IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER P.C., a domestic professional corporation, and DAN M. WINDER, an individual,

Petitioners

Electronically Filed Jul 13 2021 09:23 a.m. Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

v.

The Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF CLARK; and the Honorable Gloria J. Sturman, District Judge Department 26,

Respondents;

And

Lavelle P. Atkinson and Sheila Atkinson, Real Parties in Interest.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Mandating the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County

The Honorable Gloria J. Sturman District Judge

Grant Summary Judgment to Petitioners in

District Court Case No. A-19-804902-C

PETITIONERS' APPENDIX VOLUME 5 of 5

Arnold Weinstock, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 810

LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C.
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DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

1415

16 LAVELLE P. ATKINSON, SHEILA ATKINSON, individuals,

Plaintiffs.

Defendants.

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VS.

19 CHARLES BROWN, an individual; STACY

BROWN, an individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN M WINDER, P.C., a domestic professional corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS

22 | I through X, inclusive.

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Pursuant to NRCP 6(b), Plaintiffs Lavelle P. Atkinson and Sheila Atkinson (collectively

"Plaintiffs" or the "Atkinsons"), by and through their attorneys of record, hereby file this errata to their opposition to the Winder Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Through this errata,

Plaintiffs will correct an error in which Plaintiffs inadvertently omitted Exhibit 29 to the above-

Case No.: A-19-804902-C

Dept. No.: XXVI

ERRATA TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO WINDER DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hearing Date: June 15, 2021 Hearing Time: 9:30 a.m.

1	1 referenced opposition. As such, attached hereto is	Exhibit 29 to Plaintiffs' opposition.
2	DATED this 24th day of May, 2021.	
3	3	Respectfully submitted,
4	4	Maier Gutierrez & Associates
5	5	/a/ Danielle I. Dannara
6	6	/s/ Danielle J. Barraza JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESQ.
7	7	Nevada Bar No. 9046 Danielle J. Barraza, Esq.
8	8	Nevada Bar No. 13822 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue
9	9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, a copy of ERRATA TO PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO WINDER DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was electronically filed on the 24th day of May, 2021, and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List, as follows: Dan M. Winder, Esq. Arnold Weinstock, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C. 3507 West Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorney for defendants Dan M. Winder and Law Office of Dan M. Winder P.C. /s/ Natalie Vazquez An Employee of MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES

EXHIBIT 29

EXHIBIT 29

DECLARATION OF TEX WHITSON

I, Tex Whitson, declare as follows:

- 1. I am over the age of 18 and I have personal knowledge of all matters set forth herein. If called to do so, I would competently and truthfully testify to all matters set forth herein, except for those matters stated to be based upon information and belief, and as to those matters I am informed and believe them to be true.
- 2. From 1990 to present day, I have resided at 5275 Auburn Avenue in Las Vegas, Nevada 89108.
- 3. Sheila and Lavell Atkinson were my neighbors ever since I moved in and until they moved out about three years ago.
- 4. During the summer of 2017, I personally witnessed Charles Brown coming to Sheila and Lavell Atkinson's residence on Auburn Avenue on numerous occasions. He was talking to Sheila for long periods of time.
- 5. I also personally interacted with Charles Brown on different occasions at the Atkinson home, at the Atkinsons' property that Charles Brown was supposed to be buying, at my residence, and at community meetings.
- 6. In 2017, Charles Brown indicated to me that he had an interest in purchasing the commercial property located at 2315 North Decatur Blvd., Las Vegas, Nevada, 89108, which was owned by the Atkinsons (the "Atkinsons' Commercial Property").
- 7. In 2017, Charles Brown would be walking around the neighborhood often, and went to my house on numerous occasions to talk to me about the Atkinsons' Commercial Property and his plans for turning the property into a used car lot.
- 8. On several occasions in 2017, I personally witnessed Charles Brown walking around the Atkinsons' Commercial Property. I would stop by to see what he and the men he was with were doing at the Property and he would talk to me about his plans and him owning the Atkinsons' Commercial Property.
- 9. From my personal observations, Charles Brown was not working by himself on trying to obtain the Atkinsons' Commercial Property, but with a team of people. For example, I personally

observed Charles Brown with a couple of other men walking around the Atkinsons' Commercial Property and talking about how they were going to remodel it. I also personally heard Charles Brown say to me that he was working with an attorney [Dan Winder], who was helping him with obtaining the Atkinsons' Commercial Property.

- 10. This information that Charles Brown was getting help from an attorney was surprising to me because from my personal observations, Charles Brown appeared destitute and unable to pay for any attorney, as on one occasion in 2017 Charles Brown showed up without a vehicle at the community meeting (stating that he owned the Atkinsons' Commercial Property). He asked me for a ride home. Charles Brown had me driving him all across the Las Vegas valley before eventually I told him I could not be driving him around everywhere, so he finally had me drop him off on Charleston Boulevard, which was on the other side of town from the Atkinsons' Commercial Property, but which I understand is also where Charles Brown's attorneys' office is located.
- 11. At one point after Charles Brown sued the Atkinsons, Charles Brown called me and asked if I would be willing to show up at a hearing and "testify" on his behalf for his case against the Atkinsons, which was a direction from his attorney. I told Charles Brown that I had no interest in testifying, as I had no personal information about any wrongdoing from the Atkinsons. My understanding was that Charles Brown never paid the Atkinsons once cent but he would say that he was suing them to get his money back.
- 12. Throughout my interactions with Charles Brown, it became clear to me that Charles Brown had no real experience in purchasing properties, and needed a team of people to try to help him obtain the Atkinsons' Commercial Property, which per Charles Brown himself, included his attorney Dan Winder.
- 13. Charles Brown also personally said to me that he and his wife were interested in obtaining a residential property in the Auburn Avenue neighborhood, which is where the Atkinsons lived and I later found out that Charles Brown and his attorney also had plans for that property.

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1	14. In making this Declaration, I declare under penalty of perjury and the laws of the State				
2	of Nevada that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my information, knowledge, and belief				
3	DATED this Day of May, 2021.				
4	- KIOW 33N				
5	TÉX WHITSON				
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8TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NV

Lavelle P. Atkinson, Sheila Atkinson, individuals,

Plaintiffs

|| VS.

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CHARLES BROWN, and individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER P.C. a domestic professional corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual, et al

Defendants

Date of Hearing: 06/15/21 Time of Hearing: 9:30 AM

CASE NO: A-19-804902-C

Dept.: 26

DEFENDANTS' REPLY
RE
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED 05 07 21

Defendants Law Office of Dan M. Winder, P.C. and Dan M. Winder, by and through their attorney Dan M. Winder hereby reply to the Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs on the 21st day of May, 2021.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. SUMMARY OF RESPONSE

1.1. CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION.

Plaintiffs did assert the identical claims in the first litigation and they were dismissed; the claims are barred by issue and claim preclusion. In addition, the claim for attorney fees could have

Page 1 of 20

been brought by motion in the first litigation.

