the Defendants
25 did not inform investors of the material impact on cash flows as a result of those differences. *Id.*
26 ¶ 65.

27 13. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants failed to disclose that Midway (a)
28 was unable to raise sufficient cash to complete the Pan Mine project in the manner set forth in the

2011 Pan Mine Study, as well as fund on-going operations until the Pan Mine project produced sufficient revenues to cover these expenses, and (b) did not seek the proper permits and did not have the necessary facilities to process the gold solution once leaching was completed, and there would be a considerable delay before the facilities were constructed and permitted for operations. *Id.* ¶¶ 65, 86.

14. On January 23, 2014, Plaintiff exercised stock options to acquire 200,000 shares at \$0.56/share for \$112,000 Canadian Dollars (\$100,636 USD). *Id.* ¶ 69.

15. On September 19, 2014, Plaintiff exercised his stock option to acquire 1,000,000 shares at \$0.86/share for \$860,000 Canadian Dollars (\$783,778 USD). Plaintiff's acquisition of shares was also a result of his exercising certain of his qualified employee stock options. *Id.* ¶¶ 87, 88, 89.

16. Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendants arising out of the Defendants' alleged failure to disclose certain facts regarding the progress (or lack thereof) of the Pan Mine project prior to Plaintiff's stock option exercises in 2014.

17. Plaintiff alleges that had he known these undisclosed facts, he would not have exercised his stock options in either January 2014 or September 2014. Plaintiff also alleges that he and his family were induced to hold their stock when, had they known the material facts, they would have sold their stock when Midway's stock price reached its peak on February 28, 2014. *See* SAC ¶¶ 106, 111, 114, 117, 124, 130, 131, 144-145.

18. Plaintiff alleged that he relied on these allegedly misleading statements in exercising his stock options, which were subsequently rendered worthless by Midway's bankruptcy. *See* SAC ¶¶ 95-96.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

19. When a plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the Court must dismiss the claim upon motion under NRCP 12(b)(5). "In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) the court accepts a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but the allegations must be legally sufficient to constitute the elements of the claims asserted." *Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 818, 823, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009) (citation

1 omitted). “To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain some ‘set of facts, which, if true, would
2 entitle the plaintiff to relief.’” *In re Amerco Derivative Litig.*, 127 Nev. 196, 211, 252 P.3d 681,
3 692 (2011) (citation omitted). “Dismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to
4 establish the elements of a claim for relief.” *Stockmeier v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr.*, 124 Nev. 313,
5 316, 183 P.3d 133, 135 (2008) (citations omitted).

6 20. Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for Securities Fraud under the California
7 Corporate Securities Act. Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 provides: “It is unlawful for any person to
8 offer or sell a security in this state, or to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of
9 any written or oral communication that includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
10 state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
11 under which the statements were made, not misleading.”

12 21. Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(a) provides: “Sale or sell includes every contract of sale
13 of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. Sale or sell
14 includes any exchange of securities and any change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
15 restrictions of or on outstanding securities.”

16 22. Further, Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) provides: “Every sale or offer of a warrant or
17 right to purchase or subscribe to another security of the same or another issuer, as well as every
18 sale or offer of a security which gives the holder a present or future right or privilege to convert
19 the security into another security of the same or another issuer, includes an offer and sale of the
20 other security only at the time of the offer or sale of the warrant or right or convertible security;
21 but neither the exercise of the right to purchase or subscribe or to convert nor the issuance of
22 securities pursuant thereto is an offer or sale.”

23 23. After review of the plain language of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e), the Court
24 concludes that neither the exercise of the right to purchase shares nor the issuance of securities
25 pursuant thereto is an offer or sale. The sale or offer is deemed to occur at the time of the offer
26 or sale of the right to purchase the share.

24. Although Plaintiff contends this provision relates to stock warrants, stock warrants are listed separately from rights to purchase and is separated by the word “or,” implying that the provision applies to both warrants and rights to purchase shares.

25. Plaintiff claims the alleged misrepresentations, namely the 2013 and 2014 Material Facts impose liability on Defendants under Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 for the alleged misleading sale. However, the application of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) indicates that the sale occurred in 2009 when the stock options were issued, and there are no allegations that the sale in 2009 was based upon any untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of the same. Accordingly, the California Securities Fraud cause of action fails as a matter of law and is subject to dismissal with prejudice as to all Defendants.

26. With regard to Plaintiffs’ claims, “[t]he question whether a suit is derivative by nature or may be brought by a shareholder in his own right is governed by the law of the state of incorporation” *Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs.*, 348 F.3d 584, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2003); *see also Kepley v. Lanz*, 715 F.3d 969, 972-73 (6th Cir. 2013).

27. As Midway Gold is a British Columbian corporation, the test British Columbian courts apply when evaluating whether a claim is direct or derivative is whether “the gravamen of the cause of action alleged [arises] as a result of wrongs done to the company. . . . If the damage that flows is a direct result of the wrongs done to the company, then those damages can only be claimed by the company.” *Robak Indus. Ltd. v. Gardner*, 2006 CarswellBC 2533, para. 5 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL).

28. In making this determination, the courts in that jurisdiction examine “the nature of the damages suffered as alleged in the pleadings.” *Id.* at para. 13; *see also Luft v. Ball*, 2013 CarswellBC 820, para. 34 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL) (“In order for a complaining shareholder to maintain a personal action for breach of duties owed to the company, that shareholder must show that he or she has suffered damage or loss in a manner distinct from other shareholders.”).

29. The Nevada Supreme Court recently adopted Delaware’s “direct harm” test for distinguishing between derivative and direct shareholder claims in *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 427, 401 P.3d at 1108. In order to determine whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative,

1 the court must consider: “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing
2 stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other
3 remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?” *Id.* (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at
4 1033).

5 30. Pursuant to the direct harm test, the relevant inquiry in addressing who suffered
6 the alleged harm is: “Looking at the body of the complaint and considering the nature of the
7 wrong alleged and the relief requested, has the plaintiff demonstrated that he or she can prevail
8 without showing an injury to the corporation. *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 426, 401 P.3d at
9 1107-08 (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1036). Applying the direct harm test as set forth in
10 *Parametric Sound*, Wolfus’s fiduciary duty claims are derivative because he has not demonstrated
11 a harm that is independent of the injury to Midway as a corporation.

