IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, Petitioner,

VS.

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, COUNTY OF CLARK, STATE OF NEVADA, THE HONORABLE MONICA TRUJILLO, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE,

Respondent,

And

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Real Party in Interest.

Electronically Filed Jun 28 2023 11:45 AM Elizabeth A. Brown Clerk of Supreme Court

CASE NO: 86434-COA

RESPONDENT'S APPENDIX

BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, #63618 Southern Desert Correctional Center 20825 Cold Creek Road P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070 (702) 451-4921 STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 Office of the Clark County District Attorney Regional Justice Center 200 Lewis Avenue Post Office Box 552212 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 State of Nevada

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General Nevada Bar #0007704 100 North Carson Street Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717 (775) 684-1265

Pro Per Appellant

Counsel for Respondent

INDEX

<u>Document</u>	<u>Page No</u> .
Case #98C154293-2, Odyssey Register of Actions Minutes of November 29, 1999	1-2
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Filed June 29, 2020	5-18
Judgment of Conviction, filed December 2, 1999	3-4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify and affirm that this document was filed electronically with the Nevada Supreme Court on June 28, 2023. Electronic Service of the foregoing document shall be made in accordance with the Master Service List as follows:

AARON D. FORD Nevada Attorney General

JONATHAN E. VANBOSKERCK Chief Deputy District Attorney

I also certify that I served a copy of this document by mailing a true and correct copy thereof, postage pre-paid, addressed to:

BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, #63618 Southern Desert Correctional Center 208 Cold Creek Road P.O. Box 208 Indian Springs, Nevada 89070

I, further certify that on June 28, 2023, a copy was sent via email to: District Court, Department 3's JEA for Judge Trujillo:

Terri Elliott – JEA ElliottT@clarkcountycourts.us

BY /s/ E. Davis
Employee, District Attorney's Office

JEV//ed

REGISTER OF ACTIONS

CASE No. 98C154293-2

š

 $\omega \omega \omega \omega \omega \omega \omega \omega \omega$

State of Nevada vs Brendan Nasby

Felony/Gross Misdemeanor § Case Type: Date Filed: 10/21/1998 99999

Location: Department 3

Location : District Courts Images Help

Cross-Reference Case Number: C154293 Defendant's Scope ID #: 1517690 Lower Court Case # Root: 98F11168 98F11168B Lower Court Case Number:

Supreme Court No.: 58579

RELATED CASE INFORMATION

§ Š

Related Cases

98C154293-1 (Multi-Defendant Case) 98C154293-3 (Multi-Defendant Case) 98C154293-4 (Multi-Defendant Case) A-19-788126-W (Writ Related Case)

PARTY INFORMATION

Lead Attorneys Pro Se Defendant Nasby, Brendan James

Plaintiff State of Nevada Steven B Wolfson

702-671-2700(W)

CHARGE INFORMATION

Charges: Nasby, Brendan James Statute Level Date 1. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER. C200.010 01/01/1900 Felony 2. MURDER WITH A DEADLY WEAPON 200.010*165 Felony 01/01/1900

EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT

11/29/1999 | Sentencing (9:00 AM) ()

SENTENCING Court Clerk: TINA HURD Reporter/Recorder: PATSY SMITH Heard By: Mark Gibbons

Minutes

11/29/1999 9:00 AM

Tom Tatten of Parole and Probation present. Mr. Sciscento requested a brief continuance as he received the PSI report late Wednesday afternoon at which time he was out of state; further, he has received additional letters over the weekend. Mr. Sciscento stated he understands there are speakers and suggested a bifurcated hearing, allowing the speakers to speak today and continuing the rest of the sentencing. State objected to bifurcating as the victim's family has travelled a great distance and want to see deft. sentenced so they can have closure; however, he would have no objection to trailing the matter so Mr. Sciscento can go over the PSI report with deft. Colloquy. COURT ORDERED, matter TRAILED until 2:00 p.m. this afternoon. 2:20 P.M.--Matter recalled with all present as before. DEFT. NASBY ADJUDGED GUILTY OF COUNT I - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER (F) and COUNT II - FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON (F). Sworn statements made by victim's grandmother and mother, ELLEN BEAVER-JONES and VELMA BEASLEY, and deft's mother, BRENDA NASBY. Matter argued and submitted. COURT ORDERED, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment fee, deft. is SENTENCED to a MAXIMUM term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the Nevada Department of Prisons for Count I and SENTENCED to LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE plus an equal and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE for use of a