1.2. PLAINTIFF'S HAVE NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTENTION THAT BROWN INTENDED TO FRAUDULENTLY INDUCE THEM TO ENTER INTO THE PUIRCHASE AGREEMENT

Despite any lack of credible evidence, Plaintiffs continue to claim that, at the time they signed the Purchase Agreement, that Brown intended to swindle the Plaintiffs out of their property without paying for it. According to the Purchase Agreement, In order to receive the property, Brown had to pay for it. They do not proffer any explanation as to how Brown might have thought he could possibly get his hands on the property without paying for it. No reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence Brown intended to get his hands on the property without the Plaintiffs being paid.

1.3. EACH OF THE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ASSERTED BY PLAINTIFFS REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO PROVE THAT BROWN COMMITTED THE TORT OF FRAUDLENT INDUCEMENT WHICH THEY CANNOT PROVE.

1.3.1. <u>Civil Conspiracy</u>

As stated by the Plaintiff (Op Brf P24, L 78), "to establish a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show **commission of an underlying tort**..." Plaintiffs have established no proof whatsoever that, at the time Plaintiffs signed the Purchase Agreement, Defendant intended to swindle them out of their property without paying for it. Since that was a legal impossibility, the claim is simply unbelievable on its face.

1.1.1. Concert Of Action

As stated by the Plaintiff (Op Brf P24, L2-3), "Under the Restatement, liability attached for concert of action if two **persons commit a tort** while acting in concert..." There being no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that either Brown or the Winder defendants intended to transfer the property to Brown without consideration, this claim fails on that ground

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alone.

1.1.2. Aiding and Abetting a Misrepresentation

As pointed out by the Plaintiffs (Brf P 26 L23-24), "Under the Restatement, liability attached for civil aiding and abetting if the defendant substantially assists or encourages another's conduct **in breaching a duty** to a third person." They claim the same baseless breach of duty, that Brown had a duty to tell the Atkinson's he did not intend to pay for the property. As this claim is without any factual support and surely no reasonable jury will find clear and convincing evidence to support the theory, the Aiding and Abetting claim must fail for want of a misrepresentation, among other reasons.

1.2. THERE IS INSUFFIENT EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEY FEES TO SUBMIT THESE FEES TO THE JURY

Defendants have offered no proof whatsoever that Plaintiffs owed their attorneys any money whatsoever at the end of the first litigation.

2. PLAINTIFFS' INTRODUCTION SHOULD BE IGNORED IN ITS ENTIRETY.

NRCP 56(c) provides:

- (1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
 - (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;...

EDCR 2.21 provides:

(a) Factual contentions involved in any pretrial or post-trial motion must be initially presented and heard upon affidavits, unsworn declarations under penalty of perjury, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.

The entire introduction is without a single reference to any affidavit or document; it should be

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3. <u>REFUTATION OF FACTS CLAIMED AS UNDISPUTED BY PLAINTIFFS</u>

3.1. (P5 ¶¶ 7-8) BROWN'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS ARE NOT ADMISSABLE

Plaintiffs' assert (P ¶7) "Charles Brown told Sheila Atkinson that he had a 'partner' involved, specifically his "attorney" Dan Winder" and that 'they worked together' and that Mr. Winder "was going to make the papers out" for the sale of the Commercial Property" and other hearsay statements concerning Mr. Winder and "the guy that wants to buy this place...it's his partner." Similar hearsay assertions are made in ¶ 8.

Plaintiffs offer no explanation as to how this hearsay statement might be admissible in evidence.

NRCP 56(c)(2) provides:

(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.

Nevada follows the Federal Hearsay Rules which are embodies at NRS 51.035:

- "Hearsay" means a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted unless:
- 1. The statement is one made by a witness while testifying at the trial or hearing;
- 2. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is:
 - (a) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony;
 - (b) Consistent with the declarant's testimony and offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive;
 - (c) One of identification of a person made soon after perceiving the person; or
 - (d) A transcript of testimony given under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury; or
- 3. The statement is offered against a party and is:
 - (a) The party's own statement, in either the party's individual or a representative capacity;

- (b) A statement of which the party has manifested adoption or belief in its truth;
- (c) A statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject;
- (d) A statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the party's agency or employment, made before the termination of the relationship; or
- (e) A statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

No one expects Mr. Brown to testify at trial; §2 is not apposite.

Since there has been no tort committed, the conspiracy and other claims must fail

Plaintiffs may assert that §3(e) is apposite. However, before testimony of hearsay statements made by a coconspirator may be admitted, the existence of the conspiracy must be established by independent evidence, *Fish v. State*, 92 Nev. 272, 274, 549 P.2d 338, 340 (1976), and the statements must have been made "during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy," *Carr v. State*, 96 Nev. 238, 239, 607 P.2d 114, 116 (1980). Even if the tort of fraudulent inducement is established there is no independent evidence of a conspiracy.

3.2. (P6 ¶13) BROWN'S DEOPOSTION TESTIMONY IN A PRIOR CASE IS NOT ADMISSABLE AND IS INACCURATELY CHARACTERIZED BY PLAINIFFS.

Brown's testimony in the prior deposition is hearsay evidence. Evidence must be admissible to be considered in a motion for summary judgment. The statements made in his deposition by Mr. Brown are clearly hearsay statements. The Winder Defendants were not a party to the prior litigation and they had no opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Brown as they represented him in that matter and were not informed of the claims in this matter at that time.

The Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the admission of Brown's statements to be used against the Winder Defendants.

NRCP 32(8) provides:

(8) Deposition Taken in an Earlier Action. A deposition lawfully taken and, if required, filed in any federal- or state-court action may be used in a later

action involving the same subject matter between the same parties, or their representatives or successors in interest, to the same extent as if taken in the later action. A deposition previously taken may also be used as allowed by Nevada law of evidence.

The Winder Defendants were not a party to the prior action nor were they a representative or successor in interest. Also, the prior action did not involve the same subject matter.

Although Brown did state he visited the Plaintiffs on some occasions he did not suggest or intimate that the Plaintiffs required wearing down anywhere in the passage cited by Plaintiffs Neither is that conclusion a reasonable inference from the testimony of Mr. Brown in the deposition.

3.3. (P6 \P 18) CHARLES BROWN DID TRANSFER FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE OF OPENING AN ESCROW ACCOUNT

The undisputed fact is check #16333 dated 08/21/17 was issued by Defendant Winder Law for the express purpose of funding an escrow account. The word "escrow" appears on the memo line in front of the address for the property the Atkinson's had agreed to sell. This was one of the costs advanced by Winder Law in connection with its representation of Mr. Brown in the purchase of the property. Although the documents produced in the prior litigation finally demonstrated an escrow had not been opened, it is clear both Mr. Brown and Mr. Winder believed an escrow had been opened.