12 31. The gravamen of Wolfus’s Second Amended Complaint is the Directors’ alleged
13 mismanagement of Midway, specifically, mismanagement in the form of failing to secure
14 sufficient capital for the Pan project, deciding not to sell assets to create necessary capital, and
15 purportedly allowing a certain Director to “tak[e] effective control of Midway and the Pan project
16 even though” Wolfus contends that Director “lacked the ability to manage the Pan project.”
17 Wolfus also alleges the Directors failed to appropriately employ supervisory staff for the Pan
18 project, which delayed production. Further, Wolfus alleges the Pan project failed because the
19 Directors, rather than cut costs to purchase necessary equipment, “decided not to purchase this
20 necessary equipment” and instead purchased equipment for which the company had not secured
21 the appropriate permits. These alleged acts of mismanagement and imprudent investment
22 decisions impaired or prevented what Wolfus describes in his Second Amended Complaint as the
23 “two major events” required for the Pan project to succeed: Midway securing necessary permits
24 and securing necessary financing for the project. SAC ¶ 46.

25 32. The Court concludes, based on the body of his Second Amended Complaint and
26 the nature of his claims, that Wolfus’s breach of fiduciary duty claims describe a derivative action
27 based on the Directors’ alleged mismanagement of Midway. His Second Amended Complaint
28 merely reflects an unavailing attempt to characterize the derivative claim as a direct claim

1 personal to him. Such an effort does not alter the nature of his claims. *See Kramer v. W. Pac.*
2 *Indus., Inc.*, 546 A.2d 348, 352-53 (Del. 1988) (holding that where the gravamen of a
3 stockholder's complaint is director mismanagement, the cause of action is derivative in nature).
4 Notwithstanding his attempt to characterize his claims as direct, the essence of Wolfus's claims
5 allege harm to Midway from which injury resulted indirectly to each of Midway's shareholders.
6 Accordingly, Wolfus's breach of fiduciary duty claims are derivative and he lacks standing to
7 pursue them.

8 33. Wolfus argues that California common law, as set forth in *Small v. Fritz Cos.*, 65
9 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003), permits him to assert claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation
10 directly. Regardless of how Wolfus purports to characterize these claims, however, he has simply
11 repackaged his fiduciary duty claims under different labels. Here, Wolfus attempts to frame his
12 cause of action as one for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, but the claims are based on what
13 the Directors purportedly should have disclosed about their management of Midway. The
14 underlying nature of Wolfus's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are derivative as they
15 are dependent on alleged injuries to Midway.

16 34. Wolfus's Second Amended Complaint alleges that, had he known of the
17 purportedly undisclosed facts the Directors withheld, Wolfus "would have sold all of his Midway
18 shares . . . in February 2014 when Midway's stock price began to fall from its peak." The nature
19 of the harm alleged here cannot be understood apart from the decline in Midway's stock value
20 which ostensibly resulted from the Directors' purported mismanagement. The decline in
21 Midway's stock value did not result from any misrepresentation or omission, but from the
22 Directors' alleged failure to successfully manage the Pan project. Generally, such an allegation
23 will sustain a derivative action, not an action for direct injury to the shareholder. *See, e.g., Rivers*
24 *v. Wachovia Corp.*, 665 F.3d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2011) ("The well-established general rule is
25 that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or
26 injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their stock."
27 (internal quotation marks omitted); *Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.*, 407 F.3d 381, 384-85 (5th Cir.
28 2005) (concluding a shareholder's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were

1 derivative because alleged corporate misrepresentations that “caus[e] a decline in the company’s
2 share price when the truth is revealed,” injure the corporation directly and the shareholders only
3 indirectly.); *Pareto v. FDIC*, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding a shareholder’s
4 allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and corporate mismanagement “describe[d] a direct injury
5 to the bank, not the individual stockholders,” and allegations of “depreciation of stock value
6 [were] an indirect result of the injury to [the bank] which resulted in its closure”).

7 35. Even if the Court were to entertain Wolfus’s argument that his claims for fraud
8 and misrepresentation allege direct harm personal to him, his pleading would be inadequate
9 pursuant to the very authority upon which he relies, specifically, the decision in *Small v. Fritz*
10 *Cos.*, 65 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Cal. 2003).

11 36. Having determined that Wolfus’s claims against the Directors are derivative in
12 nature, as allegations of mismanagement which harmed Midway directly, the Court concludes the
13 law of British Columbia, where Midway was incorporated, controls Wolfus’s claims. *Vaughn v.*
14 *Le nnt’l, Inc.*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 175 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Under the internal affairs doctrine, the
15 rights of shareholders in a foreign company, including the right to sue derivatively, are determined
16 by the law of the place where the company is incorporated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

17 37. British Columbia law requires a corporate shareholder to apply for leave of the
18 court of that jurisdiction before filing a derivative action, and requires the shareholder to provide
19 notice of such application to the company and demand that the directors take remedial action prior
20 to commencement of the suit. Business Corporations Act, R.S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 §§ 232(2)(a) &
21 233(1)(a)-(b). The failure to obtain leave of court is fatal under British Columbia common law.
22 *Bruneau v. Irwin Indus. (1978) Ltd.*, 2002 CarswellIBC 1107, para. 19 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL)
23 (“[W]here an action [is] in fact a derivative action but commenced without leave, the appropriate
24 remedy [is] to strike it as disclosing no reasonable claim.”).

25 38. Wolfus concedes that if his claims are derivative, they are also subject to an
26 effective pre-suit demand requirement which he failed to satisfy. Failure to comply with such a
27 requirement is equally fatal to his complaint. *Vaughn*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171-72 (holding a pre-
28

1 suit demand requirement imposed by the British Virgin Islands Business Companies Act of 2004
2 imposed a substantive requirement determining whether a shareholder had standing to sue).