RA 000001

deadly weapon. for Count II, CONSECUTIVE to Count I, with 480 DAYS credit for time served. BOND, if any, EXONERATED. Mr. Sciscento advised deft's visitors have been restricted to his mother, fiancee and child by court order and requested that be lifted. State advised he moved for that when he found all his witnesses were being intimidated and threatened; deft. is obviously not in isolation now or he would not have these new charges for Battery on a Corrections Officer. COURT ORDERED, the Court order restricting visitation is LIFTED and matter is left to the discretion of the jail commander. Mr. Sciscento advised, as to the appeal, he believes there will be a conflict as the Special Public Defender represented one of the co-defts. and requested the Court appoint Mr. Santacroce. State took no position. COURT ORDERED, Mr. Santacroce is APPOINTED to represent deft. Nasby on appeal. Off the record at 3:16 p.m.

Parties Present
Return to Register of Actions

JOC STEWART L. BELL DISTRICT ATTORNEY Nevada Bar #000477 200 S. Third Street Las Vegas, Nevada 89155 (702) 455-4711 Attorney for Plaintiff

FILED

DISTRICT COURT

CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA

7

4

5

6

9

10

11

12 13

14

15 16

17

RECEIVED 27 24

THE STATE OF NEVADA,

-VS-

Plaintiff,

BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, #1517690

Defendant.

C154293 Case No. Dept. No. VII Docket

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION (JURY TRIAL)

WHEREAS, on the 24th day of November, 1998, the Defendant BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes of CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER and MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON, committed on the 17th day of July, 1998, in violation of NRS 199.480, 200.010, 200.030, and the matter having been tried before a jury, and the Defendant being represented by counsel and having been found guilty of the crimes of COUNT I - CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MURDER and COUNT II - FIRST DEGREE MURDER WITH USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON; and

WHEREAS, thereafter, on the 29th day of November, 1999, the Defendant being present in Court with his counsel JOSEPH SCISCENTO, Esq., and FRANK JOHAN COUMOU, Deputy District Attorney also being present; the above entitled Court did adjudge Defendant guilty thereof by reason of said trial and verdict and, in addition to the \$25.00 Administrative Assessment Fee, sentenced Defendant to a MAXIMUM term of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) MONTHS with a MINIMUM parole eligibility of FORTY-EIGHT (48) MONTHS in the

DEC 0 6 1999

RA 000003

22

23

Nevada Department of Prisons for Count I and SENTENCED to LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE plus an equal and CONSECUTIVE term of LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE for use of a deadly weapon. for Count II, CONSECUTIVE to Count I, with 480 DAYS credit for time served.

THEREFORE, the Clerk of the above entitled Court is hereby directed to enter this Judgment of Conviction as part of the record in the above entitled matter.

DATED this _____ day of November, 1999, in the City of Las Vegas, County of Clark, State of Nevada.

DISTRICT JUDGE

DA#98-154293A/msr LVMPD EV#9807170541 CONSP MURD; MWDW-F (TK3)