3.4. (P 6 ¶19- P7 ¶ 26) DECLARANT BROWN'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS

Plaintiffs make many references to Brown's inadmissible deposition from a prior case and Sheila Atkinsons' recitation of purported statements of Mr. Brown to establish a partnership

¹ P Ex. 21 ATKINSON0404.

² P Op Ex. 15, Winder Depo P87-89² P Op Ex.15, in passim see particularly P 54-61

³ P Op Ex. 15 P 44 L4-13

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between Mr. Brown and Mr. Winder and that Mr. Brown didn't have the money to pay for the property. Since none of this is admissible for the reasons stated above, they can hardly be established facts.

Further, Mr. Brown testified he believed he could get investors to pay for the property⁴. Certainly, there is a large business in finding undervalued property and getting investors to invest in the property, selling it and dividing the profit.

3.5. P 27 ¶ 27-28 INSUFFICENT EVIDENCE FOR CLAIM DAN WINDER WAS PARTNER REFERRED TO IN DEPOSITION

As discussed above, the hearsay statements of Mr. Brown reported by Sheila Atkinson in her deposition are inadmissible both because the statements are hearsay and because the deposition of Mr. Brown is not usable in this proceeding.

Further, despite Plaintiff's representation that Dan Winder is the partner referred to by Mr. Brown, there is no reason to believe that is true based upon the deposition testimony.⁵ In fact, Mr. Brown appears to be referring to his brother, "the one that was the bad arm."

3.6. P 9 ¶ 29- P11 ¶ 36 ARGUMENTS ARE NOT FACTS

Whether the letter sent by the Winder firm to the Atkinsons is threatening is argument, not a fact. The letter states "If you, or your legal counsel, if any, wish to discuss this matter further, please feel free to contact me at your convenience. I shall await your prompt response."⁷

Plaintiffs offer no factual support whatsoever to support their contention "Dan Winder had an employee, Arnold Weinstock, Esq. sign off on the December 2017 letter."8

⁴ P Op Ex. 4 P 82 L7-25

⁵ P. Op. Ex 3. 37-38

⁶ P. Op Ex. 2 P 39 L 2-24.

⁷ P. Op Ex 6

⁸ P. Op. P9 ¶32.

⁹ P. Op. Ex 11 ¶ 11.

3.7. (P 11 ¶ 46) NO ADMISSABLE PROOF EXISTS BROWN LIED ABOUT THE KELLY MORTGAGE PRE-APPROVAL LETTER.

The author of the affidavit on which this false claim is based is a resident of California, her deposition was not taken and she cannot be compelled to appear at trial. Certainly, the affidavit is not admissible at trial because it is hearsay. As there is no admissible evidence to support Plaintiffs' claimed admissible fact, it cannot be considered in the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Tracy L. Kelly perjured herself by claiming she is competent to make the affidavit and that she has personal knowledge of the facts set forth in the affidavit. Further, she does not show any competence for her conclusory statement that "My assistant's name is Veda Williams, but she is not a Mortgage Consultant and she did not sign the letter." ⁹ She offers no explanation as how she knows what Veda signed or didn't sign; she cannot have personal knowledge of what Veda signed or didn't sign. The only person who is competent to testify that his assistant did not sign the letter is Veda Williams herself. Veda Williams has not been disclosed as a witness and presumably lives in California as well. As such, she probably cannot be compelled to appear and testify at trial even if the Court would allow her to as a consequence of not being disclosed. Presumably, this affidavit was prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel who knew or should have known Tracy L. Kelly was incompetent to make this assertion. From this we can infer that Veda Williams probably would have said she did prepare and sign the letter whether she was authorized to or not.

3.8. (P 14 ¶ 53) THE EXISTANCE OF AN APPRAISL WAS DISCLOSED BY MR. BROWN IN RESPONSE TO AN INTERROGATORY.

Defendants claim no preliminary appraisal letter was ever disclosed by Mr. Brown. If "disclosed" means "attached to a 16.1 disclosure," Plaintiffs' statement is technically correct but misleading. On October 27th, 2018, Defendant responded to interrogatories as follows:

INTERROGATORY NO. 12:

If you ever had an appraisal conducted on the Property at issue, please state the following:

- a. Name, address and phone number of person/company who performed the appraisal
- b. Date of appraisal
- c. Amount property was appraised at.

ANSWER NO.12:

I had an appraisal done. The property was appraised at \$250,000. The property was appraised by Keith Harper of Las Vegas.¹⁰

From the Interrogatories, Plaintiffs were well aware of the appraisal and who did it when Plaintiffs took Brown's deposition a month later.¹¹ No one was trying to hide anything about this appraisal from the Plaintiffs.

3.9. P14 ¶ 55 DEFENDANTS WERE RETAINED TO REPRESENT BROWN BEFORE WINDER LAW ISSUED ANY CHECKS.

Plaintiffs arbitrarily picked the date of the signed retainer agreement as the beginning of Mr. Winder's representation of Mr. Brown in connection with the Atkinson property. However, the relationship began before the signed agreement. As Mr. Winder testified in his deposition:

Q And so did you agree that Purchase Agreement before you -- I mean did you review that Purchase Agreement before you agreed to take Charles Brown's case?

A I believe when he consulted with me about the property and wanting legal assistance in purchasing the property, there was no -- at that point in time we developed an attorney-client relationship. He subsequently brought a Purchase Agreement to me.

Q And was that before or after the legal representation had started? [Objection]

¹⁰ P Op.Ex. 12 P4 INT 12

¹¹ P Op Ex. 11 P 1

13 P Op Ex 1 P6, the checks were issued by Defendant Winder Law on

¹² P Op Ex. 15 P 42 L8-P43 L7

Q So when I asked you when the legal representation started, you said you'd have to refer to the representation agreement. Do you recall that?

A I'm saying, when I began to consult with him, the relationship began; and if you wanted the dates, it was prior to the signed retainer agreement. So I'd have to consult with the -- look at the retainer agreement to give you the approximate date to that.¹²

The purchase agreement was signed on July 20th, 2017.¹³ The representation began before that time. The check for the Appraisal was written August 7th, 2017,¹⁴ after the representation began. The check for the Escrow was written August 21, 2017,¹⁵ after the representation began.

3.10. P 14 ¶57-58. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT AND NO DISCREPANCY REGARDING WHETHER WINDER LAW LOANED BROWN THE MONEY FOR THE APPRAISAL AND ESCROW.