3 39. Wolfus also lacks standing to pursue derivative claims on behalf of Midway as a
4 result of Midway's bankruptcy, over which the estate's trustee has exclusive standing to litigate.
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541; *Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court Case No.*
6 *SPR 02211*, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy
7 trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate."); *Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres*, 785
8 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the bankruptcy estate of a corporate debtor
9 includes any derivative right of action the corporation may have to recover damages for
10 misconduct, mismanagement, or neglect of duty by a corporate officer or director).

11 **ORDER**

12 Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing,

13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court's Order Regarding Defendants' Motion to
14 Dismiss dated June 6, 2018 is VACATED;

15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
16 Claim for Securities Fraud, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
18 Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
20 Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, which is hereby DISMISSED with
21 prejudice.

22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
23 Claim for Fraud, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89134
Phone: (702) 222-2500 ♦ Fax: (702) 669-4650

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
2 Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 DATED this 9 day of Jan 2020 ~~December 2019~~.

5
6 Nancy L. Alf
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

7 JD

8 Respectfully submitted by:


9 Robert J. Cassity

10 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
11 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
12 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

13
14 Holly Stein Sollod, Esq. (Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
15 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202

16 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
17 *Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy Haddon,*
18 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
19 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
Rodney D. Knutson

20 13844471_v1
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28



1 **NEOJ**

2 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
3 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
4 HOLLAND & HART LLP
5 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
7 Tel: (702) 669-4600
8 Fax: (702) 669-4650
9 bcassity@hollandhart.com
10 dfreeman@hollandhart.com

11 Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
12 HOLLAND & HART LLP
13 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
14 Denver, CO 80202
15 Tel: (303) 295-8085
16 Fax: (303) 295-8261
17 hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

18 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
19 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
20 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
21 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
22 *Rodney D. Knutson.*

23 **DISTRICT COURT**

24 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

25 DANIEL E. WOLFUS, ,

26 Plaintiff,

27 v.

28 KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO. : A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

**NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS
TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT**

HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89134
Phone: (702) 222-2500 ♦ Fax: (702) 669-4650

1 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that an Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
2 Second Amended Complaint was entered on the 10th day of January 2020. A copy is attached.

3 DATED this 13th day of January 2020.
4

5 By /s/ Robert J. Cassity
6 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
7 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
8 HOLLAND & HART LLP
9 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
10 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

11 Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq.
12 *(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)*
13 HOLLAND & HART LLP
14 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
15 Denver, CO 80202

16 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
17 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
18 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
19 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
20 *Rodney D. Knutson.*
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 13th day of January 2020, a true and correct copy of the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT** was served by the following method(s):

☒ **Electronic:** by submitting electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey eFileNV Electronic Filing system and serving all parties with an email address on record, as indicated below, pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R. That date and time of the electronic proof of service in place of the date and place of deposit in the U.S. Mail.

James R. Christensen, Esq.
JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas, NV 89101
jim@jchristensenlaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq.
Christopher Miltenberger, Esq.
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Ste 600
Las Vegas, NV 89135
ferrariom@gtlaw.com
miltenbergerc@gtlaw.com

*Attorneys for Martin M. Hale, Jr. Trey
Anderson, Nathaniel Klein, INV-MID, LLC,
EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID, LLC*

Jason D. Smith, Esq.
SANTORO WHIMIRE
10100 W. Charleston Blvd., #250
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
Email: jsmith@santoronevada.com


Attorneys for Kenneth A. Brunk

☒ **U.S. Mail:** by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage fully prepaid to the persons and addresses listed below:

Eric B. Liebman, Esq.
Rebecca DeCook, Esq.
MOYE WHITE LLP
16 Market Square, 6th Floor
1400 16th Street
Denver, CO 80202

Attorneys for Kenneth A. Brunk

/s/ Valerie Larsen
An Employee of Holland & Hart LLP



1 **ORDG**

2 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
3 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
4 HOLLAND & HART LLP
5 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
6 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
7 Tel: (702) 669-4600
8 Fax: (702) 669-4650
9 bcassity@hollandhart.com
10 dfreeman@hollandhart.com

11 Holly Stein Sollod, Esq. (Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*)
12 HOLLAND & HART LLP
13 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
14 Denver, CO 80202
15 Tel: (303) 295-8085
16 Fax: (303) 295-8261
17 hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

18 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
19 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
20 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
21 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
22 *Rodney D. Knutson.*

23 **DISTRICT COURT**

24 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA**

25 DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

26 Plaintiff,

27 v.

28 KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

**ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS TO DISMISS SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT**

Electronic Filing Case

On March 16, 2018, Defendants Richard D. Moritz, Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon, Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and Rodney D. Knutson (collectively, the “D&O Defendants”) filed D&O Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint (the “Motion”), Defendants Martin M. Hale, Jr., Trey Anderson, Nathaniel Klein, INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC and HCP-MID, LLC (collectively, the “Hale Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss and Joinder thereto (the “Hale Joinder”) and Defendant Kenneth A. Brunk (“Brunk”) Motion to Dismiss and Joinder thereto (the “Brunk Joinder”) (collectively, the Motion, Brunk Joinder, and Hale Joinder will be referred to as “Defendants’ Motions”), wherein the D&O Defendants, Hale Defendants and Brunk (collectively, the “Defendants”) moved the Court to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for Damages filed by Plaintiff Daniel E. Wolfus (“Wolfus” or “Plaintiff”) on February 5, 2018 (the “Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”).

The Defendants’ Motions came before this Court for hearing on May 9, 2018 at 10:30 a.m. Robert J. Cassity, Esq. and David J. Freeman, Esq., of the law firm HOLLAND & HART LLP, appeared on behalf of the D&O Defendants. Mark E. Ferrario, Esq. and Christopher R. Miltenberger, Esq., of the law firm GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, appeared on behalf of the Hale Defendants. Eric B. Liebman, Esq., of the law firm MOYE WHITE LLP, and Jason D. Smith, Esq., of the law firm SANTORO WHITMIRE, appeared on behalf of Brunk. James R. Christensen, Esq., of the law firm JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN PC, and Samuel T. Rees, Esq. appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

On June 6, 2018, the Court entered an Order Regarding Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On June 12, 2018, Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition or, Alternatively, Mandamus (the “Writ Petition”) with the Nevada Supreme Court, which was assigned Case No. 76052. In the Writ Petition, Defendants challenged the Court’s Order Regarding Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. On July 26, 2018, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order Directing an Answer to the Writ Petition. On September 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed an Answer to the Writ Petition. On October 29, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply in Support of the Writ Petition. On April 2, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court, sitting *en banc*, held oral argument on Defendants’

1 Writ Petition. On October 11, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an Order Granting
2 Petition for Writ of Prohibition, and the Supreme Court issued a Writ of Prohibition, instructing
3 this Court to vacate its Order Regarding Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and to enter an order
4 granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. A Notice of Lieu of Remittitur was issued on
5 November 5, 2019.