Electronically Filed 6/29/2020 4:03 PM Steven D. Grierson CLERK OF THE COURT

1 **FCL** STEVEN B. WOLFSON Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565 2 3 TALEEN PANDUKHT Chief Deputy District Attorney 4 Nevada Bar #005734 200 Lewis Avenue 5 Las Vegas, Nevada 89155-2212 (702) 671-2500 6 Attorney for Plaintiff 7 DISTRICT COURT CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA 8 9 BRENDAN JAMES NASBY, #1517690, 10 Petitioner. CASE NO: A-19-788126-W 11 -VS-98C154293-2 12 THE STATE OF NEVADA DEPT NO: XIX13 Respondent. 14 15 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 16 DATE OF HEARING: JUNE 8, 2020 17 TIME OF HEARING: 10:15 AM THIS CAUSE having come on for hearing before the Honorable WILLIAM D. 18 KEPHART, District Judge, on the 8th day of June, 2020, the Petitioner not being present, 19 proceeding in proper person, the Respondent being represented by STEVEN B. WOLFSON, 20 Clark County District Attorney, by and through ANN DUNN, Deputy District Attorney, and 21 the Court having considered the matter, including briefs, transcripts, arguments of counsel, 22 and documents on file herein, now therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact 23 and conclusions of law: 24 /// 25 /// 26 27 ///

\CLARKCOUNTYDA NET\CRMCASE2\1900\1998\349\26\199834926C-FFCO-(NASBY, BRENDAN)-001.DOCX

///

28

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 9, 1998, the State filed an Information charging BRENDAN JAMES NASBY ("Petitioner") with: Count 1 – Conspiracy to Commit Murder; and Count 2 – Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon (Open Murder). Petitioner's jury trial began on October 11, 1999. On October 19, 1999, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts; as to Count 2, the jury returned a guilty verdict for First Degree Murder with use of a Deadly Weapon.

On November 29, 1999, the District Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: Count 1-a maximum of one hundred twenty (120) months to a minimum of forty-eight (48) months in the Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDC"); and Count 2- Life with the possibility of parole, plus an equal and consecutive term of Life with the possibility of parole for the use of a deadly weapon, to run consecutive to Count 1, with four hundred eighty (480) days credit for time served. The Judgment of Conviction was filed on December 2, 1999.

On December 14, 1999, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction on February 7, 2001. <u>Nasby v. State</u>, No. 35319 (Order of Affirmance, Feb. 7, 2001). Remittitur issued on March 6, 2001.

On January 30, 2002, Petitioner filed a Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State filed a Response on April 5, 2002. On March 27, 2006, the Court denied Petitioner's Petition and filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on April 26, 2006. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on April 12, 2006. On June 18, 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the Court's denial of Petitioner's first Petition. See Nasby v. State, No. 47130 (Order of Affirmance, June 28, 2007). Remittitur issued on July 13, 2007.

Petitioner filed his second Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 18, 2011. The State responded on April 8, 2011. The Court denied Petitioner's second Petition as procedurally barred on May 11, 2011. The Court then filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on June 17, 2011. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2011, with the Nevada Supreme Court affirming the decision of the District Court on February

8, 2012, and issuing Remittitur on March 5, 2012. See Nasby v. State, No. 58579 (Order of Affirmance, Feb. 8, 2012).

On December 9, 2014, Petitioner filed his third Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responded on February 4, 2015. This Court denied Petitioner's Petition as procedurally barred on February 25, 2015 and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law was filed on March 30, 2015. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on March 13, 2015. On September 11, 2015, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the Court's denial of Petitioner's third petition as untimely, successive, and an abuse of the writ without a showing of good cause and prejudice.

On April 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge, and Notice and Motion to Attach Supplemental Exhibits on April 21, 2015. The State filed on Opposition on April 28, 2015. On April 28, 2015, the Court filed a written order denying Petitioner's motions. Petitioner appealed this decision and the Nevada Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal on July 8, 2015.

On January 5, 2016, Petitioner filed his fourth Post-Conviction Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, and Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The State filed a Response on February 23, 2016. Petitioner filed a Reply on March 10, 2016. On April 4, 2016, the District Court denied Petitioner's Petition. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law were filed on May 9, 2016. On May 18, 2016, Petitioner filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment N. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The State responded on June 2, 2016. On June 8, 2016, the Court denied Petitioner's Motion. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on June 14, 2016. On July 12, 2017, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Petitioner's fourth Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

On January 26, 2016, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (NRS 34.360 - Constitutional Questions/Questions of Law) in the Eleventh Judicial District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment on seven (7) allegations of trial error. The Eleventh Judicial District Court transferred Petitioner's Petition back to this Court, as this Court has proper jurisdiction

over Petitioner. On April 4, 2017, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The State responded on April 19, 2017. The State Responded to Petitioner's Petition on April 25, 2017. The next day, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. On May 10, 2017, Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response to Petitioner's Petition, and on May 15, 2017, the court denied Petitioner's Petition. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order was filed on June 20, 2017. On June 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On August 14, 2018, the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision; Remittitur issued on November 30, 2018.