Many lawyers handle cases on a contingent basis. Frequently, the lawyers pay costs in connection with their representation of clients. Not uncommonly, lawyers pay certain expenses before litigation is commenced. As the Winder Law's fee was largely contingent in this matter, ¹⁶ it made sense for Winder Law to obtain an appraisal to make sure the deal had value, and to fund the initial escrow fee without which there could not have been a recovery. That's what Winder Law did. Sometimes agreements provide that although costs may be deducted from the recovery in addition to the attorney fees, the costs are not owing in the event there is no recovery. Sometimes the client owes the attorney the extended costs regardless of the recovery. In this case, Mr. Brown still owes the money even though the escrow did not close. The agreement was contingent in that, without the close of escrow, Winder Law will probably never be paid.

The initial agreement in this matter provided for a retainer fee in the amount of \$20,000.00 at the time the property was refinanced. Costs advanced by the attorney were to be paid upon the refinancing of the property. This is a loan and it is an advance of costs. There is no discrepancy.

P Op Ex 14.
 P Op Ex 21 ATKINSON0404.

¹⁶ Retainer Agreement P OP Ex. 17

Plaintiffs posit no reason why the check should have been disclosed in the first litigation and whether it was disclosed or not has no bearing on this litigation.

3.11. P. 59 ¶ 59-60 MR. BROWN AND THE WINDER DEFENDANTS WERE COMPLETELY CLEAR ABOUT THE APPRAISAL

During the first litigation, Mr. Brown disclosed the existence of the appraisal in response to an interrogatory question before his deposition was taken. He obviously had no intent to hide the appraisal. The appraisal was simply not relevant to the first proceeding no is relevant to this one. Plaintiffs offer no reason as to why either The Winder Defendants or Mr. Brown should have obtained copies of the documents and provided them to the Plaintiffs.

While it is true that Keith Harper put in an affidavit that the final evaluation of the property would be significantly altered because the lease was not consummated, the lease was not consummated because the sale did not go through.

3.12. P 63 ¶ 64-69 AT THE MOTION FOR SUMARY JUDGMENT HEARING IN THE PRIOR LITIGATION, MR. WINDER BELIEVED AN ESCROW HAD BEEN OPENED BECAUSE WINDER LAW HAD PAID THE INITIAL \$1000.00 DEPOSIT FOR THE ESCROW.

At the hearing, Mr. Winder represented the \$1000.00 check he wrote for opening deposit in escrow had been used for that purpose. In fact, that turned out not to be true. There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Winder ever intended the check he wrote to fund the escrow ended up being used to pay for a loan application.

3.13. P19 ¶ 71-72 THE RETAINER AGREEMENT IS AND ALWAYS HAS BEEN FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE PURCHASE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AT 2315 N. DECATUR BLVD.

Defendants ask this Court give judicial notice to the fact that the property located at 2315 N. Decatur Blvd, is located at the corner of Decatur and Auborn.¹⁷ This fact is well known to

¹⁷ Street view and map of 2315 N. Decatur Ex. J Hereto

Plaintiffs as it was discussed in the deposition of Defendant Winder. ¹⁸ This is an undisputed fact exactly contrary to the Plaintiffs' false assertion. The Agreement to Employ Attorney, ¹⁹ when taken in context, is clearly for the purchase of the Decatur property. There is no suggestion anywhere in the factual record, that the Agreement had anything to do with the Plaintiffs' home.

3.14. P20 ¶¶ 73-75 THE FEE AGREEMENT WAS CONTINGENT IN THE SENSE DEFENDANTS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE PAID IN THE EVENT ESCROW DID NOT CLOSE.

Although under the terms of the agreement, Mr. Brown was required to pay the retainer whether or not escrow closed, the collection of the fees was largely uncertain if escrow did not close. In any event, whether the agreement was contingent or not has no bearing on any material fact in this litigation.

3.15. P20 ¶76 DEFENDANTS HAVE PRODUCED NO ADMISSABLE DAMAGES.

3.15.1. Emotional Distress

In cases where emotional distress damages are not secondary to physical injuries, but rather, precipitate physical symptoms, either a physical impact must have occurred or, in the absence of physical impact, proof of "serious emotional distress" causing physical injury or illness must be presented. *Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc.*, 114 Nev. 441, 448, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998). Plaintiffs claim no physical injury or illness, have no medical testimony or records to support a claim of physical injury or illness and thus cannot claim any emotional distress type damages. The Nevada Supreme Court requires physical injury in the context of a real property transaction for emotional distress damages in connection with a real property matter:

We have previously required a plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she has suffered some physical manifestation of emotional distress in order to support an award of emotional damages. *See, e.g., Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc.,* 114 Nev. 441, 448, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1998) ("[I]n cases where emotional distress damages are not secondary to physical injuries, but rather, precipitate physical

¹⁸ P OP Ex. 24 P 6 L10-22

¹⁹ P OP Ex 17 P D 0009.

symptoms, either a physical impact must have occurred or, in the absence of physical impact, proof of 'serious emotional distress' *167 causing physical injury or illness must be presented."); *Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc.*, 109 Nev. 478, 482–83, 851 P.2d 459, 462 (1993). While we have relaxed the physical manifestation requirement in a few limited instances, *see Olivero v. Lowe*, 116 Nev. 395, 400, 995 P.2d 1023, 1026 (2000) (explaining that the physical manifestation requirement is more relaxed for damages claims involving assault), we cannot conclude that a claim for emotional distress damages resulting from deceptive trade practices in connection with a failed real estate and lending transaction should be exempted from the physical manifestation requirement.

Unlike in *Olivero*, where we stated that "the nature of a claim of assault is such that the safeguards against illusory recoveries mentioned in *Barmettler* and *Chowdhry* are not necessary," 116 Nev. at 400, 995 P.2d at 1026, there is no guarantee of the legitimacy of a claim for emotional distress damages resulting from a failed real estate and lending transaction without a requirement of some physical manifestation of emotional distress.

Thus, because Betsinger failed to present any evidence that he suffered any physical manifestation of emotional distress, we reverse the jury's award of \$43,000 in emotional distress damages. *Betsinger v. D.R. Horton, Inc.*, 126 Nev. 162, 167, 232 P.3d 433, 436 (2010)

Thus, because this is a failed real estate transaction and because Plaintiffs do not contend they suffered any physical injury as a result, there can be no damages for emotional distress.

3.15.2. Invoices From Boarding Up Property

There is no evidence this expense was occasioned by anything done by Mr. Brown and, in any event, there is no proffered reason why the Winder Defendants should be held liable for this damage.

3.15.3. Attorney Fees

Because they are claiming attorney fees as damages, the damages must be proven to the jury. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that Plaintiffs owed their attorney anything after the first litigation, only named witnesses to authenticate the bills on the last day of discovery, and have no witness who can testify to the reasonableness and necessity of the bills, a foundational requirement. Plaintiffs have never produced any kind of engagement letter or retainer agreement

indicating their attorneys are owed anything and if so, what.

4. THERE ARE NO MATERIAL DISPUTED FACTS.

Addressed below are each of the facts Plaintiffs claim are disputed.