6 The Court having carefully considered the D&O Defendants' Motion, Hale Joinder, Brunk
7 Joinder, Plaintiff's Consolidated Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
8 Motions to Dismiss, the Defendants' respective reply briefs filed in support of the Motion,
9 together with all declarations filed in support of and opposition to the Motion and Joinders,
10 including the exhibits to the declarations, the oral argument of counsel presented at the hearing
11 on this matter, and having reviewed the Nevada Supreme Court's Order Granting Petition for
12 Writ of Prohibition, having been served with the Writ of Prohibition, and in accordance with the
13 requirements of the Writ of Prohibition, issues the following Order Granting Defendants' Motions
14 to Dismiss:

15 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

16 1. Midway Gold Corp. ("Midway") was a publicly traded Canadian Corporation
17 incorporated under the Company Act of British Columbia, with its principal executive offices
18 located in Englewood, Colorado. *See* Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 23.

19 2. Midway was engaged in the business of exploring and mining gold, primarily from
20 mines located in Nevada and Washington (*see id.* ¶¶ 24, 30), including the Pan Mine located at
21 the northern end of the Pancake mountain range in Western Pine County, Nevada (*see id.* ¶ 32).

22 3. Defendants are alleged to be former directors, officers and/or controlling persons
23 of Midway. SAC ¶¶ 8-20.

24 4. Defendants INV-MID, LLC, EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID, LLC are each
25 Delaware limited liability corporations with their principal places of business in New York. SAC
26 ¶ 20.

1 5. Plaintiff, a California resident, became an outside director of Midway in
2 November 2008 and began purchasing Midway common stock in the open market in February
3 2008. *Id.* ¶¶ 7, 26 and 29.

4 6. In 2009, Plaintiff became Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer
5 of Midway, serving in both capacities until May 18, 2012 when he was replaced by Brunk. *Id.* ¶
6 27.

7 7. Plaintiff also received stock option grants pursuant to Midway's qualified
8 employee stock option plan on January 7, 2009 and September 10, 2009. *See* Mot. Exs. H, I.

9 8. At the time Plaintiff became Chairman of the Board and CEO, Midway had
10 properties in the exploratory stage where gold mineralization had been identified (*see* SAC ¶ 30),
11 including the Pan Mine (*see id.* ¶ 32).

12 9. Prior to May 2010, Midway made the decision to convert from a purely exploration
13 company into a gold mining production company using the Pan Mine as its initial production
14 mine. *Id.* ¶ 35.

15 10. In late 2011, when Plaintiff was still Midway's Chairman and CEO, an
16 independent contractor, Gustavson Associates, completed a feasibility study on the Pan Mine,
17 which predicted over 1 million ounces of gold existed at the mine, and could be commercially
18 mined (the "2011 Pan Mine Study"). *Id.* ¶ 44; *Id.* Ex. 1 at 9.

19 11. Midway disclosed the study to the public in December 2011 (*see id.* ¶ 45), and
20 stated it was converting to a production company to bring the Pan Mine online as a profitable
21 revenue stream.

22 12. Plaintiff alleges that, by either mid or late 2013, Midway's management and its
23 board (including the D&O Defendants) knew the Pan Mine was being built and operated in ways
24 that were materially different from those assumed in the 2011 Pan Mine Study, but the Defendants
25 did not inform investors of the material impact on cash flows as a result of those differences. *Id.*
26 ¶ 65.

27 13. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants failed to disclose that Midway (a)
28 was unable to raise sufficient cash to complete the Pan Mine project in the manner set forth in the

2011 Pan Mine Study, as well as fund on-going operations until the Pan Mine project produced sufficient revenues to cover these expenses, and (b) did not seek the proper permits and did not have the necessary facilities to process the gold solution once leaching was completed, and there would be a considerable delay before the facilities were constructed and permitted for operations. *Id.* ¶¶ 65, 86.

14. On January 23, 2014, Plaintiff exercised stock options to acquire 200,000 shares at \$0.56/share for \$112,000 Canadian Dollars (\$100,636 USD). *Id.* ¶ 69.

15. On September 19, 2014, Plaintiff exercised his stock option to acquire 1,000,000 shares at \$0.86/share for \$860,000 Canadian Dollars (\$783,778 USD). Plaintiff's acquisition of shares was also a result of his exercising certain of his qualified employee stock options. *Id.* ¶¶ 87, 88, 89.

16. Plaintiff has asserted claims against Defendants arising out of the Defendants' alleged failure to disclose certain facts regarding the progress (or lack thereof) of the Pan Mine project prior to Plaintiff's stock option exercises in 2014.

17. Plaintiff alleges that had he known these undisclosed facts, he would not have exercised his stock options in either January 2014 or September 2014. Plaintiff also alleges that he and his family were induced to hold their stock when, had they known the material facts, they would have sold their stock when Midway's stock price reached its peak on February 28, 2014. *See* SAC ¶¶ 106, 111, 114, 117, 124, 130, 131, 144-145.

18. Plaintiff alleged that he relied on these allegedly misleading statements in exercising his stock options, which were subsequently rendered worthless by Midway's bankruptcy. *See* SAC ¶¶ 95-96.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

19. When a plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted," the Court must dismiss the claim upon motion under NRCP 12(b)(5). "In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) the court accepts a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but the allegations must be legally sufficient to constitute the elements of the claims asserted." *Sanchez ex rel. Sanchez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 125 Nev. 818, 823, 221 P.3d 1276, 1280 (2009) (citation

1 omitted). “To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain some ‘set of facts, which, if true, would
2 entitle the plaintiff to relief.’” *In re Amerco Derivative Litig.*, 127 Nev. 196, 211, 252 P.3d 681,
3 692 (2011) (citation omitted). “Dismissal is proper where the allegations are insufficient to
4 establish the elements of a claim for relief.” *Stockmeier v. Nevada Dep’t of Corr.*, 124 Nev. 313,
5 316, 183 P.3d 133, 135 (2008) (citations omitted).