On January 11, 2019, Petitioner filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The State responded on March 13, 2019. On March 25, 2019, the District Court denied the Petition as procedurally barred, successive, and an abuse of the Writ process. On April 1, 2019, Petitioner filed a Reply to the State's Response, NRCP 12(f) Motion to Strike; and if Necessary, NRCP 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment". On April 12, 2019, the Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. On May 2, 2019, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. On April 10, 2020, the Nevada Court of Appeals issued its Order of Affirmance.

On February 27, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. On June 4, 2020, Petitioner filed a "Motion for Resolution of Petition Notwithstanding Respondent's Failure to Answer". The Court did not order the State to file a response and denied the Petition on June 8, 2020.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

During its case-in-chief, the State presented overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt. This evidence included testimony that Petitioner had murdered Michael Beasley execution style, that Petitioner made admissions to two (2) different people and that Petitioner voluntarily, and without provocation, led police to the location of the murder weapon within Petitioner's house. Furthermore, the State offered evidence from Petitioner's accomplices to detail the premeditated manner in which the homicide took place.

The State called the three (3) accomplices that joined Petitioner in killing Michael. The first accomplice, Jeremiah Deskin ("Jeremiah"), testified that he knew Petitioner as a member of the gang L.A. Crazy Riders and that Petitioner was the gang leader. Jeremiah told the jury that Tommie Burnside ("Tommie") and his brother Jotee Burnside ("Jotee") were also members of the gang. Jeremiah said that one (1) month prior to the July 16, 1998 killing of Michael, Petitioner met with Jeremiah, Tommie, Jotee and another male gang member to discuss whether Michael should be killed. Jeremiah specifically recalled that Petitioner was soliciting opinions as to whether Michael should be killed because Michael was allegedly trying to take Petitioner's role in the gang. Jeremiah also related that the general consensus from the other gang members at that meeting was that Michael should not be killed.

Jeremiah further testified that on the night of the murder, he was at Petitioner's house when Petitioner called him into the garage. There inside the garage with Tommie, Petitioner told Jeremiah to go pick up Michael so that they could take him to the desert and shoot him. Jeremiah then went with Tommie and Jotee to Michael's residence. Upon returning to Petitioner's home, Petitioner displayed his Browning 9mm handgun that he had purchased from an individual named David. Jeremiah explained that the "plan" was to go to the desert to shoot guns and smoke weed, but that no one had any weed on them.

After driving out into the desert, Jeremiah recalled that he stopped his car near the edge of a wash. Jeremiah told the jury that all five (5) men got out of the car to look amongst the garbage and debris for something to use as a target. He also said that he kept the lights of his car on to illuminate the area. At this time Petitioner asked Jeremiah to move his car closer to the edge to brighten the area of the wash where old refrigerators were strewn about. After he got out of the car, Jeremiah observed Petitioner approach Michael from behind as Michael continued looking into the wash for something to use as a target. From closer than ten (10) feet away, Petitioner then raised the handgun and shot Michael in the upper back. Having never seen Petitioner approach him from behind, Michael grabbed his neck/shoulder area while dropping down onto one (1) knee. Petitioner then stepped forward and fired another shot at Michael's neck/head area which caused Michael to fall forward and roll over onto his back.

Jeremiah testified that Tommie, Jotee and Petitioner then ran back to the car after Petitioner had shot Michael for the second time. Before Jeremiah was able to start the car to leave, Petitioner jumped out, ran over to Michael and shot once more at Michael's head as Michael lay there on his back. Jeremiah recalled that when Petitioner returned to the car, he muttered something like, "Try to take me off my own set" which Jeremiah understood to mean that Petitioner believed Michael was trying to remove Petitioner from the gang.