4.1. (P 23 ¶ 1) THERE IS NO MATERIAL DISPUTE AS TO THE DATE DEFENDANTS BEGAN REPRESENTING BROWN.

The Winder Defendants have made no differing responses as to when their representation began. Contrary to the representation of Plaintiffs, Defendant's answer to interrogatories do not state that Defendants began representing Mr. Brown on the date the litigation commenced. This mischaracterization is clear when the entire question and answer are reviewed:

INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

State the effective date of Defendant's representation of Mr. Brown in the Brown Litigation.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Defendant Law Office represented Mr. Brown on the day the litigation commenced.

Litigation is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:

litigation *n*. (17c) **1.** The process of carrying on a lawsuit <the attorney advised his client to make a generous settlement offer in order to avoid litigation>. **2.** A lawsuit itself <several litigations pending before the court. LITIGATION, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)

Plaintiffs did not ask "When did you begin representing Mr. Brown, as they claim in their brief; instead, they asked for the "effective date of the representation of Mr. Brown in the Brown Litigation." The question was answered properly and has nothing to do with when the Winder Defendants began representing Mr. Brown.

Whether the representation began before or after the Purchase Agreement was signed is not a material distinction. The Purchase Agreement was signed by the Plaintiffs on July 20th, 2017.²⁰ The check to Valuation Consultants for the appraisal is dated August 7th, 2017.²¹

²⁰ Purchase Agreement P. Op. Ex. 1 P6

²¹ Check to Valuation Consultants P Op. Ex.14 P Atkinson00034

The first Agreement to Employ Attorney was signed on the 10th of August, 2017.²²

Plaintiffs assert: [T]he first representation agreement was not signed until April 10th, 2017, well *after* the Purchase Agreement was signed in July 2017." Since April 10th, is *before* July of 2017, the Plaintiffs may have meant "August" instead of "April." Mr. Winder's Declaration²³ Mischaracterized by Plaintiffs' reads as follows:

4. On <u>or about</u> July 23rd, 2017 I undertook representing Mr. Brown with respect to the property involved in this litigation, 2314 North Decatur located on the corner of Auburn and Decatur, Las Vegas, Nevada.

As the Winder Defendants were not involved in the drafting, negotiation, or execution of the Purchase Agreement,²⁴ Regardless of when the representation began, Mr. Winder had no reason to write a check to Valuation Consultants if he was not representing Mr. Brown in the purchase of the property. The Winder Defendants have provided as straight an answer as is possible as to when the representation began in light of the passage of time and the fading of memories. What is clear and undisputed, despite the noble efforts of Plaintiff's lawyers, is that Mr. Winder was acting as an attorney for Mr. Brown and not as a partner at all times relevant.

There is no dispute of a material fact as to when the representation began. "A genuine issue of material fact is one where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."²⁵. No reasonable jury could find that the Winder Defendants were acting other than in a capacity as a lawyer for Mr. Brown.

Plaintiffs do not suggest how the beginning date of representation is material.

²² Agreement to Employ Attorney P. OP Ex 17 P 3 (Bates D 0011).

²³ D Mot, Ex A ¶4

²⁴ Winder Declaration D Mot, Ex A P4 ¶3.

²⁵ Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 452, 851 P.2d 438, 441-42 (1993). Toi-Ya D. Foster, Individually, Appellant, V. Rudolph Carlo King, M.D., Individually; And Wellhealth Medical Group (Volker), P.C., A Nevada Professional Corporation, Respondents. Toi-Ya D. Foster, Individually, Appellant,, No. 78957-Coa, 2021 Wl 2155034, At *2 (Nev. App. May 26, 2021)

4.2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD CONLUDE THE FEE AGREEMENTS PERTAINED TO PLAINTIFFS' RESIDENCE.

As discussed above, the commercial property which is the subject of this litigation is located on the corner of Auburn and Decatur. The use of Auburn Property in the retainer agreement refers to the commercial property. The use of Auburn to describe the commercial property in no way implicates any intentions with regard to the Plaintiffs' home; Plaintiffs cite no facts to support their contention, there is no evidence The Winder Defendants undertook representation of Mr. Brown that they had any knowledge whatsoever pertaining to the Plaintiffs' residence.

4.3. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD CONCLUDE THE WINDER DEFENDANTS WERE CONSPIRING AND ACTING IN CONCERT WITH BROWN.

4.3.1. As An Attorney And Law Firm Representing Mr. Brown Defendants Are Immune From Liability to Plaintiffs.

As discussed above, there is no material issue of fact as to whether Defendants were representing Mr. Brown at all times relevant.

Given an attorney's ethical obligations to be candid with a client and zealously represent his or her client, and the general presumption that an attorney providing legal services to a client is generally not subject to third-party liability for that representation.²⁶ Accordingly, Defendants are immune from liability to these Defendants for any of their claims.

4.3.2. Because There Is No Dispute That No Tort Was Committed By Mr. Brown With Respect To His Intent To Pay For The Property, There Can Be No Liability For Any Of Plaintiffs' Claims.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated any evidence which a reasonable jury could find clear and convincing that Mr. Brown lacked the intention to pay for the property at the time the Plaintiffs willingly signed the Purchase Agreement. Without that, there is no tort. A tort

²⁶ Dezzani v. Kern & Assocs., Ltd., 134 Nev. 61, 69, 412 P.3d 56, 62 (2018)

is a required element of all three of Plaintiffs' Causes of Actions against Defendants.

To establish fraud in the inducement, the plaintiff must prove, by *clear and convincing evidence* each of the following elements:

- (1) a false representation made by the defendant
- (2) Defendant's knowledge or belief that the representation was false (or knowledge that he had an insufficient basis for making the representation),
- (3) Defendant's intention to therewith induce Jones to consent to the contract's formation,
- (4) Plaintiff's justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and
- (5) damage to the Plaintiff resulting from such reliance.

Fraud is never presumed; it must be clearly and satisfactorily proved.²⁷

There is no evidence proffered by Plaintiffs from which a reasonable jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Brown never intended to pay for the property. Why would he have had his wife apply for a loan if he didn't intend to go through with the purchase. What reason might he have had for forging, if he did, these documents.

4.3.3. No Reasonable Jury Could Find The Winder Defendants Conspired or Acted in Concert With Mr. Brown.

4.3.3.1. CONSPIRACY

Actionable civil conspiracy arises where two or more persons undertake some concerted action with the intent "to accomplish an unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another," and damage results. *Consol. Generator–Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co.*, 114 Nev. 1304, 1311, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998). Thus, a plaintiff must provide evidence of an explicit or tacit agreement between the alleged conspirators. *Mahlum*, 114 Nev. at 1489, 970 P.2d at 112. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no evidence of an agreement or intent to harm the

²⁷ J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc., 120 Nev. 277, 290–91, 89 P.3d 1009, 1018 (2004)

plaintiff. Consol. Generator-Nevada, 114 Nev. at 1311, 971 P.2d at 1256.