6 20. Plaintiff’s first cause of action is for Securities Fraud under the California
7 Corporate Securities Act. Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 provides: “It is unlawful for any person to
8 offer or sell a security in this state, or to buy or offer to buy a security in this state, by means of
9 any written or oral communication that includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
10 state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
11 under which the statements were made, not misleading.”

12 21. Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(a) provides: “Sale or sell includes every contract of sale
13 of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security for value. Sale or sell
14 includes any exchange of securities and any change in the rights, preferences, privileges, or
15 restrictions of or on outstanding securities.”

16 22. Further, Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) provides: “Every sale or offer of a warrant or
17 right to purchase or subscribe to another security of the same or another issuer, as well as every
18 sale or offer of a security which gives the holder a present or future right or privilege to convert
19 the security into another security of the same or another issuer, includes an offer and sale of the
20 other security only at the time of the offer or sale of the warrant or right or convertible security;
21 but neither the exercise of the right to purchase or subscribe or to convert nor the issuance of
22 securities pursuant thereto is an offer or sale.”

23 23. After review of the plain language of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e), the Court
24 concludes that neither the exercise of the right to purchase shares nor the issuance of securities
25 pursuant thereto is an offer or sale. The sale or offer is deemed to occur at the time of the offer
26 or sale of the right to purchase the share.

1 24. Although Plaintiff contends this provision relates to stock warrants, stock warrants
2 are listed separately from rights to purchase and is separated by the word “or,” implying that the
3 provision applies to both warrants and rights to purchase shares.

4 25. Plaintiff claims the alleged misrepresentations, namely the 2013 and 2014 Material
5 Facts impose liability on Defendants under Cal. Corp. Code § 25401 for the alleged misleading
6 sale. However, the application of Cal. Corp. Code § 25017(e) indicates that the sale occurred in
7 2009 when the stock options were issued, and there are no allegations that the sale in 2009 was
8 based upon any untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of the same. Accordingly, the
9 California Securities Fraud cause of action fails as a matter of law and is subject to dismissal with
10 prejudice as to all Defendants.

11 26. With regard to Plaintiffs’ claims, “[t]he question whether a suit is derivative by
12 nature or may be brought by a shareholder in his own right is governed by the law of the state of
13 incorporation” *Kennedy v. Venrock Assocs.*, 348 F.3d 584, 589-90 (7th Cir. 2003); *see also*
14 *Kepley v. Lanz*, 715 F.3d 969, 972-73 (6th Cir. 2013).

15 27. As Midway Gold is a British Columbian corporation, the test British Columbian
16 courts apply when evaluating whether a claim is direct or derivative is whether “the gravamen of
17 the cause of action alleged [arises] as a result of wrongs done to the company. . . . If the damage
18 that flows is a direct result of the wrongs done to the company, then those damages can only be
19 claimed by the company.” *Robak Indus. Ltd. v. Gardner*, 2006 CarswellBC 2533, para. 5 (Can.
20 B.C.S.C.) (WL).

21 28. In making this determination, the courts in that jurisdiction examine “the nature of
22 the damages suffered as alleged in the pleadings.” *Id.* at para. 13; *see also Luft v. Ball*, 2013
23 CarswellBC 820, para. 34 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL) (“In order for a complaining shareholder to
24 maintain a personal action for breach of duties owed to the company, that shareholder must show
25 that he or she has suffered damage or loss in a manner distinct from other shareholders.”).

26 29. The Nevada Supreme Court recently adopted Delaware’s “direct harm” test for
27 distinguishing between derivative and direct shareholder claims in *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev.
28 at 427, 401 P.3d at 1108. In order to determine whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative,

1 the court must consider: “(1) who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing
2 stockholders, individually); and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other
3 remedy (the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?” *Id.* (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at
4 1033).

5 30. Pursuant to the direct harm test, the relevant inquiry in addressing who suffered
6 the alleged harm is: “Looking at the body of the complaint and considering the nature of the
7 wrong alleged and the relief requested, has the plaintiff demonstrated that he or she can prevail
8 without showing an injury to the corporation. *Parametric Sound*, 133 Nev. at 426, 401 P.3d at
9 1107-08 (quoting *Tooley*, 845 A.2d at 1036). Applying the direct harm test as set forth in
10 *Parametric Sound*, Wolfus’s fiduciary duty claims are derivative because he has not demonstrated
11 a harm that is independent of the injury to Midway as a corporation.

12 31. The gravamen of Wolfus’s Second Amended Complaint is the Directors’ alleged
13 mismanagement of Midway, specifically, mismanagement in the form of failing to secure
14 sufficient capital for the Pan project, deciding not to sell assets to create necessary capital, and
15 purportedly allowing a certain Director to “tak[e] effective control of Midway and the Pan project
16 even though” Wolfus contends that Director “lacked the ability to manage the Pan project.”
17 Wolfus also alleges the Directors failed to appropriately employ supervisory staff for the Pan
18 project, which delayed production. Further, Wolfus alleges the Pan project failed because the
19 Directors, rather than cut costs to purchase necessary equipment, “decided not to purchase this
20 necessary equipment” and instead purchased equipment for which the company had not secured
21 the appropriate permits. These alleged acts of mismanagement and imprudent investment
22 decisions impaired or prevented what Wolfus describes in his Second Amended Complaint as the
23 “two major events” required for the Pan project to succeed: Midway securing necessary permits
24 and securing necessary financing for the project. SAC ¶ 46.