Jeremiah further testified that on the way back to Las Vegas, Petitioner threatened Jeremiah and the Burnside brothers if any of them spoke of the killing. Jeremiah explained to the jury that he had also been charged in the death of Michael, but agreed to plead to a lesser charge in exchange for his testimony against Petitioner. The Burnside brothers, Tommie and Jotee, testified that they had been at Petitioner's house on the night of the murder and that Petitioner had shot Michael out in the desert. They also explained that they too had been charged with the death of Michael, but had agreed with the State to testify against Petitioner.

Two women next testified for the State -- Tanesha Banks ("Tanesha") and Crystal Bradley ("Crystal"). Tanesha related that she was the mother of Michael's son and had been involved in a three (3) way conversation over the telephone with Crystal and Petitioner on July 17, 1998. Tanesha stated that Petitioner sounded "panicky" when she incorrectly mentioned that she had seen Michael earlier in the morning of July 17, 1998. Tanesha also told the jury that she had been beaten by a friend of Petitioner purportedly because Tanesha had been telling people she believed Petitioner was responsible for Michael's death. Tanesha later explained that once Petitioner had been arrested, she received a threatening call from him when he was being held at the Clark County Detention Center ("CCDC").

Crystal next testified that she had been familiar with Petitioner from the L.A. Crazy Riders gang and that she had stayed in contact with the gang. She also recalled the three (3) way telephone conversation with Tanesha and Petitioner in which Petitioner abruptly told her that he needed to speak with only Crystal. Crystal then testified that during this conversation, Petitioner admitted to murdering Michael, and he planned on attempting to make it look like another gang had committed the killing. Crystal revealed that while she did not believe

Petitioner at first, she later called Secret Witness when she confirmed that Michael was indeed dead.

Brittney Adams ("Brittney") testified that she had talked to Petitioner about Michael's death and that she thought Petitioner was "covering something up." Brittney also said that Petitioner had told her Crystal and Tanesha were involved in Michael's death and that he wanted Brittney to kill Tanesha because Tanesha was blaming him for the death. Brittney explained that she drove over to Tanesha's house with her cousin and Petitioner to get Tanesha's side of the story. Petitioner offered Brittney a hammer to use in the assault of Tanesha telling her, "You can just hit her between the eyes and kill her; just kill her, cuz; just kill her." Brittney told the jury that she refused Petitioner's offer to use the hammer, but did get into a fight with Tanesha while Petitioner remained inside the car. Brittney recalled that when they left Tanesha's house, Petitioner repeatedly said to her, "You should have killed her, cuz, you should have killed her."

Jomeka Beavers ("Jomeka"), Michael's aunt, testified that she was living with Michael on the day he was murdered. She related that Michael had received a telephone call early in the evening on the night he was killed. Michael then asked Jomeka to watch his infant son while he went out with his friends. Jomeka specifically remembered that Michael got into a car with Jeremiah, whom she knew as Woodpecker, but that Charles Damion Von Lewis a.k.a. Sugar Bear was not present.

Dr. Robert Jordan ("Jordan") testified that he performed the autopsy on Michael who had three (3) bullet wounds, two (2) to the chest and one (1) to the head. Jordan explained that the Michael had one entrance wound to the back, one exit wound to the chest and one entrance wound above the left eye. Jordan also testified that the only projectiles he recovered during the autopsy were bullet fragments from Michael's skull.

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department ("LVMPD") homicide detectives James Buczek ("Buczek") and Thomas Thowsen ("Thowsen") testified that they had been the lead investigators into Michael's death. Buczek related that he had developed Petitioner as a suspect in the murder of Michael after he spoke with Tanesha who told him about the three (3) way