In addition to there being no evidence to conclude that there was fraud in the inducement of the Purchase Agreement, there is no evidence that the Winder Defendants had any intent "to accomplish and unlawful objective for the purpose of harming the Plaintiffs. There is no evidence of an explicit or tacit agreement between Brown and the Winder Defendants to accomplish and unlawful objective.

As briefed above, for the "Partner" statements reportedly made by Mr. Brown, they are hearsay. In any event, other evidence of an explicit or tacit agreement to commit a tort before liability can attach for Civil Conspiracy. There is no other such evidence.

4.3.3.2. ACTING IN CONCERT

"[T]o constitute concerted action, the [plaintiffs] were required to present evidence manifesting a common plan to commit a tortious act where the participants knew of the plan and its purpose and took substantial affirmative steps to [harm the plaintiffs]."); *Juhl v. Airington*, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644–45 (Tex.1996) cited with approval by *GES*, *Inc. v. Corbitt*, 117 Nev. 265, 271, 21 P.3d 11, 15 (2001). If Brown had a plan to commit a tortious act, Defendants were not aware of it.²⁸ There is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the Winder Defendants knowingly acted in concert with Mr. Brown.. Accordingly, Winder Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on this Claim for relief.

4.3.3.3. AIDING AND ABETTING

The tort of aiding and abetting is laid out in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:

A defendant is subject to liability for aiding and abetting a tort upon proof of the following elements:

- (a) a tort was committed against the plaintiff by another party;
- (b) the defendant knew that the other party's conduct was wrongful;
- (c) the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted in the commission or concealment of the tort; and
- (d) the plaintiff suffered economic loss as a result.

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²⁸ Declaration of Dan M. Winder, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A

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25 26 The only tort Plaintiffs allege was committed is the tort of fraud in the inducement with respect to the original Purchase Agreement Plaintiffs offer up the two checks issued by Winder Law. There are no facts which indicate that Brown did not intend to go through with the purchase or that, if he didn't, that the Winder Defendants had any knowledge of or participation in the fraud or attempted in any way to cover it up.²⁹

5. **CONCLUSION**

These claims are entirely barred by issue and claim preclusion

Defendants are immune from liability in this matter because they were acting as attorneys at all stages. Plaintiffs have offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Winder Defendants knew of any fraudulent conduct of Mr. Brown with respect to the inducement to sign the Purchase Agreement. Mr. Brown's hearsay partner statements are inadmissible in the absence of other evidence of conspiracy or knowledge and, in any event, Mr. Brown naming Mr. Winder as his "partner" does not mean in any way that the Winder Defendants had any knowledge that Brown intended to commit or had committed a fraud with respect to the purchase agreement.


Accordingly, the Winder Defendants pray this Court enter Summary Judgment as follows:

- 1) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by issue and claim preclusion.
- 2) Plaintiffs' claims are barred by lawyer-immunity
- 3) No Reasonable Jury Could Conclude there is clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Brown fraudulently induced Plaintiffs to sign the Purchase Agreement.
- 4) Insufficient independent evidence of conspiracy exists to admit the partner hearsay statements and that there for Plaintiffs' claim fails.
- 5) No reasonable Jury could find the Winder Defendants acquiesced, encouraged or had any knowledge of Brown's intent, if he had it, to fraudulently induce Plaintiffs to sign the Purchase Agreement or that, if true, the Plaintiffs had been defrauded. Accordingly, all of

²⁹ Declaration of Dan M. Winder, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A.

EXHIBIT J

EX J







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CLERK OF THE COURT

1	ORDR			
2	DISTRICT COURT			
3	CLARK COUNTY, NEV	/ADA		
4	II .			
5	- H			
6	LAVELLE P. ATKINSON, et al.,			
7	Plaintiff(s),			
8	v. CAS	SE NO. A-19-804902-C		
9	DEF	PT NO. 26		
10		ARING DATE: 5/13/21		
11	HEA	ARING TIME: 9:00 a.m.		
12				
13	ODDED DE DISCOVEDY COMMISSIONED'S DEDO	ORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS		
15				
16	The Court, having reviewed the above report and recor	nmendations prepared by the		
17	Discovery Commissioner and,			
18	X_No timely objection having been filed,			
19	After reviewing the objections to the Report and Recommendations and good cause appearing,			
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CASE NAME: ATKINSON v. BROWN CASE NO: A-19-804902-C

- 1	
1	AND
2	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and
3	Recommendations are affirmed and adopted.
4	
5	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following manner.
6	(attached hereto)
7	
8	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this matter is remanded to the Discovery Commissioner for reconsideration or further action.
9	
10	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report is
11	set for, 2021, at:a.m.
12	
13	Dated this 11th day of June, 2021
14	with
15	DFA D1E DAA0 1C2B
16	Gloria Sturman District Court Judge
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DCCR 1 DAN M. WINDER, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 001569 2 Arnold Weinstock State Bar #810 3 LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C. 3507 West Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Telephone (702) 474-0523 4 5 Facsimile (702) 474-0631 Attorney for Winder Defendants 6 7

8TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NV

Lavelle P. Atkinson, Sheila Atkinson, individuals,

Plaintiffs

VS.

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CHARLES BROWN, and individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER P.C. a domestic professional corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual, et al

Defendants

Case #:

A-19-804902-C

Dept #: 26

Hearing Date: 05/ Hearing Time: 9:0

05/13/21 9:00 AM

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS FILED 04/12/21

DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

HEARING DATE: 05/13/21

HEARING TIME: 9:00 AM

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Page 1 of 4 Pages

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APPEARANCES:

Plaintiff

Danielle J. Barraza, Esq., of the law firm MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES, on behalf of *Plaintiffs Lavelle P. Atkinson and Sheila Atkinson*

Defendant

Arnold Weinstock, Esq., of the law firm LA w OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C., on behalf of Defendants Law Office of Dan M Winder, P. C. and Dan M Winder

I. FINDINGS

Winder Defendants' Motion for Discovery Sanctions or Alternatively to Compel filed 04/12/21 came on for hearing before the Discovery Commissioner on the 13th day of May, 2021.

Defendants' Motion requested the following relief:

- 1. Plaintiffs' claims for attorney fees as damages be dismissed as a sanction for failure to disclose their attorney fee agreements and willful and unjustified failure to provide the information in response to requests for production, interrogatories, and depositions.
- 2. In the alternative, compelling Plaintiffs to disclose all documents requested, answer all interrogatories promulgated, and have additional depositions taken on all matters pertaining to attorney fees, including, without limitation, fee agreements, engagement letters, verbal understandings 'pertaining to attorney fees, payments made or which must be made, the conditions under which payments must be made and why Plaintiffs did not seek attorney fees by post-judgment motion in the prior action.
- 3. Award Defendants \$7,500.00 as a reasonable attorney fee for having to file this motion and \$3500.00 for having to retake Plaintiffs' depositions.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

The Discovery Commissioner, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein relative to the motions, having heard the representations of those present at the hearing, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes the following recommendations:

II.