25 32. The Court concludes, based on the body of his Second Amended Complaint and
26 the nature of his claims, that Wolfus’s breach of fiduciary duty claims describe a derivative action
27 based on the Directors’ alleged mismanagement of Midway. His Second Amended Complaint
28 merely reflects an unavailing attempt to characterize the derivative claim as a direct claim

1 personal to him. Such an effort does not alter the nature of his claims. *See Kramer v. W. Pac.*
2 *Indus., Inc.*, 546 A.2d 348, 352-53 (Del. 1988) (holding that where the gravamen of a
3 stockholder's complaint is director mismanagement, the cause of action is derivative in nature).
4 Notwithstanding his attempt to characterize his claims as direct, the essence of Wolfus's claims
5 allege harm to Midway from which injury resulted indirectly to each of Midway's shareholders.
6 Accordingly, Wolfus's breach of fiduciary duty claims are derivative and he lacks standing to
7 pursue them.

8 33. Wolfus argues that California common law, as set forth in *Small v. Fritz Cos.*, 65
9 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003), permits him to assert claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation
10 directly. Regardless of how Wolfus purports to characterize these claims, however, he has simply
11 repackaged his fiduciary duty claims under different labels. Here, Wolfus attempts to frame his
12 cause of action as one for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, but the claims are based on what
13 the Directors purportedly should have disclosed about their management of Midway. The
14 underlying nature of Wolfus's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are derivative as they
15 are dependent on alleged injuries to Midway.

16 34. Wolfus's Second Amended Complaint alleges that, had he known of the
17 purportedly undisclosed facts the Directors withheld, Wolfus "would have sold all of his Midway
18 shares . . . in February 2014 when Midway's stock price began to fall from its peak." The nature
19 of the harm alleged here cannot be understood apart from the decline in Midway's stock value
20 which ostensibly resulted from the Directors' purported mismanagement. The decline in
21 Midway's stock value did not result from any misrepresentation or omission, but from the
22 Directors' alleged failure to successfully manage the Pan project. Generally, such an allegation
23 will sustain a derivative action, not an action for direct injury to the shareholder. *See, e.g., Rivers*
24 *v. Wachovia Corp.*, 665 F.3d 610, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2011) ("The well-established general rule is
25 that shareholders cannot pursue individual causes of action against third parties for wrongs or
26 injuries to the corporation that result in the diminution or destruction of the value of their stock."
27 (internal quotation marks omitted); *Smith v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.*, 407 F.3d 381, 384-85 (5th Cir.
28 2005) (concluding a shareholder's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were

1 derivative because alleged corporate misrepresentations that “caus[e] a decline in the company’s
2 share price when the truth is revealed,” injure the corporation directly and the shareholders only
3 indirectly.); *Pareto v. FDIC*, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding a shareholder’s
4 allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and corporate mismanagement “describe[d] a direct injury
5 to the bank, not the individual stockholders,” and allegations of “depreciation of stock value
6 [were] an indirect result of the injury to [the bank] which resulted in its closure”).

7 35. Even if the Court were to entertain Wolfus’s argument that his claims for fraud
8 and misrepresentation allege direct harm personal to him, his pleading would be inadequate
9 pursuant to the very authority upon which he relies, specifically, the decision in *Small v. Fritz*
10 *Cos.*, 65 P.3d 1255, 1265 (Cal. 2003).

11 36. Having determined that Wolfus’s claims against the Directors are derivative in
12 nature, as allegations of mismanagement which harmed Midway directly, the Court concludes the
13 law of British Columbia, where Midway was incorporated, controls Wolfus’s claims. *Vaughn v.*
14 *Le nnt’l, Inc.*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 166, 175 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Under the internal affairs doctrine, the
15 rights of shareholders in a foreign company, including the right to sue derivatively, are determined
16 by the law of the place where the company is incorporated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

17 37. British Columbia law requires a corporate shareholder to apply for leave of the
18 court of that jurisdiction before filing a derivative action, and requires the shareholder to provide
19 notice of such application to the company and demand that the directors take remedial action prior
20 to commencement of the suit. Business Corporations Act, R.S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 §§ 232(2)(a) &
21 233(1)(a)-(b). The failure to obtain leave of court is fatal under British Columbia common law.
22 *Bruneau v. Irwin Indus. (1978) Ltd.*, 2002 CarswellIBC 1107, para. 19 (Can. B.C.S.C.) (WL)
23 (“[W]here an action [is] in fact a derivative action but commenced without leave, the appropriate
24 remedy [is] to strike it as disclosing no reasonable claim.”).

25 38. Wolfus concedes that if his claims are derivative, they are also subject to an
26 effective pre-suit demand requirement which he failed to satisfy. Failure to comply with such a
27 requirement is equally fatal to his complaint. *Vaughn*, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 171-72 (holding a pre-
28

1 suit demand requirement imposed by the British Virgin Islands Business Companies Act of 2004
2 imposed a substantive requirement determining whether a shareholder had standing to sue).

3 39. Wolfus also lacks standing to pursue derivative claims on behalf of Midway as a
4 result of Midway's bankruptcy, over which the estate's trustee has exclusive standing to litigate.
5 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541; *Estate of Spirtos v. One San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court Case No.*
6 *SPR 02211*, 443 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The bankruptcy code endows the bankruptcy
7 trustee with the exclusive right to sue on behalf of the estate."); *Delgado Oil Co. v. Torres*, 785
8 F.2d 857, 860 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the bankruptcy estate of a corporate debtor
9 includes any derivative right of action the corporation may have to recover damages for
10 misconduct, mismanagement, or neglect of duty by a corporate officer or director).

11 ORDER

12 Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing,

13 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court's Order Regarding Defendants' Motion to
14 Dismiss dated June 6, 2018 is VACATED;

15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
16 Claim for Securities Fraud, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

17 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
18 Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
20 Claim for Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty, which is hereby DISMISSED with
21 prejudice.

22 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
23 Claim for Fraud, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

24 ///

25 ///

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89134
Phone: (702) 222-2500 ♦ Fax: (702) 669-4650

1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's
2 Claim for Negligent Misrepresentation, which is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 DATED this 9 day of Jan 2020 ~~December 2019~~.