telephone conversation she had with Crystal and Petitioner. Buczek confirmed this information by speaking with Crystal and then proceeded to have a search warrant drawn up to search Petitioner's house for evidence. Petitioner was placed under arrest after the execution of the search warrant and was advised of his Miranda rights. As Buczek was transporting him to the police station, Petitioner immediately referred to a 9mm handgun as the murder weapon even though Buczek never told Petitioner what kind of weapon was used to kill Michael. Petitioner also told Buczek that the 9mm handgun was back at his house. LVMPD found the 9mm handgun in a bag under Petitioner's bed. AA Vol. 3, p. 0480. Thowsen testified that he had investigated a September 23, 1998 phone call from CCDC to Tanesha and confirmed that it had come from a phone line within CCDC. Further investigation by Thowsen revealed that two (2) phone calls had been placed from the section of CCDC where Petitioner was being held. The jury then heard from another inmate of CCDC, John Holmes ("Holmes"), who testified that Petitioner had admitted to killing Michael. Holmes stated that Petitioner told him he murdered Michael because Michael was trying to take his leadership spot in the gang.

A number of LVMPD crime scene analysts testified for the State as well. Kelly Neil ("Neil") testified that he recovered four (4) shiny, new-looking shell casings from the crime scene amidst "hundreds" of expended shell casings. Neil also recovered three (3) Winston brand cigarette butts and took photographs of footprints. Neil explained that three (3) of the four (4) shell casings he retrieved were 9mm cartridges. Randall McPhail ("McPhail") testified that he collected evidence from Petitioner's house after the search warrant had been executed. McPhail explained that he recovered a 9mm handgun, took pictures of seven (7) pairs of shoes and collected cigarette butts bearing the brands Kool, Benson & Hedges and a generic brand. A further check on the 9mm handgun revealed that it had been reported stolen from a residence in North Las Vegas.

Fred Boyd ("Boyd") next testified that he had run fingerprint analysis on the recovered shell casings and 9mm handgun, but was unable to get any tangible latent prints. Boyd also explained that he could not find a match amongst the photographs of footprint impression at the crime scene and the photographs of the seven (7) pairs of shoes from Petitioner's house.

Firearms expert Torrey Johnson ("Johnson") testified that he conducted a test fire on the 9mm handgun recovered from Petitioner's house and that the shell casings discovered at the crime scene were three (3) 9mm casings and one (1) .45 casing. Johnson also told the jury that while he could not positively find that the shell casings had been fired from the 9mm handgun seized at Petitioner's house, the casings bore marks consistent with that conclusion. Moreover, Johnson explained that based on the assumption that the coroner removed bullet fragments from Michael's skull which were the resulting cause of death, the 9mm handgun examined by Jordan was the murder weapon.

ANALYSIS

I. PETITIONER'S SEVENTH PETITION IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED

This Court FINDS that the instant Petition is time-barred, successive, and subject to the mandatory procedural bars.

A. The Procedural Bars are Mandatory

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that "[a]pplication of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is *mandatory*," noting:

Habeas corpus petitions that are filed many years after conviction are an unreasonable burden on the criminal justice system. The necessity for a workable system dictates that there must exist a time when a criminal conviction is final.

State v. Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 112 P.3d 1070 (2005) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that procedural bars "cannot be ignored [by the district court] when properly raised by the State." <u>Id.</u> at 233, 112 P.3d at 1075. The Nevada Supreme Court has granted no discretion to the district courts regarding whether to apply the statutory procedural bars; the rules must be applied. For the reasons discussed below, this Court finds Petitioner's Petition is denied.

B. Petitioner's Petition is Time Barred

The mandatory provision of NRS 34.726(1) states:

Unless there is good cause shown for delay, a petition that challenges the validity of a judgment or sentence must be filed

within 1 year after entry of the judgment of conviction or, if an appeal has been taken from the judgment, within 1 year after the Supreme Court issues its remittitur. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause for delay exists if the petitioner demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court:

(emphasis added). "[T]he statutory rules regarding procedural default are mandatory and cannot be ignored when properly raised by the State." <u>State v. Dist. Court (Riker)</u>, 121 Nev. 225, 233, 112 P.3d 1070, 1075 (2005).

Accordingly, the one-year time bar prescribed by NRS 34.726 begins to run from the date the judgment of conviction is filed or a remittitur from a timely direct appeal is filed. Dickerson v. State, 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1133-34 (1998); see Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 873, 34 P.3d 519, 528 (2001) (holding that NRS 34.726 should be construed by its plain meaning).