The Commissioner recommends Winder Defendants' Motion for Discovery Sanctions or Alternatively to Compel be granted in part and denied in part as follows

- 1. Plaintiffs are required to supplement and fully respond to Requests for Production 1-4. Anything within Plaintiffs' possession, custody, or control that does no fall within the provision must be produced within seven days, anything withheld must be identified in a privilege log.
- 2. Regarding depositions, the parties must conduct a 2.34 conference reference addressing what defendants deem were insufficient responses and whether retaking depositions is appropriate.
- 3. Production of retainer agreements, engagement letters, and documents pertaining to attorney fees is required where, as in this matter, Plaintiffs seek attorney fees as damages with redactions limited to matters unrelated in any manner to the fees or payment of fees. Such redactions must be accompanied by privilege log.
- 4. The Discovery Commissioner recommends no attorney fees be awarded for the bringing of this motion.

Dated this 26 day of May, 2021.

Discovery Commissioner

Page 3 of 4 Pages

Atkinson v Brown et a	l
Case No: A-19-804902-0	7

1		Case No: A-19-804902-0
2		
3	Respectfully submitted this 26 th day of May,	Approved as to form and content,
4	2021.	Maier Gutierrez & Associates
5	LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C.	/s/Danielle J Barraza
6	·	Joseph A. Gutierrez, Esq.
7	/s/Arnold Weinstock State Bar No: 810	Nevada Bar No. 9046 Danielle J Barraza, Esq.
8	3507 West Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Telephone (702) 474-0523	Nevada Bar No. 13822 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue
9	Facsimile (702) 474-0631	Las Vegas, NV 89148
10	Attorney for Winder Defendants	Attorney for the Plaintiffs
11		
12	NOTICE	
13		
14	Pursuant to NRCP 16.3(c)(2), you are hereby notified that within fourteen (14) days aft	
15	being served with a report any party may file and serve written objections to the	
16	recommendations. Written authorities may be filed with objections, but are not mandatory. It	
17	written authorities are filed, any other party may file and serve responding authorities within sever	
18	(7) days after being served with objections.	
19		
20	Objection time will expireJ	<u>fune 10</u> , 2021.
21		
22	A copy of the foregoing Discovery Comn	nissioner's Report and Recommendations wa
23	electronically filed and served on counsel on	May 27 , 2021 pursuant to
24	NEFCR 9.	
25	D.	: Notelil Simonetti
26	Dy	Commissioner Designee.
	Page 4	of 4 Pages

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1	ORDR	
2	ADRIANA PEREYRA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 12263	
_	INTEGRITY LAW FIRM	
3	819 South 6 th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
4	Phone: 702.202.4449 Fax: 702.947.2522	
5	E-mail: adriana@integritylawnv.com	
6	Joseph A. Gutierrez, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9046	
7	Danielle J. Barraza, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 13822	
8	MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue	
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Telephone: 702.629.7900	
10	Facsimile: 702.629.7925 E-mail: jag@mgalaw.com	
11	djb@mgalaw.com	
12	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
13		
14	DISTRICT COURT	
15	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
16	LAVELLE D ATVINCON CHEHA	G N A 10 904002 G
17	LAVELLE P. ATKINSON, SHEILA ATKINSON, individuals,	Case No.: A-19-804902-C Dept. No.: 26
18	Plaintiffs,	Hamina Datas Mass 12, 2021
19	vs.	Hearing Date: May 13, 2021 Hearing Time: 9:00 a.m.
20	CHARLES BROWN, an individual; STACY BROWN, an individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN	
21	M WINDER, P.C., a domestic professional	
22	corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS	
23	I through X, inclusive.	
24	Defendants.	
25		
26	ORDI	ER
26 27		eport and Recommendations prepared by the

1		Lavelle P. Atkinson, et al v. Charles Brown, et al Case No. A-19-804902-C
2 3	X	No timely objection having been filed,
4 5 6	AND	After reviewing the objections to the Report and Recommendations and good cause appearing,
7 8 9	X	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted.
10 11 12		IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, the Discovery Commissioner's Report and Recommendations are affirmed and adopted as modified in the following matter.
13 14 15 16		(Attached hereto.) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that a hearing on the Discovery Commissioner's Report is set for, 2021, at:m.
17 18 19		Dated this 11th day of June, 2021
20 21 22 23		A98 059 BE25 360B Gloria Sturman District Court Judge
24 25		
262728		

Electronically Filed 5/27/2021 11:38 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 DCRR ADRIANA PEREYRA, ESO. 2 Nevada Bar No. 12263 INTEGRITY LAW FIRM 819 South 6th Street 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone: 702.202.4449 4 Fax: 702.947.2522 5 E-mail: adriana@integritylawnv.com 6 JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9046 DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 13822 8 **MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES** 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Telephone: 702.629.7900 Facsimile: 702.629.7925 10 E-mail: jag@mgalaw.com 11 dib@mgalaw.com 12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 14 **DISTRICT COURT** 15 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 16 SHEILA Case No.: A-19-804902-C LAVELLE Ρ. ATKINSON. 17 ATKINSON, individuals, Dept. No.: 26 18 Plaintiffs. DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S 19 VS. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 20 CHARLES BROWN, an individual; STACY PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR AN BROWN, an individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AS TO WHY M WINDER, P.C., a domestic professional corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual; 21 DEFENDANT LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C. SHOULD NOT BE HELD 22 DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS IN CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO I through X, inclusive. ABIDE BY DCRR GRANTING 23 PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL #1 Defendants. 24 25 **DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS** 26 DATE OF HEARING: May 13, 2021 27 TIME OF HEARING: 9:00 a.m. 28