5
6 Nancy L. Alf
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

7 JD

8 Respectfully submitted by:


9 Robert J. Cassity

10 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
11 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
12 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

13
14 Holly Stein Sollod, Esq. (Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
15 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202

16 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
17 *Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy Haddon,*
18 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
19 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
Rodney D. Knutson

20 13844471_v1
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28



JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3861
James R. Christensen PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas NV 89101
(702) 272-0406 / (702) 272-0415 fax
jim@jchristensenlaw.com

SAMUEL T. REES, ESQ.
26 Muirfield Place
New Orleans, LA 70131
(213) 220-9988
STReesEsq@earthlink.net

Attorneys for Plaintiff, DANIEL E. WOLFUS

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT NO.: 27

NOTICE OF APPEAL

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A. NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1
through 25.

Defendants.

JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, PC
601 South 6th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

1 NOTICE HIS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS hereby
2 appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from (i) the Order Granting
3 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint electronically
4 filed and entered on January 10, 2020, notice of entry of which was
5 electronically filed on January 13, 2020; (ii) the Order Regarding Defendants'
6 Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, electronically filed and
7 entered on June 6, 2018, notice of entry of which was electronically filed on
8 June 7, 2018; and (iii) the Court Minutes dated May 18, 2018.
9
10

11 Dated this 12th day of February, 2020.

12
13 /s/ Samuel T. Rees
14 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN ESQ.
15 Nevada Bar No. 3861
16 James R. Christensen PC
17 601 S. 6th St.
18 Las Vegas NV 89101
19 (702) 272-0406
20 jim@jchristensenlaw.com

21 SAMUEL T. REES ESQ.
22 Admitted Pro Hac Vice
23 26 Muirfield Place
24 New Orleans, LA 70131
25 (213) 220-9988
26 streesesq@earthlink.net

27 Attorneys for Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS
28


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY SERVICE of **NOTICE OF APPEAL** was made this date
by electronic service (via Odyssey) to all parties currently shown on the
Court's e-serve list of recipients this 12th day of February 2020.

/s/ Dawn Christensen

An employee of James R. Christensen

JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, PC
601 South 6th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101



JUDG

Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Tel: (702) 669-4600
Fax: (702) 669-4650
bcassity@hollandhart.com
dfreeman@hollandhart.com

Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 295-8085
Fax: (303) 295-8261
hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

*Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,
Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,
Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,
Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and
Rodney D. Knutson*

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS, ,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

JUDGMENT

Electronic Filing Case

The Court, having issued a *Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint* on January 13, 2020, Defendants Richard D. Moritz,


1 Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon, Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger
2 A. Newell and Rodney D. Knutson having filed a *Verified Memorandum of Costs* pursuant to
3 NRS 18.005 and 18.110 on January 15, 2020, and Plaintiff Daniel E. Wolfus having filed no
4 motion to retax or settle the costs, and good cause appearing,

5 **IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that Judgment is entered in favor
6 of Defendants Richard D. Moritz, Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon, Richard Sawchak,
7 John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and Rodney D. Knutson and against Plaintiff
8 Daniel E. Wolfus in the amount of \$5,119.30. Prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest
9 shall accrue as prescribed under Nevada law.

10 DATED this 3 day of March 2020.

11 Nancy L. Alf
12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
13 JD


14 Submitted by:

15 
16 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
17 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
18 HOLLAND & HART LLP
19 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

21 Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
22 HOLLAND & HART LLP
23 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
24 Denver, CO 80202

25 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
26 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
27 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
28 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
Rodney D. Knutson

14282343_v1



NJUD

Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Tel: (702) 669-4600
Fax: (702) 669-4650
bcassity@hollandhart.com
dfreeman@hollandhart.com

Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 295-8085
Fax: (303) 295-8261
hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

*Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,
Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,
Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,
Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and
Rodney D. Knutson.*

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO. : A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

HOLLAND & HART LLP

9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, NV 89134

Phone: (702) 222-2500 ♦ Fax: (702) 669-4650

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Judgment was entered on the 4th day of March 2020.

A copy is attached.

DATED this 5th day of March 2020.

By /s/ David Freeman
Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq.
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202

*Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,
Bradley J. Blacketer, Timothy Haddon,
Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,
Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and
Rodney D. Knutson.*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 5th day of March 2020, a true and correct copy of the foregoing **NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT** was served by the following method(s):

☒ **Electronic:** by submitting electronically for filing and/or service with the Eighth Judicial District Court's Odyssey eFileNV Electronic Filing system and serving all parties with an email address on record, as indicated below, pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2 and Rule 9 of the N.E.F.C.R. That date and time of the electronic proof of service in place of the date and place of deposit in the U.S. Mail.

James R. Christensen, Esq.
JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas, NV 89101
jim@jchristensenlaw.com

Jason D. Smith, Esq.
SANTORO WHIMIRE
10100 W. Charleston Blvd., #250
Las Vegas, Nevada 89135
Email: jsmith@santoronevada.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

Attorneys for Kenneth A. Brunk

Mark E. Ferrario, Esq.
Christopher Miltenberger, Esq.
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Ste 600
Las Vegas, NV 89135
ferrariom@gtlaw.com
miltenbergerc@gtlaw.com

*Attorneys for Martin M. Hale, Jr. Trey
Anderson, Nathaniel Klein, INV-MID, LLC,
EREF-MID II, LLC, and HCP-MID, LLC*

☒ **U.S. Mail:** by depositing same in the United States mail, first class postage fully prepaid to the persons and addresses listed below:


Eric B. Liebman, Esq.
Rebecca DeCook, Esq.
MOYE WHITE LLP
16 Market Square, 6th Floor
1400 16th Street
Denver, CO 80202

Attorneys for Kenneth A. Brunk

/s/ Julie Linton

An Employee of Holland & Hart LLP

14303739_v1



JUDG

Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134
Tel: (702) 669-4600
Fax: (702) 669-4650
bcassity@hollandhart.com
dfreeman@hollandhart.com

Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
HOLLAND & HART LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
Denver, CO 80202
Tel: (303) 295-8085
Fax: (303) 295-8261
hsteinsollod@hollandhart.com

*Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,
Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,
Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,
Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and
Rodney D. Knutson*

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS, ,

Plaintiff,

v.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC; a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT. NO.: XXVII

JUDGMENT

Electronic Filing Case

The Court, having issued a *Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint* on January 13, 2020, Defendants Richard D. Moritz,


1 Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon, Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger
2 A. Newell and Rodney D. Knutson having filed a *Verified Memorandum of Costs* pursuant to
3 NRS 18.005 and 18.110 on January 15, 2020, and Plaintiff Daniel E. Wolfus having filed no
4 motion to retax or settle the costs, and good cause appearing,

5 **IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED** that Judgment is entered in favor
6 of Defendants Richard D. Moritz, Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon, Richard Sawchak,
7 John W. Sheridan, Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and Rodney D. Knutson and against Plaintiff
8 Daniel E. Wolfus in the amount of \$5,119.30. Prejudgment interest and post-judgment interest
9 shall accrue as prescribed under Nevada law.