In Gonzales v. State, 118 Nev. 590, 593, 590 P.3d 901, 902 (2002), the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the rejection of a habeas petition that was filed two days late, pursuant to the "clear and unambiguous" mandatory provisions of NRS 34.726(1). Gonzales reiterated the importance of filing the petition with the District Court within the one-year mandate, absent a showing of "good cause" for the delay in filing. Gonzales, 590 P.3d at 902. The one-year time bar is therefore strictly construed. In contrast with the short amount of time to file a notice of appeal, a prisoner has an ample full year to file a post-conviction habeas petition, so there is no injustice in a strict application of NRS 34.726(1), despite any alleged difficulties with the postal system. Gonzales, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 903.

Petitioner's Judgment of Conviction was filed on December 2, 1999. He filed a Notice of Appeal on December 14, 1999, and the Nevada Supreme Court issued its remittitur on March 6, 2001. Accordingly, Petitioner had until approximately March 6, 2002, to file a post-conviction petition. The instant motion was not filed until February 27, 2020, more than eighteen (18) years later. Therefore, absent a showing of good cause, Petitioner's motion is denied as time-barred pursuant to NRS 34.726(1). NRS 34.726 can only be overcome upon a showing of good cause and prejudice or actual innocence, which Petitioner failed to

demonstrate as stated below. Accordingly, this Court finds Petitioner's Petition must be denied.

C. Petitioner's Petition is Successive and an Abuse of the Writ

Petitioner's instant petition is dismissed pursuant to NRS 34.810 as it is successive and an abuse of the writ. NRS 34.810 provides in pertinent part that:

> A second or successive petition must be dismissed if the judge or justice determines that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and that the prior determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge or justice finds that the failure of the Defendant to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.

> 3. Pursuant to subsections 1 and 2, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate:
>
> (a) Good cause for the petitioner's failure to present the

claim or for presenting the claim again; and

(b) Actual prejudice to the petitioner.

Petitioner filed six (6) previous Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Post-Conviction) on January 30, 2002, February 18, 2011, December 9, 2014, January 5, 2016, January 26, 2016, and January 11, 2019. Each petition was duly considered and denied by the Court. Consequently, the instant petition filed on February 27, 2020, is a successive petition. Moreover, Petitioner raises similar claims as raised before. See e.g., Nasby v. State, No. 80443-COA (Order of Affirmance and Denying Petition, Apr. 10, 2020); Nasby v. State, No. 70626 (Order of Affirmance, Jul. 12, 2017). As such, the instant petition is also an abuse of the writ. See also Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 888, 34 P.3d 519, 538 (2001); Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975).

To avoid the procedural default under NRS 34.810, Petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate both good cause for his failure to present his claim in a timely manner and actual prejudice, which Petitioner fails to demonstrate. NRS 34.810(3); Hogan v. Warden, 109 Nev. 952, 959-60, 860 P.2d 710, 715-16 (1993); Phelps v. Director, 104 Nev. 656, 659, 764 P.2d 1303, 1305 (1988). Thus, this Court finds the instant Petition is denied.

///

24

25

26

27

28

II. PETITIONER CANNOT ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE TO OVERCOME THE PROCEDURAL BARS

To avoid procedural default under NRS 34.726 or NRS 34.800, a defendant has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause for his failure to present his claim in earlier proceedings or comply with the statutory requirements. See Hogan, 109 Nev. at 959-60, 860 P.2d at 715-16; Phelps, 104 Nev. at 659, 764 P.2d at 1305.

"To establish good cause, appellants *must* show that an impediment external to the defense prevented their compliance with the applicable procedural rule." Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 621, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (emphasis added); see Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 251, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003); Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34 P.3d at 537. Such an external impediment could be "that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or that 'some interference by officials' made compliance impracticable." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986)); see also Gonzalez, 118 Nev. at 595, 53 P.3d at 904 (citing Harris v. Warden, 114 Nev. 956, 959-60 n.4, 964 P.2d 785 n.4 (1998)). Any delay in filing of the petition must not be the fault of the petitioner. NRS 34.726(1)(a).