1 must be responded to as written; Interrogatory No. 31 issued to defendant Law Office of Dan M. 2 Winder, P.C. is PROTECTED; Interrogatory No. 38 issued to defendant Law Office of Dan M. 3 Winder, P.C. is COMPELLED, however limited to identifying the attorneys who worked on the 4 Brown v. Atkinson litigation, and if they were publicly reprimanded within five years prior to the execution of the purchase agreement for the property at issue in 2017, it must be disclosed, but 5 6 anything else is PROTECTED. Supplemental responses are due within seven (7) days. 7 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner will not grant attorney fees and 8 costs associated with Plaintiffs' motion. DATED this day of 9 10 DISCOVERY COMMISSIONER 11 12 13 Respectfully submitted, Approved of as to form and content, MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C. 14 15 JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESQ. DAN M. WINDER, ESQ. 16 Nevada Bar No. 9046 Nevada Bar No. 1569 DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESQ. ARNOLD WEINSTOCK, ESO. 17 Nevada Bar No. 13822 Nevada Bar No. 810 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue 3507 West Charleston Boulevard 18 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Defendants Law Office of Dan M. 19 ADRIANA PEREYRA, ESQ. Winder, P.C. and Dan M. Winder Nevada Bar No. 12263 20 INTEGRITY LAW FIRM 819 South 6th Street 21 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Lavelle P. Atkinson, et al v. Charles Brown, et al Case No. A-19-804902-C
TICE
eby notified that within fourteen (14) days after being
written objections to the recommendations. Written
t mandatory. If written authorities are filed, any other
thin seven (7) days after being served with objections.
June 102021.
's Report was:
ne following address on the day of
nsel on May 27, 2021, pursuant to

<u>NOTICE</u>
Pursuant to NRCP 16.3(c)(2), you are hereby notified that within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a report any party may file and serve written objections to the recommendations. Writt
authorities may be filed with objections, but are not mandatory. If written authorities are filed, any oth
party may file and serve responding authorities within seven (7) days after being served with objection
Objection time will expire on June 10 2021.
A copy of the foregoing Discovery Commissioner's Report was:
Mailed to Plaintiff/Defendant at the following address on the day of
, 2021:
Electronically filed and served counsel on May 27, 2021, pursuant to
N.E.F.C.R. Rule 9.

COMMISSIONER DESIGNEE

Electronically Filed 6/18/2021 10:00 AM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

NEOJ 1 ADRIANA PEREYRA, ESO. Nevada Bar No. 12263 **INTEGRITY LAW FIRM** 819 South 6th Street 3 Las Vegas, Nevada 89101 Phone: 702.202.4449 4 Fax: 702.947.2522 5 E-mail: adriana@integritylawnv.com 6 JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 9046 DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13822 8 MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue 9 Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Telephone: 702.629.7900 Facsimile: 702.629.7925 10 E-mail: jag@mgalaw.com 11 djb@mgalaw.com 12 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 13 DISTRICT COURT 14 **CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA** 15 16 LAVELLE Case No.: A-19-804902-C Р. ATKINSON, SHEILA ATKINSON, individuals, Dept. No.: XXVI 17 Plaintiffs. NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 18 VS. 19 CHARLES BROWN, an individual; STACY 20 BROWN, an individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN M WINDER, P.C., a domestic professional 21 corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS 22 I through X, inclusive. 23 Defendants. 24 25 TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD. 26 YOU AND EACH OF YOU will please take notice that an ORDER DENYING WINDER 27 /// 28 ///

1	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY J	TUDGMENT was hereby entered on the 17 th day
2	of June, 2021. A copy of which is attached hereto.	
3	DATED this 18th day of June, 2021.	
4		Respectfully submitted,
5		MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES
6		/s/ Danielle J. Barraza
7		Joseph A. Gutierrez, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 9046
8		DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESQ. Nevada Bar No. 13822
9		8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue Las Vegas, Nevada 89148
10		Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Pursuant to Administrative Order 14-2, a copy of the NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER was electronically filed on the 18th day of June, 2021 and served through the Notice of Electronic Filing automatically generated by the Court's facilities to those parties listed on the Court's Master Service List as follows: Dan M. Winder, Esq. Arnold Weinstock, Esq. LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C. 3507 West Charleston Blvd. Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorney for defendants Dan M. Winder and Law Office of Dan M. Winder P.C. /s/ Natalie Vazquez An Employee of Maier Gutierrez & Associates

ELECTRONICALLY SERVED 6/17/2021 5:54 PM

Electronically Filed 06/17/2021 5:54 PM

1	ORDR	
2	Adriana Pereyra, Esq. Nevada Bar No. 12263	
3	INTEGRITY LAW FIRM	
3	819 South 6 th Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89101	
4	Phone: 702.202.4449 Fax: 702.947.2522	
5	E-mail: adriana@integritylawnv.com	
6	JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESQ.	
7	Nevada Bar No. 9046 DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESQ.	
8	Nevada Bar No. 13822 MAIER GUTIERREZ & ASSOCIATES	
	8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue	
9	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Telephone: 702.629.7900	
10	Facsimile: 702.629.7925 E-mail: jag@mgalaw.com	
11	djb@mgalaw.com	
12	Attorneys for Plaintiffs	
13	DISTRIC	Γ COURT
14		
15	CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA	
16	LAVELLE P. ATKINSON, SHEILA	Case No.: A-19-804902-C
17	ATKINSON, individuals,	Dept. No.: XXVI
18	Plaintiffs,	ORDER DENYING WINDER
	vs.	DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
19	CHARLES BROWN, an individual; STACY	Hearing Date: June 15, 2021
20	BROWN, an individual; LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C., a domestic	Hearing Time: 9:30 a.m.
21	professional corporation; DAN M. WINDER, an individual; DOES I through X; and ROE	
22	CORPORATIONS I through X, inclusive.	
23	Defendants.	
24		
25	This matter came on for hearing before the (Court on June 15, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., on defendants
26	Law Office of Dan M. Winder, P.C. and Dan M	1. Winder's motion for summary judgment (the
27	"Motion").	
28	Plaintiffs, Lavelle P. Atkinson and Sheila A	tkinson, were represented by Danielle J. Barraza,

	JI	
1	IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJU	UDGED, AND DECREED that the parties shall participat
2	in a Settlement Conference before a Senior.	Judge. Upon entry of this order, the parties shall promptl
3	coordinate with the Senior Judge Settler	ment Conference Coordinator to ensure the settlemer
4	conference is set before trial.	
5	DATED this day of	, 202 Dated this 17th day of June, 2021
6		mi
7		578 7BB F6B0 74C 0
8		Gloria Sturman District Court Judge
9	Respectfully submitted,	Approved as to form and content,
10	DATED this day of June, 2021.	DATED this _ lb day of June, 2021.
11	Maier Gutierrez & Associates	LAW OFFICE OF DAN M. WINDER, P.C.
12	Darlows	M. May At
13	JOSEPH A. GUTIERREZ, ESO.	Dan M. Winder, Esq.
14	Nevada Bar No. 9046 DANIELLE J. BARRAZA, ESQ.	Nevada Bar No. 1569 ARNOLD WEINSTOCK, ESQ.
15	Nevada Bar No. 13822 8816 Spanish Ridge Avenue	Nevada Bar No. 810 3507 West Charleston Boulevard
16	Las Vegas, Nevada 89148 Attorneys for Plaintiffs	Las Vegas, Nevada 89102 Attorneys for Defendants Law Office of Dan M.
17		Winder, P.C. and Dan M. Winder
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