10 DATED this 3 day of March 2020.

11 Nancy L. Alf
12 DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
13 JD


14 Submitted by:

15 
16 Robert J. Cassity, Esq. (9779)
17 David J. Freeman, Esq. (10045)
18 HOLLAND & HART LLP
19 9555 Hillwood Drive, 2nd Floor
20 Las Vegas, Nevada 89134

21 Holly Stein. Sollod, Esq. (*Admitted Pro Hac Vice*)
22 HOLLAND & HART LLP
23 555 17th Street, Suite 3200
24 Denver, CO 80202

25 *Attorneys for Richard D. Moritz,*
26 *Bradley J. Blacketor, Timothy Haddon,*
27 *Richard Sawchak, John W. Sheridan,*
28 *Frank Yu, Roger A. Newell and*
Rodney D. Knutson

14282343_v1



JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3861
James R. Christensen PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas NV 89101
(702) 272-0406 / (702) 272-0415 fax
jim@jchristensenlaw.com

SAMUEL T. REES, ESQ.
26 Muirfield Place
New Orleans, LA 70131
(213) 220-9988
STReesEsq@earthlink.net

Attorneys for Plaintiff, DANIEL E. WOLFUS

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M. HALE, JR.;
TREY ANDERSON; RICHARD SAWCHAK;
FRANK YU; JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER
A. NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company; EREF-
MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability
Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company; and DOES 1
through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT NO.: 27

**AMENDED NOTICE OF
APPEAL**

1 NOTICE HIS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS hereby
2 appeals to the Supreme Court of Nevada from (i) the Order Granting
3 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint electronically
4 filed and entered on January 10, 2020, notice of entry of which was
5 electronically filed on January 13, 2020; and, (ii) the Order Regarding
6 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, electronically
7 filed and entered on June 6, 2018, notice of entry of which was electronically
8 filed on June 7, 2018. (The reference to Court Minutes dated May 18, 2018,
9 has been removed.)
10
11

12 Dated this 30th day of March, 2020.
13

14 /s/ Samuel T. Rees
15 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN ESQ.
16 Nevada Bar No. 3861
17 James R. Christensen PC
18 601 S. 6th St.
19 Las Vegas NV 89101
20 (702) 272-0406
21 jim@jchristensenlaw.com

22 SAMUEL T. REES ESQ.
23 Admitted Pro Hac Vice
24 26 Muirfield Place
25 New Orleans, LA 70131
26 (213) 220-9988
27 streesesq@earthlink.net

28 Attorneys for Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I CERTIFY SERVICE of **AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL** was made this date by electronic service (via Odyssey) to all parties currently shown on the Court's e-serve list of recipients this 30th day of March 2020.

/s/ Dawn Christensen

An employee of James R. Christensen

JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, PC
601 South 6th Street
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101



JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 3861
James R. Christensen PC
601 S. 6th St.
Las Vegas NV 89101
(702) 272-0406 / (702) 272-0415 fax
jim@jchristensenlaw.com
SAMUEL T. REES, ESQ.
26 Muirfield Place
New Orleans, LA 70131
(213) 220-9988
STReesEsq@earthlink.net

Attorneys for Plaintiff, DANIEL E. WOLFUS

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

DANIEL E. WOLFUS,

Plaintiff,

vs.

KENNETH A. BRUNK; RICHARD D.
MORITZ; BRADLEY J. BLACKETOR;
TIMOTHY HADDON; MARTIN M.
HALE, JR.; TREY ANDERSON;
RICHARD SAWCHAK; FRANK YU;
JOHN W. SHERIDAN; ROGER A.
NEWELL; RODNEY D. KNUTSON;
NATHANIEL KLEIN; INV-MID, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company;
EREF-MID II, LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company; HCP-MID, LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company;
and DOES 1 through 25.

Defendants.

CASE NO.: A-17-756971-B
DEPT NO.: 27

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1 NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS appeals
2
3 to the Supreme Court of Nevada from the Judgment electronically filed and
4 entered on March 4, 2020, notice of entry of which was electronically filed on
5 March 5, 2020. Plaintiff previously filed notice of appeal from (i) the Order
6 Granting Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint
7
8 electronically filed and entered on January 10, 2020, notice of entry of which
9 was electronically filed on January 13, 2020; (ii) the Order Regarding
10 Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint, electronically
11 filed and entered on June 6, 2018, notice of entry of which was electronically
12 filed on June 7, 2018; and (iii) the Court Minutes dated May 18, 2018, and
13 notice of entry which was electronically served May 18, 2018. An Amended
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

1 Notice of Appeal was filed removing (iii) the Court Minutes dated May 18,
2 2018.

3 Dated this 30th of March 2020.

4
5 /s/ Samuel T. Rees

6 JAMES R. CHRISTENSEN ESQ.

7 Nevada Bar No. 3861

8 James R. Christensen PC

9 601 S. 6th St.

10 Las Vegas NV 89101

11 (702) 272-0406

12 jim@jchristensenlaw.com

13 SAMUEL T. REES ESQ.

14 Admitted Pro Hac Vice

15 26 Muirfield Place

16 New Orleans, LA 70131

17 (213) 220-9988

18 streesesq@earthlink.net

19 Attorneys for Plaintiff DANIEL E. WOLFUS

20 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

21 I CERTIFY SERVICE of **NOTICE OF APPEAL** was made this date
22 by electronic service (via Odyssey) to all parties currently shown on the
23 Court's e-serve list of recipients this 30th day of March 2020.

24 /s/ Dawn Christensen

25 An employee of James R. Christensen
26
27
28