The Nevada Supreme Court has clarified that a defendant cannot attempt to manufacture good cause. Clem, 119 Nev. at 621, 81 P.3d at 526. To find good cause there must be a "substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse." Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 251, 71 P.3d at 506. Excuses such as the lack of assistance of counsel when preparing a petition, as well as the failure of trial counsel to forward a copy of the file to a petitioner have been found not to constitute good cause. See Phelps, 104 Nev. at 660, 764 P.2d at 1306, superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Nika v. State, 120 Nev. 600, 607, 97 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2004); Hood v. State, 111 Nev. 335, 890 P.2d 797 (1995). Moreover, a return to state court to exhaust remedies for federal habeas is not good cause to overcome state procedural bars. Colley v. State, 105 Nev. 235, 236, 773 P.2d 1229, 1230 (1989).

Finally, claims asserted in a petition for post-conviction relief must be supported with specific factual allegations, which if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. <u>Hargrove v. State</u>, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). "Bare" and "naked" allegations are not sufficient, nor are those belied and repelled by the record. Id.

Petitioner failed to assert any good cause for his procedural default. Instead, he argued, as discussed, supra, that the procedural bars do not apply to him. For the reasons discussed, said procedural bars are mandatory. Moreover, Petitioner could and should have previously raised these issues in an earlier petition. As such, Petitioner failed to establish an impediment external to the defense and therefore does not constitute good cause to overcome the procedural bars. Phelps v. Director, Nevada Department of Prisons, 104 Nev. 656, 764 P.2d 1303 (1988). Accordingly, Petitioner cannot demonstrate good cause and this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.

III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NRS 193.050(3) AND NRS 200.030(1)(A)

Petitioner argued that the statutes he was imprisoned under are unconstitutional; therefore, he is actually innocent. Petition at 20, 23. Specifically, Petitioner claims NRS 193.050(3) is unconstitutional as an "invalid delegation of legislative powers and abdication of legislative duties" and NRS 200.030(1)(a) is "void-for-vagueness" since the statute does not define "willful, deliberate, and premeditated". Petition at 23-26. This Court declines to issue any determination that NRS 193.050(3) and NRS 200.030(1)(a) are unconstitutional.

To the extent that similar arguments have been raised regarding the constitutionality of NRS 200.030(1)(a), said claims are barred pursuant to the Law of the Case Doctrine. Under the law of the case doctrine, an issue that has already been decided on the merits by the Nevada Supreme Court is law of the case and the holding will not be revisited in a habeas petition. "The law of a first appeal is law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same." Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315, 535 P.2d 797, 798 (1975) (quoting Walker v. State, 85 Nev. 337, 343, 455 P.2d 34, 38 (1969)). The law of the case doctrine may not be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument made after reflection upon previous proceedings. Id. at 316, 535 P.2d at 798-99; See Nasby v. State, No. 80443-COA

1	(Order of Affirmance and Denying Petition, Apr. 10, 2020); Nasby v. State, No. 70626 (Order	
2	of Affirmance, Jul. 12, 2017).	
3	ORDER	
4	THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief	
5	shall be, and it is, hereby denied.	
6	DATED this 29th day of June, 2020.	
7	Will Kyst	
9	STEVEN B. WOLFSON	
10	Clark County District Attorney Nevada Bar #001565	
11	BY /s/TALEEN PANDUKHT	
12	TALEEN PANDUKHT	
13	Chief Deputy District Attorney Nevada Bar #005734	
14		
15	CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
16	I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing was made this 29th day of June,	
17	2020, by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to:	
18		
19 20	BRENDAN NASBY #63618 LOVELOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTER 1200 Prison Road	
21	Lovelock, NV 89419	
22	DV /-/D D : 1	
23	BY <u>/s/D. Daniels</u> Secretary for the District Attorney's Office	
24		
25		
26		
27	98F11168A/TP/SW-Appeals/dd-MVU	
28	John Thiografilia w-Appeals/dd-wrv U	
	1 /	